Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1962 > April 1962 Decisions > Nos. L-17325 and L-16594 April 26, 1962

1. TAXATION; PERCENTAGE TAXES; FORFEITURE OF BOND WITHIN TEN YEARS. — Upon the execution of a bond to guarantee the payment of an internal revenue tax, the tax-payer, as principal, and the bondsman, as surety, assumed an obligation entirely distinct from the tax and became subject to an entirely different kind of liability. A bond being a written contract imposing rights and liabilities, the government, pursuant to article 1144 of the new Civil Code, has the right to take court action for its forfeiture within 10 years from the accrual of the right of action.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 332 (c) OF REVENUE CODE NOT APPLICABLE. — Section 332 (c) of the Revenue Code, is not applicable to actions for forfeiture of bonds. The period of limitation provided in this section is evidently confined to actions for the collection of taxes.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR PAYMENT OF TAX INTERRUPTED BY EXECUTION OF BOND. — Obligations contracted in a bond by a tax-payer constitute written acknowledgments of the debt and interrupt the 5-year period of prescription for the payment of tax.

G.R. No. L-15265 April 27, 1962 - BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY v. BENJAMIN TABISOLA, ET AL. :

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations.

Benjamin Tabisola and Jose Monteclaro complained against Baguio Gold Mining Co. for unfair labor practice allegedly consisting of their dismissal by the company on February 18, 1957, because they refused to stop campaigning for union membership even after the company’s general superintendent had threatened them with dismissal if they continued their union activities.

The Industrial Court found the evidence insufficient to support complainant’s claim that they were discharged for union activities. Wherefore, it dismissed their complaint; however, it ordered the company to reinstate complainants to their former positions, with one day’s salary corresponding to February 16, 1957 (which they had refused to accept on advice of their lawyer); and to pay Tabisola full back wages from February 18, 1957 until actual reinstatement. 1

The sole issue petitioner presents is: Does the Court of Industrial Relations have authority to order reinstatement and award back wages where the employer was declared not guilty of the unfair labor practice charge?

A similar question arose in National Labor Union v. Insular- Yebana Tobacco Corporation. 2 This court’s answer was in the negative.

The law is clear. In an unfair labor practice case where the Court of Industrial Relations finds that the person charged in the complaint has engaged or is engaging in unfair labor practice, the court is expressly granted the power to order reinstatement with or without backpay. 3 But his authority had been implicitly withheld where the charge is not substantiated. Then, the Court of Industrial Relations is directed to simply dismiss the complaint.

This Act shall take effect upon its approval. 4

In support of the view that the Industrial Court possesses the questioned authority, respondents contend that said court, under Commonwealth Act 103, has broad powers including reinstatement and award of back wages; and that in approving Republic Act 875, Congress had not intended to place the employee in a situation where after his unfair labor practice charge is dismissed, he may not be accorded the necessary protection guaranteed by the Constitution and the civil code.

The authority of the Court of Industrial Relations to order reinstatement under Commonwealth Act 103 is confined to instances covered thereby 5 , i.e., when the court is exercising its power of arbitration and conciliation. In unfair labor practice cases, which are distinctive proceedings prosecuted like criminal offenses 6 the Industrial Court is inhibited from exercising its powers of arbitration and conciliation. 7

The dismissed employee is not entirely without remedy if his charge of unfair labor practice fails and his complaint dismissed, because the breach by the employer of the obligation to him may be redressed like an ordinary contract or obligation. 8

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is modified by the elimination of the order for reinstatement with back wages. Costs against respondents.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Labrador and Barrera, JJ., took no part.

Endnotes:

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1. The Court of Industrial Relations based its order of reinstatement on the finding that Tabisola was dismissed "for no cause, jur or otherwise", so he was awarded full back pay and that Monteclaro was discharged because of his unruly behavior on February 9, 1957 (he resented the refusal by Alan A. Bakewell, company general superintendent, of his request for "cash advance") which disturbed work in the company’s accounting office — a violation of office rules and regulations, which the court did not deem sufficiently grave to warrant dismissal.

2. G.R. No. L-15863, July 31, 1961. The issue in this case, as stated by the respondents therein, was: In an unfair labor practice proceeding under Republic Act 875 charging an employer with discriminatory dismissal of an employee because of union activity which results in the dismissal of the case in view of a finding that the employer did not dismiss the employee for union activity, may the Court of Industrial Relations order the reinstatement with back pay of the dismissed employee pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 19 of Commonwealth Act 103, as amended, on the ground that the dismissal was not justified?; or, in the words of this Court: In a proceeding for the trial of charges of unfair labor practice, prosecuted in accordance with Section 5 of Republic Act No. 875, can the court grant a remedy such as reinstatement and back pay, even if the complaint is to be dismissed because the unfair labor practice alleged to have been committed has not been proved or found to exist? See also Cagalawan v. Customs Canteen, G.R. No. L-16031, October 31, 1961.

3. Section 5 (c), Republic Act 875.

4. Section 5 (c), Republic Act 875. (See note 2.)

5. Under Commonwealth Act No. 103, the power of arbitration and conciliation may be exercised only if an industrial dispute is causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout and the number of employees or laborers involved exceeds 30 (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 103). Once the court acquires jurisdiction and the case is pending before the court, the suspension, lay-off or dismissal of employees or laborers may not be made without the court’s approval (Sec. 19 Ibid). After trial, the court is granted power to decide the nature and form of remedy, or award that it may grant, which remedy, may include reinstatement, suspension or otherwise (Sec. 13, Ibid). The only other instance where the court may order reinstatement of an employee is where the discharge of an employee is caused by his testifying or intention to testify in an investigation before it (Sec. 21, Ibid). National Labor Union v. Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corporation, supra.

6. A consideration of the entire law on the matter clearly discloses the intention of the lawmaker to consider acts which are alleged to constitute unfair labor practices as violations of the law or offenses, to be prosecuted in the same manner as a criminal offense. The reason for this provision is that the commission of an unfair labor practice is an offense against a public right or interest and should be prosecuted in the same manner as a public offense. (National Labor Union v. Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corporation, supra.) .

7. Sec. 5 (c), Republic Act 875.

8. National Labor Union v. Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corporation, supra.