January 1950 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-2569 January 13, 1950 - GOTAMCO LUMBER CO. v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL
085 Phil 291:
085 Phil 291:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2569. January 13, 1950.]
GOTAMCO LUMBER COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, Respondents.
Paredes, Diaz & Poblador for Petitioner.
Juan R. Maralit for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondent Labor Union.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYERS AND LABORERS; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER TO FIX WAGES. — In case there is a dispute as to salaries or wages between an industrial or commercial establishment and its laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations has, by law, the power to fix just and reasonable wages, in order to peacefully solve the dispute and avoid the calamito effects of a strike.
2. ID.; COMPENSATION, OVERTIME WORK; PERMIT FROM, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; WHO IS BOUND TO SECURE. — Commonwealth Act No. 444, imposes the duty upon the employer to secure the permit for overtime work and the latter may not therefore be heard to plead his own neglect as exemption or defense. The employee, in rendering extra service at the request of his employer has a right to assume that the latter has complied with the requirements of the law, and therefore has obtained the required permission from the Department of Labor.
2. ID.; COMPENSATION, OVERTIME WORK; PERMIT FROM, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; WHO IS BOUND TO SECURE. — Commonwealth Act No. 444, imposes the duty upon the employer to secure the permit for overtime work and the latter may not therefore be heard to plead his own neglect as exemption or defense. The employee, in rendering extra service at the request of his employer has a right to assume that the latter has complied with the requirements of the law, and therefore has obtained the required permission from the Department of Labor.
D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
The petitioner, a corporation organized and existing under our laws, complains of a decision, dated July 9, 1948, of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations. It alleges:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) that the decision is contrary to law because such Court has no power to grant increases of wages which are above the minimum fixed by it;
(2) that Marino Carillo was not dismissed for his union activities, but for negligence and misconduct;
(3) that the recovery of overtime pay for services rendered without any permit from the Secretary of Labor is contrary to law; and
(4) that the ruling of this Court in Montera v. Court of Industrial Relations, 1 G. R. No. L-1340, has been violated.
At the outset we may dismiss the second ground, because it involves a question of fact, and we have time and again announced the proposition that we will not ordinarily revise the factual findings of the respondent court.
Regarding the first point, it appears that on October 15, 1947, the National Labor Union submitted eight demands to the management of the Gotamco Lumber Company. On October 20, the same Union filed with the Court of Industrial Relations the same eight demands, and asserted that the failure of the Gotamco Lumber Company to reply to their petition gave rise to an industrial dispute between said company and its laborers, which was likely to cause a strike or lockout requiring the prompt intervention of the industrial court. The pertinent demands were:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That the company shall pay a minimum wage of P7 daily to its laborers and a general increase of 20 per cent in the salaries and wages of those at present receiving more than this minimum wage;
"2. That all overtime work and all work done on Sundays and legal holidays be paid an additional 50 per cent and those who have heretofore rendered overtime work be immediately paid;
"3. That all laborers and employees be given an annual vacation leave of 15 days with pay;
"4. That in case of accident or illness the employees and laborers concerned be given free hospitalization and paid their full salaries and wages during the period that they would be unable to work; . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
After hearing the parties and their evidence, the Honorable Arsenio Roldan, Presiding Judge, in a carefully prepared decision, citing facts and circumstances, reached the conclusion that the Gotamco Lumber Company should be ordered, as it was ordered, to grant to all of its laborers and employees the following increases, effective October 21, 1947:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"P5.50 a day as minimum wage for apprentice, extra, new, casual, unskilled or common laborer. In other words, those receiving less than P5 each a day shall have their wages adjusted to P5.50 each a day.
"Apprentices should not exceed 20 per cent of the total number of laborers employed. (Secs. 5, 6, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended.)
"15 per cent increase for those who are receiving from P5 to P7 each a day.
"10 per cent increase for those who are receiving above P7 each a day.
"For the monthly salaried employees:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"P143 a month, as minimum salary. (Equivalent to P5.50 a day times 26 working days).
"15 per cent increase for those who are receiving more than P143 to P182 each a month. (P182 equivalent to P7 a day times 26 working days).
"10 per cent increase for those who are receiving above P182 each a month."cralaw virtua1aw library
Explaining its first ground of complaint, the petitioner alleges that the respondent court fixed a minimum wage, and ordered "a blanket increase of all salaries and wages which are far above the minimum fixed by it." Petitioner wherefore contends that the respondent court has no power to order the increase of wages which are above the minimum already prescribed by it. As applied to the decision, petitioner argues, in effect, that after fixing P5.50 as minimum, the respondent court could not further decree an increase of 15 percent to those receiving from P5 to P7 per day, and an increase of 10 percent to those receiving more than P7 a day.
It must be noted that the P5.50 minimum wage is given to apprentices, new, unskilled laborers, etc., whereas the additional 15 per cent and 10 per cent is awarded to other kinds of laborers (obviously the skilled ones). In effect the court was fixing another minimum wage for those receiving more than P5 a day (the skilled workers). So that granting, for the sake of argument that the respondent court may not go beyond fixing a minimum wage, what it performed in this instance was nothing more than fixing minimum wages for different kinds of laborers. Anyway we have already held in Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. National Labor Union, L-1412, 81 Phil., 331, that in case there is a dispute as to salaries or wages between an industrial or commercial establishment and its laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations has, by law, the power to fix just and reasonable wages, in order to peacefully solve the dispute and avoid the calamitous effects of a strike. (The Shell Company of the Philippines, Limited v. National Labor Union, L-1309, 81 Phil., 315.) (See also Leyte Land Transportation v. Leyte Farmers’ & Laborers’ Union, L-1377, 80 Phil., 840.)
As a matter of fact in the last case, we upheld an order of the respondent court directing the transportation company to grant its several employees, drivers, conductors and laborers an increase in wages at various rates. We said, "there can be no doubt about the propriety (of the raises) since said court is impliedly empowered to do so under section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103."cralaw virtua1aw library
The decision now under review grants to all the workers and employees of the company "50 per cent additional compensation for work performed in excess of eight hours a day including Sundays and legal holidays effective October 21, 1947." The petitioner maintains that as the overtime work had been performed without a permit from the Department of Labor, no extra compensation should be authorized. Several decisions of this Court are invoked. But those decisions were based on the reasoning that "as both the laborer and employer are duty bound" to secure the permit from the Department of Labor, both were in pari delicto. However, the present law in effect imposes that duty upon the employer (Commonwealth Act No. 444). Such employer may not therefore be heard to plead his own neglect as exemption or defense. The employee, in rendering extra service at the request of his employer has a right to assume that the latter has complied with the requirements of the law, and therefore has obtained the required permission from the Department of Labor.
The fourth ground invoked by the petitioner is based on the alleged pendency before the Court of Industrial Relations of another case No. 31-V between the Gotamco Lumber Company and the C. L. O. concerning the demands of the same laborers involved in this expediente. It appearing that said case No. 31-V had been stopped or withdrawn as of June 11, 1948, and that the decision of this case was rendered on July 9, 1948, we fail to see any prejudicial error.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
(1) that the decision is contrary to law because such Court has no power to grant increases of wages which are above the minimum fixed by it;
(2) that Marino Carillo was not dismissed for his union activities, but for negligence and misconduct;
(3) that the recovery of overtime pay for services rendered without any permit from the Secretary of Labor is contrary to law; and
(4) that the ruling of this Court in Montera v. Court of Industrial Relations, 1 G. R. No. L-1340, has been violated.
At the outset we may dismiss the second ground, because it involves a question of fact, and we have time and again announced the proposition that we will not ordinarily revise the factual findings of the respondent court.
Regarding the first point, it appears that on October 15, 1947, the National Labor Union submitted eight demands to the management of the Gotamco Lumber Company. On October 20, the same Union filed with the Court of Industrial Relations the same eight demands, and asserted that the failure of the Gotamco Lumber Company to reply to their petition gave rise to an industrial dispute between said company and its laborers, which was likely to cause a strike or lockout requiring the prompt intervention of the industrial court. The pertinent demands were:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That the company shall pay a minimum wage of P7 daily to its laborers and a general increase of 20 per cent in the salaries and wages of those at present receiving more than this minimum wage;
"2. That all overtime work and all work done on Sundays and legal holidays be paid an additional 50 per cent and those who have heretofore rendered overtime work be immediately paid;
"3. That all laborers and employees be given an annual vacation leave of 15 days with pay;
"4. That in case of accident or illness the employees and laborers concerned be given free hospitalization and paid their full salaries and wages during the period that they would be unable to work; . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
After hearing the parties and their evidence, the Honorable Arsenio Roldan, Presiding Judge, in a carefully prepared decision, citing facts and circumstances, reached the conclusion that the Gotamco Lumber Company should be ordered, as it was ordered, to grant to all of its laborers and employees the following increases, effective October 21, 1947:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"P5.50 a day as minimum wage for apprentice, extra, new, casual, unskilled or common laborer. In other words, those receiving less than P5 each a day shall have their wages adjusted to P5.50 each a day.
"Apprentices should not exceed 20 per cent of the total number of laborers employed. (Secs. 5, 6, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended.)
"15 per cent increase for those who are receiving from P5 to P7 each a day.
"10 per cent increase for those who are receiving above P7 each a day.
"For the monthly salaried employees:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"P143 a month, as minimum salary. (Equivalent to P5.50 a day times 26 working days).
"15 per cent increase for those who are receiving more than P143 to P182 each a month. (P182 equivalent to P7 a day times 26 working days).
"10 per cent increase for those who are receiving above P182 each a month."cralaw virtua1aw library
Explaining its first ground of complaint, the petitioner alleges that the respondent court fixed a minimum wage, and ordered "a blanket increase of all salaries and wages which are far above the minimum fixed by it." Petitioner wherefore contends that the respondent court has no power to order the increase of wages which are above the minimum already prescribed by it. As applied to the decision, petitioner argues, in effect, that after fixing P5.50 as minimum, the respondent court could not further decree an increase of 15 percent to those receiving from P5 to P7 per day, and an increase of 10 percent to those receiving more than P7 a day.
It must be noted that the P5.50 minimum wage is given to apprentices, new, unskilled laborers, etc., whereas the additional 15 per cent and 10 per cent is awarded to other kinds of laborers (obviously the skilled ones). In effect the court was fixing another minimum wage for those receiving more than P5 a day (the skilled workers). So that granting, for the sake of argument that the respondent court may not go beyond fixing a minimum wage, what it performed in this instance was nothing more than fixing minimum wages for different kinds of laborers. Anyway we have already held in Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. National Labor Union, L-1412, 81 Phil., 331, that in case there is a dispute as to salaries or wages between an industrial or commercial establishment and its laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations has, by law, the power to fix just and reasonable wages, in order to peacefully solve the dispute and avoid the calamitous effects of a strike. (The Shell Company of the Philippines, Limited v. National Labor Union, L-1309, 81 Phil., 315.) (See also Leyte Land Transportation v. Leyte Farmers’ & Laborers’ Union, L-1377, 80 Phil., 840.)
As a matter of fact in the last case, we upheld an order of the respondent court directing the transportation company to grant its several employees, drivers, conductors and laborers an increase in wages at various rates. We said, "there can be no doubt about the propriety (of the raises) since said court is impliedly empowered to do so under section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103."cralaw virtua1aw library
The decision now under review grants to all the workers and employees of the company "50 per cent additional compensation for work performed in excess of eight hours a day including Sundays and legal holidays effective October 21, 1947." The petitioner maintains that as the overtime work had been performed without a permit from the Department of Labor, no extra compensation should be authorized. Several decisions of this Court are invoked. But those decisions were based on the reasoning that "as both the laborer and employer are duty bound" to secure the permit from the Department of Labor, both were in pari delicto. However, the present law in effect imposes that duty upon the employer (Commonwealth Act No. 444). Such employer may not therefore be heard to plead his own neglect as exemption or defense. The employee, in rendering extra service at the request of his employer has a right to assume that the latter has complied with the requirements of the law, and therefore has obtained the required permission from the Department of Labor.
The fourth ground invoked by the petitioner is based on the alleged pendency before the Court of Industrial Relations of another case No. 31-V between the Gotamco Lumber Company and the C. L. O. concerning the demands of the same laborers involved in this expediente. It appearing that said case No. 31-V had been stopped or withdrawn as of June 11, 1948, and that the decision of this case was rendered on July 9, 1948, we fail to see any prejudicial error.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. 79 Phil., 345.
