January 2002 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 143885-86 January 21, 2002 - MERCED TY-DAZO, ET AL. v. SANDIGANBAYAN:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143885-86. January 21, 2002.]
MERCED TY-DAZO and ROLANDO QUIMINALES, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Merced Ty-Dazo and Rolando Quiminales assailing the Resolutions, dated September 20, 1999 and September 27, 1999, of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 23656 and 22021, respectively, which denied their motions to dismiss for lack of merit. Petitioners likewise assail the Sandiganbayan’s Joint Resolution, dated May 12, 2000, denying their motions for reconsideration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The antecedent facts are as follows: on February 19, 1993, the 362nd PNP Mobile Force Company received a report about the illegal cutting of logs near the Salcedo Watershed. In response to said report, several police officers were sent to the watershed to investigate. Along the highway near the watershed, the police saw a mini-truck, then driven by petitioner Quiminales, being loaded with sawed logs. The logs, allegedly owned by petitioner Ty-Dazo, were without the proper permit or license. Hence, the logs were immediately confiscated. Upon recommendation of the local officers of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), criminal charges were filed against petitioners for the illegal cutting, gathering and transporting of lumber.
Since petitioner Ty-Dazo was a public official (municipal mayor of Salcedo, Eastern Samar), the charges against petitioners were referred by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Eastern Samar to the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. The complaint in Criminal Case No. 22021 (OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0632) for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) was received by the said office of the Ombudsman on September 1, 1993. The information against petitioner Ty-Dazo was filed with the Sandiganbayan on February 17, 1995. Petitioner Ty-Dazo then moved for a reinvestigation on July 4, 1995. The motion for reinvestigation was denied on March 5, 1999.
On the other hand, the complaint in Criminal Case No. 23656 (OMB-VIS-CRIM-03-0347) was received by the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas on May 11, 1993. The corresponding information against petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No. 705 (Forestry Code), as amended, was filed with the Sandiganbayan on April 28, 1997. Thereafter, petitioners moved for reinvestigation. Resolving said motion, on January 4, 1999, the special prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioners for lack of probable cause. The Ombudsman, however, denied the special prosecutor’s recommendation. Instead, he (the Ombudsman) directed the special prosecutor to proceed to trial. On January 25, 1999, the special prosecutor filed his manifestation with the Sandiganbayan informing the latter of the Ombudsman’s directive.
On March 5, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 23656, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to dismiss alleging that the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman violated their rights to due process and speedy disposition of their case. In the assailed Resolution, dated September 23, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss. 1
Similarly, on September 6, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 22021, petitioner Ty-Dazo filed a motion to dismiss likewise alleging violation of her rights to due process and speedy disposition of the case. On September 27, 1999, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioner Ty-Dazo’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit. 2
Petitioners then filed their motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. Acting on these motions, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Joint Resolution, dated May 11, 2000, denying these motions for lack of merit. 3
Petitioners now come to this Court alleging that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their motions to dismiss. Petitioners contend that the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman constitutes a violation of their rights to due process and speedy trial. The Office of the Ombudsman allegedly already received the complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. 23656 and 22021 some time in 1994. However, it was only on April 28, 1997, or three (3) years after the receipt of the complaint, that the corresponding information in Criminal Case No. 23656 was filed with the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, while the information in Criminal Case No. 22021 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on January 18, 1995, it took the Office of the Ombudsman more than four (4) years to resolve petitioner Ty-Dazo’s motion for reinvestigation.
Petitioners take exception to the pronouncement of respondent Sandiganbayan that they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of their cases by the filing of the motion for reinvestigation. Said motion was allegedly filed precisely to bring to the attention of respondent Sandiganbayan that the unreasonable length of time that it took the Office of the Ombudsman to file the information in Criminal Case No. 23656 violated petitioners’ right to due process and right to the speedy disposition of their cases.
To support their contention, petitioners rely mainly on our ruling in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan 4 where we ruled that the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by the then Tanodbayan violated the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases.
The petition lacks merit.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 5 In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are: the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. 6
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 7
In Tatad, this Court held that "the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information" constituted a violation of the right of the accused to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases after it took into consideration several attendant circumstances, namely: that political motivation played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; that there was a blatant departure from the established procedure prescribed by law for the conduct of a preliminary investigation; and that the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the facts on record. 8
Reliance by petitioners on Tatad is utterly misplaced. In the first place, there is no showing that the filing of the cases against petitioners was politically motivated. Moreover, unlike in Tatad, the established procedure prescribed for the conduct of preliminary investigation was observed in this case. Petitioners were given the opportunity to submit their respective evidence to refute the charges against them before the corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. Finally, as noted by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners themselves contributed to the delay, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[T]he Court notes that notwithstanding their present claim that the lapse of time from the conduct of the preliminary investigation until the filing of the cases already violated their constitutional right to due process, Accused filed a motion for reinvestigation of this case, which, admittedly, served to further delay the case. 9
The Court thus finds that there is no basis for petitioners’ allegations that their constitutional rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases against them. * The bare allegation that it took the Ombudsman more than three (3) years to terminate the preliminary investigation and file the necessary information would not suffice. As earlier stated, "a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient." 10
In fine, petitioners failed to show that the assailed resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are tainted by grave abuse of discretion or jurisdictional defect to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
The antecedent facts are as follows: on February 19, 1993, the 362nd PNP Mobile Force Company received a report about the illegal cutting of logs near the Salcedo Watershed. In response to said report, several police officers were sent to the watershed to investigate. Along the highway near the watershed, the police saw a mini-truck, then driven by petitioner Quiminales, being loaded with sawed logs. The logs, allegedly owned by petitioner Ty-Dazo, were without the proper permit or license. Hence, the logs were immediately confiscated. Upon recommendation of the local officers of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), criminal charges were filed against petitioners for the illegal cutting, gathering and transporting of lumber.
Since petitioner Ty-Dazo was a public official (municipal mayor of Salcedo, Eastern Samar), the charges against petitioners were referred by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Eastern Samar to the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. The complaint in Criminal Case No. 22021 (OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0632) for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) was received by the said office of the Ombudsman on September 1, 1993. The information against petitioner Ty-Dazo was filed with the Sandiganbayan on February 17, 1995. Petitioner Ty-Dazo then moved for a reinvestigation on July 4, 1995. The motion for reinvestigation was denied on March 5, 1999.
On the other hand, the complaint in Criminal Case No. 23656 (OMB-VIS-CRIM-03-0347) was received by the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas on May 11, 1993. The corresponding information against petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No. 705 (Forestry Code), as amended, was filed with the Sandiganbayan on April 28, 1997. Thereafter, petitioners moved for reinvestigation. Resolving said motion, on January 4, 1999, the special prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioners for lack of probable cause. The Ombudsman, however, denied the special prosecutor’s recommendation. Instead, he (the Ombudsman) directed the special prosecutor to proceed to trial. On January 25, 1999, the special prosecutor filed his manifestation with the Sandiganbayan informing the latter of the Ombudsman’s directive.
On March 5, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 23656, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to dismiss alleging that the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman violated their rights to due process and speedy disposition of their case. In the assailed Resolution, dated September 23, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss. 1
Similarly, on September 6, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 22021, petitioner Ty-Dazo filed a motion to dismiss likewise alleging violation of her rights to due process and speedy disposition of the case. On September 27, 1999, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioner Ty-Dazo’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit. 2
Petitioners then filed their motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. Acting on these motions, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Joint Resolution, dated May 11, 2000, denying these motions for lack of merit. 3
Petitioners now come to this Court alleging that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their motions to dismiss. Petitioners contend that the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman constitutes a violation of their rights to due process and speedy trial. The Office of the Ombudsman allegedly already received the complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. 23656 and 22021 some time in 1994. However, it was only on April 28, 1997, or three (3) years after the receipt of the complaint, that the corresponding information in Criminal Case No. 23656 was filed with the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, while the information in Criminal Case No. 22021 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on January 18, 1995, it took the Office of the Ombudsman more than four (4) years to resolve petitioner Ty-Dazo’s motion for reinvestigation.
Petitioners take exception to the pronouncement of respondent Sandiganbayan that they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of their cases by the filing of the motion for reinvestigation. Said motion was allegedly filed precisely to bring to the attention of respondent Sandiganbayan that the unreasonable length of time that it took the Office of the Ombudsman to file the information in Criminal Case No. 23656 violated petitioners’ right to due process and right to the speedy disposition of their cases.
To support their contention, petitioners rely mainly on our ruling in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan 4 where we ruled that the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by the then Tanodbayan violated the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases.
The petition lacks merit.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 5 In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are: the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. 6
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 7
In Tatad, this Court held that "the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information" constituted a violation of the right of the accused to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases after it took into consideration several attendant circumstances, namely: that political motivation played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; that there was a blatant departure from the established procedure prescribed by law for the conduct of a preliminary investigation; and that the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the facts on record. 8
Reliance by petitioners on Tatad is utterly misplaced. In the first place, there is no showing that the filing of the cases against petitioners was politically motivated. Moreover, unlike in Tatad, the established procedure prescribed for the conduct of preliminary investigation was observed in this case. Petitioners were given the opportunity to submit their respective evidence to refute the charges against them before the corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. Finally, as noted by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners themselves contributed to the delay, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[T]he Court notes that notwithstanding their present claim that the lapse of time from the conduct of the preliminary investigation until the filing of the cases already violated their constitutional right to due process, Accused filed a motion for reinvestigation of this case, which, admittedly, served to further delay the case. 9
The Court thus finds that there is no basis for petitioners’ allegations that their constitutional rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases against them. * The bare allegation that it took the Ombudsman more than three (3) years to terminate the preliminary investigation and file the necessary information would not suffice. As earlier stated, "a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient." 10
In fine, petitioners failed to show that the assailed resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are tainted by grave abuse of discretion or jurisdictional defect to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, pp. 19-22.
2. Id., at 23-26.
3. Id., at 34-35.
4. 159 SCRA 70 (1988).
5. Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65 (1999); Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298(1991).
6. Blanco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136757-58, November 27, 2000.
7. Binay v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
8. Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 83; See also Blanco v. Sandiganbayan, id.
9. Resolution, Criminal Case No. 23656, September 23, 1999, p. 3; Resolution, Criminal Case No. 22021, October 1, 1999, p. 3.
10. Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, 317 SCRA 521 (1999).
