Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence


Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1952 > May 1952 Decisions > G.R. No. L-3899 May 21, 1952 - RAYMUNDO TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. v. VICTORINO CERVO

091 Phil 313:




PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-3899. May 21, 1952.]

RAYMUNDO TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., Petitioner, v. VICTORINO CERVO, Respondent.

A.M. Zarate, for Petitioner.

Nabong & Sese, for Respondent.

SYLLABUS


1. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; TRIAL; APPEAL; DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE EVIDENCE; QUESTION RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. — Hearing of a contested case before the Public Service Commission cannot be legally delegated to its Chief Attorney. However, this question cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. An appellant can only raise in a petition for review questions that had been raised by him before the Public Service Commission, (Sec. 2 of Rule 43).

2. PUBLIC UTILITIES; PUBLIC NECESSITY AND CONVENIENCE; ADDITIONAL PERMIT TO OPERATE ON SAME LINE. — The fact that appellant has been operating on the Pililla-Manila line for a long time does not preclude the Public Service Commission from granting an additional permit to another person or company to operate on the same line if public necessity so demands. This is a matter for the Commission to determine. In it many factors are involved, and as long as they are met by applicant the granting of a new permit is justified. Public necessity and convenience are of paramount importance.

3. ID.; RUINOUS COMPETITION; WHEN COMPETITION IS ALLOWED. — When public necessity requires that a new operator be allowed to put up an additional service, that cannot be considered a ruinous competition, for it is to be presumed that the demand of the passengers in that line is such as to justify the requirements of all those who are in the service. Competition, if wholesome and constructive, should be allowed because it tends to promote satisfaction and efficiency in the management and operation of the public service.

4. ID.; MONOPOLY; PRIVILEGE OF OLD OPERATOR TO PUT UP ADDITIONAL SERVICE. — There are cases where to favor old operators in the service cannot be done without causing injustice to emergency operators who were forced to enter the field due to the inability of old operators to rehabilitate and resume their former service in keeping with the demand of the travelling public. To deprive a new operator of the privilege already enjoyed by him after investing money and effort, for the sole purpose of giving preference to an old operator, would be most unfair and unjust and cannot in equity be sanctioned. Such a ruling would lead to a monopoly, which should be avoided.


D E C I S I O N


BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:


Immediately after the liberation of the Philippines, Victorino Cervo secured an emergency certificate of public convenience to operate one auto-truck from Pililia to Manila from the Public Service Commission. This emergency certificate having expired on December 31, 1948, it was extended for an indefinite period in line with the policy of the Commission. In the meantime, he filed a petition for the conversion of his emergency certificate into a permanent one. The application was first heard on March 24, 1949, before chief attorney Antonio H. Aspillera who was authorized by the Commission to receive the evidence. Of the several operators affected on the line applied for by Cervo, only petitioner herein has filed its opposition to the application.

Among the grounds stated by petitioner in its opposition are: that in the line applied for by Victorino Cervo, now respondent, there is no need for any additional service or operator; that if there is need for additional service, petitioner is willing to put up such additional service; and that the proposed service will be but a duplicate of the service being rendered by petitioner and will only lead to a ruinous competition.

After Attorney Aspillera has submitted his report to the Public Service Commission, the latter rendered its decision granting the permanent certificate applied for by Respondent. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition for review.

The first error assigned by petitioner-appellant refers to the delegation made by the Public Service Commission to Chief Attorney Antonio H. Aspillera of its authority to receive the evidence in connection with the application of respondent which, it is claimed, cannot be legally done be cause this is a contested case.

This claim is well taken, as it is in line with a recent decision of this Court (G. R. No. L-2639). However, we find that petitioner is raising this question for the first time in this instance for it has never made any objection to the designation of Attorney Aspillera as a commissioner to receive the evidence in this case either before him or before the Public Service Commission. Instead it submitted itself to trial and presented its evidence before him. As provided for in Rule 43, section 2 of the Rules of Court, an appellant can only raise in a petition for review questions that had been raised by him before the Public Service Commission, and as petitioner has never raised this question before the Commission, the same cannot now be raised in this petition for review.

The other errors assigned by petitioner-appellant may be boiled down as follows: (1) that appellee should not have been allowed to invade the Pililia-Manila line because appellant has been operating on it even before the war; (2) to allow appellee to operate on the same line would result in a ruinous competition with appellant; (3) that public necessity does not require the service proposed by appellee; and if it so requires, appellant should have been given the preference to put up such additional service; and (4) it is unwise to grant a permanent certificate of public convenience to appellee after appellant had completed its pre-war equipment of 51 units pursuant to the requirements of the Commission.

The first issue has no merit. The fact that appellant has been operating on the Pililia-Manila line for a long time does not preclude the Public Service Commission from granting an additional permit to operate on the same line if public necessity so demands. This is a matter for the Commission to determine. In it many factors are involved, and as long as they are met by the applicant the granting of a new permit is justified. Public necessity and convenience are of paramount importance.

The claim that to allow the appellee to operate on the same line would only result in a ruinous competition is a question which depends upon the requirements of the travelling public. When public necessity requires that a new operator be allowed to put up an additional service, that cannot be considered a ruinous competition, for it is to be presumed that the demand of the passengers in that line is such as to justify the requirements of all those who are in the service. Competition if wholesome and constructive should be allowed because it tends to promote satisfaction and efficiency in the management and operation of the public service. This is what the Public Service Commission did: to allow a wholesome competition. There is no showing that the competition is ruinous or prejudicial to the Appellant.

Whether public necessity and convenience warrant the putting up of additional service on the part of the appellee, is a question of fact which the Public Service Commission has found in the affirmative. This finding, being supported by sufficient evidence, should not be disturbed (Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc. & Acro Taxicab Co. Inc. v. Danon, 58 Phil. 75). The plea that if public necessity requires the putting up of additional service such privilege should be given to appellant which is old in the service is tenable, but there are cases where this cannot be done without causing injustice to emergency operators who were forced to enter the field due to the inability of old operators to rehabilitate and resume their former service in keeping with the demand of the travelling public. And one of these operators is the appellant which only recently acquired the needed equipment to put its service on a pre-war level. To deprive the appellee now of the privilege already enjoyed by him after investing money and effort for the sole purpose of giving preference to the appellant would be most unfair and unjust and cannot in equity be sanctioned by this Court. Such a ruling would lead to a monopoly and this should be avoided.

In view of the foregoing, w e find no error in the decision of the Public Service Commission.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the Appellant.

Paras C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions


MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur in the majority opinion in so far as it affirms the decision of the Public Service Commission converting the emergency certificate previously issued to respondent Victorino Cervo into a permanent certificate. Said emergency certificate was given to Cervo during the emergency following the termination of the war when the petitioner Raymundo Transportation Co., Inc., because of the destruction of its units and equipment and its inability to immediately replace them, was not in a position to render the transportation service required by the public, while respondent Cervo as an emergency operator filled the breach and by his ingenuity and resourcefulness, gave the service badly needed. In a decision by this Court in the case of Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. v. Roman Mabanag, 88 Phil. 66, we said that as a reward to these postwar emergency operators, their emergency certificates should be converted into permanent ones. I also agree that the legality of the delegation made by the Commission to its Chief Attorney, Antonio H. Aspillera, of its authority to receive evidence in this contested case, may not be raised in this appeal for the first time.

However, I disagree to the other considerations made in the majority opinion, particularly, that the fact that an old operator who has been operating on a certain line for a long time does not preclude the Commission from granting an additional permit to operate on the same line if public necessity so demands. The majority opinion also states that any ruling that leads to monopoly should be avoided. I maintain that as long as an old, established land transportation operator is giving good, adequate, safe and efficient service, no other (new) operator should be allowed on the same line, unless the Commission and this Court desire to allow and encourage ruinous, cut-throat competition, with all its attendant evils, among them, the common practice of racing on the highways by rival buses, endangering the lives and limbs of passengers, just to be ahead in picking up passengers, and discourage established companies which were first on the field and endanger, even destroy their capital. If additional services on a line are needed by the public, the old operator should be require and be given an opportunity to render such service increase its units and equipment if necessary. Only when such old operator fails or refuses, should a new operator be given the certificate to operate and give said needed service.

In a long line of decisions of this Tribunal which I had occasion to cite in the case of Interprovincial Autobus Co. v. Clarete, (supra p. 275) 1 the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is the duty of the Public Service Commission to protect rather than to destroy the investments of established operators, and that it should not grant a subsequent license or certificate to another for the same thing over the same route or line; that rights are to be protected before permitting ruinous competition; and that before granting a certificate to a transportation company, there being another with a proper certificate, the latter should be given an opportunity to improve its service if deficient or inadequate. This is a wholesale policy which for many years the Government thru this Tribunal, has fostered and carried out, and I greatly deplore seeing this policy disturbed or abandoned by means of the considerations in the majority opinion which I had occasion to refer to.

I do not mean to advocate monopoly in transportation, which the majority wants to avoid. It is the principle and rule of giving preference to old operators who were first on the field, that I am trying to defend. Speaking of old transportation operators in the case of Interprovincial Auto bus Co. v. Clarete, supra, I had occasion to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . that these old operators were pioneers in the field of transportation. They in a way blazed the trail in this field of activity, educated the public to travel and created a demand for transportation. They ventured into the new enterprise and into an unchartered region and took chances of losing; they put their capital, oftentimes subscribed by trusting stockholders, in the undertaking, in the belief and assurance that with the protection and supervision of the Government they would receive adequate returns for their investment, and that the same Government would not allow or tolerate, much less encourage unnecessary and ruinous competition which would result in the loss, not only of reasonable profits but even of the capital itself.

"Furthermore, the transportation business over long distances as distinguished from cab services in the cities, is no small time undertaking. To give efficient, adequate, and safe service requires big capital, a corps of skilled mechanics, drivers, conductors and a fleet of units not only busses and autotrucks but also of emergency units to tow and to take care of units stalled or broken down on the highway."cralaw virtua1aw library

An old, established operator can easily give the additional service needed by merely assigning extra units or equipment, all under the same management. On the other hand a new operator would find it more difficult and expensive to cover the same line with new- equipment, garages and stations, and install officials, resulting in the unnecessary duplication of expense and effort on the same line.

If I have dwelled perhaps a little too extensively on this point of ruinous competition, duplication of services, and the preference to be given to old transportation operators it is because of the importance that I attach to it, and the far-reaching effect which a change in the policy would entail.

Endnotes:



1. Batangas Transportation Co. v. Orlanes, 52 Phil., 455; Batangas Transportation Co., v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 29154; Silang Traffic Co., v. Karunkong, 56 Phil., 826; Mangubat & Leveriza v. Silang Traffic Co., G.R. No. 31556; Bohol Land Transportation Co., v. Jureidini, 56 Phil., 560; Tan Sima v. Hacbang, 58 Phil., 16; and Pangasinan Transportation Co., v. Manila Railroad Co., 60 Phil., 617.




Back to Home | Back to Main


chanrobles.com



ChanRobles On-Line Bar Review

ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : www.chanroblesbar.com





May-1952 Jurisprudence                 

  • G.R. No. L-4367 May 2, 1952 - GENEROSA TORREFIEL, ET AL. v. ANASTACIO TORIANO

    091 Phil 209

  • G.R. No. L-3318 May 5, 1952 - CORNELIO ANTIQUERA v. SOTERO BALUYOT

    091 Phil 213

  • G.R. No. L-5482 May 5, 1952 - TRANQUILINO ROVERO v. RAFAEL AMPARO, ET AL.

    091 Phil 228

  • G.R. No. L-4741 May 7, 1952 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ELIGIO CAMO, ET AL.

    091 Phil 240

  • G.R. No. L-5514 May 7, 1952 - PEDRO CALANO v. PEDRO CRUZ

    091 Phil 247

  • G.R. No. L-4472 May 8, 1952 - ESPIRIDION RONE v. VICTOR CLARO, ET AL.

    091 Phil 250

  • G.R. No. L-5047 May 8, 1952 - VICENTE PANG KOK HUA v. REPUBLICA DE FILIPINAS

    091 Phil 254

  • G.R. No. L-4002 May 12, 1952 - RAMON PASCUAL v. REALTY INVESTMENT, INC.

    091 Phil 257

  • G.R. No. L-4615 May 12, 1952 - JUAN DULDULAO, ET AL. v. EUSEBIO F. RAMOS

    091 Phil 261

  • G.R. No. L-4133 May 13, 1952 - AGUSTINA DE GUZMAN VDA. DE CARRILLO v. FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ

    091 Phil 265

  • G.R. No. L-4893 May 13, 1952 - PEDRO GAMBOA v. JOSE TEODORO

    091 Phil 270

  • G.R. Nos. L-4100 & L-4102 May 15, 1952 - INTERPROVINCIAL AUTOBUS COMPANY v. LUIS CLARETE

    091 Phil 275

  • G.R. No. L-4156 May 15, 1952 - FLORENCIA VITUG v. DONATA MONTEMAYOR

    091 Phil 286

  • G.R. Nos. L-4218-19 May 19, 1952 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. GENARO OBENIA

    091 Phil 292

  • G.R. No. L-4420 May 19, 1952 - CESAR REYES v. MAX BLOUSE

    091 Phil 305

  • G.R. No. L-3899 May 21, 1952 - RAYMUNDO TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. v. VICTORINO CERVO

    091 Phil 313

  • G.R. No. L-4189 May 21, 1952 - EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS v. JACINTO SANTOS

    091 Phil 320

  • G.R. No. L-4234 May 21, 1952 - ABBOT LABORATORIES v. CELEDONIO AGRAVA

    091 Phil 328

  • G.R. No. L-3391 May 23, 1952 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. AGUSTIN HERNANDEZ

    091 Phil 334

  • G.R. No. L-4132 May 23, 1952 - FRANCISCO M. ALONSO v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

    091 Phil 345

  • G.R. No. L-4333 May 23, 1952 - MARY HAYDEN ARCACHE v. NICOLAS LIZARES & CO., INC., ET AL.

    091 Phil 348

  • G.R. No. L-3646 May 26, 1952 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. PABLO S. RIVERA

    091 Phil 354

  • G.R. No. L-4043 May 26, 1952 - CENON S. CERVANTES v. THE AUDITOR GENERAL

    091 Phil 359

  • G.R. No. L-4783 May 26, 1952 - JULITA RELUCIO v. RAMON R. SAN JOSE, ETC.

    091 Phil 365

  • G.R. No. L-4869 May 26, 1952 - ESTEBAN MANGAOANG v. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LA UNION

    091 Phil 368

  • G.R. No. L-3538 May 28, 1952 - JUAN LUNA SUBDIVISION v. M. SARMIENTO

    091 Phil 371

  • G.R. No. L-4061 May 28, 1952 - CENTRAL VEGETABLE OIL MANUFACTURING CO. v. PHIL. OIL INDUSTRY WORKERS UNION

    091 Phil 378

  • G.R. No. L-4091 May 28, 1952 - MARIANO M. PARAS v. COURT OF APPEALS

    091 Phil 389

  • G.R. No. L-4181 May 28, 1952 - EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS v. RODOLFO GERARDO

    091 Phil 395

  • G.R. Nos. L-4231 y L-4232 May 28, 1952 - EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS v. ARTURO ALFARO, ET AL.

    091 Phil 404

  • G.R. No. L-4316 May 28, 1952 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. HIGINIO MACADAEG, ET AL.

    091 Phil 410

  • G.R. No. L-4340 May 28, 1952 - REBECCA LEVIN v. JOAQUIN V. BASS

    091 Phil 419

  • G.R. Nos. L-4378-79 May 28, 1952 - MUNICIPALITY OF GATTARAN v. DOROTEO ELIZAGA

    091 Phil 440

  • G.R. No. L-4533 May 28, 1952 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. LORENZO MORALES

    091 Phil 445

  • G.R. No. L-4813 May 28, 1952 - ASSOCIATION OF BEVERAGE EMPLOYEES, ET AL. v. JOSE FIGUERAS

    091 Phil 450

  • G.R. No. L-4229 May 29, 1952 - DALMACIO FALCASANTOS v. HOW SUY CHING

    091 Phil 456

  • G.R. No. L-4373 May 29, 1952 - ENRIQUE BAUTISTA v. LEONCIA REYES

    091 Phil 469

  • G.R. No. L-4683 May 29, 1952 - OLIMPIO NEÑARIA v. JOSE P. VELUZ

    091 Phil 473

  • G.R. No. L-4606 May 30, 1952 - RAMON B. FELIPE v. JOSE N. LEUTERIO, ET AL.

    091 Phil 482