March 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 192070 : March 13, 2012]
EDDIE "AMONG ED" T. PANLILIO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND LILIA G. PINEDA.
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated MARCH 13, 2012, which reads as follows: cralaw
"G.R. No. 192070 - EDDIE "AMONG ED" T. PANLILIO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND LILIA G. PINEDA.
RESOLUTION
The petitioner seeks the reversal of the Resolution issued on May 4, 2010 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in EPC No. 2007-04,[1] which affirmed the Resolution dated February 11, 2010 of the Second Division, COMELEC:[2] (a) declaring respondent Lilia G. Pineda as the duly-elected Governor of the Province of Pampanga in the May 14, 2007 Local Elections; and (b) ordering the petitioner to vacate the post of Governor of the Province of Pampanga and to allow Pineda to assume the vacated post.
The petitioner and Pineda were two of the three candidates who ran for the position of Governor of the Province of Pampanga during the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections.[3] On May 18, 2007, after the canvassing of votes, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed the petitioner as the duly elected Governor with 219,706 votes, as opposed to Pineda's 218,559 votes. On May 25, 2007, Pineda filed an election protest in the COMELEC contesting the results of all the precincts that functioned during the election, with the exception of Angeles City.
In its Resolution promulgated on February 11, 2010,[4] the Second Division of the COMELEC declared Pineda as the duly elected Governor "after garnering, on the basis of this Commission's xxx review and examination of the contested ballots, a total number of 190,729 votes as against the 188,718 votes cast in favor of Protester Panlilio;" and ordered the petitioner to vacate his post and to allow Pineda to assume as Governor in accordance with the pertinent rules, laws and jurisprudence.
On May 4, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, on May 17, 2010, the petitioner came to the Court on certiorari to assail the Resolution of May 4, 2010.[5]
Before the petition was filed, the regular National and Local Elections were held on May 10, 2010, and the winners proclaimed.
On June 29, 2010, the Court directed COMELEC and Pineda to comment on the petition.[6]
In the meanwhile, the term of office being contested between the parties ended at noon of June 30, 2010; and the next term of office for the same position commenced. Pineda was proclaimed as the Governor of the Province of Pampanga duly elected during the National and Local Elections of May 10, 2010. She assumed the office on July 1, 2010. This development has left the Court no alternative except to dismiss the petition in accord with jurisprudence to the effect that the expiration of the contested term of office renders the petition moot and academic. As the Court held in Malaluan v. COMELEC:[7]
It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has become moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioner's right to the mayoralty seat in his municipality because expiration of the term of office contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering the same moot and academic.
When the appeal from a decision in an election case has already become moot, the case being an election protest involving the office of [the] mayor the term of which had expired, the appeal is dismissible on that ground, unless the rendering of a decision on the merits would be of practical value. This rule we established in the case of Yorac v. Magalona which we dismissed because it had been mooted by the expiration of the term of office of the Municipal Mayor of Saravia, Negros Occidental, x x x x [underscoring supplied.]
Indeed, the expiration of the contested term of office eliminated any practical or useful purpose to still pass upon and determine the merits of the petition, and rendered the dismissal of the petition a necessity. It is elementary that the courts of law will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted.[8] An academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question is not necessary,[9] because a judgment on the case cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.[10] We reiterate what was aptly said in Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,[11] viz:
It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.cralaw
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court DISMISSES the petition for being moot and academic."
Del Castillo, J., on leave.
Abad, J., no part.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 57-71.[2] Id., pp. 44-56.
[3] Mark Lapid was the third candidate.
[4] Supra, note 2.
[5] Rollo, pp. 5-43.
[6] Id, p. 342.
[7] G.R. No. 120193, March 6, 1996, 254 SCRA 397.
[8] Villarico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132115, January 4, 2002, 373 SCRA 23.
[9] Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 96663, August 10, 1999, 312 SCRA 104.
[10] Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 130, 138.
[11] G.R. No. 108033, April 14, 1997, 271 SCRA 204.
