December 1982 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
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G.R. No. L-29469 December 9, 1982 - PATRICIO PEBEAUCO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL.
204 Phil. 452:
204 Phil. 452:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-29469. December 9, 1982.]
PATRICIO PEBEAUCO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor, PRUDENCIO AUSTRIA, ET AL., Oppositors-Appellants.
Casimiro S. Pe for Petitioner-Appellee.
Bermejo & Bacosa for private oppositors-appellants.
The Solicitor General for oppositor.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner-appellee’s application for registration of a parcel of land was opposed by the Director of Land and herein appellants who alleged that the property sought to be registered is a public land which they have been occupying continuously, openly and notoriously since September 1959 and have been paying taxes therefor. However, on the date scheduled for the presentation of evidence for oppositors-appellants, they failed to appear because of the sudden suspension of operation of the only boat that plies between Coron where appellants lived and Puerto Princesa, Palawan where trial was held and there was no other means of transportation available to traverse the distance of more than 200 kilometers. As a result, the trial judge, having received the applicant’s evidence, considered the case submitted for decision despite the motion for postponement made orally in open court by appellants’ counsel, and thereafter, rendered judgment declaring petitioner-appellee as owner of the disputed land. Hence, this appeal where the only issue raised is whether the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion to postpone the hearing, thereby depriving them of their chance to present their case to the court.
The Supreme Court held that the court a quo erred in denying appellants motion for postponement, since the failure on the part of appellants to come to trial was reasonable, something beyond their control and definitely not intended for delay.
Assailed judgment, set aside. Case remanded to the court a quo for reception of appellants’ evidence.
The Supreme Court held that the court a quo erred in denying appellants motion for postponement, since the failure on the part of appellants to come to trial was reasonable, something beyond their control and definitely not intended for delay.
Assailed judgment, set aside. Case remanded to the court a quo for reception of appellants’ evidence.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTIONS; MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT; ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURTS. — While it is true that motions for postponements are addressed to the sound discretion of the courts, the discretion must be exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and with the view of doing substantial justice (People v. Martinez, 105 Phil. 200). It should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the convenience of the courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby (Zubiri v. Zubiri, 18 SCRA 1157).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIS FOR GRANT OR DENIAL. — In considering motions for postponement, two (2) things should be taken into consideration, namely: (1) the reasonableness of the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPELLANTS’ MOTION HELD REASONABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, the oppositors-appellants failed to appear on the date scheduled for the presentation of their evidence because the M/V Basilan, which was and still is the only boat that plies between Coron where appellants live and Puerto Princesa where trial was held, had been suddenly suspended in operation for that week and there was no other means of transportation available. Failure then on the part of the appellants to come to trial was reasonable and something beyond their control, hence, definitely not intended for delay.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIS FOR GRANT OR DENIAL. — In considering motions for postponement, two (2) things should be taken into consideration, namely: (1) the reasonableness of the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPELLANTS’ MOTION HELD REASONABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, the oppositors-appellants failed to appear on the date scheduled for the presentation of their evidence because the M/V Basilan, which was and still is the only boat that plies between Coron where appellants live and Puerto Princesa where trial was held, had been suddenly suspended in operation for that week and there was no other means of transportation available. Failure then on the part of the appellants to come to trial was reasonable and something beyond their control, hence, definitely not intended for delay.
D E C I S I O N
RELOVA, J.:
Patricio Pebeauco applied for the registration, under Act 496, as amended, of a parcel of land with an area of 229.4531 hectares, situated at Borac-Marcella, Coron, Palawan. Some of the oppositors were the oppositors were the Director of Lands, represented by the Provincial Fiscal, and herein sixty-one (61) appellants, Prudencio Austria, Et Al., who claimed that sometime in September 1959 they were told by then Governor Alfredo Abueg that the land sought to be registered in the name of herein petitioner is a public land; that because of the information given by the governor, they entered, occupied, cultivated and developed the portions they have been occupying since then continuously, openly and notoriously; and that they are destitute farmers and do not have land of their own except the ones applied for registration by applicant Pebeauco and which they are now actually occupying and have been paying taxes therefor.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Trial was held on January 18, 1966 when applicant Patricio Pebeauco presented his evidence until the following day when he rested his case.
On the date scheduled for the presentation of evidence for herein oppositors-appellants, they failed to appear because the M/V Basilan, which was and still is the only boat that plies between Coron and Puerto Princesa, Palawan where the hearing was held, had been suddenly suspended in operation for that week and there was no other means of transportation available. When appellants failed to appear, the Honorable Judge Tranquilino Tividad considered the case submitted for decision despite the motion for postponement made orally in open court by their counsel.
On May 30, 1966, Judge Tividad rendered the decision in the case declaring applicant Patricio Pebeauco as owner of the land. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in an order dated September 10, 1966.
Hence, this appeal.
The only issue here is whether the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion to postpone the hearing, thereby depriving them of their chance to present their case to the court.
The distance between Coron where appellants live and Puerto Princesa where trial was held is more than 200 kilometers, which distance could be travelled only by water. Failure then on the part of the appellants to go to Puerto Princesa on the date of trial was due to accident because their failure to travel from their place of residence to the place of trial was beyond their control and definitely the same was not intended for delay.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
While it is true that motions for postponements are addressed to the sound discretion of the courts, the discretion must be exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and with a view of doing substantial justice (People v. Martinez, 105 Phil. 200). It should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the convenience of the courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby (Zubiri v. Zubiri, 18 SCRA 1157). Thus, in considering motions for postponement, two (2) things should be taken into consideration, namely: (1) the reasonableness of the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.
In the case at bar, failure on the part of the appellants to come to trial was reasonable and something beyond their control. The trial judge rather adhered to the technical and rigid enforcement of the rules thereby defeating the purpose thereof which is to help and secure to the parties substantial justice.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated May 30, 1966 is hereby SET ASIDE, and the case is remanded the court a quo so that appellants can present their evidence.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Actg. C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Trial was held on January 18, 1966 when applicant Patricio Pebeauco presented his evidence until the following day when he rested his case.
On the date scheduled for the presentation of evidence for herein oppositors-appellants, they failed to appear because the M/V Basilan, which was and still is the only boat that plies between Coron and Puerto Princesa, Palawan where the hearing was held, had been suddenly suspended in operation for that week and there was no other means of transportation available. When appellants failed to appear, the Honorable Judge Tranquilino Tividad considered the case submitted for decision despite the motion for postponement made orally in open court by their counsel.
On May 30, 1966, Judge Tividad rendered the decision in the case declaring applicant Patricio Pebeauco as owner of the land. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in an order dated September 10, 1966.
Hence, this appeal.
The only issue here is whether the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion to postpone the hearing, thereby depriving them of their chance to present their case to the court.
The distance between Coron where appellants live and Puerto Princesa where trial was held is more than 200 kilometers, which distance could be travelled only by water. Failure then on the part of the appellants to go to Puerto Princesa on the date of trial was due to accident because their failure to travel from their place of residence to the place of trial was beyond their control and definitely the same was not intended for delay.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
While it is true that motions for postponements are addressed to the sound discretion of the courts, the discretion must be exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and with a view of doing substantial justice (People v. Martinez, 105 Phil. 200). It should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the convenience of the courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby (Zubiri v. Zubiri, 18 SCRA 1157). Thus, in considering motions for postponement, two (2) things should be taken into consideration, namely: (1) the reasonableness of the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.
In the case at bar, failure on the part of the appellants to come to trial was reasonable and something beyond their control. The trial judge rather adhered to the technical and rigid enforcement of the rules thereby defeating the purpose thereof which is to help and secure to the parties substantial justice.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated May 30, 1966 is hereby SET ASIDE, and the case is remanded the court a quo so that appellants can present their evidence.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Actg. C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
