June 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 195157 : June 15, 2011]
OSCAR F. GABUYA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 195157 (Oscar F. Gabuya v. People of the Philippines). - Before the Court is a motion[1] filed by petitioner Oscar F. Gabuya seeking the reconsideration of the Resolution, dated January 14, 2011, issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) and the object of Gabuya's petition for review on certiorari filed with the Court. We treat this submission as a motion seeking the reconsideration of our Resolution dated March 2, 2011, where we denied Gabuya's petition for review on certiorari.[2]
Gabuya's petition imputed errors against the CA Decision dated August 27, 2010,[3] which affirmed his conviction for violation of the second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1866, as amended, which states:
Section 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full authomatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
The criminal charge alleged that Gabuya was engaged in the unauthorized manufacture and sale of unlicensed firearms.
Gabuya argues that the lower courts erroneously interpret "assembly" of firearm out of "finished parts" of a firearm as similar to the prohibited act of "manufacturing or making" a firearm. He contends that the assembly of firearms is not a criminal act pursuant to PD No. 1866. The lower courts' interpretation is erroneous because "manufacturing" presupposes that there is intervention of tools or machine in building or creating a firearm or a part of it out of a simple slab of steel or metal into a full functioning firearm or part thereof.
The Court finds that Gabuya's motion for reconsideration raises the same arguments that he did in his petition for review on certiorari. The RTC correctly relied on the case of US v. Thompson (504 US 505, 1992) in determining when is a firearm deemed made:
when a gun other than a firearm was placed together with a further part or parts that would have had no use in association with the gun except to convert it into a firearm, a firearm was produced.
Gabuya's claim that the services he offered to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents were limited to the repair and fitting of gun parts is belied by his admission that the NBI agents, as buyers, would "complete the parts" of a dismantled unfinished gun[4] and he would "fit together" those parts to make it functional. Gabuya claims that he should not incur criminal liability for this act because it is covered by his license to repair guns. The word "repair" covers the act of making a damaged or destroyed gun functional, but it certainly excludes making functional an unfinished dismantled gun. Black defines "repair" as:
To mend, remedy, restore, renovate. To restore to a sound or good state after decay, injury, dilapidation, or partial destruction. The word "repair" contemplates an existing structure or thing which has become imperfect, and means to supply in the original existing structure that which is lost or destroyed, and thereby restore it to the condition in which it originally existed.[5]
In contrast, "manufacture" is defined as:
The process or operation of making goods or any material produced by hand, by machinery or by other agency; x x x. The production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving such materials new forms, qualities, properties or combinations, whether by hand labor or machine.[6]
The same definition of "manufacture" is broad enough to include the concept of "assembling" parts to make a new form. Moreover, even if Section 1 of PD No. 1866, as amended, did not expressly include the word "assemble," the concept may still be considered as embraced within the meaning of the word "manufacture." To construe it as such would in fact support the purpose behind the Decree's enactment, as stated in one of its "Whereas" clauses:
WHEREAS, there has been an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the Court's Resolution, dated March 2, 2011, is DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 245-265.[2] Id. at 244.
[3] Also assailed is the CA Resolution of January 14, 2011 denying Gabuya's motion for reconsideration.
[4] See rollo, p. 252.
[5] Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1167.
[6] Id. at 870.