August 1903 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
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G.R. No. 1302 August 21, 1903 - UNITED STATES v. NARCISO CALIGAGAN
002 Phil 433:
002 Phil 433:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1302. August 21, 1903. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. NARCISO CALIGAGAN, Defendant-Appellant.
Juan Medina Cue for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. — Testimony given at the preliminary hearing can never be considered at the trial in the Court of First Instance unless there is proof in the latter court of what the testimony was in the justice court.
2. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED AT PRELIMINARY HEARING. — Such testimony when given by the defendant, when so proved, may be considered by the Court of First Instance.
3. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF WITNESS AT PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. — Such testimony given by a third person against the defendant and retracted by such witness in the Court of First Instance can not be used against the defendant. If it is in favor of the defendant and is changed by the witness in the Court of First Instance, when proved in the latter court, it can be used by the defendant to impeach the credibility of the witness.
2. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED AT PRELIMINARY HEARING. — Such testimony when given by the defendant, when so proved, may be considered by the Court of First Instance.
3. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF WITNESS AT PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. — Such testimony given by a third person against the defendant and retracted by such witness in the Court of First Instance can not be used against the defendant. If it is in favor of the defendant and is changed by the witness in the Court of First Instance, when proved in the latter court, it can be used by the defendant to impeach the credibility of the witness.
D E C I S I O N
WILLARD, J. :
It is claimed by the counsel for the defendant in this court that the statements made in the preliminary investigation were improperly considered by the court below, citing in support of his claim decisions of this court. Testimony given in the preliminary hearing can never be considered by the Court of First Instance when the accused is there on trial unless it is reproduced in that court — that is, unless there is proof in that court of what was the testimony before the justice of the peace.
When there is such proof, the effect to be given to the testimony before the justice of the peace depends upon the person who gave it. If such person was the defendant, his statement has, at least, the effect of any extrajudicial confession made by him and is evidence proper to be taken into consideration against him, although he may have in the Court of First Instance retracted his confession.
On the other hand, if the person were not the defendant his testimony before the justice can never be used to convict the defendant. If such a person testified before the justice that he saw the defendant commit the act, and in the Court of First Instance testifies that he did not, his first statement can not avail the Government. If, however, he testified before the justice that he did not see the defendant commit the act, and in the Court of First Instance testifies that he did, the defendant can there prove what his testimony was before the justice, for the purpose of impeaching his credibility as a witness.
In the case at bar the Government proved at the trial in the Court of First Instance that the defendant made certain statements before the justice in the preliminary investigation. These statements the Court of First Instance had a right to consider in deciding upon the guilt or innocence of the accused.
On the other hand, the witness Pangan before the justice testified that the deceased Capulong, before he died, told him that the defendant had wounded him. But at the trial in the Court of First Instance he testified that the deceased said nothing to him at the time. His first statement can not be used as evidence against the defendant.
Upon all the evidence that is proper to be considered, we think that the guilt of the defendant is proved but that he is entitled to the benefit of the attenuating circumstance of drunkenness.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs of this instance against the Appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa and McDonough, JJ., concur.
When there is such proof, the effect to be given to the testimony before the justice of the peace depends upon the person who gave it. If such person was the defendant, his statement has, at least, the effect of any extrajudicial confession made by him and is evidence proper to be taken into consideration against him, although he may have in the Court of First Instance retracted his confession.
On the other hand, if the person were not the defendant his testimony before the justice can never be used to convict the defendant. If such a person testified before the justice that he saw the defendant commit the act, and in the Court of First Instance testifies that he did not, his first statement can not avail the Government. If, however, he testified before the justice that he did not see the defendant commit the act, and in the Court of First Instance testifies that he did, the defendant can there prove what his testimony was before the justice, for the purpose of impeaching his credibility as a witness.
In the case at bar the Government proved at the trial in the Court of First Instance that the defendant made certain statements before the justice in the preliminary investigation. These statements the Court of First Instance had a right to consider in deciding upon the guilt or innocence of the accused.
On the other hand, the witness Pangan before the justice testified that the deceased Capulong, before he died, told him that the defendant had wounded him. But at the trial in the Court of First Instance he testified that the deceased said nothing to him at the time. His first statement can not be used as evidence against the defendant.
Upon all the evidence that is proper to be considered, we think that the guilt of the defendant is proved but that he is entitled to the benefit of the attenuating circumstance of drunkenness.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs of this instance against the Appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa and McDonough, JJ., concur.
