Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence


Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1974 > September 1974 Decisions > Antonio, J., Concurring : Separate Opinion : G.R. Nos. L-35546, L-35538, L-35539, L-35540, L-35547, L-35556, L-35567, L-35571 and L-35573 September 17, 1974 - G.R. No. L-35546. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Repondents : G.R. No. L-35538. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Et Al. : G.R. No. L-35539. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES : G.R. No. L-35540. September 17, 1974. _ MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35547. September 17, 1974. - ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, v. BRIG GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE : G.R. No. L-35556. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35567. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35571. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, Petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35573. September 17, 1974 - ERNESTO RONDON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA:




PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-35546. September 17, 1974.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35538. September 17, 1974.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Et Al., Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35539. September 17, 1974.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, 1 petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35540. September 17, 1974.]

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35547. September 17, 1974.] 2

ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, Petitioner, v. BRIG GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35556. September 17, 1974.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, Petitioners, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35567. September 17, 1974.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35571. September 17, 1974.] 3

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, Petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-35573. September 17, 1974.]

ERNESTO RONDON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA, Respondents.


SEPARATE OPINION


ANTONIO, J., concurring:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

These applications for writs of habeas corpuspresent for review Proclamation No 1081 of the President of the Philippines, placing the country under martial law on September 21, 1972, and the legality of the arrest and detention of prisoners under the aforesaid proclamation. The issues posed have confronted every democratic government in every clime and in every age. They have always recurred in times of crisis when the nation’s safety and continued existence are in peril. Involved is the problem of harmonizing two basic interests that lie at the foundation of every democratic constitutional system. The first is contained in Rosseau’s formulation, "the people’s first intention is that the State shall not perish," in other words, the right of the State to its existence. The second are the civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, which "imply the existence of an organized system maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses . . ." (Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 [1940]).

The petitions for habeas corpusinitially raise the legality of the arrest and detention of petitioners. As the respondents, however, plead, in defense, the declaration of martial law and the consequent suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, the validity of Proclamation No. 1081 is the ultimate constitutional issue.

Hearings were held on September 26 and 29 and October 6, 1972 1 Meanwhile, some of the petitioners were allowed to withdraw their petitions. 2 Most of the petitioners were subsequently released from custody under certain conditions and some of them insist that their cases have not become moot as their freedom of movement is restricted 3 As of this date, only petitioner Benigno Aquino, Jr. (L-35546) remains in military custody.

On August 11, 1973, petitioner Benigno Aquino, Jr. was charged before the military commission with the crimes of subversion under the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700), murder and illegal possession of firearms. On August 23, 1973, he filed an action for certiorariand prohibition (L-35546) with this Court, assailing the validity of his trial before the military commission, because the creation of military tribunals for the trial of offenses committed by civilians is unconstitutional in the absence of a state of war or status of belligerency; being martial law measures, they have ceased with the cessation of the emergency; and he could not expect a fair trial because the President of the Philippines had prejudged his case. That action is pending consideration and decision.

On December 28, 1973, petitioner Diokno moved to withdraw his petition (L-35539), claiming that there was delay in the disposition of his case, and that as a consequence of the decision of this Court in Javellana v. Executive Secretary (L-36142, March 31, 1973) and of the action of the members of this Court in taking an oath to support the New Constitution, he has reason to believe that he cannot "reasonably expect to get justice in this case." Respondents oppose this motion on the ground that public interest or questions of public importance are involved and the reasons given are factually untrue and contemptuous. On September 11, 1974, petitioner Diokno was released from military custody. In view of his release, it was the consensus of the majority of the Court to consider his case as moot.

We shall now proceed to discuss the issues posed by the remaining cases.

1. Is the determination by the President of the Philippines of the necessity for the exercise of his power to declare martial law political, hence, final and conclusive upon the courts, or is it justiciable and, therefore, his determination is subject to review by the courts?

2. Assuming Lansang to be applicable, can it be said that the President acted arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 1081?

3. Assuming that the issues are justiciable, can the Supreme Court upon the facts of record and those judicially known to It now declare that the necessity for martial law has already ceased?

4. Under a regime of martial law, can the Court inquire into the legal justification for the arrest and detention as well as the other constraints upon the individual liberties of the petitioners? In the affirmative, does It have any adequate legal basis to declare that their detention is no longer authorized by the Constitution.

I

CONSTITUTION INTENDED STRONG EXECUTIVE


The right of a government to maintain its existence is the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty. To protect the nation’s continued existence, from external as well as internal threats, the government "is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were generally considered to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions" (Mr. Justice Bradley, concurring in Legal Tender Cases [US] 12 Wall. 457, 554, 556, 20 L. ed. 287, 314, 315). To attain this end, nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. The constitutional power to act upon this basic principle has been recognized by all courts in every nation at different periods and diverse circumstances.

These powers which are to be exercised for the nation’s protection and security have been lodged by the Constitution under Article VII, Section 10 (2) thereof, on the President of the Philippines, who is clothed with exclusive authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called forth.

The constitutional provision expressly vesting in the President the power to place "the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it," 4 is taken bodily from the Jones Law with the difference that the President of the United States had the power to modify or vacate the action taken by the Governor General. 5 Although the Civil Governor, under Section 5 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, could, with the approval of the Philippine Commission, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, no power to proclaim martial law was specifically granted. This power is not mentioned in the Federal Constitution of the United States. It simply designates the President as commander-in-chief:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several states when called into actual service of the United States. . . 6

Its absence in the Federal Constitution notwithstanding, President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War placed some parts of the country under martial law. He predicated the exercise of this power on his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and on the ground of extreme necessity for the preservation of the Union. When not expressly provided in the Constitution, its justification, therefore, would be necessity. Thus some authoritative writers view it as "not a part of the Constitution but is rather a power to preserve the Constitution when constitutional methods prove inadequate to that end. It is the law of necessity " 7 Since the meaning of the term "martial law" is obscure, as is the power exercisable by the Chief Executive under martial law, resort must be had to precedents. Thus the powers of the Chief Executive under the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Federal Constitution have been drawn not only from general and specific provisions of the Constitution but from historical precedents of Presidential action in times of crises. Lincoln invoked his authority under the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Federal Constitution for the series of extraordinary measures which he took during the Civil War, such as the calling of volunteers for military service, the augmentation of the Army and Navy, the payment of $2 million from the unappropriated funds in the Treasury to persons unauthorized to receive it, the closing of the Post Office to "treasonable correspondence," the blockade of Southern ports, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the arrests and detentions of persons "who were represented to him as being engaged in or contemplating "treasonable practices" — all this for the most part was done without the least statutory authorization from Congress. The actions of Lincoln "assert for the President," according to Corwin, "an initiative of indefinite scope and legislative in effect in meeting the domestic aspects of a war emergency." 8 The creation of public offices is conferred by the Federal Constitution to Congress. During World War I, however, President Wilson, on the basis of his power under the "Commander-in-Chief" clause of the Federal Constitution, created "public offices," which were copied in lavish scale by President Roosevelt in World War II. "The principal canons of constitutional interpretation are in wartime set aside," according to Corwin, "so far as concerns both the scope of national power and the capacity of the President to gather unto himself all the constitutionally available powers in order the more effectively to focus them upon the task of the hour." 9 The presidential power, "building on accumulated precedents has taken on at times, under the stimulation of emergency conditions," according to two eminent commentators, the "dimensions of executive prerogative as described by John Locke, of a power to wit, to fill needed gaps in the law, or even to supersede it so far as may be requisite to realize the fundamental law of nature and government, namely, that as much as may be all the members of society are to be preserved." 10

There is no question that the framers of the 1935 Constitution were aware of these precedents and of the scope of the power that had been exercised by the Presidents of the United States in times of grave crisis. The framers of the Constitution "were not only idealists but also practical-minded men." "While they abjured wars of aggression they well knew that for the country to survive provisions for its defense had to be made." 11

II


TEXTUALLY DEMONSTRABLE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMITMENT OF ISSUE TO THE PRESIDENT


Instead of making the President of the Philippines simply the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces, with authority whenever it becomes necessary to call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, the framers of the 1935 Constitution expressly conferred upon him the exclusive power and authority to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpusor place the Philippines, or any part thereof, under martial law.

"The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the wit of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." 12

The condition which would warrant the exercise of the power was not confined to actual invasion, insurrection or rebellion, but also to imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it. It is evident, therefore, that while American Presidents derived these extraordinary powers by implication from the State’s right to self-preservation, the President of the Philippines was expressly granted by the Constitution with all the powers necessary to protect the nation in times of grave peril.

The safety and well-being of the nation required that the President should not be hampered by lack of authority but was to be a "strong executive who could maintain the unity of the nation with sufficient powers and prerogatives to save the country during great crises and dangers." 13

As Delegate Jose P. Laurel comprehensively explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . A strong executive he is intended to be, because a strong executive we shall need, especially in the early years of our independent, or semi-independent existence. A weak executive is synonymous with a weak government. He shall not be a ‘monarch’ or a dictator in time of profound and Octavian peace, but he virtually so becomes in an extraordinary emergency; and whatever may be his position, he bulwarks, normally, the fortifications of a strong constitutional government, but abnormally, in extreme cases, he is suddenly ushered is as a Minerva, full-grown and in full panoply of war, to occupy the vantage ground as the ready protector and defender of the life and honor his nation." (Emphasis supplied)14

The concentration of an amplitude of power in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who is at the same time the elected civilian Chief of State, is predicated upon the fact that it is he who must initially shoulder the burden and deal with the emergency. By the nature of his position he possesses and wields the extraordinary powers of self-preservation of the democratic, constitutional state. In times of crisis there is indeed unification of responsibility and centralization of authority in the Chief Executive. "The concentration of governmental power in a democracy faced by an emergency," wrote Rossiter, "is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. . . . In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to decisive emergency action in behalf of the State and its independent existence. There are moments in the life of any government when all the powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative and judicial powers in the hands of one man. The more complete the separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis." (Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 288-289.)

It was intended, however, that the exercise of these extraordinary powers is for the preservation of the State, its democratic institutions, and the permanent freedom of its citizens.

III

RESPONSIBILITY IMPLIES BROAD AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION


The conditions of war, of insurrection or rebellion, or of any other national emergency are as varied as the means required for meeting them and it is. therefore, within the contemplation of the Constitution that the Chief Executive, to preserve the safety of the nation on those times of national peril, should have the broadest authority compatible with the emergency in selecting the means and adopting the measures which in his honest judgment are necessary for the preservation of the nation’s safety. "The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite," wrote Alexander Hamilton, "and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed . . . This is one of those truths which to a correct and unprejudiced mind carries its own evidence along with it, and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning . . . The means ought to be in proportion to the end; the persons from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained.’’ 15 Mr. Madison expressed the same idea in the following terms: "It is vain to impose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-reservation. It is worse than in vain, because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power." 16

"Unquestionably," wrote Chief Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden (7 How. 44, [1849], 12 L. ed. 600), "a State may use its military power to put down an armed insurrection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The power is essential to the existence of every government, essential to the preservation of order and free institutions, and is as necessary to the States of this Union as to any other government. The State itself must determine what degree of force the crisis demands. And if the Government of Rhode Island deemed the armed opposition so formidable, and so ramified throughout the State, as to require the use of its military force and the declaration of martial law, we see no ground upon which this Court can question its authority."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the Prize cases (17 L. ed. 476, [1863]), the Court ascribed to the President of the United States, by virtue of his powers as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief, the power which in Luther v. Borden is attributed to the government as a whole, to treat of insurrection as a state of war, and the scene of the insurrection as a seat or theater of war. As Justice Grier in the Prize cases significantly stated: "Whether the President in fulfilling his duties as Commander-in-Chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the Political Department of the government to which this power was entrusted. ‘He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.’ " (Emphasis supplied)

In Hirabayashi v. United States, where the Court upheld the curfew regulations affecting persons of Japanese ancestry as valid military measures to prevent espionage and sabotage, there was again reaffirmance of the view that the Constitution has granted to the President and to Congress in the exercise of the war powers a "wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it. Ex parte Quirin, supra (317 US 28, 29, ante, 12, 13, 63 S Ct 2); cf. Prize Cases, supra (2 Black [US] 670, 17 L ed 477); Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. [US] 19, 29, 6 L ed 537, 540). Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of the Government on which the Constitution has place the responsibility of war-making, it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.

"The actions taken must be appraised in the light of the conditions with which the President and Congress were confronted in the early months of 1942, many of which, since disclosed, were then peculiarly within the knowledge of the military authorities." 17

"The measures to be taken in carrying on war and to suppress insurrection," according to Justice Swayne, in Stewart v. Kahn, 18 are not defined. The decision of all questions rests wholly in the discretion of those to whom the substantial powers involved are confided by the Constitution. In the latter case, the power is not limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the insurgent forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress."cralaw virtua1aw library

The thrust of those authorities is that the President as commander-in-chief and chief executive on whom is committed the responsibility is empowered, indeed obliged, to preserve the state against domestic violence and alien attack. In the discharge of that duty, he necessarily is accorded a very broad authority and discretion in ascertaining the nature and extent of the danger that confronts the nation and in selecting the means or measures necessary for the preservation of the safety of the Republic.

The terms "insurrection" and "rebellion" are in a large measure incapable of precise or exact legal definitions and are more or less elastic in their meanings. As to when an act or instance of revolting against civil or political authority may be classified as an "insurrection" or as a "rebellion" is a question better addressed to the President, who under the Constitution is the authority vested with the power of ascertaining the existence of such exigencies and charged with the responsibility of suppressing them. To suppress such danger to the state, he is necessarily vested with a broad authority and discretion, to be exercised under the exigencies of each particular occasion as the same may present itself to his judgment and determination. His actions in the face of such emergency must be viewed in the context of the situation as it then confronted him. It is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of his action as commander-in-chief or to substitute its judgment for his.

IV

NEED FOR UNQUESTIONING ADHERENCE TO POLITICAL DECISION


It is, however, insisted that even with the broad discretion granted to the President by the Constitution in ascertaining whether or not conditions exist for the declaration of martial law, his findings in support of such declaration should nevertheless be subject to judicial review.

It is important to bear in mind that We are here dealing with a plenary and exclusive power conferred upon the Chief Executive by the Constitution. The power itself is to be exercised upon sudden emergencies, and under circumstances which may be vital to the existence of the government. A prompt and unhesitating obedience to orders issued in connection therewith is indispensable as every delay and obstacle to its immediate implementation may jeopardize the public interests.

By reason of his unique position as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, it is he, more than any other high official of the government, who has the authority and the means of obtaining through the various facilities in the civil and military agencies of the government under his command, information promptly and effectively, from every quarter and corner of the state about the actual peace and order condition of the country. In connection with his duty and responsibility, he is necessarily accorded the wise and objective counsel of trained and experienced specialists on the subject. Even if the Court could obtain all available information, it would lack the facility of determining whether or not the insurrection or rebellion or the imminence thereof poses a danger to the public safety. Nor could the courts recreate a complete picture of the emergency in the face of which the President acted, in order to adequately judge his military action. Absent any judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving judicially those questions, such a task for a court to undertake may well-nigh be impossible. On the other hand, the President, who is responsible for the peace and security of the nation, is necessarily compelled by the Constitution to make those determinations and decisions. The matter is committed to him for determination by criteria of political and military expediency. There exists, therefore, no standard ascertainable by settled judicial experience by reference to which his decision can be reviewed by the courts 19 Indeed, those are military decisions and in their very nature, "military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent and judicial appraisal. They do not pretend to rest on evidence, but are made on information that often would not be admissible and on assumptions that could not be proved. Information in support of an order could not be disclosed to courts without danger that it would reach the enemy. Neither can courts act on communications made in confidence. Hence, courts can never have any real alternative to accepting the mere declaration of the authority that issued the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military viewpoint." 20 He is necessarily constituted the judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance and is bound to act according to his belief of the facts.

Both reason and authority, therefore, dictate that the determination of the necessity for the exercise of the power to declare martial law is within the exclusive domain of the President and his determination is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all persons. (cf. Fairman, Martial Rule and the Suppression of Insurrection, p. 771.) 21 This construction necessarily results from the nature of the power itself, and from the manifest object contemplated by the Constitution.

(a) Barcelon v. Baker.

The existing doctrine at the time of the framing and adoption of the 1935 Constitution was that of Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. 87). It enunciated the principle that when the Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine Commission, under Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, declares that a state of rebellion, insurrection or invasion exists, and by reason thereof the public safety requires the suspension of the privileges of habeas corpus, this declaration is held conclusive upon the judicial department of the government. And when the Chief Executive has decided that conditions exist justifying the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, courts will presume that such conditions continue to exist until the same authority has decided that such conditions no longer exist. These doctrines are rooted on pragmatic considerations and sound reasons of public policy. The "doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, such person is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts" has been recognized by all courts and "has never been disputed by any respectable authority." (Barcelon v. Baker, supra.) The political department, according to Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. Mott (12 Wheat 29-31), is the sole judge of the existence of war or insurrection, and when it declares either of these emergencies to exist, its action is not subject to review or liable to be controlled by the judicial department of the State. (Citing Franklin v. State Board of Examiners, 23 Cal. 112, 178.)

The dangers and difficulties which would grow out of the adoption of a contrary rule are clearly and ably pointed, out in the Barcelon case, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"If the investigation and findings of the President, or the Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine Commission, are not conclusive and final as against the judicial department of the Government, then every officer whose duty it is to maintain order and protect the lives and property of the people may refuse to act, and apply to the judicial department of the Government for another investigation and conclusion concerning the same conditions, to the end that they may be protected against civil actions resulting from illegal acts."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Owing to conditions at times, a state of insurrection, rebellion, or invasion may arise suddenly and may jeopardize the very existence of the State. Suppose, for example, that one of the thickly populated Governments situated near this Archipelago, anxious to extend its power and territory, should suddenly decide to invade these Islands, and should, without warning, appear in one of the remote harbors with a powerful fleet and at once begin to land troops. The governor or military commander of the particular district or province notifies the Governor-General by telegraph of this landing of troops and that the people of the district are in collusion with such invasion. Might not the Governor-General and the Commission accept this telegram as sufficient evidence and proof of the facts communicated and at once take steps, even to the extent of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as might appear to them to be necessary to repel such invasion? It seems that all men interested in the maintenance and stability of the Government would answer this question in the affirmative.

"But suppose some one, who has been arrested in the district upon the ground that his detention would assist in restoring order and in repelling the invasion, applies for the writ of habeas corpus, alleging that no invasion actually exists; may the judicial department of the Government call the officers actually engaged in the field before it and away from their posts of duty for the purpose of explaining and finishing proof to it concerning the existence or nonexistence of the facts proclaimed to exist by the legislative and executive branches of the State? If so, then the courts may effectually tie the hands of the executive, whose special duty it is to enforce the laws and maintain order, until the invaders have actually accomplished their purpose. The interpretation contended for here by the applicants, so pregnant with detrimental results, could not have been intended by the Congress of the United States when it enacted the law.

"It is the duty of the legislative branch of the Government to make such laws and regulations as will effectually conserve peace and good order and protect the lives and property of the citizens of the State. It is the duty of the Governor-General to take such steps as he deems wise and necessary for the purpose of enforcing such laws. Every delay and hindrance and obstacle which prevents a strict enforcement of laws under the conditions mentioned necessarily tends to jeopardize public interests and the safety of the whole people. If the judicial department of the Government, or any officer in the Government, has a right to contest the orders of the President or of the Government-General under the conditions above supposed, before complying with such orders, then the lands hands of the President or the Governor-General may be tied until the very object of the rebels or insurrectos or invaders has been accomplished. But it is urged that the President, or the Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine Commission, might be mistaken as to the actual conditions; that the legislative department — the Philippine Commission — might, by resolution, declare after investigation, that a state of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion exists, and that the public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpuswhen, as a matter of fact, no such conditions actually existed; that the President, or Governor-General acting upon the authority of the Philippine Commission, might by proclamation suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, without there actually existing the conditions mentioned in the act of Congress. In other words, the applicants allege in their argument in support of their application for the writ of habeas corpus, that the legislative and executive branches of the Government might reach a wrong conclusion from their investigations of the actual conditions, or might, through a desire to oppress and harass the people, declare that a state of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion existed and that public safety required the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpuswhen actually and in fact no such conditions did exist. We can not assume that the legislative and executive branches will act or take any action based upon such motives.

"Moreover, it cannot be assumed that the legislative and executive branches of the Government, with all the machinery which those branches have at their command for examining into the conditions in any part of the Archipelago, will fail to obtain all existing information concerning actual conditions. It is the duty of the executive branch of the Government to constantly inform the legislative branch of the Government of the condition of the Union as to the prevalence of peace or disorder. The executive branch of the Government, through its numerous branches of the civil and military, ramifies every portion of the Archipelago, and is enabled thereby to obtain information from every quarter and corner of the State. Can the judicial department of the Government, with its very limited machinery for the purpose of investigating general conditions, be any more sure of ascertaining the true conditions through out the Archipelago, or in any particular district, than the other branches of the Government? We think not." (5 Phil., pp. 93-96.)

(b) The Constitutional Convention of 1934.

This was the state of Philippine jurisprudence on the matter, when the Constitutional Convention met on July 20, 1934. It must be recalled that, under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusby the Governor-General was subject to the approval of the Philippine Commission (Section 5, Act of Congress of July 1, 1902), while, under Section 21 of the Jones Law of 1916, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusas well as the proclamation of martial law by the Governor-General could be modified or vacated by the President of the United States. When the first Draft was submitted conferring the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusexclusively upon the President, Delegate Araneta proposed an amendment to the effect that the National Assembly should be the organ empowered to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpusand, when not in session, the same may be done by the President with the consent of the majority of the Supreme Court. Under the provisions of the Draft, Delegate Araneta argued, "the Chief Executive would be the only authority to determine the existence of the reasons for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus; and, according to Philippine jurisprudence, the Supreme Court would refuse to review the findings of the Executive on the matter. Consequently, he added, arrests would be effected by military men who were generally arbitrary. They would be arresting persons connected with the rebellion, insurrection, invasion; some of them might also be arresting other persons without any cause whatsoever. The result would be that many persons might find themselves detained when in fact they had no connection whatsoever with the disturbances."22 Notwithstanding the brilliant arguments of Delegate Araneta, the Convention voted down the amendment. Evident was the clear intent of the framers of the Charter of vesting on the President the exclusive power of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the conclusive power to determine whether the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension. There was no opposition in the Convention to the grant on the President of the exclusive power to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

Realizing the fragmentation of the Philippines into thousands of islands and of the war clouds that were then hovering over Europe and Asia, the aforesaid framers of the Charter opted for a strong executive.

The provision of Section 10, Paragraph 2, of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution was, therefore, adopted in the light of the Court’s interpretation in Barcelon v. Baker.

(c) Montenegro v. Castañeda

On August 30, 1952, or 17 years after the ratification of the 1935 Constitution, this Court in Montenegro v. Castañeda (91 Phil. 882, 887), construing the power of the President of the Philippines under Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution, re-affirmed the doctrine in Barcelon v. Baker, thus: "We agree with the Solicitor General that in the light of the view of the United States Supreme Court through Marshall, Taney and Story quoted with approval in Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. 87, 99-100), the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension belongs to the President and ‘his decision is final and conclusive’ upon the courts and upon all other persons."cralaw virtua1aw library

On Montenegro’s contention that there is no state of invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof, as the "intermittent sorties and lightning attacks by organized bands in different places are occasional, localized and transitory," this Court explained that to the unpracticed eye the repeated encounters between dissident elements and military troops may seem sporadic, isolated, or casual. But the officers charged with the Nation’s security, analyzed the extent and pattern of such violent clashes and arrived at the conclusion that they are warp and woof of a general scheme to overthrow this government "vi et armis, by force of arms." This Court then reiterated one of the reasons why the finding of the Chief Executive that there is "actual danger of rebellion" was accorded conclusiveness, thus: "Indeed, as Justice Johnson said in that decision, whereas the Executive branch of the Government is enabled thru its civil and military branches to obtain information about peace and order from every quarter and corner of the nation, the judicial department, with its very limited machinery can not be in better position to ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing in the Archipelago." (Montenegro v. Castañeda and Balao, 91 Phil., 882, 886-887.)

It is true that the Supreme Court of the United States in Sterling v. Constantin, 23 asserted its authority to review the action taken by the State Governor of Texas under his proclamation of martial law. However, the Court chose not to overturn the principle expressed in Moyer v. Peabody that the question of necessity is "one strictly reserved for executive discretion." It held that, while the declaration of necessity is conclusive, the measures employed are reviewable:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It does not follow from the fact that the execute has this range of discretion, deemed to be a necessary incident of his power to suppress disorder that every sort of action the Governor may take, no matter how unjustified by the exigency or subversive or private right and the jurisdiction of the courts, otherwise available, is conclusively supported by mere executive fiat. The contrary is well-established. What are the limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

This ruling in Sterling should be viewed within the context of its factual environment. At issue was the validity of the attempt of the Governor to enforce by executive or military order the restriction on the production of oil wells which the District Judge had restrained pending proper judicial inquiry. The State Governor predicated his power under martial law, although it was conceded that "at no time has there been any actual uprising in the territory; at no time has any military force been exerted to put riots and mobs down." The Court disapproved the order of the Governor as it had no relation to the suppression of disorder but on the contrary it undermined the restraining order of the District Judge. The Court declared that the Governor could not bypass the processes of constitutional government by simply declaring martial law when no bona fide emergency existed. While this case shows that the judiciary can interfere when no circumstances existed which could reasonably be interpreted as constituting an emergency, it did not necessarily resolve the question whether the Court could interfere in the face of an actual emergency.

(d) Lansang v. Garcia.

Our attention, is however, invited to Lansang v. Garcia (G.R. No. L-33964 etc., December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448) where this Court declared, in connection with the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusby the President of the Philippines on August 21, 1971, that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of the factual basis of the proclamation in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. But this assertion of authority is qualified by the Court’s unequivocal statement that "the function of the Court is merely to check — not to supllant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." And "that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the ascertainment of the factual basis of the suspension, however, the Court had to rely implicitly on the findings of the Chief Executive. It did not conduct any independent factual inquiry for, as this Court explained in Barcelon and Montenegro, ." . . whereas the Executive branch of the Government is enabled thru its civil and military branches to obtain information about peace and order from every quarter and corner of the nation, the judicial department, with its very limited machinery cannot be in a better position to ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing in the Archipelago." Indeed, such reliance on the Executive’s findings would be the more compelling when the danger posed to the public safety is one arising from Communist rebellion and subversion.

We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Communists have refined their techniques of revolution, but the ultimate object is the same — "to undermine through civil disturbances and political crises the will of the ruling class to govern, and, at a critical point, to take over State power through well-planned and ably directed insurrection." 24 Instead of insurrection, there was to be the protracted war. The plan was to retreat and attack only at an opportune time. "The major objective is the annihilation of the enemy’s fighting strength and in the holding or taking of cities and places. The holding or taking of cities and places is the result of the annihilation of the enemy’s fighting strength." 25 The Vietnam War contributed its own brand of terrorism conceived by Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap — the silent and simple assassination of village officials for the destruction of the government’s administrative network. Modern rebellion now is a war of sabotage and harassment, of an aggression more often concealed than open, of guerrillas striking at night, of assassins and terrorists, and of professional revolutionaries resorting to all sorts of stratagems, crafts, methods and subterfuge, to undermine and subvert the security of the State to facilitate its violent overthrow 26

In the ultimate analysis, even assuming that the matter is justiciable and We apply the standards set in Lansang, by ascertaining whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 1081, the result would be the same.

For the existence of an actual rebellion and insurrection in this country by a sizable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government was confirmed by this Court in Lansang.

". . . our jurisprudence attests abundantly to the Communist activities in the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally at incitement to sedition or rebellion, as the immediate objective. Upon the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the movement seemed to have waned notably: but, the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific and the miseries, the devastation and havoc and the proliferation of unlicensed firearms concomitant with the military occupation of the Philippines and its subsequent liberation, brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of the Communist threat, with such vigor as to be able to organize and operate in Central Luzon an army — called HUKBALAHAP, during the occupation, and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) after liberation — which clashed several times with the armed forces of the Republic. This prompted then President Quirino to issue Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the validity of which was upheld in Montenegro v. Castañeda. Days before the promulgation of said Proclamation, or on October 18, 1950, members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines were apprehended in Manila. Subsequently accused and convicted of the crime of rebellion, they served their respective sentences.

"The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and order were concerned. Still, on June 20, 1957, Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, was approved, upon the ground stated in the very preamble of said statute — that

‘. . . the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘. . . the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines; and

‘. . . in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country . . .’

In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, on September 4, 1971, by the Senate Ad Hoc Committee of Seven — copy of which Report was filed in these cases by the petitioners herein —

‘The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of several mass organizations, notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the Socialist Party of the Philippines) among the workers; the Malayang Samahan ng Mga Magsasaka (MASAKA) among the peasantry; the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among the intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has exerted all-out effort to infiltrate, influence and utilize these organizations in promoting its radical brand of nationalism.’

"Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2) groups, one of which — composed mainly of young radicals, constituting the Maoist faction — reorganized the Communist Party of the Philippines early in 1969 and established a New People’s Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist concept of the ‘Protracted People’s War’ or ‘War of National Liberation.’ Its ‘Programme for a People’s Democratic Revolution’ states, inter alia:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its general programme for a people’s democratic revolution. All Filipino communists are ready to sacrifice their lives for the worthy cause of achieving the new type of democracy, of building a new Philippines that is genuinely and completely independent, democratic, united, just and prosperous . . .

x       x       x


‘The central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize political power. The Communist Party of the Philippines assumes this task at a time that both the international and national situations are favorable to taking the road of armed revolution . . .’

"In the year 1969, the NPA had — according to the records of the Department of National Defense — conducted raids, resorted to kidnapping and taken part in other violent incidents numbering over 230, in which it inflicted 404 casualties, and, in turn, suffered 243 losses. In 1970, its record of violent incidents was about the same, but the NPA casualties more than doubled.

"At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they belong to the traditional group or to the Maoist faction, believe that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of their main and ultimate objective, and act in accordance with such belief, although they may disagree on the means to be used at a given time and in a particular place; and (b) there is a New People’s Army, other, of course, than the armed forces of the Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New People’s Army is per se proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially considering that its establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in the nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may be likened to a declaration of war, sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even before the actual commencement of hostilities.

"We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.’

x       x       x


"The records before Us show that, on or before August 21, 1971, the Executive had information and reports — subsequently confirmed, in many respects, by the abovementioned Report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Committee of Seven — to the effect that the Communist Party of the Philippines does not merely adhere to Lenin’s idea of a swift armed uprising; that it has, also, adopted Ho Chi Minh’s terrorist tactics and resorted to the assassination of uncooperative local officials; . . .

"Petitioner similarly fail to take into account that — as per said information and reports — the reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao’s concept of protracted people’s war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of the government, of the political, economic and intellectual leadership, and of the people themselves; that conformably to such concept, the Party has placed special emphasis upon a most extensive and intensive program of subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban centers, the organization or armed city partisans and the infiltration in student groups, labor unions, and farmer and professional groups; that the CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations; that it has exploited the youth movement and succeeded in making Communist fronts of eleven (11) major student or youth organizations; that there are, accordingly, about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interest, . . . ; that in 1970, the Party had recorded two hundred fifty-eight (258) major demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) ended in violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured; that most of these actions were organized, coordinated or led by the aforementioned front organizations; that the violent demonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but well-trained group of armed agitators; that the number of demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has already exceeded those of 1970; and that twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and resulted in the death of fifteen (15) persons and the injury to many more.

"Subsequent events — as reported — have also proven that petitioners’ counsel have underestimated the threat to public safety posed by the New People’s Army. Indeed, it appears that, since August 21, 1971, it had in Northern Luzon six (6) encounters and staged one (1) raid, in consequence of which seven (7) soldiers lost their lives and two (2) others were wounded, whereas the insurgents suffered five (5) casualties; that on August 26, 1971, a well-armed group of NPA, trained by defector Lt. Victor Corpus, attacked the very command post of TF LAWIN in Isabela, destroying two (2) helicopters and one (1) plane, and wounding one (1) soldier; that the NPA had in Central Luzon a total of four (4) encounters, with two (2) killed and three (3) wounded on the side of the Government, one (1) BSDU killed and three (3) NPA casualties; that in an encounter at Botolan, Zambales, one (1) KM-SDK leader, an unidentified dissident, and Commander Panchito, leader of the dissident group were killed; that on August 26, 1971, there was an encounter in the barrio of San Pedro, Iriga City, Camarines Sur, between PC and the NPA, in which a PC and two (2) KM members were killed; that the current disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces have been rendered more complex by the involvement of the CPP/NPA, for, in mid-1971, a KM group, headed by Jovencio Esparagoza, contacted the Higa-onan tribes, in their settlement in Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, and offered them books, pamphlets and brochures of Mao Tse Tung, as well as conducted teach-ins in the reservation; that Esparagoza was reportedly killed on September 22, 1971, in an operation of the PC in said reservation; and that there are now two (2) NPA cadres in Mindanao."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is true that the suspension of the privilege of the writ was lifted on January 7, 1972, but it can not be denied that soon thereafter, lawlessness and terrorism had reached such a point that the nation was already drifting towards anarchy.

On September 21, 1972, when the President of the Philippines, pursuant to Article VII, section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1935 Constitution, placed the Philippines under martial law, the nation was in the throes of a crisis. The authority of the constitutional government was resisted openly by a coalition of forces, of large numbers of persons who were engaged in an armed conflict for its violent overthrow. 27 The Muslim secessionist movement with the active material and financial assistance of foreign political and economic interests was engaged in an open attempt to establish by violence and force a separate and independent political state.

Forceful military action, matched with attractive benevolence and a socio-economic program, has indeed broken the back of the rebellion in some areas. There are to be sure significant gains in the economy, the unprecedented increase in production and in exports, the billion-dollar international reserve, the new high in revenue collections and other notable infrastructures of development and progress. Indeed there is a noticeable transformation in the people’s sense of values, in their attitudes and motivations. But We personally take notice of the fact that even as of this late date, there is still a continuing rebellion that poses a danger to the public safety. Communist insurgency and subversion, once it takes root in any nation, is a hardy plant. A party whose strength is in selected, dedicated, indoctrinated and rigidly disciplined members, which may even now be secreted in strategic posts in industry, schools, churches and in government, can not easily be eradicated. 28

The NPA (New People’s Army) is pursuing a policy of strategic retreat but tactical offensive. It continues to conduct its activities through six Regional Operational Commands (ROCs) covering Northern, Central, and Southern Luzon, Western and Eastern Visayas, and Mindanao. Combat operations were conducted against the Communist insurgents by the armed forces of the government in Cagayan, Ifugao, Kalinga, Apayao, Camarines Sur, and Sorsogon. Subversive activities continue unabated in urban areas. Last January, 1974, the Maoist group known as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) attacked and overran the military detachment at Bilaan, Sulu, and the town of Parang. The town of Jolo was attacked by a rebel force of 500 men last February 6, 1974, and to cover their retreat razed two-thirds of the town. Only this August, there was fighting between government troops and muslim rebels armed with modern and sophisticated weapons of war in some parts of Cotabato and in the outskirts of the major southern port city of Davao. It would be an incredible naivete to conclude in the face of such a reality, that the peril to public safety had already abated.

Nor is the fact that the courts are open proof that there is no ground for martial rule or its continuance. The "open court" theory has been derived from the dictum in Ex Parte Milligan (7 Wall. 127 [1866], viz.: "Martial rule cannot arise from a threatened invasion; the necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration." This has been dismissed as unrealistic by authoritative writers on the subject as it does not present an accurate definition of the allowable limits of the martial law powers of the President of the United States. As a matter of fact, the limiting force of the Milligan case was materially modified a generation later in another decision of the Federal Supreme Court in Moyer v. Peabody (212 U.S. 78 [909]).

Speaking for the Court in Moyer v. Peabody, Justice Holmes brushed aside as immaterial the fact, which the majority opinion in the Milligan case thought as absolutely crucial — viz.: martial rule can never exist where the Courts are open and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. The opinion admitted that the Courts were open but held "that the governor’s declaration that a state of insurrection existed is conclusive of that fact." Although It found that the "Governor, without sufficient reason, but in good faith in the course of putting the insurrection down, held the plaintiff until he thought that he could safely release him," the Court held that plaintiff Moyer had no cause of action. Stating that the Governor was empowered to employ the National Guard to suppress insurrection, the Court further declared that "he may kill persons who resist, and of course he may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but are by way of precaution, to present the exercise of hostile power." "So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the Governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office on the ground that he had no reasonable ground for his belief . . . When it comes to a decision by the head of state upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of the individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process."cralaw virtua1aw library

"It is simply not true," wrote Clinton Rossiter in 1950, 29 "that martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion or that martial law can never exist where the Courts are open. These statements do not present an accurate definition of the allowable limits of the martial powers of President and Congress in the face of alien threats or internal disorder. Nor was Davis’ dictum on the specific powers of Congress in this matter any more accurate. And, however eloquent and quotable his words on the untouchability of the Constitution in times of actual crisis, they do not now, and did not then, express the realities of American Constitutional Law."cralaw virtua1aw library

In any event, this "open court" theory does not apply to the Philippine situation. Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions expressly authorize the declaration of martial law, even where the danger to the public safety arises merely from the imminence of an invasion or rebellion. The fact that the civil courts are open can not be controlling, since they might be open and undisturbed in their functions and yet wholly incompetent to avert the threatened danger and to punish those involved in the invasion or rebellion with certainty and promptitude. Certainly such a theory when applied to the situation of a modern war, and of the present day Communist insurgency and subversion would prove to be unrealistic. 30

Nor may it be argued that the employment of government resources for the building of a New Society is inconsistent with the efforts of suppressing the rebellion and creating a legitimate public order. "Everyone recognized the legal basis for the martial necessity," wrote President Marcos, "this was the simplest theory of all. National decline and demoralization, social and economic deterioration, anarchy and rebellion were not just statistical reports; they were documented in the mind and body and ordinary experience of every Filipino. But, as a study of revolutions and ideologies proves, martial rule could not in the long run, secure the Philippine Republic unless the social iniquities and old habits which precipitated the military necessity were stamped out. Hence, the September 21 Movement for martial rule to be of any lasting benefit to the people and the nation, to justify the national discipline, should incorporate a movement for great, perhaps even drastic, reforms in all spheres of national life. Save the Republic, yes, but to keep it safe, we have to start remaking the society."31 Indeed, the creation of a New Society was a realistic response to the compelling need for a revolutionary change.

For centuries, most of our people were imprisoned in a socio-cultural system that placed them in perpetual dependence. "It made of the many mere pawns in the game of partisan-power politics, legitimized ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water’ for the landed elite, grist for the diploma mills and an alienated mass sporadically erupting in violent resentment over immemorial wrongs. Rural backwardness was built into the very social order wherein our masses could not move forward or even desire to get moving. 32 The old political framework, transplanted from the West had proven indeed to be inadequate. The aspirations of our people for social justice had remained unfulfilled. The electoral process was no model of democracy in action. To a society that has been torn up by decades of bitter political strife and social anarchy, the problem was the rescue of the larger social order from factional interests. Implicit then was the task of creating a legitimate public order, the creation of political institutions capable of giving substance to public interests. This implied the building of coherent institutions, an effective bureaucracy and an administration capable of enlisting the enthusiasm, support and loyalty of the people. Evidently, the power to suppress rebellions or insurrections is not "limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the insurgent forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict and to remedy the evils. 33 which spawned and gave rise to the exigency.

We find confirmation of this contemporaneous construction of presidential powers in the new Constitution. It must be noted that while Art. IX, Sec. 12 of the new Constitution embodies the commander-in-chief clause of the 1935 Constitution (Art. VII, Sec. 10[2]), it expressly declares in Art. XVIII, Sec. 3[2] that the proclamations, orders and decrees, instructions and acts issued or done by the incumbent President are "part of the law of the land" and are to "remain valid, legal, binding, and effective" until "modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly." Undoubtedly, the aforecited proviso refers to the present martial law regime and the measures taken under it by the President. It must be recalled that the prudent exercise by the President of the powers under martial law not only stemmed the tide of violence and subversion but also buttressed the people’s faith in public authority. It is in recognition of the objective merit of the measures taken under martial law that the Constitution affirms their validity.

This is evident from the deliberations of the 166-Man Special Committee of the Constitutional Convention, formed to finally draft the Constitution, at its meeting on October 24, 1972, on the provisions of Section 4 of the draft, now Section 12 of Article IX of the New Constitution, which are quoted hereunder, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): The question, Your Honor, brings to the fore the nature and concept of martial law. As it is understood by recognized authorities on the subject, martial law rests upon the doctrine of paramount necessity. The controlling consideration, Your Honor, is necessity. The crucial consideration is the very existence of the State, the very existence of the Constitution and the laws upon which depend the rights of the citizens, and the condition of peace and order so basic to the continued enjoyment of such rights. Therefore, from this view of the nature of martial law, the power is to be exercised not only for the more immediate object of quelling the disturbance or meeting a public peril which, in the first place, caused the declaration of martial law, but also to prevent the recurrence of the very causes which necessitated the declaration of martial law. Thus, Your Honor, I believe that when President Marcos, to cite the domestic experience, declared that he proclaimed Martial law to save the Republic and to form a New Society, he was stating the full course which martial law must have to take in order to achieve its rational end. Because in the particular case of the Philippine situation, I agree with the President that it is not enough that we be able to quell the rebellion and the lawlessness, but that we should also be able to eliminate the many ills and evils in society which have, in the first place, bred and abetted the rebellion and the lawlessness.

DELEGATE LEVISTE (O.): I agree with you wholeheartedly, Your Honor. That’s all, Mr. Chairman.

"DELEGATE ADIL: It seems, Your Honor, that we are revolutionizing the traditional concept of martial law which is commonly understood as a weapon to combat lawlessness and rebellion through the use of the military authorities. If my understanding is correct, Your Honor, martial law is essentially the substitution of military power for civilian authorities in areas where such civilian authorities are unable to discharge their functions due to the disturbed peace and order conditions therein. But with your explanation, Your Honor, it seems that the martial law administrator, even if he has in the meantime succeeded in quelling the immediate threats to the security of the state, could take measures no longer in the form of military operations but essentially and principally of the nature of ameliorative social action.

"DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): His Honor is correct when he said that we are abandoning the narrow, traditional and classic concept of martial law. But we are abandoning the same only to humanize it. For Your Honor will recall that the old concept of martial law is that the law of the camp is the law of the land, which we are not ready to accept, and President Marcos, aware as he is, that the Filipino people will not countenance any suppressive and unjust action, rightly seeks not only to immediately quell and break the back of the rebel elements but to form a New Society, to create a new atmosphere which will not be a natural habitat of discontent. Stated otherwise, the concept of martial law, as now being practiced, is not only to restore peace and order in the streets and in the towns but to remedy the social and political environments in such a way that discontent will not once more he renewed.

"DELEGATE ORTIZ (R.): I can feel from the discussion, Mr. Chairman, that we are having difficulty in trying to ascertain the scope and limitations of martial law. To my mind, Mr. Chairman, it is constitutionally impossible for us to place in this great document, in black and white, the limits and the extent of martial law. We are framing a Constitution and not a statute and unlike a statute, a Constitution must limit itself to providing basic concepts and policies without going into details. I have heard from some of the Delegates here their concern that we might be, by this provision and the interpretations being given to it, departing from the traditional concept of martial law. Concepts are mere concepts, Mr. Chairman, but concepts, like principles, must be tested by their application to existing conditions, whether those concepts are contained in statutes or in a Constitution. Referring specifically to the exercise of this power by President Marcos, doubts have been expressed in some quarters, whether in declaring martial law he could exercise legislative and judicial powers. I would want to emphasize that the circumstances which provoked the President in declaring martial law may not be quantified. In fact, it is completely different from a case of invasion where the threat to national security comes from the outside. The martial law declared by the President was occasioned by the acts of rebellion, subversion, lawlessness and chaos that are widespread in the country. Their origin, therefore, is internal. There was no threat from without, but only from within. But these acts of lawlessness, rebellion, and subversion are mere manifestations of more serious upheavals that beset the deepest core of our social order. If we shall limit and constrict martial law to its traditional concept, in the sense that the military will be merely called upon to discharge civilian functions in areas where the civil functionaries are not in a position to perform their normal duties or, better still, to quell lawlessness and restore peace and order, then martial law would be a mere temporary palliative and we shall be helpless if bound by the old maxim that martial law is the public law of military necessity, that necessity calls it forth, that necessity justifies its existence, and necessity measures the extent and degrees to which it may be employed. My point here, Your Honor, is that beyond martial necessity lies the graver problem of solving the maladies which, in the first place, brought about the conditions which precipitated the exercise of his martial authority, will be limited to merely taking a military measures to quell the rebellion and eliminating lawlessness in the country and leave him with no means or authority to effect the needed social and economic reforms to create an enduring condition of peace and order, then we shall have failed in providing in this Constitution the basic philosophy of martial law which, I am sure, we are embodying in it for the great purpose of preserving the State. I say that the preservation of the State is not limited merely to eliminating the threats that immediately confront it. More than that, the measure to preserve the State must go deeper into the root cases of the social disorder that endanger the general safety.

"DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): I need not add more, Mr. Chairman, to the very convincing remarks of my good friend and colleague, Delegate Ortiz. And I take it, Mr. Chairman, that is also the position of this Committee.

"PRESIDING OFFICER TUPAZ (A.): Yes, also of this Committee.

"DELEGATE ADIL: Just one more question, Mr. Chairman, if the distinguished Delegate from La Union would oblige.

"DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): All the time, Your Honor.

"DELEGATE ADIL: When martial law is proclaimed, Your Honor, would it mean that the Constitution, which authorizes such proclamation, is set aside or that at least some provisions of the Constitution are suspended?

"DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): The Constitution is not set aside, but the operation of some of its provisions must, of necessity, he restricted, if not suspended, because their continuance is inconsistent with the proclamation of martial law. For instance, some civil liberties will have to be suspended upon the proclamation of martial law, not because we do not value them, but simply because it is impossible to implement these civil liberties hand-in-hand with the effective and successful exercise and implementation of martial powers. There are certain individual rights which must be restricted and curtailed because their exercise and enjoyment would negate the implementation of martial authority. The preservation of the State and its Constitution stands paramount over certain individual rights and freedom. As it were, the Constitution provides martial law as its weapon for survival, and when the occasion arises, when such is at stake, prudence requires that certain individual rights must have to be sacrified temporarily. For indeed, the destruction of the Constitution would mean the destruction of all the rights that flow from it.

"DELEGATE ADIL: Does Your Honor mean to say that when martial law is declared and I, for instance, am detained by the military authorities, I cannot avail of the normal judicial processes to obtain my liberty and question the legality of my detention?

"DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): If I am not mistaken, Your Honor, you are referring to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

"DELEGATE ADIL: Yes, Your Honor, that is correct.

"DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): In that case, Your Honor, I take it that when martial law is proclaimed, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusis ipso facto suspended and, therefore, if you are apprehended and detained by the military authorities, more so, when your apprehension and detention were for an offense against the security of the State, then you cannot invoke the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusand ask the courts to order your temporary release. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, like some other individual rights, must have to yield to the greater need of preserving the State. Here, we have to make a choice between two values, and 1 say that in times of great peril, when the very safety of the whole nation and this Constitution is at stake, we have to elect for the greater one. For, as I have said, individual rights assume meaning and importance only when their exercise could be guaranteed by the State, and such guaranty cannot definitely be had unless the State is in a position to assert and enforce its authority.

"DELEGATE ADIL: Since martial law was declared by President Marcos last September 21, 1972, and announced on September 23, 1972, the President has been issuing decrees which are in the nature of statutes, regulating as they do, various and numerous norms of conduct of both the private and the public sectors. Would you say, Your Honor, that such exercise of legislative powers by the President is within his martial law authority?

"DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Certainly, and that is the position of this Committee. As martial law administrator and by virtue of his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President could exercise legislative and, if I may add, some judicial powers to meet the martial situation. The Chief Executive must not be hamstrung or limited to his traditional powers as Chief Executive. When martial law is declared, the declaration gives rise to the birth of powers, not strictly executive in character, but nonetheless necessary and incident to the assumption of martial law authority to the end that the State may be safe.

"DELEGATE ADIL: I am not at all questioning the constitutionality of the President’s assumption of powers which are not strictly executive in character. Indeed, I can concede that when martial law is declared, the President can exercise certain judicial and legislative powers which are essential to or which have to do with the quelling of rebellion, insurrection, imminent danger thereof, or meeting an invasion. What appears disturbing to me, and which I want Your Honor to convince me further, is the exercise and assumption by the President or by the Prime Minister of powers, either legislative or judicial in character, which have nothing to do with the conditions of rebellion, insurrection, invasion or imminent danger thereof. To be more specific, Your Honor, and to cite to you an example, I have in mind the decree issued by the President proclaiming a nationwide laud reform or declaring land reform throughout the Philippines. I suppose you will agree with me, Your Honor, that such a decree, or any similar decree for that matter, has nothing to do with invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof. My point, Your Honor, is that this measure basically has nothing to do with the restoration of peace and order or the quelling of rebellion or insurrection. How could we validly say that the President’s assumption of such powers is justified by the proclamation of martial law?

"DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): As I have repeatedly stated, Your Honor, we have now to abandon the traditional concept of martial law as it is understood in some foreign textbooks. We have to look at martial law not as an immutable principle. Rather, we must view it in the light of our contemporary experience and not in isolation thereof. The quelling of rebellion or lawlessness or, in other words, the restoration of peace and order may admittedly be said to be the immediate objective of martial law, but that is to beg the question. For how could there really be an enduring peace and order if the very causes which spawned the conditions which necessitated the exercise of martial powers are not remedied? You cite as an example the decree on land reform. Your Honor will have to admit that one of the major causes of social unrest among the peasantry in our society is the deplorable treatment society has given to our peasants. As early as the 1930’s, the peasants have been agitating for agrarian reforms to the extent that during the time of President Quirino they almost succeeded in overthrowing the government by force. Were we to adopt the traditional concept of martial law, we would be confined to merely putting down one peasant uprising after another, leaving unsolved the maladies that in the main brought forth those uprisings. If we are really to establish an enduring condition of peace and order and assure through the ages the stability of our Constitution and the Republic, I say that martial law, being the ultimate weapon of survival provided for in the Constitution, must penetrate deeper and seek to alleviate and cure the ills and the seething furies deep in the bowels of the social structure. In a very real sense, therefore, there is a profound relationship between the exercise by the martial law administrator of legislative and judicial powers and the ultimate analysis, the only known limitation to martial law powers is the convenience of the martial law administrator and the judgment and verdict of the people and, of course, the verdict of history itself.

"DELEGATE LEVISTE (O): Your Honor, just for purposes of discussion, may I know from you whether there has been an occasion in this country where any past President had made use of his martial law power?

"DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): I am glad that you asked that question, Your Honor, because it seems that we are of the impression that since its incorporation into the 1935 Constitution, the martial law provision has never been availed of by any President. I recall, Your Honor, that during the Japanese occupation, President Laurel had occasion to declare martial law, and I recall that when President Laurel declared martial law, he also assumed legislative and judicial powers. We must, of course, realize that during the time of President Laurel, the threats to national security which precipitated the declaration came from the outside. The threats, therefore, were not internal in origin and character as those which prompted President Marcos to issue his historic proclamation. If, in case — as what happened during the time of President Laurel — the declaration of martial law necessitated the exercise of legislative powers by the martial law administrator, I say that greater necessity calls forth the exercise of that power when the threats to national security are posed not by invaders but by the rebellious and seditious elements, both of the left and right, from within. I say that because every rebellion, whether in this country or in other foreign countries, is usually the product of social unrest and dissatisfaction with the established order. Rebellions or the acts of rebellion are usually preceded by long suffering of those who ultimately choose to rise in arms against the government. A rebellion is not born overnight. It is the result of an accumulation of social sufferings on the part of the rebels until they can no longer stand those sufferings to the point that, like a volcano, it must sooner erupt. In this context, the stamping out of rebellion must not be the main and only objective of martial law. The Martial law administrator should, nay, must, take steps to remedy the crises that lie behind the rebellious movement, even if in the process, he should exercise legislative and judicial powers. For what benefit would it be after having put down a rebellion through the exercise of martial power If another rebellion is again in the offing because the root causes which propelled the movement are ever present? One might succeed in capturing the rebel leaders and their followers, imprison them for life or, better still, kill them in the field, but someday new leaders will pick up the torch and the tattered banners and lead another movement. Great causes of every human undertaking do not usually die with the men behind those causes. Unless the root causes are themselves eliminated, there will be a resurgence of another rebellion and, logically, the endless and vicious exercise of martial law authority. This reminds me of the wise words of an old man in our town: That if you are going to clear your field of weeds and grasses, you should not merely cut them, but dig them out.

"PRESIDING OFFICER TUPAZ (A.): With the indulgence of the Gentleman from La Union, the Chair would want to have a recess for at least ten minutes.

"DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I was about to move for it after the gruelling interpellations by some of our colleagues here, but before we recess, may I move for the approval of Section 4?

"PRESIDING OFFICER TUPAZ (A.): Are there any objections? There being none, Section 4 is approved."cralaw virtua1aw library

Although there are authorities to the contrary, it is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. 34 It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it. 35 More than this, the people realized that these provisions of the new Constitution were discussed in the light of the tremendous forces of change at work in the nation, since the advent of martial law. Evident in the humblest villages to the bustling metropolises at the time were the infrastructures and institutional changes made by the government in a bold experiment to create a just and compassionate society. It was with an awareness of all of these revolutionary changes, and the confidence of the people in the determination and capability of the new dispensation to carry out its historic project of eliminating the traditional sources of unrest in the Philippines, that they overwhelmingly approved the new Constitution.

V

POLITICAL QUESTION


We have adverted to the fact that our jurisprudence attests abundantly to the existence of a continuing Communist rebellion and subversion, and on this point there can hardly be any dispute. The narrow question, therefore, presented for resolution is whether the determination by the President of the Philippines of the necessity for the exercise of his constitutional power to declare martial law is subject to judicial review. In resolving the question, We re-affirm the view that the determination of the necessity for the exercise of the power to declare martial law is within the exclusive domain of the President, and his determination is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all persons. This conclusion necessity results from the fact that the very nature of the executive decision is political, not judicial. The decision as to whether or not there is necessity for the exercise of the power is wholly confided by our Constitution to the Chief Executive. For such decision, he is directly responsible to the people for whose welfare he is obliged to act. In view of the nature of the responsibility reposed upon him, it is essential that he be accorded freedom of action demanded by the exigency. The power is to be exercised upon sudden emergencies and under circumstances vital to the existence of the State. The issue is committed to him for determination by criteria of political and military expediency. It is not pretended to rest on evidence but on information which may not be acceptable in court There are, therefore, no standards ascertainable by settled judicial experience or process by reference to which his decision can be judicially reviewed. In other words, his decision is of a kind for which the judiciary has neither the aptitude, facilities nor responsibility to undertake. We are unwilling to give our assent to expressions of opinion which, although not intended, tends to cripple the constitutional powers of the government in dealing promptly and effectively with the danger to the public safety posed by the rebellion and Communist subversion.

Moreover, the Court is without power to shape measures for dealing with the problems of society, much less with the suppression of rebellion. or Communist subversion. The nature of judicial power is largely negative, and it is essential that the opportunity of the Chief Executive for well-directed positive action in dealing with the problem be preserved, if the Government is to serve the best interests of the people. Finally, as a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, where 18,052,016 citizens voted overwhelmingly for the continuance of President Marcos in office beyond 1973 to enable him to finish the reforms he had instituted under martial law, the question of the legality of the proclamation of martial law, and its continuance, had undoubtedly been removed from judicial intervention.

We conclude that the proclamation of martial law by the President of the Philippines on September 21, 1972 and its continuance until the present are valid as they are in accordance with the Constitution.

VI

COURT PRECLUDED FROM INQUIRING INTO LEGALITY OF ARREST AND DETENTION OF PETITIONERS


Having concluded that the Proclamation of Martial Law on September 21, 1972 by the President of the Philippines and its continuance are valid and constitutional, the arrest and detention of petitioners, pursuant to General Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 of the President, as amended by General Order No. 2-A, dated September 26, 1972, may not now be assailed as unconstitutional and arbitrary. General Order No. 2 directed the Secretary of National Defense to arrest "individuals named in the attached list, for being active participants in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the government by force . . . in order to prevent them from further committing acts that are inimical or injurious to our people, the government and our national interest" and "to hold said individuals until otherwise ordered released by the President or his duly authorized representative." It is not disputed that petitioners are all included in the list attached to General Order No. 2.

It should be important to note that as a consequence of the proclamation of martial law, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpushas been impliedly suspended. Authoritative writers on the subject view the suspension of the writ of habeas corpusas an incident, but an important incident of a declaration of martial law.

"The suspension of the writ of habeas corpusis not, in itself, a declaration of martial law; it is simply an incident, though a very important incident, to such a declaration. But practically, in England and the United States, the essence of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and a declaration of martial law would be utterly useless unless accompanied by the suspension of the privilege of such writ. Hence, in the United States the two, martial law and the suspension of the writ is regarded as one and the same thing. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Martin v, Mott, 12 Wheat. 19; Story, Com. on the Constitution, sec. 1342; Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Martin, N.S. 530." (12 L. ed. 582-83).

Evidently, according to Judge Smalley, there could not be any privilege of the writ of habeas corpusunder martial law (In re Field, 9 Fed. Cas. 1 [1862]). The evident purpose of the suspension of the writ is to enable the executive, as a precautionary measure, to detain without interference persons suspected of harboring designs harmful to public safety (Ex Parte Zimmerman, 32 Fed. 2nd. 442, 446). In any event, the Proclamation of Martial Law, in effect, suspended the privilege of the writ with respect to those detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, etc., thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed in furtherance or on the occassion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of the nations, crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title and improper use of names, uniforms and insignia, crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be enumerated in orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of any violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my direction shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly designated representative." (Emphasis supplied).

General Order No. 2 was issued to implement the aforecited provisions of the Proclamation of Martial Law.

By the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the judiciary is precluded from interfering with the orders of the Executive by inquiring into the legality of the detention of persons involved in the rebellion.

The arrest and detention of persons reasonably believed to be engaged in, or connected with, the insurgency is predicated upon the principle that in time of public disorder it is the right and duty of all citizens especially the officer entrusted with the enforcement of the law to employ such force as may be necessary to preserve the peace and restrain those who may be committing felonies. Encroachments upon personal liberty, as well as upon private property on those occassions, are justified by the necessity of preserving order and the greater interests of the political community. The Chief Executive, upon whom is reposed the duty to preserve the nation in those times of national peril, has correspondingly the right to exercise broad authority and discretion compatible with the emergency in selecting the means and adopting the measures which, in his honest judgment, are necessary for the preservation of the nation’s safety. In case of rebellion or insurrection, the Chief Executive may "use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment but are by way of precaution, to prevent the exercise of hostile power." (Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 [1909] 53 L. ed. 411.)

The justification for the preventive detention of individuals is that in a crisis such as invasion or domestic insurrection "the danger to the security of the nation and its institutions is so great that the government must take measures that temporarily deprive citizens of certain rights in order to ensure the survival of the political structure that protects those and other rights during ordinary times." (Developments — National Security, Vol. 85, Harvard Law Review, March 1972, No. 5, p. 1286). 36

In Moyer v. Peabody, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the detention of a labor leader whose mere presence in the area of a violent labor dispute was deemed likely to incite further disturbances. "So long as such arrests are made in good faith," said the erudite Justice Holmes, "and in the honest belief that they are made in order to head the insurrection off, the governor is the final judge and can not be subjected to an action after he is out of office, on the ground that he had no reasonable ground for his belief."cralaw virtua1aw library

During World War II, persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from their homes in the West Coast and interned in the interior until the loyalty of each individual could be established. In Korematsu v. United States (323 U.S. 214 [244]), the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the exclusion of these persons on the ground that among them a substantial number were likely to be disloyal and that, therefore, the presence of the entire group created the risk of sabotage and espionage. Although the Court avoided deciding the constitutionality of the detention that followed the evacuation, its separation of the issue of exclusion from that of detention was artificial, since the separate orders were part of a single over-all policy. The reasoning behind its approval of exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry would seem to apply with equal force to the detention despite the greater restrictions of movement that the latter entailed. In the Middle East, military authorities of Israel have detained suspected Arab terrorists without trial (Dershowitz, Terrorism and Preventive Detention: The Case of Israel, 50 Commentaries, Dec. 1970 at 78).

Among the most effective countermeasures adopted by the governments in Southeast Asia to prevent the growth of Communist power has been the arrest and detention without trial of key united front leaders of suitable times. 37

The preventive detention of persons reasonably believed to be involved in the Communist rebellion and subversion has long been recognized by all democratic governments as a necessary emergency measure for restoring order. "Because of the difficulty in piercing the secrecy of tightly knit subversive organizations in order to determine which individuals are responsible for the violence, governments have occasionally responded to emergencies marked by the threat or reality of sabotage or terrorism by detaining persons on the ground that they are dangerous and will probably engage in such actions." 38

In the case at bar, petitioner Aquino (L-35546) has already been charged with the violation of the Anti-Subversion Act (L-37364) and therefore his detention is reasonably related to the quelling of the rebellion. Upon the other hand, the other petitioners have been released but their movements are subject to certain restrictions. The restrictions on the freedom of movement of these petitioners, as a condition for their release, are, however, required by considerations of national security. 39 In the absence of war or rebellion, the right to travel within the Philippines may be considered constitutionally protected. But even under such circumstances that freedom is not absolute. Areas ravaged by floods, fire and pestilence can be quarantined, as unlimited travel to those areas may directly and materially interfere with the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the area affected. During a rebellion or insurrection the authority of the commander to issue and enforce police regulations in the area of the rebellion or insurrection is well recognized. Such regulations may involve the limitation of the right of assembly, the right to keep arms, and restrictions on freedom of movement of civilians.40 Undoubtedly, measures conceived in good faith, in the face of the emergency and directly related to the quelling of the disorder fall within the discretion of the President in the exercise of his authority to suppress the rebellion and restore public order.

We find no basis, therefore, for concluding that petitioner Aquino’s continued detention and the restrictions imposed on the movements of the other petitioners who were released, are arbitrary.

C O N C L U S I O N


We realize the transcendental importance of these cases. Beyond the question of deprivation of liberty of petitioners is the necessity of laying at rest any doubt on the validity of the institutional changes made to bring the country out of an era of rebellion, near political anarchy and economic stagnation and to establish the foundation of a truly democratic government and a just and compassionate society. Indeed, as a respected delegate of two Constitutional Conventions observed: "The introduction of martial law has been a necessary recourse to restore order and steer the country safely through a severe economic and social crisis." 41 The exercise of these extraordinary powers not only to restore civil order thru military force but also to effect urgently needed reforms in order to root out the causes of the rebellion and Communist subversion may indeed be an experiment in the government. But it was necessary if the national democratic institution was to survive in competition with the more revolutionary types of government. "National democratic constitutionalism, ancient though its origin may be," observed Dr. C.F. Strong, 42 "is still in an experimental stage and if it is to survive in competition with more revolutionary types of government, we must be prepared to adapt to ever-changing conditions of modern existence. The basic purpose of a political institution is, after all, the same wherever it appears: to secure social peace and progress, safeguard individual rights, and promote national well-being."cralaw virtua1aw library

These adaptations and innovations were resorted to in order to realize the social values that constitute the professed goals of the democratic polity. It was an attempt to make the political institution serve as an effective instrument of economic and social development. The need of the times was for a more effective mode of decision-making and policy-formulation to enable the nation to keep pace with the revolutionary changes that were inexorably reshaping Philippine Society. A government, observed the then Delegate Manuel Roxas, a Member of the Sub-Committee of Seven of the Sponsorship Committee of the 1934 Constitutional Convention, "is a practical science, not a theory, and a government can be successful only if in its structure due consideration is given to the habits, the customs, the character and, as McKinley said, to the idiosyncracies of the people." 43

WHEREFORE, We hereby conclude that (a) the proclamation of martial law (Proclamation No. 1081) on September 21, 1972 by the President of the Philippines and its continuance, are valid, as they have been done in accordance with the Constitution, and (b) as a consequence of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, upon the proclamation of martial law, the Court is therefore precluded from inquiring into the legality of the arrest and detention of these petitioners or on the restrictions imposed upon their movements after their release from military custody.

Accordingly, We vote to dismiss all the petitions.

Makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.



Endnotes:



1. Some of those who argued for the petitioners were Attys. Lorenzo Tañada, Jovito Salonga, Ramon A Gonzales, Joker D. Arroyo, Sedfrey Ordoñez, Pedro Yap, and Francis Garchitorena, while Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza argued for the respondents.

2. L-35556 — Veronica L. Yuyitung and Tan Chin Hian; L-35569 — Amando Doronila, Hernando J. Abaya, Ernesto Granada, Luis D. Beltran, Bren Guiao, Puben Cusipag, and Willie Baun; L-35571 — Teresita M. Guiao in behalf of Bren Guiao, also petitioner in L-35569.

3. Joaquin P. Roces, Teodoro M. Locsin Sr., Rolando Fadul, Rosalind Galang, Go Eng Guan, Renato Constantino, and Luis R. Mauricio in L-35538; Maximo Soliven, Napoleon G. Rama, and Jose Mari Velez in L-35540; Ramon Mitra, Jr., Francisco Rodrigo, and Napoleon Rama in L-35546; Enrique Voltaire Garcia II (deceased ) in L-35547; the petitioners in L-35556, L-35556, L-35571, and Ernesto Rondon in L-35573.

4. Art. VII, Sec. 10 (2), 1935 Constitution.

5. Sec. 21, Jones Law of 1916.

6. Art. II, Sec. 2, par. 1, U.S. Constitution.

7. Fairman at 23-25; see also Dowell at 231-32.

8. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, p. 280.

9. Ibid, p. 318.

10. Corwin and Koenig, The Presidency Today.

11. Cortes, The Philippine Presidency, p. 155.

12. Art. VII, Sec. 10(2), 1935 Philippine Constitution.

13. In his report to the Constitutional Convention, Delegate Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Chairman of the Committee on Executive Power, stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Señor President: nosotros, los miembros del comit Ejecutivo, teniendo en cuenta por un lado la fragmentación de nuestro territorio en miles de islas, y, por otro, las grandes crisis que agitan la humanidad, hemos procurado formar un ejecutivo fuerte que mantenga la unidad de la nacion, con suficientes poderes y prerogativas para salvar el pais en los momentos de grandes crisis y en los momentos de grandes peligros. Para conseguir este objetivo, nosotros hemos provisto que el jefe del poder ejecutivo sea eligido por el sufragio directo de todos los electores cualificados del pais; reconocemos su facultad de supervisar los departamentos ejecutivos, todos los negociados administrativos, las provincias y los municipios; le nombramos genral en jefe del ejercito y milicias filipinos; reconocemos su derecho de vetar leyes y de proponer el nombramiento de los altos funcionarios, desde los secretarios departamentales hasta los embajadores y cónsules, y en los momentos de grandes crisis, cuando la nacion se vea confrontada de algunos peligros como en casos de guerra etc. se reconoce en este proyecto el derecho del jefe dl podr ejecutivo de promulgar reglas, con fuerza de ley, para llevar a cabo una politica nacional. . . ." (Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Laurel, Vol. III, p. 216, Session of Nov. 10, 1934). (Emphasis supplied)

As Delegate Miguel Cuaderno observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . not only among the members of the Sub-Committee of Seven, but also with a majority of the delegates was the feeling quite prevalent that there was need of providing for a strong executive. And in this the lessons of contemporary history were a powerful influence. In times when rulers exercising the prerogatives of a dictator appear to give the last ray of hope to peoples suffering from chaos, one could not but entertain the feeling that the safety and well-being of our young nation require a President who would be unhampered by lack of authority, or vexatious procrastination of other governmental units in case of emergency." (Cuaderno, The Framing of the Constitution of the Philippines, p. 90).

14. The Philippine Constitution, published by the Phil. Lawyers Association, Vol. I, 1969 Ed., p. 183.

15. Federalist No. 23.

16. Ex Parte Jones, 45 LRA (N.S.) 1044.

17. 320 US 92, 94 (1943), 87 L. ed. 1782.

18. 11 Wallace 493, 506 (1870).

19. Per Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. ed. 2d. 723.

20. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, Korematsu v. US, 323 U.S. 245, 89 L ed. 214.

21. "No court will review the evidence upon which the executive acted nor set up its opinion against his." (Vanderheyden v. Young [1814] 11 Johns. [N.Y.] 150; Martin v. Mott [1827] 12 Wheat. [U.S.] 19; Luther v. Borden [1848] 7 How. [U.S.] 1; Ex Parte Moore [1870] 64 N.C. 802; Appeal of Hartcraft [1877] 85 Pa. St. 433; In re Boyle [1899] 6 Idaho 609; Sweeney v. Commonwealth [1904] 118 Ky. 912; Barcelon v. Baker [1905] 5 Phil., 87, 100; In re Moyer [1905] 35 Colo. 159; Frank’s v. Smith [1911] 142 Ky. 232; Ex Parte McDonald, supra, Note 11.

22. Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I p. 431, 1949 Ed.

23. 278 U.S. 378-404; 77 L. ed. 375; Decided December 12, 1932.

24. Goh Keng Swee, The Nature and Appeals of Communism in Non-Communist Asian Countries, p. 43.

25. James Amme H. Garvey, Marxist-Leninist China: Military and Social Doctrine, 1960, p. 29.

26. "Finally, Lin Piao in the same article, provides us with a definition of Mao’s strategy of waging revolutionary warfare, the strategy of people’s war, which comprises the following six major elements:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) Leadership by a revolutionary communist party which will properly apply Marxism-Leninism in analyzing the class character of a colonial or semicolonial country, and which can formulate correct policy to wage a protracted war against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism.

"(2) Correct utilization of the united front policy to build ‘the broadest possible’ national united front to ‘ensure the fullest mobilization of the basic masses as well as the unity of all the forces than can be united,’ in an effort to take over the leadership of the national revolution and establish the revolution on an alliance of, first, the workers and peasants and, second, an alliance of the working peoples with the bourgeoisie and other ‘non-working people.’

"(3) Reliance on the peasantry and the establishment of rural buses, because in agrarian and ‘semifeudal’ societies the peasants are the great majority of the population; ‘subjected to threefold oppression and exploitation by imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat capitalism,’ they will provide most of the human and material resources for the revolution. In essence, the revolution is a peasant revolution led by the communist part: ‘to rely on the peasants, build rural base areas and use the countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities — such was the way to victory in the Chinese revolution.’

"(4) Creation of a communist party-led of a new type, for a ‘universal truth of Marxism-Leninism’ is that ‘without a people’s army the people have nothing.’ A new type of communist party-led army in which ‘politics is the commander’ must be formed, one which focuses on instilling in the minds of the population a ‘proletarian revolutionary consciousness and courage’ and which actively seeks the ‘support and backing of the masses.’

"(5) Use of the strategy and tactics of people’s war as interpreted by Mao Tse-tung, in a protracted armed struggle to annihilate the enemy and take over state power, based on the support of a mobilized mass population and the use of guerrilla warfare, and ultimately mobile and even positional warfare as the revolution progresses.

"(6) Adherence to a policy of self-reliance, because ‘revolution or people’s war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should he carried out primarily by their own efforts; and there is no other way.’ " (Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, pp. 70-72.)

27. "A report of the ‘Palanan Incident’ submitted by defense and military authorities to the House committee on national defense said that no single incident had done so much to focus the dangers posed by the ‘reestablished’ Communist Party of the Philippines and the NPA than the discovery of an abandoned ship and the subsequent recovery of military hardware and documents in innocent-looking Digoyo Bay. The discovery of these ‘instruments of war’ which were intended for the insurgents was a cause of deep concern because of its direct bearing on the national security, the report stated.

"Under wraps. Before the Karagatan entered the picture, there had been intelligence reports of increased NPA activities in the mountain areas and shorelines of Palanan and nearby Dilasag-Casiguran in Quezon Province. Military authorities, for well-placed reasons, had kept these reports under wraps. But a few of them leaked out. For instance, a coded dispatch from Task Force Saranay mentioned a submarine unloaded some 200 men and while off Dinapique Point, north of Palanan.

"While skeptical newsmen skimmed through the reports, they came across recorded instances of actual operations: last May 19, a big number of NPA’s arrived and encamped in the vicinity of the Divinisa River. On May 26, a ship unloaded about 200 sacks of rice, firearms and ammunition at the vicinity of Digollorin. Shipside unloading was effected and cargo ferried aboard small boats and bancas.

"Two days later, on May 28, a powerboat painted red, white and blue with a Philippine flag flying astern, reconnoitered from Dinatadmo to Divinisa Point. Fishermen from barrio Maligaya, Palanan, were among those forced to unload food and military supplies. About the second week of June, another landing of supplies took place there.

"Programs of action. By this time, Brig. Gen. Tranquilino Paranis, Saranay commander, started to move some of his men from task force headquarters in Echague, Isabela, to the Palanan area. On June 18, a patrol of the task force encountered a group of NPA’s in barrio Taringsing, Cordon town. Here government troops recovered CCP documents outlining programs of action for 1972. The documents according to military analysts, contained timetables calling for the intensification of sabotage, violence and attacks on military camp and other government installations from July to December. On July 3, information was received that an unidentified vessel had been seen off Digoyo point. Paranis relayed the message to Brig. Gen. Tomas Diaz at First PC Zone headquarters in Camp Olivas, Pampanga. From then on until army intelligence raided the home of a sister of one of the incorporators of the Karagatan Fishing Co., in Cainta, Rizal and stumbled on stacks of communist propaganda materials, the Karagatan had exploded on the public face in bold glaring headlines.

"What bothered army authorities most was not only the actual landing of about 3,000 rifles of the M-14 type of which 737 had already been recovered by troops who stormed Hill 225 in Palanan and also seized 60,000 rounds of ammunition and another 30 boxes of ammunition for rocket launchers. It was the presence of the rockets themselves. The 40mm rockets are high-explosive anti-tank weapons. They appear to be copies of the Soviet RPG-2 while the rocket launchers are prototypes of the Soviet RPG-2 anti-tank launchers used by the Vietcong.

"The landing of military hardware in enormous quantities have multiplied the dangers of the CCP-Maoist faction, the military said. Armed with high powered weapons and with sufficient ammunition, the insurgents have become a more potent force to contend with. This has emboldened them to intensify operations with the use of new recruits. The new recruits have been trained in the use of high explosives and were to be unleashed on the population centers of Greater Manila as part of the continuing September-October plan that includes the bombing of Congress, the Constitutional Convention, City Hall, public utilities, department stores and moviehouses. The recruits were to seek sanctuary in safe houses installed for them by the NPA in Caloocan City, the army asserted." (Time-table for Terror, PACE, Vol. 1, No. 52, September, 1972).

28. "The Communists have no scruples against sabotage, terrorism, assassination, or mob disorder. xxx The Communist recognizes that an established government in control of modern technology cannot be overthrown by force until it is about ready to fall of its own weight." Revolution is, therefore, "not a sudden episode but as the consummation of a long process." (Per Mr. Justice Jackson, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 564, 565, 95 L.ed. 1181.)

29. The Supreme Court and the Commander-in-Chief, 1951, Cornell University Press, p. 36.

30. "Not even the aerial attack upon Pearl Harbor closed the courts or of its own force deposed the civil administration, yet it would be common understanding of men that those agencies which are charged with the national defense surely must have authority to take on the spot some measures which in normal times would be ultra vires."cralaw virtua1aw library

x       x       x


"When one considers certain characteristics of modern war, mobility on land, surprise from the air, sabotage, and the preparation of fifth columns — it must be apparent that the dictum that ‘martial rule cannot arise from a threatened invasion’ is not an adequate definition of the extent of the war power of the United States. An Army today has a dispersion in depth quite unknown in our Civil War. Thus Under Secretary of War Patterson, in stressing the need for a state guard to protect installations in the rear, pointed to ‘the fact that the wars of today know no front line; that a tiny village hundreds of miles behind the theoretical front may suddenly become the scene of desperate and blazing action.’ If the problem were to arise today it seems fair to assume that the Supreme Court would not hold to the letter of Justice Davis’ opinion. Just as in the construction of the commerce and other grants of national power the Court of late has notably sought to make them adequate to the conditions which we face, almost certainly it would so construe the war power as to include all that is requisite ‘to wage war successfully.’" (Charles Fairman, Law of Martial Rule, 55 Harvard Law Review, 1287.)

31. Notes on the New Society, pp. 29-30.

32. Dr. Abelardo Samonte, Inaugural Address, U.P. Los Baños, Jan. 11, 1974.

33. Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wallace 493, 506.

34. Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & T. Co. (1895) 157 U.S. 429, 39 L. ed. 759; See also Legal Tender cases (1884) 110 U.S. 421, 28 L. ed. 204, 70 A.L.R. 30.

35. State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor (1911) 22 N.D. 362, 133 N.W. 1046.

36. During the Civil War in the United States, the writ of habeas corpuswas suspended and many thousands of persons suspected of disloyalty to the Union were interned. (J. Randall & D. Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 301 [1961]). It must be noted that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 of the United States required that lists of political prisoners be furnished to the judges of the federal courts; limited the duration of detention to one session of the grand jury, at the end of which courts were to order the release of those prisoners who had not been indicted for a crime. However, during the Civil War the Habeas Corpus Act was virtually ignored by President Lincoln, and the arrest, confinement, and release of prisoners continued as if it had not been passed. (Lee J. Randall & D. Donald, supra, p. 306).

37. There are three reasons advanced why this was found necessary. "First, the evidence to satisfy the requirements of legal procedure will blow the cover of police agents who have penetrated Communist open-front organizations. Further, the possibility of prosecution assumes that participation in Communist conspiratorial activities is a legal offense, which it is not in most countries. Third, to wait for the Communist activitist to engage in overtly illegal action, for example, riots and other sorts of violence before prosecution, will give them a political advantage which few governments of the new states of Asia can afford. For by then the political situation would have deteriorated to a state of acute instability, which in turn would probably have caused economic decline due to loss of confidence. Should political instability become endemic, serious doubts will creep into men’s minds as to who would emerge the winner. This can make the problem of control of subversion, for which public confidence and co-operation are important, a very acute one.

"The power of arrest and detention without trial is, therefore, a necessary weapon in the fight against Communists in the newly established Asian states. It is, however, of the utmost importance that the highest standards of conduct on the part of the secret police are maintained. There should be checks, in the form of review committees consisting of lawyers and professional men, on the actions of the police. These checks should be real and not perfunctory measures Nothing would be more favourable to the growth of Communist influence than extensive and indiscriminate use of the powers of detention. For this will generally cause widespread resentment against the authorities, which the Communist underground can use to stoke the fires of revolution. Further, it is important that police action is limited to really worthwhile targets — the thinkers and the planners, the able propagandists and the organization men. Ninety-nine per cent of those who engage in Communist open-front activities are not worth detaining, not even the second echelon activists and the musclemen on whom the Communists depend to discipline their followers. They are the expendables and can be replaced without much difficulty, unlike the thinker and the plotter, and their detention serves no purpose beyond creating unnecessary disaffection among their families." (Goh Keng Swee: Minister of Defense of the Interior in Singapore, The Nature and Appeals of Communism in Non-Communist Asia Countries.)

38. Development-National Security, Vol. 85, Harvard Law Review, March 1972, No. 5, p. 1313.

39. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 [1965] upheld the constitutionality of the Cuba area restriction.

40. Charles Fairman, Martial Rule and the Suppression of Insurrection.

41. Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., Martial Law and the National Economy, 1974 Ed. Delegate to the 1934 and 1971 Constitutional Conventions, member of the Sub-Committee of Seven that finalized the draft of the 1935 Constitution.

42. Modern Political Constitutions, p. 55.

43. Vol. I, The Philippine Constitution, Debates on the First Draft of the Constitution, p. 157.

FERNANDEZ, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. General Order No. 2 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, and in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and for being active participants in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force, the extent of which has now assumed the proportion of an actual war against our people and their legitimate Government and in order to prevent them from further committing acts that are inimical or injurious to our people, the Government and our national interest, I hereby order you as Secretary of National Defense to forthwith arrest or cause the arrest and take into custody the individuals named in the attached list and to hold them until otherwise so ordered by me or by my designated representative.

"Likewise, I do hereby order you to arrest or cause the arrest and take into custody and to hold them until otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly authorized representative, such persons as may have committed crimes and offenses in furtherance on the occasion of or incident to or in connection with the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, as well as persons who have committed crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against the fundamental laws of the state, crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, title, improper use of name, uniform and insignia, including persons guilty of crimes as public officers, as well as those persons who may have violated any decree or order promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my direction."cralaw virtua1aw library

* On the issue of withdrawal, "petitioner" refers to former Senator Jose W. Diokno and not any of the other petitioners.

** Although this Rule 17 falls under Procedure in Courts of First Instance," it may also serve as a guide to this Court in resolving a question of this nature. In the Court of Appeals, and in the Supreme Court, "An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before filing of appellee’s brief. After that brief is filed the withdrawal may be allowed by the Court in its discretion . . ." (Section 4, Rule 50; Section 1, Rule 56).

2. "(2) The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial." (Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. VII, 1936 Constitution).

"Sec. 12. The Prime Minister shall be commander-in-chief of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." (Sec. 12, Art. IX, New Constitution.)

3. Formed by the Constitutional Convention to prepare the final draft of the Constitution. I was a member of this Committee, being the Vice-Chairman of the Panel of Floor leaders.

*** In fact Petitioner Diokno was released by the President on September 11, 1974.



Back to Home | Back to Main


chanrobles.com



ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc. : www.chanroblesprofessionalreview.com
ChanRobles On-Line Bar Review

ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : www.chanroblesbar.com
ChanRobles CPA Review Online

ChanRobles CPALE Review Online : www.chanroblescpareviewonline.com
ChanRobles Special Lecture Series

ChanRobles Special Lecture Series - Memory Man : www.chanroblesbar.com/memoryman





September-1974 Jurisprudence                 

  • G.R. No. L-37919 September 6, 1974 - BIENVENIDO U. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-23155 September 9, 1974 - RUFINO G. BARTULATA v. MACARIO PERALTA, JR., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-30351 September 11, 1974 - AUREA BAÑEZ, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL

  • G.R. No. L-32733 September 11, 1974 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ALFONSO MANANGAN

  • G.R. No. L-37443 September 11, 1974 - IN RE: CHUA KIAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL.

  • A.C. No. 533 September 12, 1974 - IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE

  • G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974 - BENJAMIN VICTORIANO v. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-26657 September 12, 1974 - VISAYAN STEVEDORE & TRANSPORTATION COMPANY v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-27526 September 12, 1974 - ANGELITA G. VDA. DE VALERA, ET AL. v. MACARIO M. OFILADA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-28782 September 12, 1974 - AUYONG HIAN v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-32276 September 12, 1974 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JOSE ALVIAR Y TUAZON

  • G.R. No. L-34663 September 12, 1974 - SIMON GENCIANA v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. Nos. L-38945-47 September 12, 1974 - DEMOCRITO BARRIDO, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-38565 September 16, 1974 - BAYANI SARMIENTO, ET AL. v. CONSTANTINO NOLASCO, ET AL.

  • A.M. No. 128-MJ September 18, 1974 - SEGUNDINA CORAL v. JOSE CONSOLACION-SERRANO

  • G.R. No. L-35494 September 18, 1974 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. DIONISIO IGNACIO

  • G.R. No. L-27314 September 26, 1974 - TEODOSIA ALFILER, ET AL. v. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-33818 September 26, 1973

    LECAR & SONS, INC. v. ARTURO R. TANCO, JR., ETC., ET AL.

  • A.M. No. P-44 September 30, 1974 - MOISES M. MASPIL, ET AL. v. FERNANDO R. ROMERO

  • A.M. No. 440-CFI September 30, 1974 - REMEDIOS I. JUGUETA v. ALEJANDRO R. BONCAROS

  • G.R. No. L-18717 September 30, 1974 - CASIMIRO ESTANISLAO, ET AL. v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-27396 September 30, 1974 - JESUS V. OCCEÑA, ET AL. v. PAULINO S. MARQUEZ

  • G.R. No. L-28693 September 30, 1974 - VI VE CHEMICAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ET AL.

  • G.R. Nos. L-30450-51 September 30, 1974 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ANTONIO BODUSO

  • G.R. No. L-30978 September 30, 1974 - FORTUNATO MEDINA v. MANUEL T. YAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-32078 September 30, 1974 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. BALTAZAR LACAO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-32408 September 30, 1974 - IN RE: PO SOON TEK v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL.

  • G.R. No. L-33293 September 30, 1974 - DOMINGO FERRER, ET AL. v. FLORENCIO VILLAMOR

  • G.R. No. L-34317 September 30, 1974 - WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-34369 September 30, 1974 - ANTONIO VILLASIS, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. Nos. L-36874-76 September 30, 1974 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ROGELIO REYES

  • G.R. No. L-37949 September 30, 1974 - JUAN ALONZO v. CFI OF CAGAYAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-39059 September 30, 1974 - ANTONIO CABALLERO, ET AL. v. ALMA DEIPARINE, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-39373 September 30, 1974 - FELIXBERTO W. FERRER v. YANG SEPENG

  • A.M. No. P-227 September 30, 1974 - BENJAMIN N. MUÑASQUE v. ROSALINA CAPE

  • G.R. Nos. L-35546, L-35538, L-35539, L-35540, L-35547, L-35556, L-35567, L-35571 and L-35573 September 17, 1974 - G.R. No. L-35546. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Repondents : G.R. No. L-35538. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Et Al. : G.R. No. L-35539. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES : G.R. No. L-35540. September 17, 1974. _ MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35547. September 17, 1974. - ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, v. BRIG GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE : G.R. No. L-35556. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35567. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35571. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, Petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35573. September 17, 1974 - ERNESTO RONDON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA

  • Antonio, J., Concurring : Separate Opinion : G.R. Nos. L-35546, L-35538, L-35539, L-35540, L-35547, L-35556, L-35567, L-35571 and L-35573 September 17, 1974 - G.R. No. L-35546. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Repondents : G.R. No. L-35538. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Et Al. : G.R. No. L-35539. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES : G.R. No. L-35540. September 17, 1974. _ MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35547. September 17, 1974. - ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, v. BRIG GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE : G.R. No. L-35556. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35567. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35571. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, Petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35573. September 17, 1974 - ERNESTO RONDON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA

  • Barredo, J., Concurring : Separate Opinion : G.R. Nos. L-35546, L-35538, L-35539, L-35540, L-35547, L-35556, L-35567, L-35571 and L-35573 September 17, 1974 - G.R. No. L-35546. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Repondents : G.R. No. L-35538. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Et Al. : G.R. No. L-35539. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES : G.R. No. L-35540. September 17, 1974. _ MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35547. September 17, 1974. - ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, v. BRIG GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE : G.R. No. L-35556. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35567. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35571. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, Petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35573. September 17, 1974 - ERNESTO RONDON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA

  • Castro, J., Concurring : Separate Opinion : G.R. Nos. L-35546, L-35538, L-35539, L-35540, L-35547, L-35556, L-35567, L-35571 and L-35573 September 17, 1974 - G.R. No. L-35546. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Repondents : G.R. No. L-35538. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Et Al. : G.R. No. L-35539. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES : G.R. No. L-35540. September 17, 1974. _ MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35547. September 17, 1974. - ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, v. BRIG GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE : G.R. No. L-35556. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35567. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35571. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, Petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35573. September 17, 1974 - ERNESTO RONDON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA

  • Esguerra, J., Concurring : Separate Opinion : G.R. Nos. L-35546, L-35538, L-35539, L-35540, L-35547, L-35556, L-35567, L-35571 and L-35573 September 17, 1974 - G.R. No. L-35546. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Repondents : G.R. No. L-35538. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Et Al. : G.R. No. L-35539. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES : G.R. No. L-35540. September 17, 1974. _ MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35547. September 17, 1974. - ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, v. BRIG GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE : G.R. No. L-35556. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35567. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35571. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, Petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35573. September 17, 1974 - ERNESTO RONDON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA

  • Fenandez, J., Concurring : Separate Opinion : G.R. Nos. L-35546, L-35538, L-35539, L-35540, L-35547, L-35556, L-35567, L-35571 and L-35573 September 17, 1974 - G.R. No. L-35546. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Repondents : G.R. No. L-35538. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Et Al. : G.R. No. L-35539. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES : G.R. No. L-35540. September 17, 1974. _ MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35547. September 17, 1974. - ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, v. BRIG GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE : G.R. No. L-35556. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35567. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35571. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, Petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35573. September 17, 1974 - ERNESTO RONDON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA

  • Fernando, J., Concurring and Dissenting: Separate Opinion : G.R. Nos. L-35546, L-35538, L-35539, L-35540, L-35547, L-35556, L-35567, L-35571 and L-35573 September 17, 1974 G.R. No. L-35546. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Repondents : G.R. No. L-35538. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Et Al. : G.R. No. L-35539. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES : G.R. No. L-35540. September 17, 1974. _ MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35547. September 17, 1974. - ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, v. BRIG GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE : G.R. No. L-35556. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35567. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35571. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, Petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35573. September 17, 1974 - ERNESTO RONDON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA

  • MUÑOZ PALMA, J., Dissenting : Separate Opinion : G.R. Nos. L-35546, L-35538, L-35539, L-35540, L-35547, L-35556, L-35567, L-35571 and L-35573 September 17, 1974 - G.R. No. L-35546. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Repondents : G.R. No. L-35538. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Et Al. : G.R. No. L-35539. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES : G.R. No. L-35540. September 17, 1974. _ MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35547. September 17, 1974. - ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, v. BRIG GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE : G.R. No. L-35556. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35567. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35571. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, Petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35573. September 17, 1974 - ERNESTO RONDON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA

  • Teehankee, J., Concurring and Dissenting : Separate Opinion : G.R. Nos. L-35546, L-35538, L-35539, L-35540, L-35547, L-35556, L-35567, L-35571 and L-35573 September 17, 1974 G.R. No. L-35546. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Repondents : G.R. No. L-35538. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, Et Al. : G.R. No. L-35539. September 17, 1974. - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES : G.R. No. L-35540. September 17, 1974. _ MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35547. September 17, 1974. - ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, v. BRIG GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE : G.R. No. L-35556. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35567. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35571. September 17, 1974 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, Petitioner, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY : G.R. No. L-35573. September 17, 1974 - ERNESTO RONDON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA