November 1988 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 84907 : November 03, 1988]
IN THE MATTER OF THE SPECIAL PETITION TO THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO ANNUL THE RESOLUTION OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT DATED JUNE 22, 1988, [SEC. 4(3), ART. VIII CONST.] GLORIA JOPSON ASUNCION, PETITIONER
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated November 3, 1988
| "G.R. No. 84907 | In the matter of the Special Petition to the Supreme Court En Banc for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari to annul the Resolution of the First Division of the Supreme Court dated June 22, 1988, [Sec. 4(3), Art. VIII Const.] |
GLORIA JOPSON ASUNCION, Petitioner |
In this "special petition for certiorari" addressed to the Court en banc, petitioner seeks to annul the Resolution, dated 22 June 1988, of the Court's First Division which dismissed her petition to set aside the Order of the court a quo denying her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In its Resolution, dated 1 August 1988, the First Division denied, with finality, reconsideration of the Resolution dated 22 June 1988. In this "special petition", petitioner likewise prays for the issuance of an order for her immediate release.
Reproduced below is the recital of facts contained in the questioned Resolution of 22 June 1988:
"The facts show that on March 29, 1988, petitioner Gloria Jopson-Asuncion was arrested without a warrant by elements of the CAPCOM-NCRSU-CSG at 239-C Lt. Artiaga Street, San Juan, Metro Manila when the said peace officers raided the premises pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of Br. 151. Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, against Rafael Baylosis, Rolando Kintanar, Maria Concepcion Araneta and Fides Lim.
"On April 5, 1988, an information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal charging her and four others apprehended during the raid with the crime of violation of P.D. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives) with Branch 156, Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, presided by Judge Martin Villarama, Jr. and docketed as Criminal Case No. 72705.
"On April 11, 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, pursuant to Rule 112, Section 7 of the Rules of Court. The motion was granted.
"On April 13, 1988, petitioner filed with the court (RTC, Branch 156) a Motion for the suspension of further proceedings in the case against her pending the result of the reinvestigation being conducted by the Provincial Fiscal and for her release on the ground that there was no legal basis for her continued detention. Judge Villarama, in his order dated April 13, 1988, granted the suspension of further proceedings but denied the petitioner's prayer for release on the ground that the accused has not yet been arraigned and hence the court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
"On April 26, 1988, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with Branch 98, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, presided by respondent, Judge Cezar Peralejo. This petition alleged that the application for search warrant and the order accordingly issued both make no mention of petitioner or of any illegal acts which may be attributed to her and that up to the present there is no judicial process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the form of a warrant of arrest or order of commitment which authorizes such continued detention of petitioner. Accordingly, the petition is anchored on the grounds that there is no probable cause, no legal ground for the warrantless arrest of petitioner and for her continued deprivation of personal liberty without any lawful order from the court.
"The petition likewise alleged that the only basis for her detention is her romantic involvement with one of the persons arrested, i.e. Rolando Kintanar, a.k.a. Mario Asuncion.
"On April 28, 1988, the respondent judge of Quezon City dismissed the petition stating that whatever illegality which might have originally affected her detention, if any, had been cured by the filing of the information against her."
On 30 April 1988, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for certiorari and habeas corpus, entitled "Gloria Jopson Asuncion vs. Hon. Cezar C. Peralejo, et al.", docketed as G.R. No. 82915 and assigned to the First Division. The petition sought the issuance of a writ of certiorari to set aside the order of the lower court (Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, presiding) and a writ of habeas corpus for her release. The First Division issued the writ of habeas corpus to which respondents, as required, made a return. In said return, respondents manifested their opposition to the issuance, of a writ of habeas corpus as prayed for by petitioner. Respondents contend that at the time petitioner was arrested, she was found in possession of unlicensed firearms and explosives which is declared an unlawful act under paragraph 3, section 3 of P.D. 1866, and carries with it the penalty of death. Otherwise stated, according to the respondents, petitioner was arrested while committing an illegal act.
As aforestated, the First Division dismissed the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus in the Resolution dated 22 June 1988, pertinent portions of which read as follows:
"Even if We were to put aside procedural technicalities, the petition is still devoid of merit. There is no explicit rule requiring a judge, after an accused has been arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the regional trial court and later charged in a complaint or information conformably with the provisions of Rule 112, Section 7 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to still issue a warrant of arrest or order of commitment for the said accused. Clearly, such rule is not provided since the accused is already under detention so that the issuance of a warrant for his arrest or an order for his commitment would be an absolute superfluity. The need of a warrant of arrest arises only when the accused is at large as under Rule 113, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure means 'the taking of a person in custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.' The obvious purpose of the warrant is for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
"But assuming, arguendo, that the judge must issue a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, such requirement may be considered to have been dispensed with by the voluntary appearance of the. petitioner in court, through counsel, which virtually was a submission to the court's jurisdiction, thereby legalizing her continued detention. x x x."
Petitioner in this "special petition for certiorari, etc." now urges the Court en banc to set aside the resolution rendered by the First Division, on the ground that it has allegedly overruled a settled doctrine laid down by the Court en banc in the cases of Lino v. Fugoso (No. L-1159, January 30, 1947, 77 Phil. 933) and Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila (No. L-2128, May 12, 1948, 80 Phil. 859). In support of her instant "special petition", petitioner cites section 4(3), Art VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
"(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberation on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc."
At the outset, it should be stated that this "special petition for certiorari" has no basis in the Rules of Court. It is a remedy not provided for in the Rules. The most liberal treatment that can be accorded to it is to consider it as a second motion for reconsideration which, under the Rules, may be filed only with prior leave of court. Both motions (motion for leave to file second motion for reconsideration and the second motion for reconsideration) should have been filed with the First Division. Of course, the filing of a second motion for reconsideration with the First Division may have appeared futile to the petitioner considering its resolution, dated 1 August 1988, denying with finality petitioner's first motion for reconsideration of its resolution, dated 22 June 1988. But, then, what petitioner seeks to attain with the instant petition is for the Court en banc to take cognizance of the case. This could have been done only if, after considering petitioner's second motion for reconsideration, at least three (3) members of the First Division had voted that the case merits the attention of the Court en banc and a majority of the members of the Court en banc had joined in such conclusion (par. (f), resolution of 23 February 1984 in Bar Matter No. 209).
Based on the foregoing considerations, this petition should be dismissed.
Even on the merits, the facts obtaining in the case at bar are materially different from those involved in the cases cited by petitioner. Unlike in the Lino and Sayo cases, petitioner herein placed herself under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 156, where she voluntarily appeared, through counsel, to seek a suspension of further proceedings, pending the result of reinvestigation by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal of the charges filed against her; and as a matter of fact, such reinvestigation is being conducted by the Provincial Fiscal, upon petitioner's request, while proceedings have been suspended in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 156, pursuant also to petitioner's request.
Furthermore, petitioner is charged with a most serious offense that carries with it the penalty of death (automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua under the 1987 Constitution). The evidence of petitioner's guilt being strong, bail is unavailing to her. Upon the other hand, detainees in the Sayo case were merely charged with robbery, while those in the Lino case were charged with "unjust vexation and disobedience to police orders." Thus, in the Lino case, Mr. Chief Justice Moran, speaking for the Court, made these significant pronouncements -
"It must be observed, in this connection, that in said informations, the two petitioners are charged with light offenses punishable by law with arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 peso or both, according to the second paragraph of Articles 151 and 287, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code. Under Rule 108, section 10, when the offense charged is of that character, 'the judge with whom the complaint or information is filed, shall not issue any warrant or order for the arrest of the defendant, but shall order the latter to appear on the day and hour fixed in the order to answer to the complaint or information,' although in particular instances he may also 'order that a defendant charged with such offense be arrested and not released except upon furnishing bail. 'The general rule, there fore, is that when the offense charged is light the accused should not be arrested, except in particular instances when the court expressly so orders in the exercise of its discretion. In the instant case, the municipal court has not yet acted on the informations nor exercised its discretion to order the arrest of the two petitioners and, therefore, they are still detained not because of the informations filed against them but as a continuance of their illegal detention by the police officers. xxx
"xxx In the eyes of the law, therefore, these prisoners should have been out of prison long before the informations were filed with the municipal court, and they should not be retained therein merely because of the filing of such informations it appearing particularly that the offenses charged are light and are not, as a general rule, grounds for arrest, under Rule 108, section 10. Under such circumstances, only an order of commitment could legalize the prisoner's continued confinement, and no such order has ever been issued. xxx"
In fine, the questioned resolution of the First Division, dated 22 June 1988, has not modified or reversed any doctrine 6r principle of law laid down by the Court in the earlier cases cited by petitioner.
Finally, the following principles predicated on the Constitution, should be re-stated:
1. The Supreme Court sits either en banc or in divisions of three, five or seven Members (Sec. 4(1), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). At present, the Court has three divisions of five Members each.
2. A decision or resolution of a division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4(3), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). The Court en banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of a division may be appealed.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) DANIEL T. MARTINEZ
Clerk of Court
