Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2007 > July 2007 Resolutions > [G.R. No. 149571 : July 02, 2007] GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM V. BENJAMIN NONOY O. FONTANARES :

Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of this Court dated 02 July 2007:

G.R. No. 149571 - (Government Service Insurance System v. Benjamin Nonoy O. Fontanares)


In a Decision dated February 21, 2007, the Court granted the Petition filed by the Government Service Insurance System, affirming the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) dated August 19, 1999 which, in turn, ruled that Rheumatic Heart Disease is not a compensable ailment under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended and, furthermore, that respondent failed to prove that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the said ailment.

Submitted now for resolution is respondent's, Motion for Reconsideration.

First, respondent contends for the first time that since Rheumatic Heart Disease is a kind of cardio-vascular disease, it is a compensable occupational disease under Section l(h), Rule III of the ECC Amended Rules on Employees Compensation Commission in relation to its Annex "A".

The foregoing ECC Rules nonetheless provide for certain conditions for the disease to be compensable. In Ra�ises v. Employees' Compensation Commission,^[1] this Court held:

Section l(h), Rule III of the ECC Amended-Rules on Employees Compensation, now considers cardio-vascular disease as compensable occupational disease. Included in Annex "A" is cardio-vascular disease, which cover[s] myocardial infarction. However, it maybe considered as compensable occupational disease only when substantial evidence is adduced to prove any of the following conditions:

a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be proof that an acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work;

b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship.^[2]

c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain of work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship."(emphasis supplied)

Other than his bare allegations, respondent failed to demonstrate or submit proof that the circumstances of his case would satisfy any of the foregoing conditions.

Nor can respondent rely on Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission^[3] as a precedent where the Court, citing Panangui v. Employees' Compensation Commission,^[4] considered that Rheumatic Heart Disease as a compensable disease. The case of Panangui, decided in 1983, does not squarely apply to the instant case, mainly because the Court thus applied the "presumption of compensability and aggravation" as basis for the award. This presumption had been abandoned by the new system, as the Court had discussed in the Decision. Furthermore, that Panotes listed Rheumatic Heart Disease as a compensable disease does not per se make such disease compensable without proof. Under the new system, the claimant must prove either of two (2) things: (a) that the sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; or, (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions. The claimant must also prove this causal relation between the ailment and working conditions by substantial evidence. Respondent failed to satisfy any of these conditions to entitle him to compensation.

Second, respondent contends that he was in good health at the start of his employment; and, that the stressful nature of his work, the daily emotional and physical stress that he experienced, and his exposure to dangerous and noxious chemicals, had most likely caused him to develop his ailment.

These matters reiterate basically the same arguments raised in respondent's pleadings which had been laid to rest by the Decision dated February 21, 2007, and the Court finds no cogent reason that warrants a reconsideration thereof. The Court must restate that Rheumatic Heart Disease is a disease resulting from a previous Rheumatic Fever, marked by inflammation and disfigurement of the heart valves.^[5] While it may be true that the respondent had been diagnosed with Rheumatic Valvular Disease in January 1998, the respondent failed to prove that his work conditions had predisposing factors that caused Rheumatic Fever which, in turn, led to Rheumatic Heart Disease. As stated, he cannot rest his case on bare allegations alone.

And third, respondent turns to Heirs of Aniban v. National Labor Relations Commission^[6] arguing that the Court therein declared that his disease is compensable on the ground that any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally resulting in the wear and tear of the human body. The Court arrived at no such conclusion. It cannot be said that any disease, resulting from any kind of work that produces strain and wear and tear of the body, is compensable. Otherwise, absurd results follow. In Heirs of Aniban, the heirs of the worker were able to show that myocardial infarction is compensable since the disease was aggravated by undue pressure and strain in the performance of the worker's duties as radio operator. Principally, the claimants in that case were able to demonstrate the causal link between the working conditions and the disease, unlike in the instant case. Respondent thus misappreciates the Court's holding in Heirs of Aniban.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

(Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez ponente, with Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, as additional member, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Minita V. Chico-Nazario and Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura);

Endnotes:

---

^[1] G.R. No. 141709, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 71.

^[2] Ranises v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra note 1 at 74-75.

^[3] G. R. No. L-64802, September 23, 1985, 138 SCRA 595, 603.

^[4] 206 Phil. 61 (1983).

^[5] Panangui v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra note 4 at 68.

^[6] 347 Phil. 46 (1997).