December 2008 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. Nos. 167707 & 173775 : December 02, 2008] THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET A., V. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, ET AL:
[G.R. Nos. 167707 & 173775 : December 02, 2008]
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET A., V. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, ET AL
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 2, 2008
G.R. Nos. 167707 & 173775 (The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, et al., v. Mayor Jose S. Yap, et al.) - This refers to private claimants' motions for reconsideration[1] of Our Decision[2] of October 8, 2008, declaring that prior to Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on May 22, 2006, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan was unclassified land of the public domain, over which they have not acquired vested rights of ownership.
Private claimants Mila Y. Sumndad, Aniceto Yap, and Libertad Taiapian insist that (1) Boracay Island is susceptible of private ownership by acquisitive prescription under applicable laws classifying it as agricultural land and as a tourism zone under Proclamation No. 1801 and related issuances;[3] (2) Proclamation No. 1064 is an ultra vires act since the President unconstitutionally arrogates upon herself the power of classification with respect to forest lands which power properly belongs to Congress and as a direct violation of property rights without due process of law;[4] and (3) if this case involves the inadequacy of customary norms and vagueness or inflexibility of statutes, it demands in the process the application of this Court's equity jurisdiction to do substantial, practical, and total justice.[5]
For their part, private claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and Wilfredo Gelito assert that (1) they are entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064;[6] (2) their rights to free patent under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6940 and R.A. No. 9176 should have been considered m Our decision;[7] (3) the prayer for mandamus or prohibition in G.R. No. 173775 should be granted;[8] (4) Section 3 (a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, or the Revised Forestry Code, being not only hard law, but no law at all, should not be applied here;[9] (5) Proclamation No. 1801 is the positive classification of Boracay Island into partly forest reservation and alienable tourist land subject to private ownership;[10] and (6) the issue of whether private claimants have acquired private ownership of the lands they occupy even without securing titles was not ruled upon." [11] They ask that they be heard on oral arguments before their motions are resolved, considering the importance and public interest in this case.[12]
We deny the motions.
We note that the bulk of the issues raised and the arguments aired are merely repetitive of those already passed upon by the Court.
The Court has clearly resolved the basic issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and its related issuances constitute the positive act that classified Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land.
On the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1064, the Court cannot entertain private claimants' belated argument that President Arroyo arrogated unto herself the Congressional power to classify forest lands. This is raised for the first time and it is a collateral attack on the validity of Sections 6 and 7 of the Public Land Act,[14] the basis of President Arroyo's action. For reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of a law cannot be attacked collaterally.[15]
Regarding private claimants' right to apply for free patent titles, We stressed in Our decision that "the twin petitions pertain to their right, if any.to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws."[16] Private claimants themselves relied merely on judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of CA 141 and Section 54, paragraph 6 of Act No. 496 to support their claim of ownership.[17] However, We said that our decision does not preclude them from looking at other modes of applying for original registration of title.
As to private claimants' prayer for mandamus or prohibition in G.R. No. 173775, the issue involves determining the factual issue of whether each of them has been in possession of their properties since time immemorial, or since June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, this Court, in G.R. No. 173775, cannot be a trier of such fact.[l8b]The function belongs to the trial court. Thus, absent evidence showing that possession is of the required nature and length entitling each claimant to survey of the land. We cannot here compel the DENR to perform the act prayed for.
Anent the harshness of Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 705, that matter has been amply treated in our decision. Further, to retrain from applying the provision because it is '"hard law" or is "no law at all" is outside the ambit of Our functions. It is not for the Court to refuse to apply a law that has not been declared unconstitutional or invalid.
Lastly, the issue of whether private claimants have acquired vested rights or private ownership of the lands they occupy has been extensively discussed in our decision. There is no need for Us to go over the same again.
Considering that the basic issues in the twin petitions have been duly passed upon and private claimants presented no substantial argument or compelling reason for us to reconsider, to hold oral arguments on the motions for reconsideration would be futile and unnecessary.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration and their supplement, as well as the one to set said motions for hearing on oral arguments, are DENIED.
The Court further Resolved to NOTE the Manifestation for the Record filed by counsel for Mila Y. Sumndad, Aniceto Yap and Libertad Talapian.
Carpio, J., no part.
Corona, J., on official leave.
G.R. Nos. 167707 & 173775 (The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, et al., v. Mayor Jose S. Yap, et al.) - This refers to private claimants' motions for reconsideration[1] of Our Decision[2] of October 8, 2008, declaring that prior to Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on May 22, 2006, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan was unclassified land of the public domain, over which they have not acquired vested rights of ownership.
Private claimants Mila Y. Sumndad, Aniceto Yap, and Libertad Taiapian insist that (1) Boracay Island is susceptible of private ownership by acquisitive prescription under applicable laws classifying it as agricultural land and as a tourism zone under Proclamation No. 1801 and related issuances;[3] (2) Proclamation No. 1064 is an ultra vires act since the President unconstitutionally arrogates upon herself the power of classification with respect to forest lands which power properly belongs to Congress and as a direct violation of property rights without due process of law;[4] and (3) if this case involves the inadequacy of customary norms and vagueness or inflexibility of statutes, it demands in the process the application of this Court's equity jurisdiction to do substantial, practical, and total justice.[5]
For their part, private claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and Wilfredo Gelito assert that (1) they are entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064;[6] (2) their rights to free patent under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6940 and R.A. No. 9176 should have been considered m Our decision;[7] (3) the prayer for mandamus or prohibition in G.R. No. 173775 should be granted;[8] (4) Section 3 (a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, or the Revised Forestry Code, being not only hard law, but no law at all, should not be applied here;[9] (5) Proclamation No. 1801 is the positive classification of Boracay Island into partly forest reservation and alienable tourist land subject to private ownership;[10] and (6) the issue of whether private claimants have acquired private ownership of the lands they occupy even without securing titles was not ruled upon." [11] They ask that they be heard on oral arguments before their motions are resolved, considering the importance and public interest in this case.[12]
We deny the motions.
We note that the bulk of the issues raised and the arguments aired are merely repetitive of those already passed upon by the Court.
The Court has clearly resolved the basic issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and its related issuances constitute the positive act that classified Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land.xxxx
Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas' alienability.[13]
On the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1064, the Court cannot entertain private claimants' belated argument that President Arroyo arrogated unto herself the Congressional power to classify forest lands. This is raised for the first time and it is a collateral attack on the validity of Sections 6 and 7 of the Public Land Act,[14] the basis of President Arroyo's action. For reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of a law cannot be attacked collaterally.[15]
Regarding private claimants' right to apply for free patent titles, We stressed in Our decision that "the twin petitions pertain to their right, if any.to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws."[16] Private claimants themselves relied merely on judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of CA 141 and Section 54, paragraph 6 of Act No. 496 to support their claim of ownership.[17] However, We said that our decision does not preclude them from looking at other modes of applying for original registration of title.
As to private claimants' prayer for mandamus or prohibition in G.R. No. 173775, the issue involves determining the factual issue of whether each of them has been in possession of their properties since time immemorial, or since June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, this Court, in G.R. No. 173775, cannot be a trier of such fact.[l8b]The function belongs to the trial court. Thus, absent evidence showing that possession is of the required nature and length entitling each claimant to survey of the land. We cannot here compel the DENR to perform the act prayed for.
Anent the harshness of Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 705, that matter has been amply treated in our decision. Further, to retrain from applying the provision because it is '"hard law" or is "no law at all" is outside the ambit of Our functions. It is not for the Court to refuse to apply a law that has not been declared unconstitutional or invalid.
Lastly, the issue of whether private claimants have acquired vested rights or private ownership of the lands they occupy has been extensively discussed in our decision. There is no need for Us to go over the same again.
Considering that the basic issues in the twin petitions have been duly passed upon and private claimants presented no substantial argument or compelling reason for us to reconsider, to hold oral arguments on the motions for reconsideration would be futile and unnecessary.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration and their supplement, as well as the one to set said motions for hearing on oral arguments, are DENIED.
The Court further Resolved to NOTE the Manifestation for the Record filed by counsel for Mila Y. Sumndad, Aniceto Yap and Libertad Talapian.
Carpio, J., no part.
Corona, J., on official leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo (167707), pp. 314-365, 366-477, and 507-526, namely: Motion for Reconsideration (Re; Decision dated 8 October 2008) filed by respondents/petitioners Mila Y. Sumndad, Aniceto Yap, and Libertad Talapian on October 30, 2008; Motion for Reconsideration dated October 24, 2008 filed by respondent Mayor Jose S. Yap and petitioners Dr. Orlando Sacay and Wilfredo Gelito on October 30, 2008; and Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration dated November 17, 2008 filed by respondent Mayor Jose S.Yap and petitioners Dr. Orlando Sacay and Wilfredo Gelito on November 18, 2008, respectively.
[2] G.R. Nos. 167707 & 173775, October 8, 2008.
[3] Id. at 317.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 382, 515.
[7] Id. at 390, 518.
[8] Id. at 397, 521.
[9] Id. at 400-416.
[10] Id. at 416.
[11] Id. at 420, 521.
[12] id. at 428, 528-534.
[13] Supra note 2, at pp. 25-26.
[14] SEC. 6. The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources), shall from time to lime classify lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
And may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the President upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources), shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
[15] Rayo v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 165142, December 10, 2007.
[16] Supra note 2 at pp. 9-10.
[17] Rollo (173775), pp. 9-10.
[18] Leoncio v. De Vera, G.R. No. 176842, February 18, 2008.
