March 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 150649 : March 07, 2007] HEIRS OF SIMEON D. CABANAYAN AND CONSUELO CABANAYAN VERSUS MARLYN A. BENITO AND GERONIMA C. RAVARA:
[G.R. No. 150649 : March 07, 2007]
HEIRS OF SIMEON D. CABANAYAN AND CONSUELO CABANAYAN VERSUS MARLYN A. BENITO AND GERONIMA C. RAVARA
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court dated March 7, 2007.
G.R. No. 150649 - (HEIRS OF SIMEON D. CABANAYAN and CONSUELO CABANAYAN versus MARLYN A. BENITO and GERONIMA C. RAVARA)
Petitioners, the heirs of Simeon D. Cabanayan and Consuelo Cabanayan, bring to us this petition for review on certiorari[1] questioning the August 10, 2001 decision[2] and November 7, 2001 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64074.
Sometime in 1996, Simeon D. Cabanayan executed an authority to sell a portion of a 264,176 square-meter parcel of land he owned in Bolaen, Sual, Pangasinan. The power of attorney was in favor of respondents Marlyn A. Benito and Geronima C. Ravara[4] who were authorized to look for a buyer at a price of P25 per square-meter and a commission of 5% of the total price, plus any excess or "overprice" as their service fee.[5]
A portion (or 180,000 square-meters) was sold to spouses McArthur and Erlinda Ang for P35 per square meter or a total of P6.3 million.[6] Pursuant to the authority to sell, respondents demanded their commission amounting to P225,000 and the overprice of P1.8 million as service fee but Cabanayan paid them only P500,000 leaving a balance of P1,525,000.[7]
To pursue their claim, respondents filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69 against the spouses Simeon and Consuelo Cabanayan.[8] In a decision dated March 26, 1999, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
The court a quo held that since it was respondents, along with a certain Juanita de Leon, who found the buyers (the spouses Ang), they were entitled to the commission and service fee agreed upon in the authority to sell.[9] Consequently, it ruled that the spouses Cabanayan were jointly and severally liable to pay respondents P1,525,000 plus interest, moral damages in the amount of P40,000 and attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.[10]
Aggrieved, the spouses Cabanayan appealed to the CA. Pending their appeal, Simeon Cabanayan passed away and his heirs substituted him.[11] The CA affirmed the RTC but deleted the award of moral damages and attorney's fees for being unwarranted.[12]
Hence this petition.
The core issue petitioners raise is factual. Inevitably, their petition must fail.
Petitioners insist that respondents had no involvement in the sale of the land. They maintain that it was solely Juanita de Leon who found the buyers. However, the RTC and CA determined otherwise. It was shown that respondents, along with de Leon, were responsible for effecting and finalizing the sale.[13]
Time and time again, we have stated that only questions of law may be raised by the parties in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45.[14] Findings of fact of the CA affirming those of the trial court are accorded great respect, even finality, by this Court when supported by the evidence on record.[15] It is not our function to re-examine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties.[16] While we recognize several exceptions to this rule,[17] none of these exceptions finds application here.
According to both the CA and RTC, it was undeniably through the efforts of respondents that the lot was sold. Thus, they were entitled to the balance of their commission and the "overprice" or service fee. No compelling reason whatsoever was shown by petitioners for this Court to review and reverse the trial court's findings and conclusions, as affirmed by the CA.
Petitioners assert that there was no basis to hold Consuelo Cabanayan "jointly and severally liable" with her husband Simeon because only the latter executed the authority to sell.[18] This issue, however, was not raised in their appeal.[19] Evidence not having been adduced in the courts below why she should not be held solidarily liable, we decline to rule on this issue.
They also argue that as heirs, they should not be held liable under Rule 3, Sec. 20 of the Rules of Court. We disagree. Aside from the fact that this issue is also being proffered for the first time on appeal, nowhere in the cited rule does it say that heirs of the deceased defendant will not be liable. In fact, Rule 3, Sec. 20 provides that despite the death of the defendant, the case will continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff can then be prosecuted against the estate of the deceased person.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the August 10, 2001 decision and November 7, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64074 AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150649 - (HEIRS OF SIMEON D. CABANAYAN and CONSUELO CABANAYAN versus MARLYN A. BENITO and GERONIMA C. RAVARA)
Petitioners, the heirs of Simeon D. Cabanayan and Consuelo Cabanayan, bring to us this petition for review on certiorari[1] questioning the August 10, 2001 decision[2] and November 7, 2001 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64074.
Sometime in 1996, Simeon D. Cabanayan executed an authority to sell a portion of a 264,176 square-meter parcel of land he owned in Bolaen, Sual, Pangasinan. The power of attorney was in favor of respondents Marlyn A. Benito and Geronima C. Ravara[4] who were authorized to look for a buyer at a price of P25 per square-meter and a commission of 5% of the total price, plus any excess or "overprice" as their service fee.[5]
A portion (or 180,000 square-meters) was sold to spouses McArthur and Erlinda Ang for P35 per square meter or a total of P6.3 million.[6] Pursuant to the authority to sell, respondents demanded their commission amounting to P225,000 and the overprice of P1.8 million as service fee but Cabanayan paid them only P500,000 leaving a balance of P1,525,000.[7]
To pursue their claim, respondents filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69 against the spouses Simeon and Consuelo Cabanayan.[8] In a decision dated March 26, 1999, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
The court a quo held that since it was respondents, along with a certain Juanita de Leon, who found the buyers (the spouses Ang), they were entitled to the commission and service fee agreed upon in the authority to sell.[9] Consequently, it ruled that the spouses Cabanayan were jointly and severally liable to pay respondents P1,525,000 plus interest, moral damages in the amount of P40,000 and attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.[10]
Aggrieved, the spouses Cabanayan appealed to the CA. Pending their appeal, Simeon Cabanayan passed away and his heirs substituted him.[11] The CA affirmed the RTC but deleted the award of moral damages and attorney's fees for being unwarranted.[12]
Hence this petition.
The core issue petitioners raise is factual. Inevitably, their petition must fail.
Petitioners insist that respondents had no involvement in the sale of the land. They maintain that it was solely Juanita de Leon who found the buyers. However, the RTC and CA determined otherwise. It was shown that respondents, along with de Leon, were responsible for effecting and finalizing the sale.[13]
Time and time again, we have stated that only questions of law may be raised by the parties in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45.[14] Findings of fact of the CA affirming those of the trial court are accorded great respect, even finality, by this Court when supported by the evidence on record.[15] It is not our function to re-examine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties.[16] While we recognize several exceptions to this rule,[17] none of these exceptions finds application here.
According to both the CA and RTC, it was undeniably through the efforts of respondents that the lot was sold. Thus, they were entitled to the balance of their commission and the "overprice" or service fee. No compelling reason whatsoever was shown by petitioners for this Court to review and reverse the trial court's findings and conclusions, as affirmed by the CA.
Petitioners assert that there was no basis to hold Consuelo Cabanayan "jointly and severally liable" with her husband Simeon because only the latter executed the authority to sell.[18] This issue, however, was not raised in their appeal.[19] Evidence not having been adduced in the courts below why she should not be held solidarily liable, we decline to rule on this issue.
They also argue that as heirs, they should not be held liable under Rule 3, Sec. 20 of the Rules of Court. We disagree. Aside from the fact that this issue is also being proffered for the first time on appeal, nowhere in the cited rule does it say that heirs of the deceased defendant will not be liable. In fact, Rule 3, Sec. 20 provides that despite the death of the defendant, the case will continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff can then be prosecuted against the estate of the deceased person.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the August 10, 2001 decision and November 7, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64074 AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now Associate Justice of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. of the Eleventh Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 29-40.
[3] The resolution was penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.; id., pp. 41-42.
[4] Id., pp. 12 and 29.
[5] id.
[6] Id., p. 29.
[7] Id., pp. 29-30.
[8] Docketed as Civil Case No. 17712; id., p. 29.
[9] Id., p. 33.
[10] Id., p. 31.
[11] Id., p. 32.
[12] Id., pp. 38-39.
[13] This was established by the testimony of de Leon herself; id., pp. 33-35.
[14] Jose v. People, G.R. No. 148371, 12 August 2004, 436 SCRA 294, 302; Pleyto v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737, 16 June 2004, 432 SCRA 329, 336; Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Wong, 412 Phil. 207, 216 (2001).
[15] Jose v. People, supra; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 554, 558 (2001); Garrido v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 872, 881 (2001); Santos v. Spouses Reyes, 420 Phil. 313, 317 (2001); Yu Bun Guan v. Ong, 419 Phil. 845, 854 (2001); Fernandez v. Fernandez, 416 Phil. 322, 337 (2001); Nagkakaisang Kapisanan Kapitbahayan sa Commonwealth Avenue v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil. 146, 153-154 (2001).
[16] Jose v. People, supra.
[17] The exceptions are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 542, 549; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission, 390 Phil. 1228, 1242 (2000); CIR v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phil), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547 (1999); Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998).
[18] Rollo, p. 120.
[19] They alleged that the trial court erred:
I
IN RELYING ON THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF [RESPONDENTS'] WITNESS JUANITA DE LEON, RATHER THAN ON HER EARLIER TESTIMONY THAT [RESPONDENTS] HAD NO PARTICIPATION IN THE EVENTUAL SALE OF [PETITIONERS'] PROPERTY.
II
IN NOT GIVING FULL WEIGHT TO THE OCULAR INSPECTION REPORT WHICH ESTABLISHED BEYOND PERADVENTURE THAT [RESPONDENTS] WERE NOT EVEN AWARE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND EVENTUAL SALE OF [PETITIONERS'] PROPERTY TO THE BUYERS.
III
IN FINDING EXHIBIT 2 MATERIAL TO THE CASE AND A FAVORABLE VERDICT TO [RESPONDENTS].
IV
IN GIVING COMMISSIONS AND SERVICE FEES TO [RESPONDENTS] WHO HAVE NOT RENDERED ANY SERVICE [TO PETITIONERS] AND WHO ARE NOT IN FACT LICENSED REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND ARE NOT THEREFORE ENTITLED TO LEGAL COMMISSIONS AND OVERPRICE FROM REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS. (Id., pp. 31-32.)
