ChanRobles™ Virtual Law Library | chanrobles.com™  
Main Index Law Library Philippine Laws, Statutes & Codes Latest Legal Updates Philippine Legal Resources Significant Philippine Legal Resources Worldwide Legal Resources Philippine Supreme Court Decisions United States Jurisprudence
Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan's The Labor Code of the Philippines, Annotated Labor Standards & Social Legislation Volume I of a 3-Volume Series 2019 Edition (3rd Revised Edition)
 

 
Chan Robles Virtual Law Library
 









 

 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
 

 
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
 

   
October-1996 Jurisprudence                 

  • Adm. Matter MTJ-93-850 October 2, 1996 - ROBERTO CARPIO v. RODOLFO R. DE GUZMAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 116236 October 2, 1996 - VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC. v. NLRC, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 116347 October 3, 1996 - NATIVIDAD PONDOC v. NLRC, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 118091 October 3, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. WILFREDO VIERNES, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 120894 October 3, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MORENO BAYANI

  • G.R. No. 122668 October 3, 1996 - JESSIE DE LEON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.

  • G.R. No. 94548 October 4, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. GERARDO COGONON

  • G.R. No. 106722 October 4, 1996 - JOSEMARIA G. ESTRADA v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 108936 October 4, 1996 - SOL LAGUIO, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 117323 October 4, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. AGUSTIN DIAZ

  • G.R. No. 117514 October 4, 1996 - MT. CARMEL COLLEGE, ET AL. v. NLRC, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 119007 October 4, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ROMULO G. SORIA

  • G.R. No. 119290 October 4, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ROBERTO PIASIDAD

  • G.R. No. 90655 October 7, 1996 - DANIEL V. ZARATE, JR. v. NORMA C. OLEGARIO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 103577 October 7, 1996 - ROMULO A. CORONEL, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 102713 October 9, 1996 - EDWARD LITTON v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 117950 October 9, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ARADAM DE MANUEL

  • G.R. No. 119417 October 9, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. OMAR CLETO VARONA, JR.

  • G.R. No. 116172 October 10, 1996 - SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC.-CEBU v. BIENVENlDO E. LAGUESMA, ET AL.

  • Adm. Matter No. P-96-1227 October 11, 1996 - RENATO L. LIRIO v. ARTURO A. RAMOS

  • G.R. No. 104624 October 11, 1996 - SAN PEDRO HOSPITAL OF DIGOS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 108919 October 11, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. EDGAR S. CORDERO

  • G.R. No. 89075 October 15, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ROBERTO GEROLAGA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 108433 October 15, 1996 - WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC., ET AL. v. NLRC, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 118320 October 15, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. RODOLFO E. CABODOC

  • G.R. No. 119014 October 15, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JOJO P. PEREZ, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 79543 October 16, 1996 - JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 111401 October 17, 1996 - ERIBERTO G. VALENCIA, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 120385 October 17, 1996 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 120961 October 17, 1996 - DISTILLERIA WASHINGTON, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 121574 October 17, 1996 - METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION, INC. v. NLRC, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 107741 October 18, 1996 - FRANCISCO BERNARTE, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 109834 October 18, 1996 - CECILE SAN JUAN DITCHING, ET AL., v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 110007 October 18, 1996 - HOLY CROSS OF DAVAO COLLEGE, INC. v. JEROME JOAQUIN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 120008 October 18, 1996 - PHIL. ADVERTISING COUNSELORS, INC., ET AL. v. NLRC, ET AL.

  • Adm. Matter No. MTJ- 95-1051 October 21, 1996 - EMERITO M. AGCAOILI v. BRICCIO A. AQUINO

  • G.R. No. 106427 October 21, 1996 - INTER-ASIA SERVICES CORP. (INT’L.) v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996 - PHIL. INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORP., ET AL. v. ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 116013 October 21, 1996 - ANANIAS SOCO, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 105961 October 22, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. PACIFICO SUMAOY

  • G.R. No. 113926 October 23, 1996 - SECURITY BANK AND TRUST CO. v. RTC-MAKATI, BR. 61, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 97935 October 23, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JOEL T. ALIPOSA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 113926 October 23, 1996 - SECURITY BANK AND TRUST CO. v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-MAKATI, BR. 61, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 98310 October 24, 1996 - MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD PRODUCTS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 106817 October 24, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JULIAN RAPANUT, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 114129 October 24, 1996 - MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 118347 October 24, 1996 - VICENTE LIM, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. Nos. 101213-14 October 28, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. HENRY APILO

  • G.R. No. 112148 October 28, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. NUMERIANO JUBILAG

  • G.R. No. 115953 October 28, 1996 - GENOVEVA LIGOT SEMPIO, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 116175 October 28, 1996 - PEDRO V. SOLIS v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 120506 October 28, 1996 - PHILIPPINE AIRLINES v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 120730 October 28, 1996 - RAMON J. BERNARDO, SR., ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • Adm. Matter No. P-93-956 October 30, 1996 - OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. ARTURO A. ALAGABAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 102772 October 30, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ROGELIO C. DEOPANTE

  • G.R. No. 107968 October 30, 1996 - ELIAS S. CIPRIANO, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 110296 October 30, 1996 - MID-PASIG LAND DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 113116 October 30, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. RONALD DE VERA

  • G.R. No. 121506 October 30, 1996 - MACTAN CEBU INT’L. AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 121519 October 30, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. VICENTE TY, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 122256 October 30, 1996 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL., ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS. ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 123643 October 30, 1996 - PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  •  





     
     

    G.R. No. 117323   October 4, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. AGUSTIN DIAZ

     
    PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

    THIRD DIVISION

    [G.R. No. 117323. October 4, 1996.]

    PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AGUSTIN DIAZ @ "Otie" or Jose Goco," Accused-Appellant.


    SYLLABUS


    1. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; WHEN COMMITTED. — Carnal knowledge of a woman in any of the following instances i rape: when the intercourse is done by the use of force or intimidation: (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve years of age.

    2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; GUILT OF ACCUSED ESTABLISHED BY SUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN CASE AT BENCH. — Cherryl Naval claimed to have been unconscious when she was raped by the accused. There was no other witness to such rape than the accused himself. Hence, her defilement by the accused may only be proved indirectly by other evidence. And we find sufficient circumstantial evidence to convince us with moral certainty that the accused did rape Cherryl Naval when the latter was in a state of unconsciousness.

    3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 4 RULE 133 OF THE RULES OF COURT; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHEN SUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION; CASE AT BENCH. — Section 4 Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction. . . . The requisites have been satisfied in this case. . . . Circumstances prove beyond moral certainty that Cherryl was deflowered while she was in the state of unconsciousness, which was proximately caused by a substance either in the Coke or the food she had taken why ch the accused gave her, and that the accused was the one responsible for her defloration. Only the accused was with her before she lost consciousness and after she regained it. In short they constitute an unbroken chain of events which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person i.e. these proven circumstances are consistent with each other consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.

    4. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; MINOR INCONSISTENCIES STRENGTHEN CREDIBILITY; CASE AT BENCH. — The inconsistencies between the testimonies in court of Cherryl and her mother and the statements in their affidavits are not at all material to the fact that rape was committed. They refer to minor trivial or inconsequential circumstances which even serve to strengthen the credibility of the said witnesses as they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.

    5. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; AFFIDAVITS INFERIOR TO TESTIMONY GIVEN IN OPEN COURT. — Affidavits being taken ex-parte are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate sometimes for partial suggestion or for want of suggestion and inquiries. Their infirmity as e species of evidence is a matter of judicial experience and are thus considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.

    6. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ASSESSMENT THEREOF; RESTS PRIMARILY IN THE TRIAL COURT; REASON. — The assessment of the credibility of a witness rests primarily in the trial court because available to it are the aids for an accurate determination thereof such as the witness’ deportment and manner of testifying the witness furtive glance blush of conscious shame hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath .

    7. ID.: ID.; ID.; CANDID AND SIMPLE NARRATION OF YOUNG COLLEGE STUDENT CREDIBLE IN CASE AT BENCH. — Against Asina s testimony and that of the accused is the version of Cherryl narrated in a candid and simple manner, which convinced the trial court of its truthfulness. Indeed it is improbable that a young college student like Cherryl would tell a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and thereafter undergo the ordeal of a public trial unless she was motivated by nothing more than an honest desire to obtain justice .

    8. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIONS; OFFER OF COMPROMISE IS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT; CASE AT BENCH. — It was sufficiently proved that the accused tried to amicably settle the case for P10,000 00. The offer of Compromise was an implied admission of guilt pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.


    D E C I S I O N


    DAVIDE, JR., J.:


    This is an appeal from the decision 1 of 23 April 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Northern Samar (Catarman), Branch 20, in Criminal Case No. C-1810 finding accused Agustin Diaz, alias "Otie" or "Jose Goco," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify Cherryl A. Naval in the amounts of P50,000.00, by way of moral damages, and P25,000.00, as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs. 2

    The testimony of Cherryl Naval, the complainant; Jenny Naval, Cherryl’s mother; and Dr. Melodia Nerida, Medical Officer IV of the Northern Samar Hospital, established the case of the prosecution as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

    On 14 July 1993, at around 11:30 a.m., Cherryl Naval, a 17-year-old student of the University of Eastern Philippines in Catarman, was at a shed in Bobon, Northern Samar, waiting for a vehicle bound for her home in Catarman. She had just accomplished an errand for her mother. At that instance, Accused Agustin Diaz, who had been introduced to her sometime earlier by Mylene Ponio, her best friend who was working as a waitress at the Plaza Inn owned by him, arrived on his motorcycle. He offered to bring her to her destination. She initially declined the offer, but when the accused remarked that she was "too much" and that she did not "trust him," she finally agreed.

    Instead of going towards the direction of Catarman, however, the accused headed the opposite way. Cherryl protested, but the accused said that they would first see Mylene Ponio for a while. He entered a diversion road going to a beach resort in Dancalan, Bobon. He brought her to an open cottage along the shore where they sat for a while; after which, he told her to wait because he would see Mylene Ponio. Since it was 12:00 noon and she was hungry, she told the accused that she would just go ahead of him. The accused forthwith stood up and went to another cottage, talked with a man, and thereafter returned with an opened bottle of coke and some food for her. Cherryl drank the coke and ate the food on a table. The accused was seated opposite her. In less than five minutes, she began to feel dizzy and sleepy, and then drifted off to sleep and lost consciousness. Before she lapsed into unconsciousness, the accused was still seated opposite her. 3

    When Cherryl recovered from her unconsciousness at around 5:30 p.m., she found herself already inside a room in another cottage. She was feeling pain in her vagina and on her thigh, and was naked from the waist down. She immediately put on her clothes and went out of the room. Upon seeing the accused at the right side of the doorway, she asked him what he did to her. The accused answered by threatening her that if she would tell anybody what had happened, he would kill her. She was so afraid that she could not do anything but obey the accused when he ordered her to ride on his motorcycle. Upon reaching the highway, she alighted as directed by the accused. 4

    Cherryl did not, however, immediately go home. She first went to a parking lot to think about what had happened to her and why it had to happen to her. It was already 7:00 p.m. when she arrived home. She handed to her sister the hat of the accused, which she found on top of her clothes when she regained consciousness and which she inadvertently brought with her from the cottage. When she was undressing herself, she found bloodstains on her underwear, which she had not noticed before. She did not yet inform her mother and sister of what had happened because the threat made by the accused still lingered in her mind and bothered her. 5

    The next day, Cherryl thought of ending her life by committing suicide. She was already dangling from a rope when her mother, Jenny Naval, found her and timely helped her down. It was only then that she revealed to her mother that she had been raped by the accused.

    Accompanied by her mother, Cherryl went to the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital, where she underwent physical examination by Dr. Melodia R. Nerida, 6 whose findings 7 are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

    P.E.

    = Complained of pain at anterior thigh (L)

    Pelvic Exam.: LMP June 28, 1993

    Introitus — nulliparous

    Genitalia — grossly normal

    Hymen — incompletely healed hyminal [sic] laceration

    at 3, 5 o’clock laceration. Slightly superficial

    laceration with erythema at (L) labia minora.

    S/E:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

    Cx = small pinkish, closed with erosion at posterior

    cervical lip with scanty non-foul smelling discharge.

    I/E:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

    Cx = small, sl-firm, closed, non-tender or wriggling.

    U = small

    A = (-) masses/tenderness

    D = scanty whitish non-foul smelling discharge.

    Laboratory Result

    = Failed to find any sperm cells.

    On 16 July 1993, Cherryl and her mother reported the incident to the police authorities, 8 who then took down Cherryl’s sworn statement. 9

    On that same day, the accused, accompanied by a certain Gilbert Hilum, one policeman by the name of De Luna, and one Buna, went to Cherryl’s house. When they met Cherryl’s mother, the accused declared that they came to amicably settle the case and to see Cherryl. Her mother did not allow them to do so. Sometime later, one Romy Daclag, a mutual friend of Cherryl’s mother and the accused, also went to see Cherryl’s mother and told her that the accused would pay P10,000.00 for the settlement of the case. Cherryl’s mother chided Daclag, saying that they do not need the money even if they are poor; what they want is justice. 10

    The accused, on the other hand, maintained his innocence and claimed that nothing happened between him and Cherryl. He declared that it was Cherryl who asked to hitch a ride with him to a beach resort in Dancalan where she was supposed to meet her friends. The accused acceded to her request. They arrived at the resort where a policeman was celebrating his birthday. He admitted that he and Cherryl took some food and softdrinks. He, however, claimed that he did not serve Cherryl, for that was done by a waiter. After paying the bill, he immediately left and headed towards the town of San Jose. He denied ever having sexual intercourse with Cherryl, having threatened her, and having made any offer to settle the matter amicably. 11

    Alfredo Asinas, the waiter at the beach resort, corroborated the accused’s testimony that he [the accused] and Cherryl merely ate lunch at one of the cottages and that after paying the bill, he left, while Cherryl stayed behind. 12

    The trial court did not hesitate to accept Cherryl’s story of her defloration. It took into account the presumption of her good moral character and reputation and of her virginity prior to the incident, since no evidence to the contrary was shown. It noted other indicia of her truthfulness, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

    As she appeared in court to undergo the rigors of the public trial, the complainant was a picture of an innocent Filipina about to be ushered to her full womanhood, deceived, pierced and cheated of that most precious asset ever of a woman. Her hatred for the person responsible for that flashed and accelerated in vehemence as she narrated the outrage and her own shame that impelled her to hang herself.

    It also considered the total absence of any ulterior motive on the part of Cherryl to charge the accused with the crime of rape, and the accused’s offer to settle the case amicably. Appreciating against the accused the generic aggravating circumstance of the use of a motor vehicle, the trial court rendered a verdict of guilty.

    On 29 April 1994, the accused erroneously appealed from the decision 13 to the Court of Appeals. 14 The trial court likewise erroneously transmitted the record of the case to the Court of Appeals which, however, forwarded it to this Court on 24 September 1994. 15

    We accepted the appeal on 20 February 1995. 16

    The accused contends that the trial court erred

    1. In convicting accused-appellant Agustin Diaz on the contradictory, inconsistent, unprobable testimony of the prosecution witnesses Cherryl and Jenny Naval;

    2. In disregarding the testimony and conclusion of Dr. Melodia Nerida as to the state of healing of the hymenal laceration and as to the possibility that the said hymenal laceration was perpetrated or sustained by Cherryl Naval not only on July 14, 1993;

    3. In disregarding and not giving credence to the testimony of the accused and his witness Alfredo Asinas. 17

    The People, through the Appellee’s Brief filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, counter this charge by saying that Cherryl’s narration was consistent in all material points; that if ever there were inconsistencies, they were minor and inconsequential and were in fact badges of veracity that even strengthen her credibility; that having become dizzy and finally rendered unconscious, Cherryl could not be expected to completely remember all the details; that the only motive that could be ascribed to Cherryl is her desire to tell the truth; and that the trial court is the best judge as regards credibility of witnesses. 18

    We sustain the conviction of the accused

    Carnal knowledge of a woman in any of the following instances is rape: (1) when the intercourse is done by the use of force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve years of age. 19

    Before us now is the second scenario. Cherryl Naval claimed to have been unconscious when she was raped by the accused. There was no other witness to such rape than the accused himself. Hence, her defilement by the accused may only be proved indirectly by other evidence. 20 And we find sufficient circumstantial evidence to convince us with moral certainty that the accused did rape Cherryl Naval when the latter was in a state of unconsciousness.

    Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction. It reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

    SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

    (a) There is more than one circumstance;

    (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

    (c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

    These requisites have been satisfied in this case. The following circumstances have been proved, and their combination and cumulative effect point to the accused beyond any shadow of doubt as the author of the crime of rape:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

    (1) The accused offered Cherryl a ride on his motorcycle to bring her to her destination — Catarman; instead of doing so, he brought her to a beach resort in Dancalan on the pretext that her best friend Mylene Ponio was there.

    (2) He brought her to a cottage at the said resort, and after resting for a while, he told her to wait because he would see Mylene Ponio.

    (3) He went to another cottage to order food; when he came back, he was bringing an opened bottle of Coke and some food, which he gave to Cherryl.

    (4) Cherryl ate the food and drank the Coke; thereafter, in less than five minutes, she fully lost consciousness.

    (5) Before Cherryl lost consciousness, only the accused was with her in the cottage.

    (6) When she regained consciousness at around 5:30 p.m. of the same day, she found herself in one of the two rooms of the cottage, naked from the waist down, and feeling pain in her private parts and on her thigh.

    (7) As she was about to leave for home, she saw the accused at the right side of the doorway.

    (8) When she confronted him for what he did to her, he threatened to kill her if she would tell anyone of what had happened.

    (9) When she reached home and took off her underwear, she noticed bloodstains on it.

    (10) The examination of Cherryl by Dr. Melodia Nerida disclosed that she had "incompletely healed hyminal [sic] laceration at 3 and 5 o’clock . . . and [s]lightly superficial laceration with erythema at (L) labia minora."cralaw virtua1aw library

    (11) Upon learning of Cherryl’s complaint, the accused, accompanied by a policeman by the name of De Luna and by two other men, went to see Cherryl and her mother to amicably settle the case; then, later, Romy Daclag came to tell her mother that the accused was willing to give them P10,000.00 for the settlement of the case.

    All these circumstances prove beyond moral certainty that Cherryl was deflowered while she was in the state of unconsciousness, which was proximately caused by a substance either in the Coke or the food she had taken which the accused gave her, and that the accused was the one responsible for her defloration. Only the accused was with her before she lost consciousness and after she regained it. In short, they constitute an unbroken chain of events which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., these proven circumstances are consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 21

    The inconsistencies between the testimonies in court of Cherryl and her mother and the statements in their affidavits are not at all material to the fact that rape was committed. They refer to minor, trivial, or inconsequential circumstances which even serve to strengthen the credibility of the said witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed. 22 Besides, affidavits, being taken ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes for partial suggestion, or for want of suggestion and inquiries. Their infirmity as a species of evidence is a matter of judicial experience and are thus considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. 23

    The second assigned error merits scant consideration, for it is premised on a "possibility," not on a fact.

    In the third assigned error, the accused has not shown why Alfredo Asinas’s testimony should have been believed by the trial court. The assessment of the credibility of a witness rests primarily in the trial court because available to it are the aids for an accurate determination thereof, such as the witness’ deportment and manner of testifying, the witness’ furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. 24

    Against Asinas’s testimony and that of the accused is the version of Cherryl narrated in a candid and simple manner, which convinced the trial court of its truthfulness. Indeed, it is improbable that a young college student, like Cherryl, would tell a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and thereafter undergo the ordeal of a public trial, unless she was motivated by nothing more than an honest desire to obtain justice.25cralaw:red

    Finally, it was sufficiently proved that the accused tried to amicably settle the case for P10,000.00. The offer of compromise was an implied admission of guilt 26 pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 27, 27 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

    WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar, in Criminal Case No. C-1810 finding accused-appellant AGUSTIN DIAZ, alias "Otie" or "Jose Goco," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

    SO ORDERED

    Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

    Endnotes:



    1. Original Record (OR), Criminal Case No. C-1810, 41-48; Rollo, 9-16. Per Judge Cesar R. Cinco.

    2. Id., 48; Id., 52.

    3. TSN, 19 April 1994, 29-35.

    4. Id., 35-41.

    5. TSN, 19 April 1994, 37, 42-44, 49.

    6. Id., 45-47; 20-21.

    7. OR, 10.

    8. TSN, 19 April 1994, 47.

    9. OR, 4-5.

    10. TSN, 19 April 1994, 21-22.

    11. TSN, 21 April 1994, 9-19.

    12. Id., 31-34.

    13. OR, 40.

    14. Section 5(2)(d), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution; Section 3(c), Rule 122, Rules of Court.

    15. Rollo, 1.

    16. Id., 23.

    17. Id., 35.

    18. Rollo, 96-98.

    19. Article 335, Revised Penal Code; People v. Rejano, 237 SCRA 627, 646 [1994].

    20. People v. Fabro, 239 SCRA 146, 156 [1994].

    21. People v. Alvero, 224 SCRA 16, 27 [1993]; People v. Oracoy, 224 SCRA 759, 767 [1993].

    22. People v. Pamor, 237 SCRA 462, 475 [1994]; People v. Utinas, 239 SCRA 362, 370 [1994].

    23. People v. Marcelo, 223 SCRA 24, 34 [1993]; People v. Enciso, 223 SCRA 675, 685 [1993].

    24. People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637, 647 [1995].

    25. People v. Patilan, 197 SCRA 354, 366 [1991]; People v. Alib, 222 SCRA 517, 528 [1993].

    26. People v. Manuel, 198 SCRA 818, 825 [1991]; People v. Flores, 239 SCRA 83, 104 [1994]; People v. Delovino, supra note 24, at 649.

    27. It provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

    In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

    G.R. No. 117323   October 4, 1996 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. AGUSTIN DIAZ


    Back to Home | Back to Main

     

    QUICK SEARCH

    cralaw

       

    cralaw



     
      Copyright © ChanRobles Publishing Company Disclaimer | E-mail Restrictions
    ChanRobles™ Virtual Law Library | chanrobles.com™
     
    RED