Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence


Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2012 > September 2012 Decisions > G.R. Nos. 154470-71 : Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, et al./Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Planters Develoment Bank:




G.R. Nos. 154470-71 : Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, et al./Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Planters Develoment Bank

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 154470-71 : September 24, 2012

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Respondent.

G.R. Nos. 154589-90

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45,1ςrνll on pure questions of law, filed by the petitioners Bank of Commerce (BOC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). They assail the January 10, 2002 and July 23, 2002 Orders (assailed orders) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case Nos. 94-3233 and 94-3254. These orders dismissed (i) the petition filed by the Planters Development Bank (PDB), (ii) the "counterclaim" filed by the BOC, and (iii) the counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader filed bythe BSP; and denied the BOCs and the BSPs motions for reconsideration.

THE ANTECEDENTS

The Central Bank bills

I. First set of CB bills

The Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of seven Central Bank (CB) bills with a total face value of P 70 million, issued on January 2, 1994 and would mature on January 2, 1995.2ςrνll As evidenced by a "Detached Assignment" dated April 8, 1994,3ςrνll the RCBC sold these CB bills to the BOC.4ςrνll As evidenced by another "Detached Assignment"5ςrνll of even date, the BOC, in turn, sold these CB bills to the PDB.6ςrνll The BOC delivered the Detached Assignments to the PDB.7ςrνll

On April 15, 1994 (April 15 transaction), the PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth P 70 million, with maturity date of June 29, 1994, as evidenced by a Trading Order8ςrνll and a Confirmation of Sale.9ςrνll However, instead of delivering the Treasury Bills, the PDB delivered the seven CB bills to the BOC, as evidenced by a PDB Security Delivery Receipt, bearing a "note: ** substitution in lieu of 06-29-94" referring to the Treasury Bills.10ςrνll Nevertheless, the PDB retained possession of the Detached Assignments. It is basically the nature of this April 15 transaction that the PDB and the BOC cannot agree on.

The transfer of the first set of seven CB bills

i. CB bill nos. 45351-53

On April 20, 1994, according to the BOC, it "sold back"11ςrνll to the PDB three of the seven CB bills. In turn, the PDB transferred these three CB bills to Bancapital Development Corporation (Bancap). On April 25, 1994, the BOC bought the three CB bills from Bancap so, ultimately, the BOC reacquired these three CB bills,12ςrνll particularly described as follows:

Serial No.: 2BB XM 045351
2BB XM 045352
2BB XM 045353
Quantity: Three (3)
Denomination: Php 10 million
Total Face Value: Php 30 million

ii. CB bill nos. 45347-50

On April 20, 1994, the BOC sold the remaining four (4) CB bills to Capital One Equities Corporation13ςrνll which transferred them to All-Asia Capital and Trust Corporation (All Asia). On September 30, 1994, All Asia further transferred the four CB bills back to the RCBC.14ςrνll

On November 16, 1994, the RCBC sold back to All Asia one of these 4 CB bills. When the BSP refused to release the amount of this CB bill on maturity, the BOC purchased from All Asia this lone CB bill,15ςrνll particularly described as follows:16ςrνll

Serial No.: 2BB XM 045348
Quantity: One (1)
Denomination: Php 10 million
Total Face Value: Php 10 million

As the registered owner of the remaining three CB bills, the RCBC sold them to IVI Capital and Insular Savings Bank. Again, when the BSP refused to release the amount of this CB bill on maturity, the RCBC paid back its transferees, reacquired these three CB bills and sold them to the BOC ultimately, the BOC acquired these three CB bills.

All in all, the BOC acquired the first set of seven CB bills.

II. Second set of CB bills

On April 19, 1994, the RCBC, as registered owner, (i) sold two CB bills with a total face value of P 20 million to the PDB and (ii) delivered to the PDB the corresponding Detached Assignment.17ςrνll The two CB bills were particularly described as follows:

Serial No.: BB XM 045373
BB XM 045374
Issue date: January 3, 1994
Maturity date: January 2, 1995
Denomination: Php 10 million
Total Face value: Php 20 million

On even date, the PDB delivered to Bancap the two CB bills18ςrνll (April 19 transaction). In turn, Bancap sold the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines, which in turn sold it to the BOC.19ςrνll

PDBs move against the transfer of
the first and second sets of CB bills

On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB informed20ςrνll the Officer-in-Charge of the BSPs Government Securities Department,21ςrνll Lagrimas Nuqui, of the PDBs claim over these CB bills, based on the Detached Assignments in its possession. The PDB requested the BSP22ςrνll to record its claim in the BSPs books, explaining that its non-possession of the CB bills is "on account of imperfect negotiations thereof and/or subsequent setoff or transfer."23ςrνll

Nuqui denied the request, invoking Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28 (Regulations Governing Open Market Operations, Stabilization of the Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and Redemption of the Public Debt)24ςrνll which requires the presentation of the bond before a registered bond may be transferred on the books of the BSP.25ςrνll

In a July 25, 1994 letter, the PDB clarified to Nuqui that it was not "asking for the transfer of the CB Bills. rather it intends to put the BSP on formal notice that whoever is in possession of said bills is not a holder in due course," and, therefore the BSP should not make payment upon the presentation of the CB bills on maturity.26ςrνll Nuqui responded that the BSP was "not in a position at that point in time to determine who is and who is not the holder in due course since it is not privy to all acts and time involving the transfers or negotiation" of the CB bills. Nuqui added that the BSPs action shall be governed by CB Circular No. 28, as amended.27ςrνll

On November 17, 1994, the PDB also asked BSP Deputy Governor Edgardo Zialcita that (i) a notation in the BSPs books be made against the transfer, exchange, or payment of the bonds and the payment of interest thereon; and (ii) the presenter of the bonds upon maturity be required to submit proof as a holder in due course (of the first set of CB bills). The PDB relied on Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28.28ςrνll This provision reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(4) Assignments effected by fraud Where the assignment of a registered bond is secured by fraudulent representations, the Central Bank can grant no relief if the assignment has been honored without notice of fraud. Otherwise, the Central Bank, upon receipt of notice that the assignment is claimed to have been secured by fraudulent representations, or payment of the bond the payment of interest thereon, and when the bond is presented, will call upon the owner and the person presenting the bond to substantiate their respective claims.If it then appears that the person presenting the bond stands in the position of bonafide holder for value, the Central Bank, after giving the owner an opportunity to assert his claim, will pass the bond for transfer, exchange or payments, as the case may be, without further question.

In a December 29, 1994 letter, Nuqui again denied the request, reiterating the BSPs previous stand.

In light of these BSP responses and the impending maturity of the CB bills, the PDB filed29ςrνll with the RTC two separate petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3233 (covering the first set of CB bills) and Civil Case 94-3254 (covering the second set of CB bills) against Nuqui, the BSP and the RCBC.30ςrνll

The PDB essentially claims that in both the April 15 transaction (involving the first set of CB bills) and the April 19 transaction (involving the second set of CB bills), there was no intent on its part to transfer title of the CB bills, as shown by its non-issuance of a detached assignment in favor of the BOC and Bancap, respectively. The PDB particularly alleges that it merely "warehoused"31ςrνll the first set of CB bills with the BOC, as security collateral.

On December 28, 1994, the RTC temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the BSP from paying the face value of the CB bills on maturity.32ςrνll On January 10, 1995, the PDB filed an Amended Petition, additionally impleading the BOC and All Asia.33ςrνll In a January 13, 1995 Order, the cases were consolidated.34ςrνll On January 17, 1995, the RTC granted the PDBs application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.35ςrνll In both petitions, the PDB identically prayed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed x x x that, after due notice and hearing, the Writs of Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction, be issued; (i) commanding the BSP and Nuqui, or whoever may take her place -

(a) to record forthwith in the books of BSP the claim of x x x PDB on the [two sets of] CB Bills in accordance with Section 10 (d) (4) of revised C.B. Circular No. 28; and

(b) also pursuant thereto, when the bills are presented on maturity date for payment, to call (i) x x x PDB, (ii) x x x RCBC x x x, (iii) x x x BOC x x x, and (iv) x x x ALL-ASIA x x x; or whoever will present the [first and second sets of] CB Bills for payment, to submit proof as to who stands as the holder in due course of said bills, and, thereafter, act accordingly;

and (ii) ordering the BSP and Nuqui to pay jointly and severally to x x x PDB the following:

(a) the sum of P 100,000.00, as and for exemplary damages;

(b) the sum of at least P 500,000.00, or such amount as shall be proved at the trial, as and for attorneys fees;

(c) the legal rate of interest from the filing of this Petition until full payment of the sums mentioned in this Petition; and

(d) the costs of suit.36ςrνll

After the petitions were filed, the BOC acquired/reacquired all the nine CB bills the first and second sets of CB bills (collectively, subject CB bills).

Defenses of the BSP and of the BOC37ςrνll

The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the petition. It argued that the PDB has no cause of action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. Contrary to the PDBs "warehousing theory,"38ςrνll the BOC asserted that the (i) April 15 transaction and the (ii) April 19 transaction covering both sets of CB bills - were valid contracts of sale, followed by a transfer of title (i) to the BOC (in the April 15 transaction) upon the PDBs delivery of the 1st set of CB bills in substitution of the Treasury Bills the PDB originally intended to sell, and (ii) to Bancap (in the April 19 transaction) upon the PDBs delivery of the 2nd set of CB bills to Bancap, likewise by way of substitution.

The BOC adds that Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 cannot apply to the PDBs case because (i) the PDB is not in possession of the CB bills and (ii) the BOC acquired these bills from the PDB, as to the 1st set of CB bills, and from Bancap, as to the 2nd set of CB bills, in good faith and for value. The BOC also asserted a compulsory counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees.

On the other hand, the BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 because this section applies only to an "owner" and a "person presenting the bond," of which the PDB is neither. The PDB has not presented to the BSP any assignment of the subject CB bills, duly recorded in the BSPs books, in its favor to clothe it with the status of an "owner."39ςrνll According to the BSP

Section 10 d. (4) applies only to a registered bond which is assigned. And the issuance of CB Bills x x x are required to be recorded/registered in BSPs books. In this regard, Section 4 a. (1) of CB Circular 28 provides that registered bonds "may be transferred only by an assignment thereon duly executed by the registered owner or his duly authorized representative x x x and duly recorded on the books of the Central Bank."

x x x x

The alleged assignment of subject CB Bills in PDBs favor is not recorded/registered in BSPs books.40ςrνll (underscoring supplied)

Consequently, when Nuqui and the BSP refused the PDBs request (to record its claim), they were merely performing their duties in accordance with CB Circular No. 28.

Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the subject CB bills face value, it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the rightful owner. The BSP prayed that judgment be rendered:

a. Ordering the dismissal of the PDBs petition for lack of merit;

b. Determining which between/among [PDB] and the other claimants is/are lawfully entitled to the ownership of the subject CB bills and the proceeds thereof;

c. x x x;

d. Ordering PDB to pay BSP and Nuqui such actual/compensatory and exemplary damages as the RTC may deem warranted; and

e. Ordering PDB to pay Nuqui moral damages and to pay the costs of the suit.41ςrνll

Subsequent events

The PDB agreed with the BSPs alternative response for an interpleader

4. PDB agrees that the various claimants should now interplead and substantiate their respective claims on the subject CB bills. However, the total face value of the subject CB bills should be deposited in escrow with a private bank to be disposed of only upon order of the RTC.42ςrνll

Accordingly, on June 9, 199543ςrνll and August 4, 1995,44ςrνll the BOC and the PDB entered into two separate Escrow Agreements.45ςrνll The first agreement covered the first set of CB bills, while the second agreement covered the second set of CB bills. The parties agreed to jointly collect from the BSP the maturity proceeds of these CB bills and to deposit said amount in escrow, "pending final determination by Court judgment, or amicable settlement as to who shall be eventually entitled thereto."46ςrνll The BOC and the PDB filed a Joint Motion,47ςrνll submitting these Escrow Agreements for court approval. The RTC gave its approval to the parties Joint Motion.48ςrνll Accordingly, the BSP released the maturity proceeds of the CB bills by crediting the Demand Deposit Account of the PDB and of the BOC with 50% each of the maturity proceeds of the amount in escrow.49ςrνll

In view of the BOCs acquisition of all the CB bills, All Asia50ςrνll moved to be dropped as a respondent (with the PDBs conformity51ςrνll ), which the RTC granted.52ςrνll The RCBC subsequently followed suit.53ςrνll

In light of the developments, on May 4, 1998, the RTC required the parties to manifest their intention regarding the case and to inform the court of any amicable settlement; "otherwise, th[e] case shall be dismissed for lack of interest."54ςrνll Complying with the RTCs order, the BOC moved (i) that the case be set for pre-trial and (ii) for further proceeding to resolve the remaining issues between the BOC and the PDB, particularly on "who has a better right over the subject CB bills."55ςrνll The PDB joined the BOC in its motion.56ςrνll

On September 28, 2000, the RTC granted the BSPs motion to interplead and, accordingly, required the BOC to amend its Answer and for the conflicting claimants to comment thereon.57ςrνll In October 2000, the BOC filed its Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, reiterating its earlier arguments asserting ownership over the subject CB bills.58ςrνll

In the alternative, the BOC added that even assuming that there was no effective transfer of the nine CB bills ultimately to the BOC, the PDB remains obligated to deliver to the BOC, as buyer in the April 15 transaction and ultimate successor-in-interest of the buyer (Bancap) in the April 19 transaction, either the original subjects of the sales or the value thereof, plus whatever income that may have been earned during the pendency of the case.59ςrνll

That BOC prayed:

1. To declare BOC as the rightful owner of the nine (9) CB bills and as the party entitled to the proceeds thereof as well as all income earned pursuant to the two (2) Escrow Agreements entered into by BOC and PDB.

2. In the alternative, ordering PDB to deliver the original subject of the sales transactions or the value thereof and whatever income earned by way of interest at prevailing rate.

Without any opposition or objection from the PDB, on February 23, 2001, the RTC admitted60ςrνll the BOCs Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims.

In May 2001, the PDB filed an Omnibus Motion,61ςrνll questioning the RTCs jurisdiction over the BOCs "additional counterclaims." The PDB argues that its petitions pray for the BSP (not the RTC) to determine who among the conflicting claimants to the CB bills stands in the position of the bona fide holder for value. The RTC cannot entertain the BOCs counterclaim, regardless of its nature, because it is the BSP which has jurisdiction to determine who is entitled to receive the proceeds of the CB bills.

The BOC opposed62ςrνll the PDBs Omnibus Motion. The PDB filed its Reply.63ςrνll

In a January 10, 2002 Order, the RTC dismissed the PDBs petition, the BOCs counterclaim and the BSPs counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader, holding that under CB Circular No. 28, it has no jurisdiction (i) over the BOCs "counterclaims" and (ii) to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills.64ςrνll With the denial of their separate motions for Reconsideration,65ςrνll the BOC and the BSP separately filed the present petitions for review on certiorari.66ςrνll

THE BOCS and THE BSPS PETITIONS

The BOC argues that the present cases do not fall within the limited provision of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28, which contemplates only of three situations: first, where the fraudulent assignment is not coupled with a notice to the BSP, it can grant no relief; second, where the fraudulent assignment is coupled with a notice of fraud to the BSP, it will make a notation against the assignment and require the owner and the holder to substantiate their claims; and third, where the case does not fall on either of the first two situations, the BSP will have to await action on the assignment pending settlement of the case, whether by agreement or by court order.

The PDBs case cannot fall under the first two situations. With particular regard to the second situation, CB Circular No. 28 requires that the conflict must be between an "owner" and a "holder," for the BSP to exercise its limited jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims; and the word "owner" here refers to the registered owner giving notice of the fraud to the BSP. The PDB, however, is not the registered owner nor is it in possession (holder) of the CB bills.67ςrνll Consequently, the PDBs case can only falls under the third situation which leaves the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, with the authority to resolve the issue of ownership of a registered bond (the CB bills) not falling in either of the first two situations.

The BOC asserts that the policy consideration supportive of its interpretation of CB Circular No. 28 is to have a reliable system to protect the registered owner; should he file a notice with the BSP about a fraudulent assignment of certain CB bills, the BSP simply has to look at its books to determine who is the owner of the CB bills fraudulently assigned. Since it is only the registered owner who complied with the BSPs requirement of recording an assignment in the BSPs books, then "the protective mantle of administrative proceedings" should necessarily benefit him only, without extending the same benefit to those who chose to ignore the Circulars requirement, like the PDB.68ςrνll

Assuming arguendo that the PDBs case falls under the second situation i.e., the BSP has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills the more recent CB Circular No. 769-80 (Rules and Regulations Governing Central Bank Certificates of Indebtedness) already superseded CB Circular No. 28, and, in particular, effectively amended Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28. The pertinent provisions of CB Circular No. 769-80 read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Assignment Affected by Fraud. Any assignment for transfer of ownership of registered certificate obtained through fraudulent representation if honored by the Central Bank or any of its authorized service agencies shall not make the Central Bank or agency liable therefore unless it has previous formal notice of the fraud. The Central Bank, upon notice under oath that the assignment was secured through fraudulent means, shall immediately issue and circularize a "stop order" against the transfer, exchange, redemption of the Certificate including the payment of interest coupons. The Central Bank or service agency concerned shall continue to withhold action on the certificate until such time that the conflicting claims have been finally settled either by amicable settlement between the parties or by order of the Court.

Unlike CB Circular No. 28, CB Circular No. 769-80 limited the BSPs authority to the mere issuance and circularization of a "stop order" against the transfer, exchange and redemption upon sworn notice of a fraudulent assignment. Under this Circular, the BSP shall only continue to withhold action until the dispute is ended by an amicable settlement or by judicial determination. Given the more passive stance of the BSP the very agency tasked to enforce the circulars involved - under CB Circular No. 769-80, the RTCs dismissal of the BOCs counterclaims is palpably erroneous.

Lastly, since Nuquis office (Government Securities Department) had already been abolished,69ςrνll it can no longer adjudicate the dispute under the second situation covered by CB Circular No. 28. The abolition of Nuquis office is not only consistent with the BSPs Charter but, more importantly, with CB Circular No. 769-80, which removed the BSPs adjudicative authority over fraudulent assignments.

THE PDBS COMMENT

The PDB claims that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint/petition and not by the defenses set up in the answer.70ςrνll In filing the petition with the RTC, the PDB merely seeks to compel the BSP to determine, pursuant to CB Circular No. 28, the party legally entitled to the proceeds of the subject CB bills, which, as the PDB alleged, have been transferred through fraudulent representations an allegation which properly recognized the BSPs jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of ownership over the CB bills.

The PDB adds that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts should refrain from determining a controversy involving a question whose resolution demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the present case, the BSPs special knowledge and experience in resolving disputes on securities, whose assignment and trading are governed by the BSPs rules, should be upheld.

The PDB counters that the BOCs tri-fold interpretation of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 sanctions split jurisdiction which is not favored;but even this tri-fold interpretation which, in the second situation, limits the meaning of the "owner" to the registered owner is flawed. Section 10 (d) 4 aims to protect not just the registered owner but anyone who has been deprived of his bond by fraudulent representation in order to deter fraud in the secondary trading of government securities.

The PDB asserts that the existence of CB Circular No. 769-80 or the abolition of Nuquis office does not result in depriving the BSP of its jurisdiction: first, CB Circular No. 769-80 expressly provides that CB Circular No. 28 shall have suppletory application to CB Circular No. 769-80; and second, the BSP can always designate an office to resolve the PDBs claim over the CB bills.

Lastly, the PDB argues that even assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills, the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over the BOCs so-called "compulsory" counterclaims (which in truth is merely "permissive") because of the BOCs failure to pay the appropriate docket fees. These counterclaims should, therefore, be dismissed and expunged from the record.

THE COURTS RULING

We grant the petitions.

At the outset, we note that the parties have not raised the validity of either CB Circular No. 28 or CB Circular No. 769-80 as an issue. What the parties largely contest is the applicable circular in case of an allegedly fraudulently assigned CB bill. The applicable circular, in turn, is determinative of the proper remedy available to the PDB and/or the BOC as claimants to the proceeds of the subject CB bills.

Indisputably, at the time the PDB supposedly invoked the jurisdiction of the BSP in 1994 (by requesting for the annotation of its claim over the subject CB bills in the BSPs books), CB Circular No. 769-80 has long been in effect. Therefore, the parties respective interpretations of the provision of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 do not have any significance unless it is first established that that Circular governs the resolution of their conflicting claims of ownership. This conclusion is important, given the supposed repeal or modification of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 by the following provisions of CB Circular No. 769-80:

ARTICLE XI
SUPPLEMENTAL RULES

Section 1. Central Bank Circular No. 28 The provisions of Central Bank Circular No. 28 shall have suppletory application to matters not specially covered by these Rules.

ARTICLE XII
EFFECTIVITY

Effectivity The rules and regulations herein prescribed shall take effect upon approval by the Monetary Board, Central Bank of the Philippines, and all circulars, memoranda, or office orders inconsistent herewith are revoked or modified accordingly. (Emphases added)

We agree with the PDB that in view of CB Circular No. 28s suppletory application, an attempt to harmonize the apparently conflicting provisions is a prerequisite before one may possibly conclude that an amendment or a repeal exists.71ςrνll Interestingly, however, even the PDB itself failed to submit an interpretation based on its own position of harmonization.

The repealing clause of CB Circular No. 769-80 obviously did not expressly repeal CB Circular No. 28; in fact, it even provided for the suppletory application of CB Circular No. 28 on "matters not specially covered by" CB Circular No. 769-80. While no express repeal exists, the intent of CB Circular No. 769-80 to operate as an implied repeal,72ςrνll or at least to amend earlier CB circulars, is supported by its text "revoking" or "modif[ying" "all circulars" which are inconsistent with its terms.

At the outset, we stress that none of the parties disputes that the subject CB bills fall within the category of a certificate or evidence of indebtedness and that these were issued by the Central Bank, now the BSP. Thus, even without resorting to statutory construction aids, matters involving the subject CB bills should necessarily be governed by CB Circular No. 769-80. Even granting, however, that reliance on CB Circular No. 769-80 alone is not enough, we find that CB Circular No. 769-80 impliedly repeals CB Circular No. 28.

An implied repeal transpires when a substantial conflict exists between the new and the prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old laws.73ςrνll Repeal by implication is not favored, unless manifestly intended by the legislature, or unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated, that the laws or orders are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent with one another so that they cannot co-exist; the legislature is presumed to know the existing law and would express a repeal if one is intended.74ςrνll

There are two instances of implied repeal. One takes place when the provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, in which case, the later act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The other occurs when the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute; thus, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.75ςrνll

A general reading of the two circulars shows that the second instance of implied repeal is present in this case. CB Circular No. 28, entitled "Regulations Governing Open Market Operations, Stabilization of Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and Redemption of Public Debt," is a regulation governing the servicing and redemption of public debt, including the issue, inscription, registration, transfer, payment and replacement of bonds and securities representing the public debt.76ςrνll On the other hand, CB Circular No. 769-80, entitled "Rules and Regulations Governing Central Bank Certificate of Indebtedness," is the governing regulation on matters77ςrνll (i) involving certificate of indebtedness78ςrνll issued by the Central Bank itself and (ii) which are similarly covered by CB Circular No. 28.

The CB Monetary Board issued CB Circular No. 28 to regulate the servicing and redemption of public debt, pursuant to Section 124 (now Section 119 of Republic Act R.A. No. 7653) of the old Central Bank law79ςrνll which provides that "the servicing and redemption of the public debt shall also be effected through the Bangko Sentral." However, even as R.A. No. 7653 continued to recognize this role by the BSP, the law required a phase-out of all fiscal agency functions by the BSP, including Section 119 of R.A. No. 7653.

In other words, even if CB Circular No. 28 applies broadly to both government-issued bonds and securities and Central Bank-issued evidence of indebtedness, given the present state of law, CB Circular No. 28 and CB Circular No. 769-80 now operate on the same subject Central Bank-issued evidence of indebtedness. Under Section 1, Article XI of CB Circular No. 769-80, the continued relevance and application of CB Circular No. 28 would depend on the need to supplement any deficiency or silence in CB Circular No. 769-80 on a particular matter.

In the present case, both CB Circular No. 28 and CB Circular No. 769-80 provide the BSP with a course of action in case of an allegedly fraudulently assigned certificate of indebtedness. Under CB Circular No. 28, in case of fraudulent assignments, the BSP would have to "call upon the owner and the person presenting the bond to substantiate their respective claims" and, from there, determine who has a better right over the registered bond. On the other hand, under CB Circular No. 769-80, the BSP shall merely "issue and circularize a stop order against the transfer, exchange, redemption of the [registered] certificate" without any adjudicative function (which is the precise root of the present controversy). As the two circulars stand, the patent irreconcilability of these two provisions does not require elaboration. Section 5, Article V of CB Circular No. 769-80 inescapably repealed Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28.

The issue of BSPs jurisdiction, lay hidden

On that note, the Court could have written finis to the present controversy by simply sustaining the BSPs hands-off approach to the PDBs problem under CB Circular No. 769-80. However, the jurisdictional provision of CB Circular No. 769-80 itself, in relation to CB Circular No. 28, on the matter of fraudulent assignment, has given rise to a question of jurisdiction - the core question of law involved in these petitions - which the Court cannot just treat sub-silencio.

Broadly speaking, jurisdiction is the legal power or authority to hear and determine a cause.80ςrνll In the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power, it refers to the authority of a court to hear and decide a case.81ςrνll In the context of these petitions, we hark back to the basic principles governing the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

First, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined only by the Constitution and by law.82ςrνll As a matter of substantive law, procedural rules alone can confer no jurisdiction to courts or administrative agencies.83ςrνll In fact, an administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such powers that are specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. In contrast, an RTC is a court of general jurisdiction, i.e., it has jurisdiction over cases whose subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.84ςrνll

Second, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined not by the pleas set up by the defendant in his answer85ςrνll but by the allegations in the complaint,86ςrνll irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to favorable judgment on the basis of his assertions.87ςrνll The reason is that the complaint is supposed to contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.88ςrνll

Third, jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint.89ςrνll

Parenthetically, the Court observes that none of the parties ever raised the issue of whether the BSP can simply disown its jurisdiction, assuming it has, by the simple expedient of promulgating a new circular (specially applicable to a certificate of indebtedness issued by the BSP itself), inconsistent with an old circular, assertive of its limited jurisdiction over ownership issues arising from fraudulent assignments of a certificate of indebtedness. The PDB, in particular, relied solely and heavily on CB Circular No. 28.

In light of the above principles pointing to jurisdiction as a matter of substantive law, the provisions of the law itself that gave CB Circular 769-80 its life and jurisdiction must be examined.

The Philippine Central Bank

On January 3, 1949, Congress created the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank) as a corporate body with the primary objective of (i) maintaining the internal and external monetary stability in the Philippines; and (ii) preserving the international value and the convertibility of the peso.90ςrνll In line with these broad objectives, the Central Bank was empowered to issue rules and regulations "necessary for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of the powers assigned to the Monetary Board and to the Central Bank."91ςrνll Specifically, the Central Bank is authorized to organize (other) departments for the efficient conduct of its business and whose powers and duties "shall be determined by the Monetary Board, within the authority granted to the Board and the Central Bank"92ςrνll under its original charter.

With the 1973 Constitution, the then Central Bank was constitutionally made as the countrys central monetary authority until such time that Congress93ςrνll shall have established a central bank. The 1987 Constitution continued to recognize this function of the then Central Bank until Congress, pursuant to the Constitution, created a new central monetary authority which later came to be known as the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

Under the New Central Bank Act (R.A. No. 7653),94ςrνll the BSP is given the responsibility of providing policy directions in the areas of money, banking and credit; it is given, too, the primary objective of maintaining price stability, conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth of the economy, and of promoting and maintaining monetary stability and convertibility of the peso.95ςrνll

The Constitution expressly grants the BSP, as the countrys central monetary authority, the power of supervision over the operation of banks, while leaving with Congress the authority to define the BSPs regulatory powers over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions. Under R.A. No. 7653, the BSPs powers and functions include (i) supervision over the operation of banks; (ii) regulation of operations of finance companies and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi banking functions; (iii) sole power and authority to issue currency within the Philippine territory; (iv) engaging in foreign exchange transactions; (v) making rediscounts, discounts, loans and advances to banking and other financial institutions to influence the volume of credit consistent with the objective of achieving price stability; (vi) engaging in open market operations; and (vii) acting as banker and financial advisor of the government.

On the BSPs power of supervision over the operation of banks, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000) elaborates as follows:

CHAPTER II
AUTHORITY OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL

SECTION 4. Supervisory Powers. The operations and activities of banks shall be subject to supervision of the Bangko Sentral. "Supervision" shall include the following:

4.1. The issuance of rules of conduct or the establishment of standards of operation for uniform application to all institutions or functions covered, taking into consideration the distinctive character of the operations of institutions and the substantive similarities of specific functions to which such rules, modes or standards are to be applied;

4.2. The conduct of examination to determine compliance with laws and regulations if the circumstances so warrant as determined by the Monetary Board;

4.3. Overseeing to ascertain that laws and regulations are complied with;

4.4. Regular investigation which shall not be oftener than once a year from the last date of examination to determine whether an institution is conducting its business on a safe or sound basis: Provided, That the deficiencies/irregularities found by or discovered by an audit shall be immediately addressed;

4.5. Inquiring into the solvency and liquidity of the institution (2-D); or

4.6. Enforcing prompt corrective action. (n)

The Bangko Sentral shall also have supervision over the operations of and exercise regulatory powers over quasi-banks, trust entities and other financial institutions which under special laws are subject to Bangko Sentral supervision. (2-Ca)

For the purposes of this Act, "quasi-banks" shall refer to entities engaged in the borrowing of funds through the issuance, endorsement or assignment with recourse or acceptance of deposit substitutes as defined in Section 95 of Republic Act No. 7653 (hereafter the "New Central Bank Act") for purposes of relending or purchasing of receivables and other obligations. [emphasis ours]

While this provision empowers the BSP to oversee the operations and activities of banks to "ascertain that laws and regulations are complied with," the existence of the BSPs jurisdiction in the present dispute cannot rely on this provision. The fact remains that the BSP already made known to the PDB its unfavorable position on the latters claim of fraudulent assignment due to the latters own failure to comply96ςrνll with existing regulations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In this connection, Section 10 (b) 2 also requires that a "Detached assignment will be recognized or accepted only upon previous notice to the Central Bank x x x." In fact, in a memo dated September 23, 1991 xxx then CB Governor Jose L. Cuisia advised all banks (including PDB) xxx as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In view recurring incidents ostensibly disregarding certain provisions of CB circular No. 28 (as amended) covering assignments of registered bonds, all banks and all concerned are enjoined to observe strictly the pertinent provisions of said CB Circular as hereunder quoted:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x x

Under Section 10.b. (2)

x x x Detached assignment will be recognized or accepted only upon previous notice to the Central Bank and its use is authorized only under the following circumstances:

(a) x x x

(b) x x x

(c) assignments of treasury notes and certificates of indebtedness in registered form which are not provided at the back thereof with assignment form.

(d) Assignment of securities which have changed ownership several times.

(e) x x x

Non-compliance herewith will constitute a basis for non-action or withholding of action on redemption/payment of interest coupons/transfer transactions or denominational exchange that may be directly affected thereby. [Boldfacing supplied]

Again, the books of the BSP do not show that the supposed assignment of subject CB Bills was ever recorded in the BSPs books. [Boldfacing supplied]

However, the PDB faults the BSP for not recording the assignment of the CB bills in the PDBs favor despite the fact that the PDB already requested the BSP to record its assignment in the BSPs books as early as June 30, 1994.97ςrνll

The PDBs claim is not accurate. What the PDB requested the BSP on that date was not the recording of the assignment of the CB bills in its favor but the annotation of its claim over the CB bills at the time when (i) it was no longer in possession of the CB bills, having been transferred from one entity to another and (ii) all it has are the detached assignments, which the PDB has not shown to be compliant with Section 10 (b) 2 above-quoted. Obviously, the PDB cannot insist that the BSP take cognizance of its plaint when the basis of the BSPs refusal under existing regulation, which the PDB is bound to observe, is the PDBs own failure to comply therewith.

True, the BSP exercises supervisory powers (and regulatory powers) over banks (and quasi banks). The issue presented before the Court, however, does not concern the BSPs supervisory power over banks as this power is understood under the General Banking Law. In fact, there is nothing in the PDBs petition (even including the letters it sent to the BSP) that would support the BSPs jurisdiction outside of CB Circular No. 28, under its power of supervision, over conflicting claims to the proceeds of the CB bills.

BSP has quasi-judicial powers over a
class of cases which does not include
the adjudication of ownership of the
CB bills in question

In United Coconut Planters Bank v. E. Ganzon, Inc.,98ςrνll the Court considered the BSP as an administrative agency,99ςrνll exercising quasi-judicial functions through its Monetary Board. It held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. A "quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial powers or functions. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, the BSP Monetary Board is an independent central monetary authority and a body corporate with fiscal and administrative autonomy, mandated to provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking and credit. It has power to issue subpoena, to sue for contempt those refusing to obey the subpoena without justifiable reason, to administer oaths and compel presentation of books, records and others, needed in its examination, to impose fines and other sanctions and to issue cease and desist order. Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides that the BSP Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in determining whether administrative sanctions should be imposed on banks and quasi-banks, which necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary Board must conduct some form of investigation or hearing regarding the same. [citations omitted]

The BSP is not simply a corporate entity but qualifies as an administrative agency created, pursuant to constitutional mandate,100ςrνll to carry out a particular governmental function.101ςrνll To be able to perform its role as central monetary authority, the Constitution granted it fiscal and administrative autonomy. In general, administrative agencies exercise powers and/or functions which may be characterized as administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of these five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute.102ςrνll

While the very nature of an administrative agency and the raison d're for its creation103ςrνll and proliferation dictate a grant of quasi-judicial power to it, the matters over which it may exercise this power must find sufficient anchorage on its enabling law, either by express provision or by necessary implication. Once found, the quasi-judicial power partakes of the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, to hear and determine a class of cases within its peculiar competence and expertise. In other words, the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers an administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency.104ςrνll

Scattered provisions in R.A. No. 7653 and R.A. No. 8791, inter alia, exist, conferring jurisdiction on the BSP on certain matters.105ςrνll For instance, under the situations contemplated under Section 36, par. 2106ςrνll (where a bank or quasi bank persists in carrying on its business in an unlawful or unsafe manner) and Section 37107ςrνll (where the bank or its officers willfully violate the banks charter or by-laws, or the rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board) of R.A. No. 7653, the BSP may place an entity under receivership and/or liquidation or impose administrative sanctions upon the entity or its officers or directors.

Among its several functions under R.A. No. 7653, the BSP is authorized to engage in open market operations and thereby "issue, place, buy and sell freely negotiable evidences of indebtedness of the Bangko Sentral" in the following manner.

SEC. 90. Principles of Open Market Operations. The open market purchases and sales of securities by the Bangko Sentral shall be made exclusively in accordance with its primary objective of achieving price stability.

x x x x

SEC. 92. Issue and Negotiation of Bangko Sentral Obligations. In order to provide the Bangko Sentral with effective instruments for open market operations, the Bangko Sentral may, subject to such rules and regulations as the Monetary Board may prescribe and in accordance with the principles stated in Section 90 of this Act, issue, place, buy and sell freely negotiable evidences of indebtedness of the Bangko Sentral: Provided, That issuance of such certificates of indebtedness shall be made only in cases of extraordinary movement in price levels. Said evidences of indebtedness may be issued directly against the international reserve of the Bangko Sentral or against the securities which it has acquired under the provisions of Section 91 of this Act, or may be issued without relation to specific types of assets of the Bangko Sentral.

The Monetary Board shall determine the interest rates, maturities and other characteristics of said obligations of the Bangko Sentral, and may, if it deems it advisable, denominate the obligations in gold or foreign currencies.

Subject to the principles stated in Section 90 of this Act, the evidences of indebtedness of the Bangko Sentral to which this section refers may be acquired by the Bangko Sentral before their maturity, either through purchases in the open market or through redemptions at par and by lot if the Bangko Sentral has reserved the right to make such redemptions. The evidences of indebtedness acquired or redeemed by the Bangko Sentral shall not be included among its assets, and shall be immediately retired and cancelled.108ςrνll (italics supplied; emphases ours)

The primary objective of the BSP is to maintain price stability.109ςrνll The BSP has a number of monetary policy instruments at its disposal to promote price stability. To increase or reduce liquidity in the financial system, the BSP uses open market operations, among others.110ςrνll Open market operation is a monetary tool where the BSP publicly buys or sells government securities111ςrνll from (or to) banks and financial institutions in order to expand or contract the supply of money. By controlling the money supply, the BSP is able to exert some influence on the prices of goods and services and achieve its inflation objectives.112ςrνll

Once the issue and/or sale of a security is made, the BSP would necessarily make a determination, in accordance with its own rules, of the entity entitled to receive the proceeds of the security upon its maturity. This determination by the BSP is an exercise of its administrative powers113ςrνll under the law as an incident to its power to prescribe rules and regulations governing open market operations to achieve the "primary objective of achieving price stability."114ςrνll As a matter of necessity, too, the same rules and regulations facilitate transaction with the BSP by providing for an orderly manner of, among others, issuing, transferring, exchanging and paying securities representing public debt.

Significantly, when competing claims of ownership over the proceeds of the securities it has issued are brought before it, the law has not given the BSP the quasi-judicial power to resolve these competing claims as part of its power to engage in open market operations. Nothing in the BSPs charter confers on the BSP the jurisdiction or authority to determine this kind of claims, arising out of a subsequent transfer or assignment of evidence of indebtedness a matter that appropriately falls within the competence of courts of general jurisdiction. That the statute withholds this power from the BSP is only consistent with the fundamental reasons for the creation of a Philippine central bank, that is, to lay down stable monetary policy and exercise bank supervisory functions. Thus, the BSPs assumption of jurisdiction over competing claims cannot find even a stretched-out justification under its corporate powers "to do and perform any and all things that may be necessary or proper to carry out the purposes" of R.A. No. 7653. 115ςrνll

To reiterate, open market operation is a monetary policy instrument that the BSP employs, among others, to regulate the supply of money in the economy to influence the timing, cost and availability of money and credit, as well as other financial factors, for the purpose of stabilizing the price level.116ςrνll What the law grants the BSP is a continuing role to shape and carry out the countrys monetary policy not the authority to adjudicate competing claims of ownership over the securities it has issued since this authority would not fall under the BSPs purposes under its charter.

While R.A. No. 7653117ςrνll empowers the BSP to conduct administrative hearings and render judgment for or against an entity under its supervisory and regulatory powers and even authorizes the BSP Governor to "render decisions, or rulings x x x on matters regarding application or enforcement of laws pertaining to institutions supervised by the BSP and laws pertaining to quasi-banks, as well as regulations, policies or instructions issued by the Monetary Board," it is precisely the text of the BSPs own regulation (whose validity is not here raised as an issue) that points to the BSPs limited role in case of an allegedly fraudulent assignment to simply (i) issuing and circularizing a "stop order" against the transfer, exchange, redemption of the certificate of indebtedness, including the payment of interest coupons, and (ii) withholding action on the certificate.

A similar conclusion can be drawn from the BSPs administrative adjudicatory power in cases of "willful failure or refusal to comply with, or violation of, any banking law or any order, instruction or regulation issued by the Monetary Board, or any order, instruction or ruling by the Governor."118ςrνll The non-compliance with the pertinent requirements under CB Circular No. 28, as amended, deprives a party from any right to demand payment from the BSP.

In other words, the grant of quasi-judicial authority to the BSP cannot possibly extend to situations which do not call for the exercise by the BSP of its supervisory or regulatory functions over entities within its jurisdiction.119ςrνll

The fact alone that the parties involved are banking institutions does not necessarily call for the exercise by the BSP of its quasi-judicial powers under the law.120ςrνll

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction/>argues against BSPs purported/>authority to adjudicate ownership/>issues over the disputed CB bills

Given the preceding discussions, even the PDBs invocation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is misplaced.

In the exercise of its plenary legislative power, Congress may create administrative agencies endowed with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Necessarily, Congress likewise defines the limits of an agencys jurisdiction in the same manner as it defines the jurisdiction of courts.121ςrνll As a result, it may happen that either a court or an administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction over a specific matter or both have concurrent jurisdiction on the same. It may happen, too, that courts and agencies may willingly relinquish adjudicatory power that is rightfully theirs in favor of the other. One of the instances when a court may properly defer to the adjudicatory authority of an agency is the applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.122ςrνll

As early as 1954, the Court applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under the following terms:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

6. In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes xxx ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in the resolution of labor-management controversies xxx meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered."123ςrνll (emphasis ours)

In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,124ςrνll the Court ruled that while an action for rescission of a contract between coal developers appears to be an action cognizable by regular courts, the trial court remains to be without jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the contract sought to be rescinded is "inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to [the plaintiff] would be in line with the countrys national program and objective on coal-development and over-all coal-supply-demand balance." It then applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body."

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the Bureau of Energy Development as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. [emphases ours]

The absence of any express or implied statutory power to adjudicate conflicting claims of ownership or entitlement to the proceeds of its certificates of indebtedness finds complement in the similar absence of any technical matter that would call for the BSPs special expertise or competence.125ςrνll In fact, what the PDBs petitions bear out is essentially the nature of the transaction it had with the subsequent transferees of the subject CB bills (BOC and Bancap) and not any matter more appropriate for special determination by the BSP or any administrative agency.

In a similar vein, it is well-settled that the interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the courts construing such rule or regulation.126ςrνll While there are exceptions127ςrνll to this rule, the PDB has not convinced us that a departure is warranted in this case. Given the non-applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the BSPs own position, in light of Circular No. 769-80, deserves respect from the Court.

Ordinarily, cases involving the application of doctrine of primary jurisdiction are initiated by an action invoking the jurisdiction of a court or administrative agency to resolve the substantive legal conflict between the parties. In this sense, the present case is quite unique since the courts jurisdiction was, originally, invoked to compel an administrative agency (the BSP) to resolve the legal conflict of ownership over the CB bills - instead of obtaining a judicial determination of the same dispute.

The remedy of interpleader

Based on the unique factual premise of the present case, the RTC acted correctly in initially assuming jurisdiction over the PDBs petition for mandamus, prohibition and injunction.128ςrνll While the RTC agreed (albeit erroneously) with the PDBs view (that the BSP has jurisdiction), it, however, dismissed not only the BOCs/the BSPs counterclaims but the PDBs petition itself as well, on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction.

This is plain error.

Not only the parties themselves, but more so the courts, are bound by the rule on non-waiver of jurisdiction.129ςrνll believes that jurisdiction over the BOCs counterclaims and the BSPs counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader calls for the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the allowance of the PDBs petition even becomes imperative because courts may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte.130ςrνll

Of the three possible options available to the RTC, the adoption of either of these two would lead the trial court into serious legal error: first, if it granted the PDBs petition, its decision would have to be set aside on appeal because the BSP has no jurisdiction as previously discussed; and second when it dismissed the PDBs petitions and the BOCs counterclaims on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction, the trial court seriously erred because precisely, the resolution of the conflicting claims over the CB bills falls within its general jurisdiction.

Without emasculating its jurisdiction, the RTC could have properly dismissed the PDBs petition but on the ground that mandamus does not lie against the BSP; but even this correct alternative is no longer plausible since the BSP, as a respondent below, already properly brought before the RTC the remaining conflicting claims over the subject CB bills by way of a counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader. Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides when an interpleader is proper:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.

The remedy of an action of interpleader131ςrνll is designed to protect a person against double vexation in respect of a single liability.7ςrνll It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.132ςrνll

Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay more than once on a single liability.133ςrνll

When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a new action arises,134ςrνll where the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of initiating the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when proper, merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed out in an action. Section 2 of Rule 62 provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 2. Order. Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring the conflicting claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice so require, the court may direct in such order that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court.

This is precisely what the RTC did by granting the BSPs motion to interplead. The PDB itself "agreed that the various claimants should now interplead." Thus, the PDB and the BOC subsequently entered into two separate escrow agreements, covering the CB bills, and submitted them to the RTC for approval.

In granting the BSPs motion, the RTC acted on the correct premise that it has jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting claims over the CB bills - consistent with the rules and the parties conduct - and accordingly required the BOC to amend its answer and for the PDB to comment thereon. Suddenly, however, the PDB made an about-face and questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC. Swayed by the PDBs argument, the RTC dismissed even the PDBs petition - which means that it did not actually compel the BSP to resolve the BOCs and the PDBs claims.

Without the motion to interplead and the order granting it, the RTC could only dismiss the PDBs petition since it is the RTC which has jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting claims not the BSP. Given that the motion to interplead has been actually filed, the RTC could not have really granted the relief originally sought in the PDBs petition since the RTCs order granting the BSPs motion to interplead - to which the PDB in fact acquiesced into - effectively resulted in the dismissal of the PDBs petition. This is not altered by the fact that the PDB additionally prayed in its petition for damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit "against the public respondents" because the grant of the order to interplead effectively sustained the propriety of the BSPs resort to this procedural device.

Interpleader

1. as a special civil action

What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the interpleader suit through an original complaint but through its Answer. This circumstance becomes understandable if it is considered that insofar as the BSP is concerned, the PDB does not possess any right to have its claim recorded in the BSPs books; consequently, the PDB cannot properly be considered even as a potential claimant to the proceeds of the CB bills upon maturity. Thus, the interpleader was only an alternative position, made only in the BSPs Answer.135ςrνll

The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the specific provisions in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil actions.136ςrνll Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as part of, although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court137ςrνll does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a claim,138ςrνll a form of defense,139ςrνll or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSPs "counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs counter to general procedures.

Apart from a pleading,140ςrνll the rules141ςrνll allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court through the procedural device of a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter complaint/cross-claim for interpleader," the RTC understood this as in the nature of a motion,142ςrνll seeking relief which essentially consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to litigate with each other so that "payment is made to the rightful or legitimate owner"143ςrνll of the subject CB bills.

The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." Interpleader may be considered as a stakeholders remedy to prevent a wrong, that is, from making payment to one not entitled to it, thereby rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment.

Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, governing ordinary civil actions, a partys claim is asserted "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62.

2. the payment of docket fees covering BOCs counterclaim

The PDB argues that, even assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction over the issue of ownership of the CB bills, the BOCs failure to pay the appropriate docket fees prevents the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the BOCs "counterclaims."

We disagree with the PDB.

To reiterate and recall, the order granting the "PDBs motion to interplead," already resulted in the dismissal of the PDBs petition. The same order required the BOC to amend its answer and for the conflicting claimants to comment, presumably to conform to the nature of an answer-in interpleader. Perhaps, by reason of the BOCs denomination of its claim as a "compulsory counterclaim" and the PDBs failure to fully appreciate the RTCs order granting the "BSPs motion for interpleader" (with the PDBs conformity), the PDB mistakenly treated the BOCs claim as a "permissive counterclaim" which necessitates the payment of docket fees.

As the preceding discussions would show, however, the BOCs "claim" - i.e., its assertion of ownership over the CB bills is in reality just that, a "claim" against the stakeholder and not as a "counterclaim,"144ςrνll whether compulsory145ςrνll or permissive. It is only the BOCs alternative prayer (for the PDB to deliver to the BOC, as the buyer in the April 15 transaction and the ultimate successor-in-interest of the buyer in the April 19 transaction, either the original subjects of the sales or the value thereof plus whatever income that may have been earned pendente lite) and its prayer for damages that are obviously compulsory counterclaims against the PDB and, therefore, does not require payment of docket fees.146ςrνll

The PDB takes a contrary position through its insistence that a compulsory counterclaim should be one where the presence of third parties, of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is not required. It reasons out that since the RCBC and All Asia (the intervening holders of the CB bills) have already been dropped from the case, then the BOCs counterclaim must only be permissive in nature and the BOC should have paid the correct docket fees.

We see no reason to belabor this claim. Even if we gloss over the PDBs own conformity to the dropping of these entities as parties, the BOC correctly argues that a remedy is provided under the Rules. Section 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 12. Bringing new parties. When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained.

Even then, the strict characterization of the BOCs counterclaim is no longer material in disposing of the PDBs argument based on non-payment of docket fees.

When an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees by the party seeking affirmative relief from the court. It is the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim or the nature of the action.147ςrνll However, the non-payment of the docket fee at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, so long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, especially when the claimant demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.148ςrνll

In the present case, considering the lack of a clear guideline on the payment of docket fee by the claimants in an interpleader suit, compounded by the unusual manner in which the interpleader suit was initiated and the circumstances surrounding it, we surely cannot deduce from the BOCs mere failure to specify in its prayer the total amount of the CB bills it lays claim to (or the value of the subjects of the sales in the April 15 and April 19 transactions, in its alternative prayer) an intention to defraud the government that would warrant the dismissal of its claim.149ςrνll

At any rate, regardless of the nature of the BOCs "counterclaims," for purposes of payment of filing fees, both the BOC and the PDB, properly as defendants-in-interpleader, must be assessed the payment of the correct docket fee arising from their respective claims. The seminal case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion150ςrνll provides us guidance in the payment of docket fees, to wit:

1. x x x Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. [underscoring ours]

This must be the rule considering that Section 7, Rule 62 of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens. The docket and other lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as well as the costs and litigation expenses, shall constitute a lien or charge upon the subject matter of the action, unless the court shall order otherwise.

only pertain to the docket and lawful fees to be paid by the one who initiated the interpleader suit, and who, under the Rules, actually "claims no interest whatever in the subject matter." By constituting a lien on the subject matter of the action, Section 7 in effect only aims to actually compensate the complainant-in-interpleader, who happens to be the stakeholder unfortunate enough to get caught in a legal crossfire between two or more conflicting claimants, for the faultless trouble it found itself into. Since the defendants-in-interpleader are actually the ones who make a claim - only that it was extraordinarily done through the procedural device of interpleader - then to them devolves the duty to pay the docket fees prescribed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.151ςrνll

The importance of paying the correct amount of docket fee cannot be overemphasized:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are necessary to defray court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to avoid tremendous losses to the judiciary, and to the government as well, the payment of docket fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the case, except when the claimant is a pauper-litigant.152ςrνll

WHEREFORE, premises considered the consolidated PETITIONS are GRANTED. The Planters Development Bank is hereby REQUIRED to file with the Regional Trial Court its comment or answer-in-interpleader to Bank of Commerces Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, as previously ordered by the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, is hereby ORDERED to assess the docket fees due from Planters Development Bank and Bank of Commerce and order their payment, and to resolve with DELIBERATE DISPATCH the parties conflicting claims of ownership over the proceeds of the Central Bank bills.

The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, or his duly authorized representative is hereby ORDERED to assess and collect the appropriate amount of docket fees separately due the Bank of Commerce and Planters Development Bank as conflicting claimants in Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas interpleader suit, in accordance with this decision.ςrαlαωlιbrαr

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:


* Designated as Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo per Raffle dated September 17, 2012

1ςrνll Rules of Court.

2ςrνll Records, Volume II, pp. 565, 571.

3ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, p. 69.

4ςrνll Records, Volume II, pp. 565, 571.

5ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, p. 68.

6ςrνll Id. at 55, 68, 193.

7ςrνll On April 12, 1994, the PDB sold P 70 million worth of securities to the BOC. For its failure to deliver the securities, the PDB delivered the CB bills to the BOC as substitute. On even date, the BOC sold the CB bills to Bancapital Development Corporation (Bancap). The PDB reacquired the CB bills from Bancap. Id. at 193-194.

8ςrνll Id. at 111.

9ςrνll Id. at 112.

10ςrνll Id. at 100-101, 113.

11ςrνll Id. at 194.

12ςrνll Id. at 127.

13ςrνll Id. at 101, 195.

14ςrνll Ibid.; Records, Volume II, p. 566.

15ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, p. 196.

16ςrνll Records, Volume I, pp. 193-194.

17ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, p. 80; Records, Volume II, p. 552.

18ςrνll As evidenced by a Security Delivery Receipt issued by the PDB and acknowledged by Bancap; rollo, G.R. Nos. 154589-90, p. 83.

19ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, pp. 81, 191.

20ςrνll Through two separate letters dated June 30, 1994 of the PDBs Executive Vice President, Rodolfo V. Timbol. Id. at 74; rollo, G.R. Nos. 154589-90, pp. 37, 38.

21ςrνll Now defunct.

22ςrνll R.A. No. 7653 abolished the Central Bank and created a new corporate entity known as the BSP.

23ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, pp. 90, 115.

24ςrνll Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28 reads:

A registered bond may be transferred on the books of the Central Bank into the name of another person upon presentation of the bond properly assigned in accordance with the regulations governing assignments. Specific instructions for the issue and delivery of the registered bonds to be issued upon transfer must accompany the bonds presented. (Use Securities Form No. 14) Assignment for transfer should be made to the transferee, or if desired, to the Central Bank of the Philippines for transfer into the name of the transferee, who should be named in the assignment. Assignment in blank will also be accepted for the purpose of transfer, if accompanied by the necessary instructions for the issue of the new bonds.

25ςrνll Dated July 4, 1994. Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, pp. 116-117.

26ςrνll Records, Volume 1, p. 71.

27ςrνll Id. at 72.

28ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, pp. 118-119. The provision erroneously cited Section 10 (d) 3, instead of Section 10 (d) 4.

29ςrνll The first petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3233 was filed on December 23, 1994 (id. at 344), while the second petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3254 was filed on December 29, 1994 (id. at 345).

30ςrνll Id. at 54, 79.

31ςrνll Id. at 100.

32ςrνll Records, Volume I, p. 53.

33ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, pp. 97-108.

34ςrνll Id. at 96.

35ςrνll Records, Volume I, pp. 243-246.

36ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, pp. 106-107.

37ςrνll The RCBC and All Asia filed their respective Answers, both seeking the dismissal of the PDBs petition, among others. (Records, Volume II, pp. 551-585).

38ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, p. 131.

39ςrνll Id. at 142, 145.

40ςrνll Id. at 144-145.

41ςrνll Id. at 150.

42ςrνll Id. at 184. The PDB maintained this position in its Pre-Trial Brief (Records, Volume 4, p. 1004).

While the PDB subsequently doubted the necessity of an interpleader, it reasoned as follows:

4.1 The parties are now in the process of threshing out among themselves their respective claims;

4.2 Pending final determination by the RTC or amicable settlement as to who shall eventually be entitled to the maturity proceeds of the subject CB bills, PDB and BOC have entered into an Escrow Agreement. (Records, Volume 4, p. 905.)

43ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, pp. 156-159.

44ςrνll Id. at 171-175.

45ςrνll Considering that the proceeds of the CB bills do not earn interest while in the BSPs possession upon maturity and thereafter (Records, Volume 4, p. 869).

46ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, p. 156.

47ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154589-90, pp. 140-142, 150-152.

48ςrνll Id. at 144, 154. The RTC granted the first Joint Motion to Approve covering the first set of bills excluding that in the possession of All Asia because of All Asias Opposition, and the PDB and the BOCs Comment thereto (Records, Volume 4, pp. 784-789). However, the BOC and All Asia subsequently executed an Agreement wherein, essentially, the BOC would indemnify All Asia. On joint motion of the BOC and All Asia, the CB bill in All Asias possession was likewise included in escrow.

49ςrνll Records, Volume 4, pp. 884-885, 921-922.

50ςrνll Id. at 959, 961-962.

51ςrνll Id. at 967, 971.

52ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, p. 349.

53ςrνll Records, Volume 4, pp. 976, 980. Nuqui was also dropped as a defendant without objection from PDB (id. at 1022-1023).

54ςrνll Id. at 972.

55ςrνll Id. at 973.

56ςrνll Id. at 984.

57ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, p. 181.

58ςrνll Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims; id. at 187-207. The BOC reiterated that it had already acquired whatever rights the other claimants had over the two sets of CB bills; id. at 16, 187, 204.

59ςrνll Id. at 205.

60ςrνll Id. at 239; records, Volume 4, p. 1151.

61ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154589-90, pp. 207- 216.

62ςrνll Id. at 250-261.

63ςrνll Id. at 272-273.

64ςrνll Id. at 50-52.

65ςrνll Id. at 287-300. The BSP adopted the BOCs arguments in its motion for reconsideration.

66ςrνll In a Resolution dated November 20, 2002, these two cases were consolidated on motion of BOC; id. at 224, 333.

67ςrνll Id. at 21-22.

68ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, pp. 407-408.

69ςrνll Pursuant to Section 129 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act).

70ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, p. 353, citing Alemars (Sibal & Sons), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 236 (2001).

71ςrνll Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 388, 399, 5th ed., 2003.

72ςrνll Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992, 216 SCRA 500, 505-506; and Berces, Sr. v. Guingona, Jr., 311 Phil. 614, 620 (1995).

73ςrνll Berces, Sr. v. Guingona, Jr., supra; and Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 92, 129-130.

74ςrνll The United Harbor Pilots Asso. v. Asso. of Intl Shipping Lines, Inc., 440 Phil. 188, 199 (2002).

75ςrνll Mecano v. Commission on Audit, supra note 72, at 506.

76ςrνll Section 2, CB Circular No. 28.

77ςrνll CB Circular No. 769-80 provides the following: Article I (Issue of Central Bank Certificates of Indebtedness); Article II (Bearer and Registered Certificates); Article III (Registration and Inscription of Certificates); Article IV (Exchange of Certificates); Article V (Assignment for Transfer of Certificates); and Article VI (Pledge of Certificates).

78ςrνll A certificate or evidence of indebtedness is a written representation of debt securities or obligations of corporations (like the BSP [Section 1, R.A. No. 7653ςrνll ) such as long term commercial and short term commercial papers (Securities and Regulations Code Annotated with Implementing Rules and Regulations, Lucila M. Decasa, 2004, 1st ed., p. 7).

79ςrνll Section 124. Servicing and redemption of the public debt. - The servicing and redemption of the public debt shall also be effected through the Central Bank.

80ςrνll Websers Third New Intl Dictionary.

81ςrνll Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume 1, p. 71.

82ςrνll CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 2.

83ςrνll Fernandez v. Fulgueras, G.R. No. 178575, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 174, 178; Dept. of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, 497 Phil. 313, 322-324 (2005); and Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122256, October 30, 1996, 263 SCRA 758, 764.

84ςrνll Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 19(6).

85ςrνll Tamano v. Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 584, 588.

86ςrνll Mendoza v. Germino, G.R. No. 165676, November 22, 2010, 635 SCRA 537, 544; Eristingcol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167702, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 139, 146; Lacson Hermanas Inc. v. Heirs of Cenon Ignancio, 500 Phil. 673, 678-679 (2005); and Pilipinas Loan Co., Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 408 Phil. 291, 300 (2001).

87ςrνll Multinational Village Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98023, October 17, 1991, 203 SCRA 104, 107.

88ςrνll Nocum v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2006, 470 SCRA 639, 644-645.

89ςrνll Errectors, Inc. v. NLRC, 326 Phil. 640, 645 (1996).

90ςrνll Section 2 of R.A. No. 265, as amended.

91ςrνll Section 14 of R.A. No. 265, as amended.

92ςrνll Section 35 of R.A. No. 265.

93ςrνll The National Assembly.

94ςrνll Took effect on July 3, 1993.

95ςrνll Section 3 of R.A. No. 7653,

96ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, pp. 145-146.

97ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, p. 182.

98ςrνll G.R. No. 168859, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 321, 338-341.

99ςrνll See also Busuego v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 116, 127, 129-130 (1999).

100ςrνll CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 20.

101ςrνll Ruben E. Agpalo, Administrative Law, Law on Public Offices and Election Law, 2005 ed., p. 7.

102ςrνll Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. Nos. 164785 and 165636, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 79, 90; and Smart Communications, Inc. v. Natl Telecommunications Commission, 456 Phil. 145, 155 (2003).

103ςrνll The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, et al., G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA 470, 520, citing C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada, G.R. No. 80916, November 9, 1990, 191 SCRA 268.

104ςrνll Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) v. Lubrica, G.R. No. 159145, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 800; and Fernandez v. Fulgeras, G.R. No. 178575, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 174, 179.

105ςrνll See also Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr., G.R. Nos. 168332 and 169053, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 49, 60-70.

106ςrνll Section 36, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7653 reads:

Section 36. Proceedings Upon Violation of This Act and Other Banking Laws, Rules, Regulations, Orders or Instructions. xxx

Whenever a bank or quasi-bank persists in carrying on its business in an unlawful or unsafe manner, the Board may, without prejudice to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraph of this section and the administrative sanctions provided in Section 37 of this Act, take action under Section 30 of this Act.

107ςrνll Section 37 reads:

Section 37. Administrative Sanctions on Banks and Quasi-banks. - Without prejudice to the criminal sanctions against the culpable persons provided in Sections 34, 35, and 36 of this Act, the Monetary Board may, at its discretion, impose upon any bank or quasi-bank, their directors and/or officers, for any willful violation of its charter or by-laws, willful delay in the submission of reports or publications thereof as required by law, rules and regulations; any refusal to permit examination into the affairs of the institution; any willful making of a false or misleading statement to the Board or the appropriate supervising and examining department or its examiners; any willful failure or refusal to comply with, or violation of, any banking law or any order, instruction or regulation issued by the Monetary Board, or any order, instruction or ruling by the Governor; or any commission of irregularities, and/or conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner as may be determined by the Monetary Board, the following administrative sanctions, whenever applicable:

(a) fines in amounts as may be determined by the Monetary Board to be appropriate, but in no case to exceed Thirty thousand pesos (P 30,000.00) a day for each violation, taking into consideration the attendant circumstances, such as the nature and gravity of the violation or irregularity and the size of the bank or quasi-bank;

(b) suspension of rediscounting privileges or access to Bangko Sentral credit facilities;

(c) suspension of lending or foreign exchange operations or authority to accept new deposits or make new investments;

(d) suspension of interbank clearing privileges; and/or

(e) revocation of quasi-banking license.

x x x x

Whether or not there is an administrative proceeding, if the institution and/or the directors and/or officers concerned continue with or otherwise persist in the commission of the indicated practice or violation, the Monetary Board may issue an order requiring the institution and/or the directors and/or officers concerned to cease and desist from the indicated practice or violation, and may further order that immediate action be taken to correct the conditions resulting from such practice or violation. The cease and desist order shall be immediately effective upon service on the respondents.

The respondents shall be afforded an opportunity to defend their action in a hearing before the Monetary Board or any committee chaired by any Monetary Board member created for the purpose, upon request made by the respondents within five (5) days from their receipt of the order. If no such hearing is requested within said period, the order shall be final. If a hearing is conducted, all issues shall be determined on the basis of records, after which the Monetary Board may either reconsider or make final its order.

The Governor is hereby authorized, at his discretion, to impose upon banking institutions, for any failure to comply with the requirements of law, Monetary Board regulations and policies, and/or instructions issued by the Monetary Board or by the Governor, fines not in excess of Ten thousand pesos (P 10,000.00) a day for each violation, the imposition of which shall be final and executory until reversed, modified or lifted by the Monetary Board on appeal.

108ςrνll RA No. 265, as amended, is similarly worded, as follows:

Sec. 96. Principles of open market operations. - The open market purchases and sales of securities by the Central Bank shall be made exclusively for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the national monetary policy and shall be limited to the operations authorized in sections 97 and 98 of this Act.

x x x x

Sec. 98. Issue and negotiation of Central Bank obligations. - In order to provide the Central Bank with effective instruments for open market operations, the Bank may, subject to such rules and regulations as the Monetary Board may prescribe and in accordance with the principles stated in section 96 of this Act, issue, place, buy and sell freely negotiable evidences of indebtedness of the Bank. Said evidences of indebtedness may be issued directly against the international reserve of the Bank or against the securities which it has acquired under the provisions of section 97 of this Act, or may be issued without relation to specific types of assets of the Bank.

The Monetary Board shall determine the interest rates, maturities and other characteristics of said obligations of the Bank, and may, if it deems it advisable, denominate the obligations in gold or foreign currencies.

Subject to the principles stated in section 96 of this Act, the evidences of indebtedness of the Central Bank to which this section refers may be acquired by the Bank before their maturity, either through purchases in the open market or through redemptions at par and by lot if the Bank has reserved the right to make such redemptions. The evidences of indebtedness acquired or redeemed by the Central Bank shall not be included among its assets, and shall be immediately retired and cancelled. [emphasis ours]

109ςrνll Since 2002, the BSP has adopted inflation targeting as a framework of monetary policy aimed at achieving the objective of price stability. Inflation targeting is focused mainly on achieving a low and stable inflation, supportive of the economys growth objective. This approach entails the announcement of an explicit inflation target that the BSP promises to achieve over a given time period. (http://www.bsp.gov.ph/monetary/targeting.asp)

110ςrνll http://www.bsp.gov.ph/monetary/targeting.asp (accessed on August 15, 2012).

111ςrνll Republic Act No. 8799 defines securities as follows:

3.1. "Securities" are shares, participation or interests in a corporation or in a commercial enterprise or profit-making venture and evidenced by a certificate, contract, instruments, whether written or electronic in character. It includes:

(a) Shares of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, evidences of indebtedness, asset-backed securities.

112ςrνll http://www.bsp.gov.ph/financial/open.asp (accessed on August 15, 2012).

113ςrνll Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (In Re: Designation of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano as member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, 248 Phil. 487, 491-492).

114ςrνll R.A. No. 7653, Section 90.

115ςrνll R.A. No. 7653, Section 5.

116ςrνll www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/Publications/FAQs/targeting.pdf (accessed on August 12, 2012).

117ςrνll See also Presidential Decree No. 72, Section 25.

118ςrνll R.A. No. 7653, Section 37.

119ςrνll See Cemco Holdings, Inc. v. National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 171815, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 355.

120ςrνll In Taule v. Santos (G.R. No. 90336, August 12, 1991, 200 SCRA 512, 521), the Court ruled that

"unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers. The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations."

121ςrνll CONSTITUTION, Article 8, Section 2; Tropical Homes, Inc. v. National Housing Authority, 236 Phil. 580, 587-588 (1987).

122ςrνll Aaron J. Lockwood, The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine: Competing Standards of Appellate Review.

123ςrνll Sps. Abejo v. Judge De la Cruz, 233 Phil. 668, 684-685 (1987), citing Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 (1954).

124ςrνll 263 Phil. 352, 358-359 (1990).

125ςrνll See Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 143, 153-154; and GMA Network, Inc. v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp., et al., 507 Phil. 718, 724-726 (2005).

126ςrνll Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization, PNCC, 316 Phil. 404, 429 (1995).

127ςrνll The courts may disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity in the law, where the construction is clearly erroneous, where a strong reason exists to the contrary, and where the courts have previously given the statute a different interpretation. (Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 5th ed., 2003, p. 116.)

128ςrνll Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 21(1).

129ςrνll Sps. Atuel v. Sps. Valdez, 451 Phil. 631, 641, 645 (2003).

130ςrνll Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, 527 Phil. 623, 628 (2006).

131ςrνll The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property, whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance of the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. (Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Book III, 2006 ed., p. 224, citing Alvarez v. Commonwealth, 65 Phil. 302, 311-312.

132ςrνll Rules of Court, Rule 62, Section 1.

133ςrνll (digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044). The device was developed on the theory that the stakeholder should not be forced to take the personal risk of evaluating the claims (44B Am Jur 2d Interpleader 1). If the BSP indeed has jurisdiction over the parties conflicting claims, the remedy of interpleader would obviously be inappropriate since the exercise of a quasi-judicial discretion cannot generally, entail any personal risk to the official who exercises it. Having found that the BSP lacks jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting claims, payment to anyone of the conflicting claimants would necessarily result in exposing the BSP to "double vexation in respect of a single liability."

134ςrνll Alvarez v. Commonwealth of the Philippines, 65 Phil. 302, 312 (1938).

135ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, pp. 147-151.

136ςrνll Rule 1, Section 3.a of the Rules of Court.

137ςrνll Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

138ςrνll Section 6, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 6. Counterclaim. A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.

139ςrνll Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court read:

Sec. 4. Answer. An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses.

Sec. 5. Defenses. Defenses may either be negative or affirmative.

(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or causes of action.

(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance.

Sec. 6. Counterclaim. A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.

140ςrνll Rule 6 (Kinds of Pleadings), Section 1 defines a pleading as the parties "written statements of their respective claims and defenses." The pleadings where a "claim" may be asserted are "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." Under Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, a defendants compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim existing at the time he files his answer should be included in the answer.

141ςrνll Rules of Court, Rule 15, Section 1.

142ςrνll Records, Volume 4, p. 1091. Even then, the BOC filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that the BSPs own prayer for interpleader be granted (Records, Volume 4, pp. 1028-1030).

143ςrνll Rollo, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, p. 148.

144ςrνll Section 6, Rule 6, precisely defines a counterclaim as a "claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party." In an interpleader suit, while the defendants are asserting conflicting claims against one another over "the same subject matter," in the ultimate, the prevailing party actually asserts it against the complainant-in-interpleader because he is the stakeholder.

145ςrνll See Rule 6, Section 7.

146ςrνll When BOC filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the effective rule then was A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC (March 1, 2000), which does not require payment of docket fees for compulsory counterclaims. Effective August 16, 2004, however, under Section 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid even in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims. See Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Lerma, G.R. No. 143581, January 7, 2008, 542 SCRA 1, 16-17.

147ςrνll Fedman Development Corporation v. Agcaoili, G.R. No. 165025, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 354, 362; and Ungria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165777, July 25, 2011, 654 SCRA 314, 325, citing Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte, G.R. Nos. 88075-77, December 20, 1989, 180 SCRA 433; and Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 252 Phil. 280 (1989).

148ςrνll Fedman Development Corporation v. Agcaoili, supra, at 362-363.

149ςrνll Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 233 Phil. 579, 585 (1987).

150ςrνll 252 Phil. 280, 291 (1989).

151ςrνll Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC (March 1, 2000), the effective Rule at the time the RTC granted the BSPs motion to interplead and required the PDB and the BOC to assert their claims, reads:

SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.- (a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in litigation, is:

1. Less than P 100,000.00 P 500.00
2. P 100,000.00 or more but less than
P 150,000.00
800.00
3. P 150,000.00 or more but less than
P 200,000.00
1,000.00
4. P 200,000.00 or more but less than
P 250,000.00
1,500.00
5. P 250,000.00 or more but less than
P 300,000.00
1,750.00
6. P 300,000.00 or more but less than 2,000.00
P 350,000.00
7. P 350,000.00 or more but not more than
P 400,000.00
2,250.00
8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess of
P 400,000.00
10.00

152ςrνll Emnace v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 10, 22.




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September-2012 Jurisprudence                 

  • A.C. No. 6753 - Mila Virtusio v. Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio

  • A.M. No. RTJ-09-2182 Formerly A.M. No. 08-3007-RTJ - Government Service Insurance System by Atty. Lucio L. Yu, Jr. v. Executive Judge Maria Cancino-Erum, Regional Trial Court, Br. 210, Mandaluyong City and Presiding Judge Carlos A. Valenzuela, Regional Trial court, Branch 213, Mandaluyong City

  • G.R. No. 148607, G.R. NO. 167202, G.R. NO. 167223 and G.R. NO. 167271 - Elsa B. Reyes v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines/Artemio C. Mendoza v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines/Elsa B. Reyes v. People of the Philippines/Caridad A. Miranda v. People of the Philippines

  • G.R. No. 153799, G.R. NO. 157169, G.R. NO. 157327 and G.R. NO. 157506 - Solidbank Union, et al. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company; Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Solidbank Union, et al.; Solidbank Corporation, etc., et al. v. Solidbank Union, et al.; Solidbank Union, et al. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company

  • G.R. No. 171107 - Anita C. Vianzon, Heirs of the late Lucila Candelaria Gonzales v. Minople Macaraeg

  • G.R. No. 173425 - Fort Bonifacio Develoment Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Revenue District Officer, etc.

  • G.R. No. 175170 - Misamis Oriental II Electric Service Cooperative (MORESCO II) v. Virgilio M. Cagalawan

  • G.R. No. 176343 - Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Phil. v. Rosario S. Manalang-Demigillo

  • G.R. No. 184606 - People of the Philippines v. Calexto D. Fundales

  • G.R. No. 188979 - People of the Philippines v. Christopher Pareja y Velasco

  • G.R. No. 189486 and G.R. NO. 189699 - Simny G. Guy, Geraldine G. Guy, Gladys G. Yao and the Heirs of the late Grace G. Cheu v. Gilbert Guy/Simny G. Guy, Geraldine G. Guy, Gladys G. Yao and the heirs of the late Grace G. Cheu v. The Hon. Ofelia C. Calo, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC-Mandaluyong City-Branch 211 and Gilbert Guy

  • G.R. No. 191062 - People of the Philippine v. Mohamad Angkob y Milang

  • G.R. No. 191753 - People of the Philippines v. Ronald De Jesus y Apacible and Amelito Dela Cruz y Pua

  • G.R. No. 191837 - Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual v. Spouses Marilyn Lim and George Lim and The Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela City

  • G.R. No. 192117 and G.R. NO. 192118 - Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc., et al. v. Energy Regulatory Commission/Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc., et al. v. Energy Regulatory Commission

  • G.R. No. 192945 - City of Iriga v. Camarines Sur III Electric Cooperative Inc.

  • G.R. No. 194014 - Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Alejandro and Myrna Reblando

  • G.R. No. 195592 - Magdiwang Realty Corporation, Renato P. Dragon and Esperanza Tolentino v. The Manila Banking Corporation, substituted by First Sovereign Asset Management [SPV-AMC], Inc.

  • G.R. No. 195619 - Planters Development Bank v. Julie Chandumal

  • G.R. No. 196355 - Bienvenido William D. Lloren v. The Commission on Elections, et al.

  • G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. NO. 196232 - Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, acting through and represented by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al./Wendell Barreras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the President, Atty. Dennis F. Ortiz, et al.

  • G.R. No. 197528 - Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc. v. Amando A. Vinuya, et al.

  • G.R. No. 198662 - Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. and Eric S. Canoy v. Domingo Z. Ybarola, et al.

  • G.R. No. 199084 - Antonia P. Ceron v. Commission on Elections, et al.

  • G.R. No. 200951 - People of the Philippines v. Jose Almodiel alias "Dodong Astrobal"

  • A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-1606-MTJ : Atty. Arturo Juanito T. Maturan v. Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City

  • A.C. No. 6753 - Mila Virtusio v. Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio

  • A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666 : Gerlie M. Uy and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug v. Judge Erwin B. Javellana, Municipal Trial Court, La Castellana, Negros Occidental

  • A.M. No. P-06-2161 : Atty. Dennis A. Velasco v. Myra L. Baterbonia/In Re: Report on the financial audit conducted in the RTC, Branch 38, Alabel etc.

  • A.M. No. P-11-2920 : Lucia Nazar Vda. De Feliciano v. Romeo L. Rivera, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Valenzuela City

  • A.M. No. P-12-3086 : Office of the Court Administrator v. Susana R. Fontanilla, Clerk of Court, MCTC, San Narciso-Buenavista, San Narciso, Quezon

  • A.M. No. P-12-3087 : Dionisio P. Pilot v. Renato B. Baron, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Br. 264, Pasig City

  • A.M. No. RTJ-09-2182 Formerly A.M. No. 08-3007-RTJ - Government Service Insurance System by Atty. Lucio L. Yu, Jr. v. Executive Judge Maria Cancino-Erum, Regional Trial Court, Br. 210, Mandaluyong City and Presiding Judge Carlos A. Valenzuela, Regional Trial court, Branch 213, Mandaluyong City

  • A.M. No. RTJ-11-2271 : Lucio O. Magtibay v. Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj., RTC, Branch 14 Cotabato City

  • G.R. No. 148607, G.R. NO. 167202, G.R. NO. 167223 and G.R. NO. 167271 - Elsa B. Reyes v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines/Artemio C. Mendoza v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines/Elsa B. Reyes v. People of the Philippines/Caridad A. Miranda v. People of the Philippines

  • G.R. No. 148843 : Antioquia Development Corporation, et al. v. Benjamin P. Rabacal, et al.

  • G.R. No. 153799, G.R. NO. 157169, G.R. NO. 157327 and G.R. NO. 157506 - Solidbank Union, et al. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company; Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Solidbank Union, et al.; Solidbank Corporation, etc., et al. v. Solidbank Union, et al.; Solidbank Union, et al. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company

  • G.R. Nos. 154470-71 : Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, et al./Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Planters Develoment Bank

  • G.R. No. 161122 : Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Spouses Felix and Nenita Ng, Spouses Martin and Azucena Ng and Agripina R. Goc-ong, et al.

  • G.R. No. 162372 : Government Service Insurane System (GSIS), et al. v. Commission on Audit (COA), et al.

  • G.R. No. 162809 : Pacific Ocean Manning Inc., et al. v. Benjamin D. Penales

  • G.R. No. 165355 : Tomas T. Teodoro, et al. v. Continental Cement Corporation

  • G.R. No. 166467 : Danilo R. Querijero, Johnny P. Lilang and Ivene D. Reyes v. Lina Palmes-Limitar, Isagani G. Palmes and the Court of Appeals

  • G.R. No. 167366 : Dr. Pedro Dennis Cereno and Dr. Santos Zafe v. Court of Appeals, et al.

  • G.R. No. 170787 : Crispino Pangilinan v. Jocelyn N. Balatbat substituted by her heirs, namely, Vicente Balatbat, Ana Lucia N. Balatbat, et al.

  • G.R. No. 171107 - Anita C. Vianzon, Heirs of the late Lucila Candelaria Gonzales v. Minople Macaraeg

  • G.R. No. 171118 : Park Hotel, J's Playhouse Burgos Corp., Inc., and/or Gregg Harbutt, General Manager, Atty. Roberto Enriquez, President, and Bill Percy v. Manolo Soriano, Lester Gonzales, and Yolanda Badilla

  • G.R. No. 171219 : Atty. Fe Q. Palmiano-Salvador v. Constantino Angeles substituted by Luz G. Angeles

  • G.R. No. 173036 : Agoo Rice Mill corporation, etc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines

  • G.R. No. 173425 - Fort Bonifacio Develoment Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Revenue District Officer, etc.

  • G.R. No. 174376 : Zosima Incorporated v. Lilia Salimbagat and all persons claiming rights under her

  • G.R. No. 174669 : Belle Corporation v. Erlinda De Leon-Banks, Rhodora De Leon Tiatco, et al.

  • G.R. No. 174982 : Jose Vicente Atilano II, Heirs of Carlos V. Tan, represented by Conrad K. Tan, Carlos K. Tan, Camilo Karl Tan, Carisa Rosenda T. Go, Nelida F. Atilano and Isidra K. Tan v. Hon. Judge Tibing A. Asaali, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City and Atlantic Merchandising, Inc.

  • G.R. No. 175170 - Misamis Oriental II Electric Service Cooperative (MORESCO II) v. Virgilio M. Cagalawan

  • G.R. No. 175284 : BP Philippines, Inc. (formerly Burmah Castrol Philippines, Inc.) v. Clark Trading Corporation

  • G.R. No. 176343 - Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Phil. v. Rosario S. Manalang-Demigillo

  • G.R. No. 177438 : Amada Resterio v. People of the Philippines

  • G.R. No. 177711 : Suico Industrial Corporation and Spouses Esmeraldo and Elizabeth Suico v. Hon. Marilyn Lagura-Yap, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP), Now First E-Bank, and Antonio Agro Development Corporation

  • G.R. Nos. 177857-58 : Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. v. Republic of the Philippines

  • G.R. No. 179115 : Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

  • G.R. No. 182045 : Gulf Air Company, Philippines Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

  • G.R. No. 182230 : People of the Philippines v. Edgardo Lupac y Flores

  • G.R. No. 183097 : People of the Philippines v. Antonio Venturina

  • G.R. No. 183533 : In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data in favor of Francis Saez, Francis Saez, petitioner versus Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al., respondents

  • G.R. No. 184500 : People of the Philippines v. Wenceslao Nelmida, et al.

  • G.R. No. 184606 - People of the Philippines v. Calexto D. Fundales

  • G.R. No. 185282 : People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Bravo y Estabillo

  • G.R. No. 186002 : Apo Chemical Manufacturing and Michael Cheng v. Ronaldo A. Bides

  • Gr_187052_2012

  • G.R. No. 187801 : Heirs of Leonardo Banaag, namely: Marta R. Banaag, et al. v. AMS Farming Corporation and Land Bank of the Philippines

  • G.R. No. 188417 : Milagros De Belen Vda. De Cabalu, Meliton Cabali, Sps. Angela Cabalu and Rodolfo Talavera and Patricio Abus v. Sps. Renato Tabu and dolores Laxamana, MTCC, Tarlac city, Branch II

  • G.R. No. 188979 - People of the Philippines v. Christopher Pareja y Velasco

  • G.R. No. 189486 and G.R. NO. 189699 - Simny G. Guy, Geraldine G. Guy, Gladys G. Yao and the Heirs of the late Grace G. Cheu v. Gilbert Guy/Simny G. Guy, Geraldine G. Guy, Gladys G. Yao and the heirs of the late Grace G. Cheu v. The Hon. Ofelia C. Calo, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC-Mandaluyong City-Branch 211 and Gilbert Guy

  • G.R. No. 190680 : Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals and Ayala Land, Inc.

  • G.R. No. 191062 - People of the Philippine v. Mohamad Angkob y Milang

  • G.R. No. 191128 : Carmencita Guizano, substituted by her heirs namely, Eugenio M. Guizano, Jr., Emmanuel M. Guizano, et al. v. Reynaldo S. Veneracion

  • G.R. No. 191753 - People of the Philippines v. Ronald De Jesus y Apacible and Amelito Dela Cruz y Pua

  • G.R. No. 191837 - Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual v. Spouses Marilyn Lim and George Lim and The Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela City

  • G.R. No. 192117 and G.R. NO. 192118 - Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc., et al. v. Energy Regulatory Commission/Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc., et al. v. Energy Regulatory Commission

  • G.R. No. 192945 - City of Iriga v. Camarines Sur III Electric Cooperative Inc.

  • G.R. No. 193753 : Living @ Sense, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.

  • G.R. No. 193789 : Alex Q. Naranjo. Donnalyn De Guzman, Ronald V. Cruz, Rosemarie P. Pimentel and Rowena B. Bardaje v. Biomedica Health Care, Inc. and Carina "Karen" J. Motol

  • G.R. No. 193854 : People of the Philippines v. Dina Dulay y Pascual

  • G.R. No. 194014 - Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Alejandro and Myrna Reblando

  • G.R. No. 195592 - Magdiwang Realty Corporation, Renato P. Dragon and Esperanza Tolentino v. The Manila Banking Corporation, substituted by First Sovereign Asset Management [SPV-AMC], Inc.

  • G.R. No. 195619 - Planters Development Bank v. Julie Chandumal

  • G.R. No. 195909 : Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. St. Luke'sj Medical Center, Inc./St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

  • G.R. No. 196161 : Cyril Calpito Qui v. People of the Philippines

  • G.R. No. 196355 - Bienvenido William D. Lloren v. The Commission on Elections, et al.

  • G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. NO. 196232 - Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, acting through and represented by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al./Wendell Barreras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the President, Atty. Dennis F. Ortiz, et al.

  • G.R. No. 197205 : Jessie V. David, represented by his wife, Ma. Theresa S. David, and chinldren, Katherine and Kristina David v. OSG Shipmanagement Manila, Inc. and/or Michaelmar Shipping Services

  • G.R. No. 197528 - Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc. v. Amando A. Vinuya, et al.

  • G.R. No. 198662 - Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. and Eric S. Canoy v. Domingo Z. Ybarola, et al.

  • G.R. No. 199084 - Antonia P. Ceron v. Commission on Elections, et al.

  • G.R. No. 199082 : Jose Miguel T. Arroyo v. Department of Justice, et al./Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. v. Hon. Leila de Lima, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, et al./Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. Commission on Elections, etc., et al.

  • G.R. No. 199547 : The New Philippine Skylanders, Inc. and/or Jennifer M. Eñano-Bote v. Francisco N. Dakila

  • G.R. No. 200529 : People of the Philippines v. Juanito Garcia y Gumay @ Wapog

  • G.R. No. 200951 - People of the Philippines v. Jose Almodiel alias "Dodong Astrobal"

  • G.R. No. 202914 : Government Service Insurance System, etc. v. Heidi B. Chua