August 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2010 > August 2010 Resolutions >
[A.C. No. 6679 : August 25, 2010] ROLANDO B. CAPAPAS, COMPLAINANT -VERSUS- ATTY. ORLANDA BIGCAS-LUMAWAG, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. :
[A.C. No. 6679 : August 25, 2010]
ROLANDO B. CAPAPAS, COMPLAINANT -VERSUS- ATTY. ORLANDA BIGCAS-LUMAWAG, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated 25 August 2010, which reads as follows:
A.C. No. 6679 - ROLANDO B. CAPAPAS, complainant -versus- ATTY. ORLANDA BIGCAS-LUMAWAG, ET AL., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
For our consideration are:
(1) The partial Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 19, 2010, filed by respondent Atty. Orlanda B. Lumawag addressing our Resolution dated March 22, 2010. We granted complainant Rolando B. Capapas' prayer to file a Second Supplemental Complaint to include additional respondents; and
(2) The letter-request, dated May 5, 2010, filed by Mr. Capapas praying that he be allowed to file a Third Supplemental Complaint to include four (4) additional respondents.
The Factual Antecedents
On February 16, 2005, an administrative complaint against Atty. Lumawag, Fiscal Julius L. Abela, Atty. Roso M. Dorado and Atty. Leticia A. Acu�a (collectively referred to as the original respondents) was filed by Mr. Capapas before the Supreme Court. The original respondents were charged with violation of their oath of office, malpractice and falsification of a public document, in relation to the alleged irregularities that attended the foreclosure proceedings of a real property situated in Roxas City, owned by the late Consuelo Bondad, the mother of Mr. Capapas.
According to Mr. Capapas, the real property of his mother was fraudulently mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc. Mr. Capapas claimed that the original respondents conspired with one another in falsifying the Registration of the Certificate of Sheriffs Sale of the real property.
Atty. Lumawag was additionally charged with the notarization of the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership over the real property despite her knowledge of the invalidity of the mortgage.
We required the original respondents to file their comments to the charges. After their cornments, we referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[1] Subsequently, the IBP Board of Governors of the Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to dismiss the complaint in IBP Resolution No. XIX-2009-65 dated October 29, 2009.
The First Supplemental Pleading
By way of a supplemental pleading filed by Mr. Capapas, we previously impleaded the second group of respondents, namely, Judge Roger B. Patricio and Atty. Wilfredo B. Domo-ong. The two were charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct.[2] Mr. Capapas alleged that when Judge Patricio was still a lawyer, he authored and notarized, on November 26, 1986, two (2) fraudulent mortgage (chattel and real) documents over the properties of Consuelo Bondad.[3] In turn, Atty. Domo-ong was the Director of Rural Bank, Central Bank of the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas), who, according to Mr. Capapas, covered up in his report the fraudulent acts committed by the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc. and its officers against the properties of Consuelo Bondad.[4]
The common link between the two groups of respondents is the Special Power of Attorney (SPA), dated September 8, 1980, executed by Consuelo Bondad. Mr. Capapas claimed that the SPA was used solely to mortgage the real properties belonging to his mother in a loan, obtained by his brother (Romeo Capapas), before the Rural Bank of Pilar, Capiz. He also claimed that the SPA was revoked as of January 14, 1987,[5] upon the payment of his brother's loan. Mr. Capapas presently claims that the respondents conspired with each other to obtain the loans (in the names of Romeo Capapas and the latter1 s wife, Editha Capapas) before the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc., by using the revoked SPA to mortgage properties belonging to Consuelo Bondad. Subsequently, the bank foreclosed these properties.
The Second Supplemental Complaint
In the Second Supplemental Complaint, dated November 10, 2009,[6] Mr. Capapas filed, he impleaded the third group of respondents consisting of eight (8) individuals, namely, Fiscal Rodolfo I. Beloso,[7] Fiscal Edwin D. Devano, Fiscal Eduardo D. Deifm, Fiscal Victor I. Posadas, Fiscal Anthony D. Firmalino, Atty. Bias C. Nolasco, Jr., Judge Edward B. Contreras and Antonio del Rosario.[8] Mr. Capapas charged them with committing dishonesty, grave misconduct and abuse of discretion in the exercise of their official functions in connection with the fraudulent foreclosure of the real properties of Consuelo Bondad.
The records show that the acts against the third group of respondents stemmed from the unfavorable rulings they rendered against Mr. Capapas and his family, in connection with the cases and complaints they filed before the court, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Capiz, and the Department of Finance.
In the Resolution dated March 22, 2010, we referred the Second Supplemental Complaint to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
Third Supplemental Complaint
On May 17, 2010, Mr. Capapas moved to implead four (4) individuals, namely, Atty. Jaime M. Olan, Atty. Jose R. Fajardo, Atty. Norberto R. Capistrano, and Atty. Alfonso C. Penaco IV, as respondents in the present case and A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2214-RTJ (Rolando Capapas v. Judge Salvador S. Gubaton, et. al).[9] They are all employees of the Office of Special Investigation, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Mr. Capapas accused them of committing dishonesty, abuse of discretion and grave misconduct in the performance of their public duty as "fixers" for the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc., to cover up the latter and the respondents' crime in the present case and in A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2214-RTJ.
Motion for Reconsideration of the March 22, 2010 Resolution
In moving for a partial reconsideration with respect to the admission of the Second Supplemental Complaint, Atty. Lumawag argues that the original complaint, filed on February 16, 2005, should be finally resolved, considering the Report and Recommendation and the Resolution of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Atty. Lumawag posits that she had been unduly and unfairly deprived of her income by the unfounded complaint by Mr. Capapas since she cannot apply for a commission as a notary public.
Atty. Lumawag prays that the Second Supplemental Complaint be assigned another docket number and be denied admission as a supplement to the present case.
The Court's Ruling
We find Atty. Lumawag's motion for reconsideration meritorious.
We resolved to implead the third group of respondents (Second Supplemental Complaint) on the premise that technical rules of procedure do not strictly apply in administrative cases.[10] We considered that the ultimate goal in disciplinary cases is to ascertain the facts of the case and the veracity of the charges leveled by the complainants against the respondents.[11] Thus, we admitted the supplemental complaints for expediency and in the interest of justice so that a joint resolution of the issues can be issued, where all matters stemming from the same set of facts can be fully ventilated and threshed out.
Nevertheless, peculiar circumstances exist in the case that lead us to agree with Atty. Lumawag. Under the circumstances, we find that the ends of justice will be better served and the issues in the Second Supplemental Complaint and Third Supplemental Complaint will be better addressed if these are treated as separate administrative cases. Moreover, we find a need to re-examine the propriety of admitting the First Supplemental Pleading. Although no motion for reconsideration (against its admission) was filed by the original respondents, we are not precluded from re-examining the propriety and soundness of admitting this pleading for the reasons we stated above and given that no Court action has been taken against Judge Patricio and Atty. Domo-ong from the time we issued the Resolution dated July 5, 2006,[12] admitting the First Supplemental Pleading as part of the original complaint.
In arriving at this conclusion, we considered the following points:
First, separating the Second Supplemental Complaint and the Third Supplemental Complaint from the original complaint would allow an immediate resolution of the charges filed against the other respondents. In this regard, the records show that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline has already submitted its resolution and its report and recommendation to the charges leveled against the original respondents.
Second, treating the Second Supplemental Complaint and the Third Supplemental Complaint as separate administrative cases would promote orderly procedure and speedy administration of justice.[13] We take into account the voluminous 'documents the complainant filed in each complaint and the number of respondents and individuals sought to be impleaded. A joinder of respondents in the same administrative case increases the lisk of confusion, not only on the issues to be resolved, but also on the specific administrative charges that each party is being held accountable for.
Risk of confusion is enhanced by the fact that the above supplemental complaints, the First Supplemental Pleading, and the original complaint were prepared by Mr. Capapas who is not a lawyer. We observed that the complaints contain a jumbled presentation of facts and acts complained of, rendering it difficult to clearly determine the issues to be resolved, the parties to be held liable, and the specific charges which each party is being held accountable for.
Thus, joining all the complaints in one single administrative case would not promote efficiency, but would rather tend to muddle the facts and the issues to be resolved.
Third, Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, on supplemental pleadings, provides that:
Further, in Leobrera v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court ruled that when the cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint is different from the cause of action mentioned in the original complaint, the court should not admit the supplemental complaint.
Under the above standards, we find the admission of the three supplemental pleadings/complaints to be improper. Although the facts in the original complaint and the supplemental pleading/complaints are interrelated (as they all stemmed from the allegedly fraudulent foreclosure of the real properties of Consuelo Bondad), the charges against all the respondents and the individuals in the Third Supplemental Complaint arose from different sets of circumstances and from distinct acts. Otherwise stated, the surrounding facts, supporting the charges against the respondents in the supplemental pleading/complaints, are different from the facts supporting the charges against the original respondents in the original complaint. In addition, the supplemental pleading/complaints do not only implead different sets of parties;: they also state different causes of actions when compared to the original complaint.
To begin with, the original charges against the respondents pertain to acts relating to irregularities allegedly made in the foreclosure of a real property of Consuelo Bondad that was mortgaged to and foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc.
With respect to the second group of respondents, Judge Patricio was charged with acts pertaining to his execution of two (2) fraudulent mortgage documents - one pertaining to a chattel mortgage and the other to a real estate mortgage. In turn, Atty. Domo-ong was charged with the tampering of his report, in order to cover-up the fraudulent acts committed by the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc. and its officers against the family of Mr. Capapas.
From an examination of the First Supplemental Pleading, we also observed that the pleading itself was not really addressed to the Court; it is a complaint filed with the Department of Finance against several individuals not all of whom appear to be lawyers.[19] We also observed that the said complaint before the Department of Finance was filed by Romeo Capapas, not Mr. Rolando Capapas, the present complainant.[20]
With respect to the third group of respondents, Fiscal Beloso and Fiscal Devano were administratively charged for acts pertaining to their official functions in relation to their dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial and public documents (Criminal Case No. I.S. 2004-195), filed by Romeo Capapas against the original respondents, among others.[21]
Mr. del Rosario, a former mayor of Roxas City, was included because he allegedly did not investigate the alleged fraudulent transaction by the respondents in Criminal Case No. I.S. 2004-195, perpetrated at the Assessor's Office (Roxas City) against Francisco Camacho and Joseph Capapas, relatives of Mr. Capapas.[22]
Fiscal Delfin, Fiscal Posadas, Fiscal Firmalino and Fiscal Abela were administratively charged because they dismissed the perjury case filed against Betty Besana (an officer of the Rural Bank of Ivisan [Capiz], Inc.) and Atty. Victor Azagra. The two were accused of lying under oath in connection with an Affidavit executed by Betty Besana, stating that they did not simulate the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage (over the properties of Consuelo Bondad) nor falsify the residence certificates of Romeo Capapas and Editha Capapas.[23]
For his part, Atty. Nolasco, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, was administratively charged for proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties of Consuelo Bondad although he had constructive notice that the SPA (executed by Consuelo Bondad) over the foreclosed properties had already been revoked.[24]
Lastly, Judge Contreras (one of the judges previously assigned to handle one[25] of the cases for annulment of mortgage [Civil Case No. V-904-09-2002] filed by the heirs of Consuelo Bondad) was administratively charged for refusing to issue an order declaring defendants Atty. Leticia A. Acuna and Maria C. Capapas in default for their failure to comply with the summons and to file their answers thereon.
The four (4) individuals subject of the Third Supplemental Complaint were administratively charged because they dismissed the complaint (docketed as Admin. Case No. OSI-AC-2006-021) filed by the heirs of Consuelo Bondad before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas against the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc., its officers and the inspector/appraiser, for violation of The General Banking Law of 2000 and The New Central Bank Act.[26] Mr. Capapas argues that these individuals were lying when they dismissed the said case for lack of jurisdiction.[27]
Under the circumstances, we find that joining the original complaint and the supplemental pleading/complaints will hinder rather than expedite the resolution of the present case and the Supplemental Complaints. To repeat, the facts of each complaint, the causes of action, the charges and the parties in the supplemental pleading/complaints and the original complaint are different. At the same time, there is no showing that the rights of Mr. Capapas or the parties in the administrative complaints would be prejudiced by treating the supplemental complaints as separate administrative cases. Atty. Lumawag even pointed out - correctly, in our view - that admission of the Second Supplemental Complaint will delay the resolution of the original complaint pending with the Court since 2005.
In any case, the Court is not precluded from impleading individuals or initiating disciplinary actions, at its own initiative, against lawyers when and if appropriate under the circumstances, based on the allegations of Mr. Capapas' complaints or based on the findings of this Court after deeper consideration of the complaints.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, we resolve to:
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6679 - ROLANDO B. CAPAPAS, complainant -versus- ATTY. ORLANDA BIGCAS-LUMAWAG, ET AL., respondents.
For our consideration are:
(1) The partial Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 19, 2010, filed by respondent Atty. Orlanda B. Lumawag addressing our Resolution dated March 22, 2010. We granted complainant Rolando B. Capapas' prayer to file a Second Supplemental Complaint to include additional respondents; and
(2) The letter-request, dated May 5, 2010, filed by Mr. Capapas praying that he be allowed to file a Third Supplemental Complaint to include four (4) additional respondents.
On February 16, 2005, an administrative complaint against Atty. Lumawag, Fiscal Julius L. Abela, Atty. Roso M. Dorado and Atty. Leticia A. Acu�a (collectively referred to as the original respondents) was filed by Mr. Capapas before the Supreme Court. The original respondents were charged with violation of their oath of office, malpractice and falsification of a public document, in relation to the alleged irregularities that attended the foreclosure proceedings of a real property situated in Roxas City, owned by the late Consuelo Bondad, the mother of Mr. Capapas.
According to Mr. Capapas, the real property of his mother was fraudulently mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc. Mr. Capapas claimed that the original respondents conspired with one another in falsifying the Registration of the Certificate of Sheriffs Sale of the real property.
Atty. Lumawag was additionally charged with the notarization of the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership over the real property despite her knowledge of the invalidity of the mortgage.
We required the original respondents to file their comments to the charges. After their cornments, we referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[1] Subsequently, the IBP Board of Governors of the Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to dismiss the complaint in IBP Resolution No. XIX-2009-65 dated October 29, 2009.
The First Supplemental Pleading
By way of a supplemental pleading filed by Mr. Capapas, we previously impleaded the second group of respondents, namely, Judge Roger B. Patricio and Atty. Wilfredo B. Domo-ong. The two were charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct.[2] Mr. Capapas alleged that when Judge Patricio was still a lawyer, he authored and notarized, on November 26, 1986, two (2) fraudulent mortgage (chattel and real) documents over the properties of Consuelo Bondad.[3] In turn, Atty. Domo-ong was the Director of Rural Bank, Central Bank of the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas), who, according to Mr. Capapas, covered up in his report the fraudulent acts committed by the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc. and its officers against the properties of Consuelo Bondad.[4]
The common link between the two groups of respondents is the Special Power of Attorney (SPA), dated September 8, 1980, executed by Consuelo Bondad. Mr. Capapas claimed that the SPA was used solely to mortgage the real properties belonging to his mother in a loan, obtained by his brother (Romeo Capapas), before the Rural Bank of Pilar, Capiz. He also claimed that the SPA was revoked as of January 14, 1987,[5] upon the payment of his brother's loan. Mr. Capapas presently claims that the respondents conspired with each other to obtain the loans (in the names of Romeo Capapas and the latter1 s wife, Editha Capapas) before the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc., by using the revoked SPA to mortgage properties belonging to Consuelo Bondad. Subsequently, the bank foreclosed these properties.
The Second Supplemental Complaint
In the Second Supplemental Complaint, dated November 10, 2009,[6] Mr. Capapas filed, he impleaded the third group of respondents consisting of eight (8) individuals, namely, Fiscal Rodolfo I. Beloso,[7] Fiscal Edwin D. Devano, Fiscal Eduardo D. Deifm, Fiscal Victor I. Posadas, Fiscal Anthony D. Firmalino, Atty. Bias C. Nolasco, Jr., Judge Edward B. Contreras and Antonio del Rosario.[8] Mr. Capapas charged them with committing dishonesty, grave misconduct and abuse of discretion in the exercise of their official functions in connection with the fraudulent foreclosure of the real properties of Consuelo Bondad.
The records show that the acts against the third group of respondents stemmed from the unfavorable rulings they rendered against Mr. Capapas and his family, in connection with the cases and complaints they filed before the court, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Capiz, and the Department of Finance.
In the Resolution dated March 22, 2010, we referred the Second Supplemental Complaint to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
Third Supplemental Complaint
On May 17, 2010, Mr. Capapas moved to implead four (4) individuals, namely, Atty. Jaime M. Olan, Atty. Jose R. Fajardo, Atty. Norberto R. Capistrano, and Atty. Alfonso C. Penaco IV, as respondents in the present case and A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2214-RTJ (Rolando Capapas v. Judge Salvador S. Gubaton, et. al).[9] They are all employees of the Office of Special Investigation, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Mr. Capapas accused them of committing dishonesty, abuse of discretion and grave misconduct in the performance of their public duty as "fixers" for the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc., to cover up the latter and the respondents' crime in the present case and in A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2214-RTJ.
Motion for Reconsideration of the March 22, 2010 Resolution
In moving for a partial reconsideration with respect to the admission of the Second Supplemental Complaint, Atty. Lumawag argues that the original complaint, filed on February 16, 2005, should be finally resolved, considering the Report and Recommendation and the Resolution of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Atty. Lumawag posits that she had been unduly and unfairly deprived of her income by the unfounded complaint by Mr. Capapas since she cannot apply for a commission as a notary public.
Atty. Lumawag prays that the Second Supplemental Complaint be assigned another docket number and be denied admission as a supplement to the present case.
We find Atty. Lumawag's motion for reconsideration meritorious.
We resolved to implead the third group of respondents (Second Supplemental Complaint) on the premise that technical rules of procedure do not strictly apply in administrative cases.[10] We considered that the ultimate goal in disciplinary cases is to ascertain the facts of the case and the veracity of the charges leveled by the complainants against the respondents.[11] Thus, we admitted the supplemental complaints for expediency and in the interest of justice so that a joint resolution of the issues can be issued, where all matters stemming from the same set of facts can be fully ventilated and threshed out.
Nevertheless, peculiar circumstances exist in the case that lead us to agree with Atty. Lumawag. Under the circumstances, we find that the ends of justice will be better served and the issues in the Second Supplemental Complaint and Third Supplemental Complaint will be better addressed if these are treated as separate administrative cases. Moreover, we find a need to re-examine the propriety of admitting the First Supplemental Pleading. Although no motion for reconsideration (against its admission) was filed by the original respondents, we are not precluded from re-examining the propriety and soundness of admitting this pleading for the reasons we stated above and given that no Court action has been taken against Judge Patricio and Atty. Domo-ong from the time we issued the Resolution dated July 5, 2006,[12] admitting the First Supplemental Pleading as part of the original complaint.
In arriving at this conclusion, we considered the following points:
First, separating the Second Supplemental Complaint and the Third Supplemental Complaint from the original complaint would allow an immediate resolution of the charges filed against the other respondents. In this regard, the records show that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline has already submitted its resolution and its report and recommendation to the charges leveled against the original respondents.
Second, treating the Second Supplemental Complaint and the Third Supplemental Complaint as separate administrative cases would promote orderly procedure and speedy administration of justice.[13] We take into account the voluminous 'documents the complainant filed in each complaint and the number of respondents and individuals sought to be impleaded. A joinder of respondents in the same administrative case increases the lisk of confusion, not only on the issues to be resolved, but also on the specific administrative charges that each party is being held accountable for.
Risk of confusion is enhanced by the fact that the above supplemental complaints, the First Supplemental Pleading, and the original complaint were prepared by Mr. Capapas who is not a lawyer. We observed that the complaints contain a jumbled presentation of facts and acts complained of, rendering it difficult to clearly determine the issues to be resolved, the parties to be held liable, and the specific charges which each party is being held accountable for.
Thus, joining all the complaints in one single administrative case would not promote efficiency, but would rather tend to muddle the facts and the issues to be resolved.
Third, Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, on supplemental pleadings, provides that:
SEC. 6. Supplemental pleadings. -- Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading.In Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals,[14] we declared that a supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading; it is not intended to dispense with or substitute for the latter.[15] It is an amended pleading that substitutes for the original.[16] A supplemental pleading does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand; the issues joined under the original pleading remain as issues to be tried in the action.[17]
Further, in Leobrera v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court ruled that when the cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint is different from the cause of action mentioned in the original complaint, the court should not admit the supplemental complaint.
Under the above standards, we find the admission of the three supplemental pleadings/complaints to be improper. Although the facts in the original complaint and the supplemental pleading/complaints are interrelated (as they all stemmed from the allegedly fraudulent foreclosure of the real properties of Consuelo Bondad), the charges against all the respondents and the individuals in the Third Supplemental Complaint arose from different sets of circumstances and from distinct acts. Otherwise stated, the surrounding facts, supporting the charges against the respondents in the supplemental pleading/complaints, are different from the facts supporting the charges against the original respondents in the original complaint. In addition, the supplemental pleading/complaints do not only implead different sets of parties;: they also state different causes of actions when compared to the original complaint.
To begin with, the original charges against the respondents pertain to acts relating to irregularities allegedly made in the foreclosure of a real property of Consuelo Bondad that was mortgaged to and foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc.
With respect to the second group of respondents, Judge Patricio was charged with acts pertaining to his execution of two (2) fraudulent mortgage documents - one pertaining to a chattel mortgage and the other to a real estate mortgage. In turn, Atty. Domo-ong was charged with the tampering of his report, in order to cover-up the fraudulent acts committed by the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc. and its officers against the family of Mr. Capapas.
From an examination of the First Supplemental Pleading, we also observed that the pleading itself was not really addressed to the Court; it is a complaint filed with the Department of Finance against several individuals not all of whom appear to be lawyers.[19] We also observed that the said complaint before the Department of Finance was filed by Romeo Capapas, not Mr. Rolando Capapas, the present complainant.[20]
With respect to the third group of respondents, Fiscal Beloso and Fiscal Devano were administratively charged for acts pertaining to their official functions in relation to their dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial and public documents (Criminal Case No. I.S. 2004-195), filed by Romeo Capapas against the original respondents, among others.[21]
Mr. del Rosario, a former mayor of Roxas City, was included because he allegedly did not investigate the alleged fraudulent transaction by the respondents in Criminal Case No. I.S. 2004-195, perpetrated at the Assessor's Office (Roxas City) against Francisco Camacho and Joseph Capapas, relatives of Mr. Capapas.[22]
Fiscal Delfin, Fiscal Posadas, Fiscal Firmalino and Fiscal Abela were administratively charged because they dismissed the perjury case filed against Betty Besana (an officer of the Rural Bank of Ivisan [Capiz], Inc.) and Atty. Victor Azagra. The two were accused of lying under oath in connection with an Affidavit executed by Betty Besana, stating that they did not simulate the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage (over the properties of Consuelo Bondad) nor falsify the residence certificates of Romeo Capapas and Editha Capapas.[23]
For his part, Atty. Nolasco, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, was administratively charged for proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties of Consuelo Bondad although he had constructive notice that the SPA (executed by Consuelo Bondad) over the foreclosed properties had already been revoked.[24]
Lastly, Judge Contreras (one of the judges previously assigned to handle one[25] of the cases for annulment of mortgage [Civil Case No. V-904-09-2002] filed by the heirs of Consuelo Bondad) was administratively charged for refusing to issue an order declaring defendants Atty. Leticia A. Acuna and Maria C. Capapas in default for their failure to comply with the summons and to file their answers thereon.
The four (4) individuals subject of the Third Supplemental Complaint were administratively charged because they dismissed the complaint (docketed as Admin. Case No. OSI-AC-2006-021) filed by the heirs of Consuelo Bondad before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas against the Rural Bank of Ivisan (Capiz), Inc., its officers and the inspector/appraiser, for violation of The General Banking Law of 2000 and The New Central Bank Act.[26] Mr. Capapas argues that these individuals were lying when they dismissed the said case for lack of jurisdiction.[27]
Under the circumstances, we find that joining the original complaint and the supplemental pleading/complaints will hinder rather than expedite the resolution of the present case and the Supplemental Complaints. To repeat, the facts of each complaint, the causes of action, the charges and the parties in the supplemental pleading/complaints and the original complaint are different. At the same time, there is no showing that the rights of Mr. Capapas or the parties in the administrative complaints would be prejudiced by treating the supplemental complaints as separate administrative cases. Atty. Lumawag even pointed out - correctly, in our view - that admission of the Second Supplemental Complaint will delay the resolution of the original complaint pending with the Court since 2005.
In any case, the Court is not precluded from impleading individuals or initiating disciplinary actions, at its own initiative, against lawyers when and if appropriate under the circumstances, based on the allegations of Mr. Capapas' complaints or based on the findings of this Court after deeper consideration of the complaints.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, we resolve to:
(1) | GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 19, 2010, of our Resolution dated March 22, 2010, filed by respondent Atty. Orlanda B. Lumawag; |
(2) | DENY the Request to File (Third) Supplemental Complaint dated May 5, 2010; |
(3) | DENY the admission of the (Third) Supplemental Complaint, dated May 5, 2010, to the present case; |
(4) | RECALL paragraph (2) of the Resolution dated July 5, 2006, granting Mr. Rolando B. Capapas' request to file a supplemental pleading, dated February 4, 2006, to include Judge Roger B. Patricio, Atty. Wilfredo B. Domo-ong and other respondents, in view of the additional evidence gathered; |
(5) | NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the First Supplemental Pleading dated December 19, 2005, as the same is a complaint filed by Romeo Capapas before the Department of Finance; |
(6) | TREAT the Second Supplemental Complaint, dated November 10, 2009, and the Third Supplemental Complaint, dated May 5, 2010 as, separate administrative cases; and |
(7) | ORDER that the Second Supplemental Complaint, dated November 10, 2009, and the Third Supplemental Complaint, dated May 5, 2010, be separately docketed as administrative cases. |
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Resolution dated September 1, 2008.
[2] Folder 1, rollo, p. 244; Resolution, dated July 5, 2006, that reads, "(2) GRANT complainant's request to file supplemental pleading dated 4 February 2006 to include Judge Roger B. Patricio and Atty. Wilfredo B. Domo-ong and other respondents in view of additional evidence gathered."
[3] Id. at 164-165.
[4] Id. at 175-176.
[5] Id. at 284.
[6] Folder 5, rollo, Supplemental Complaint, p. 1
[7] Also referred to as Beluso in the records.
[8] Resolution dated March 22, 2010.
[9] This was dismissed by the Court per Resolution dated March 22, 2006; Folder 2, rollo, p. 295.
[10] Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, A.M. No. CA-05-20-P, September 9, 2005, 469 SCRA 439, 462.
[11] Roque v. Grimaldo, A.M. No. P-95-1148, July 30, 1996, 260 SCRA 1,9.
[12] Folder 1, rollo, p. 244.
[13] Alamayri v. Pabale, G.R. No. 151243, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 146, 166.
[14] G.R. No. 81024, February 3, 2000, 324 SCRA 533.
[15] Id. at 546, citing the cases of Shoemart, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 86956, October 1, 1990, 190 SCRA 189, 196, Pasay City Government v. CFI of Manila, Branch X, L-32162, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 156, 169 and British Traders' Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-20501, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 719.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid., citing Delbros Hotel Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72566, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 533, 543, citing 61 Am. Jur. 2d 286.
[18] G.R. No. 80001, February 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 711, 718, cited in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15, at 546.
[19] Folder 1, rollo, p. 162.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Second Supplemental Complaint, p. 6.
[22] Id. at 15.
[23] Folder 3, rollo, p. 1; Report and Recommendation, dated August 31, 2004, of IBP Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in A.C. No. 6175; and Folder 5, rollo, p. 7, Second Supplemental Complaint.
[24] Second Supplemental Complaint, p. 5.
[25] Id. at 8. The other civil case for annulment of mortgage is Civil Case No. V-028-03.
[26] Third Supplemental Complaint, p. 9; Folder 4, rollo, p. 28.
[27] Third Supplemental Complaint, p. 12.
