October 2000 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 131518 October 17, 2000 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. FERNANDO R. ARELLANO:
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131518. October 17, 2000.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERNANDO ARELLANO y ROBLES, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Fernando Arellano appeals from the decision 1 dated October 16, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, finding him guilty of the crime of rape.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Accused was charged with the crime of rape under the following information: 2
"That on or about the 28th day of August, 1992, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation with the use of a bladed weapon, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, DAISY D. TEREZ against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon arraignment on September 29, 1993, Accused duly assisted by counsel entered a plea of not guilty. 3 Trial thereafter ensued.
The facts established by the prosecution’s evidence are summarized in the People’s brief as follows: 4
On August 28, 1992, between 2:00 and 3:00 o’clock in the morning, Daisy D. Terez, Maribel Madeja and Erlinda Mendez, all household helpers, were suddenly awakened when appellant gained entrance inside their room (maid’s quarter) which adjoins the house of Mrs. Margie Santiago, their employer, at No. 26 Texas Street Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, (TSN, November 8, 1993, pp. 3-5). Upon noticing the presence of the intruder, Maribel Madeja screamed, which roused Terez and Mendez from sleep. (Ibid., 5; TSN, May 30, 1994, p. 3). They saw the appellant wearing short pants and polo shirt and holding a knife (TSN, November 8, 1993, 5-6 & 16). At that instance, the fluorescent lamp inside the room was lighted (Ibid., 7 & 14). Appellant stood beside Terez who shared the lower deck with Mendez, as he looked at Madeja who was occupying the upper deck of the double deck bed (Ibid., 15-16). He commanded Madeja to get down from the upper deck and join Terez and Mendez at the lower deck. He said that if they move, he will kill them. For fear that they would be killed, Madeja complied and went down beside her companions at the lower deck (Ibid., 16-17). Appellant, pretending that he had companions, peeped outside the door and said: "Pare akyatin mo na" and told the girls that he had many armed companions who are more fearless than he, adding that if they (the girls) moved they would be killed. The thought that appellant had several other armed companions made them more afraid (Ibid., pp. 18-20). Appellant sat beside them while holding the bladed weapon and asked them if they were married and their ages. When they did not answer, he peeped out of the door again (Ibid., 21). Then, appellant removed his short pants (Ibid., 21-22). He sat beside Terez and placed his left hand on her legs while his right hand held the knife (December 8, 1993, p. 27.) She pushed him away and shouted (TSN, November 15, 1993, p. 6). That made appellant angry. He went back to Terez and embraced her. Then she pushed him. Appellant became furious and punched her on the chin, stomach and legs (Ibid., 7; December 8, 1993, p. 28). Despite Terez’ plea not to hurt her, appellant lay on top of her (November 15, 1993, 7-8). She pushed him away again and she was boxed again. Then, he raised his hand while holding the knife and pointed the knife at her chest and told her that he was going to kill her. At that juncture, her companions were lying beside her, their bodies covered by appellant with a blanket up to their necks (Ibid., 8-9). He pretended talking to his companions, saying: "Pare ang tigas ng ulo" (Ibid., 11). Appellant continued to forcibly lay on top of her. He tried to open her legs. She fought back, but to no avail due to his superior weight and strength (TSN, November 15, 1993, p. 11). He cursed her and repeatedly boxed her on the stomach. With her beaten and hurt, appellant lay on top of her and embraced her (Ibid., 11). He tore her shorts and panty with his knife (TSN, December 8, 1993, p. 29). He succeeded in opening her legs and, having an erection, told her "magpaparaos lang ako" (TSN, December 8, 1993, p. 28). He inserted his organ ("ari") into her vagina (ari), and she felt pain (mahapdi) (TSN, November 15, 1993, pp. 12 & 14). The sexual intercourse lasted for about one (minute) (Ibid., 14).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Terez’ two companions who were lying beside her were not able to do anything to help her; they could not move as appellant threatened to kill them if they did (Ibid., 15). Appellant stood up, put on his short pants and peeped out of the door. He warned them not to fight back, otherwise, his companions who were more fearless would harm them, including their employer whom he claimed to have been hogtied upstairs by his companions (Ibid., 15-17). He told them to close their doors so that his companions would not be able to molest them, then he left the room (Ibid., 17).
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning, observing that there was silence in the premises, Terez and her companions came out from their quarters and sought the help of their neighbors, namely: Atty. Carbonnel, Mr. Sison, a barangay tanod and others. They found out that the main door of the Santiago house was locked so they woke her through the back door. Mrs. Santiago, who was not harmed or robbed as claimed by appellant, was surprised for she had been completely unaware of the incident as the three helpers relayed the story to her (Ibid., 17-18).
The policemen from Station 5 Bicutan arrived after their neighbors reported the crime. The police examined her (Terez) shorts and torn underwear. The barangay tanod talked with her employer (December 8, 1993, p. 5).
On the same day, accompanied by Mrs. Santiago, Terez reported the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). At about 2:20 in the afternoon, Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, (NBI) Medical Specialist III conducted a medico-legal examination on Terez. The medico-legal expert declared that the Terez suffered from contusions on the chest and chin caused by a hard-blunt object (Living Case No. MG-92-72, Exhibit "D" ; TSN, May 11, 1994, pp. 3-7). The medical report further indicated that upon genital examination, Terez suffered "abrasion at the posterior commissure" and that there was "recent genital injury." The vestibule was congested and the hymenal orifice admitted a tube 2.5 cm. in diameter. Dr. Reyes testified that the cause of the abrasion at the "posterior commissure" was a forcible attempt to introduce a male organ to the private part of the victim. The hymen of private complainant was distensible, meaning, elastic that is why even with the opening of 2.5 there was no laceration (TSN, May 11, 1994, pp. 3-8). The microscopic examination made on the vaginal smears or specimen from the victim’s private part revealed that it was positive of human spermatozoa, indicating that there was recent sexual intercourse, i.e., within 24 hours (NBI Laboratory Report No. S-92-217; TSN, May 11, 1994, p. 11).
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special Operations Group (SOG) headed by Executive Officer Atty. Lauro Reyes took the sworn statement of Terez, wherein she narrated the circumstances of her rape and gave a full description of appellant (TSN, June 6, 1994, p. 4). She requested that a cartographic sketch be drawn based on her description (Exhibit "H" ; TSN, January 31, 1994, p. 7). Whereupon, the NBI artist drew a complete sketch of appellant, a copy of which was given to the NBI investigator concerned (TSN, June 6, 1994, pp. 4-5; Exhibit "H").chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
NBI agents were dispatched to undertake close surveillance at Better Living Subdivision. Copies of the cartographic sketch of the suspect (Exhibit "H") were distributed at the tricycle terminal thereat for possible leads. Evidence was gathered from the Santiago residence. During the surveillance operations there were times when Daisy Terez accompanied the NBI agents (June 6, 1994, pp. 7-8).
On September 13, 1992, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, while Erlinda Mendez was buying softdrinks at a nearby store, she saw appellant drinking beer thereat about 14 feet away from her. She relayed this to Mrs. Santiago and other companions and Mrs. Santiago reported the matter to the NBI (May 25, 1994, pp. 10-11; May 27, 1994, p. 2).
In the morning of September 14, 1992, Mrs. Santiago called the NBI and informed Atty. Lauro Reyes that the suspect had been seen at the vicinity. At about 4:30 in the afternoon, NBI agents headed by Atty. Reyes proceeded to the Santiago residence. Between 5:00 and 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon, the NBI agents were accompanied by Mendez and Mrs. Santiago, since Terez was in school. They positioned themselves at the sari-sari store where the suspect had been seen. They waited for a while, after which Mendez pointed to appellant, who was then walking along the street, as Terez’ rapist. Appellant was accosted and brought to the NBI office for questioning. At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Terez, Mendez, the Santiagos and other companions went to the NBI headquarters. There, appellant was positively identified by Terez as the man who raped her (TSN, September 19, 1994, pp. 19-21; June 6, 1994, p. 9-13; May 29, 1994, pp. 2-4; December 8, 1993, pp. 32-33 & 41; Jan. 31, 1994, p. 8). NBI personnel then took the statements of Terez and Mendez (TSN, May 27, 1994, p. 4). The NBI agents executed a joint affidavit of arrest regarding the investigation and surveillance conducted in the case (Exhibit I, TSN, June 16, 1994, pp. 13-15). On September 15, 1992, the case was referred to the Fiscal’s office for inquest and three other victims namely, Estrella Gobris, Avelina Andrade and Francisca Magdangal, appeared at the Fiscal’s office and identified appellant as the person who raped them (TSN, June 6, 1992, p. 15). Atty. Reyes interviewed and took the statements of the three other victims who positively identified the appellant as their rapist. The NBI recommended in their letter transmittal addressed to the Inquest Fiscal (Exhibit "J") the filing of multiple rape charges against appellant (TSN, June 6, 1992, pp. 16-18). Finally, Atty. Reyes prepared an investigation report relative to this case (Exhibit "K", TSN, pp. 19-20).
For his part, Accused denied the commission of the crime and put up the defense of alibi claiming that at the time the alleged rape incident took place, he was sleeping with his wife in their house at Airport Village, Parañaque. 5 The alibi offered by the accused was corroborated by spouses Clemente and Nilda Socorro who were living in the house of the accused since March 1992 who both testified that the accused was inside his room at the time of the alleged incident since they could have easily noticed if accused left the house at that time considering that they were sleeping near the entrance door of the house.
The trial Court convicted the accused of the crime of rape giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of complainant Daisy Terez and her witness, Erlinda Mendez, who were found to be truthful witnesses without any ill motive to falsely testify against the accused. It ruled that appellant’s alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by these two witnesses and that accused failed to show impossibility to have been at the crime scene at the time of its commission. It also found the corroboration from spouses Clemente and Nilda Socorro as unavailing since they could not have possibly known the departure of the accused from his house. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: 6
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused FERNANDO ARELLANO y ROBLES is found guilty of rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or life imprisonment; and such accessory penalties as may be provided by law; and to pay the victim DAISY D. TEREZ compensatory and moral damages of P100,000.00; and litigation expenses of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
The crime committed by the accused is not yet within the purview of the law on "Heinous Crime" approved on December 13, 1993 otherwise known as Republic Act No. 7659.
The accused is however fully credited to a deduction of the period of his preventive imprisonment during the pendency of the case unless he has been legally ordered detained for another or separate crimes.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
Hence, Accused-appellant files this appeal raising five (5) assignment of errors which can be condensed into whether or not (a) accused appellant was positively identified by Daisy Terez as her rapist; (b) fatal irregularities attended the arrest and identification of the accused; and (c) defense of alibi was sufficiently established by the appellant.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Appellant assails the credibility of the testimony of complainant Daisy Terez claiming that she was uncertain as to the identity of her rapist as shown by the following instances: (a) Terez testified that she saw a man standing in front of the lower deck bed then looking at Madeja who was situated at the upper double deck bed, thus accused claims that Daisy’s line of sight to the man’s face was blocked by the upper deck of the bed, so that even with the lights on, Terez could have only seen the man’s torso and legs; (b) she described her rapist as six (6) feet tall, but appellant was only five feet four (5’4")inches tall; (c) the relative positions of victim Terez and her companions, Mendez and Madeja, in the lower double deck bed made it highly improbable for them to see the face of the man; that Madeja was made to face the wall while Mendez’ face was covered with a blanket.
The appeal has no merit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
We have gone over the records and we find no reversible error committed by the trial court in giving credence to the testimony of victim Daisy Terez and her witness, Erlinda Mendez, pointing to accused-appellant as the person who committed the crime. We entertain no doubt as to the positive identifications made by these two prosecution witnesses since Terez was the victim and Mendez was present when accused-appellant committed the crime.
Complainant Daisy Terez had the opportunity to vividly see the physical features of the accused-appellant before, during and after the rape incident. She narrated that at about 2:00 to 3:00 o’clock in the morning of August 28, 1992, when she was awakened by the scream of Maribel Madeja, who was lying at the upper double deck bed, the light in their room was on, thus, she saw the accused-appellant who was standing about one foot away from the lower double deck bed where she and Erlinda Mendez were lying. 7 Assuming arguendo that her vision was blocked by the upper deck bed, as claimed by the appellant, and she could not have seen the face of the accused at the first instance, the subsequent circumstances showed that appellant’s identity was sufficiently established. Daisy Terez declared that appellant asked Madeja to come down and join her (Daisy) and Erlinda Mendez at the lower double deck bed and after a while, Accused went to the door and peeped uttering "pare, akyatin mo na" to pretend that he had companions; Terez and her two lady companions were watching appellant. 8 Accused, holding a knife in his hand, sat beside them and inquired who were married and their respective ages 9 . Accused-appellant peeped out of the door again and then faced the three ladies focusing on Terez. Terez categorically stated that while this was happening, the light was on and she was looking at appellant’s face thinking that in case of a chance to escape, she would be able to remember appellant’s face. 10 Appellant then sat beside Terez and placed his hand on Terez’s legs but the latter pushed him away and appellant boxed her in different parts of her body; 11 appellant lay on top of Terez pointing a knife at her chest threatening her. 12 Appellant succeeded in opening Terez’ legs enabling him to put his organ into her organ for about one minute and Terez felt pain. 13 Terez emphasized that the penetration happened with the lights on. In consummating the rape, complainant was as close to accused-appellant as is physically possible, for a man and a woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during a sexual intercourse. 14 After appellant had satisfied his lustful desire, he stood up and wore his shorts and before leaving, instructed the women to move the bed to the door and not to go out until they heard the sound of the car engine which appellant claimed he was driving. 15
We are convinced of the accuracy of Terez’ positive identification of the Accused-Appellant. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive and see the looks and faces of their assailant and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and his body movements create lasting impressions which cannot be easily erased from their memory. 16 When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. 17
The actuations of Terez subsequent to the commission of the crime are likewise consistent with her allegation of rape and strengthens her credibility. After she was raped, she sought the help of their employer and immediately underwent a medico-legal examination on the same day, filed her complaint before the NBI on September 1, 1992 where she gave the description of the appellant which was the basis of a cartographic sketch.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Appellant’s claim that he was only 5’4" tall and could not be mistaken for a six footer does not impress us. It must be noted that Daisy was lying at the lower double deck bed while accused was standing about one foot away in front of her creating an illusion that accused-appellant was taller than his actual height. Moreover, familiarity with the physical features of a person is an acceptable way for proper identification. 18
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Daisy Terez before the court and her sinumpaang salaysay such as whether (1) the light was on when she was made to lie down beside Mendez and Madeja (2) they cried and shouted when accused-appellant asked them to sit together at the lower deck bed; (3) the face of Erlinda Mendez was covered by a blanket, refer to trivial and minor details that should not detract from her positive identification of the appellant. The infirmity of affidavits as evidence is a matter of judicial experience. 19 It is settled that no undue importance shall be given to a sworn statement or affidavit as a piece of evidence because being taken ex-parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and inaccurate. 20
Notably, Daisy Terez was consistent in her narration that the light was on when she was awakened by Madeja’s scream, and that the room was bright and she really saw Accused-Appellant. In fact, Terez emphasized that even when there were instances when appellant turned off and on the light inside their room, the light coming from the fluorescent bulb located outside their room penetrated through the window of their room and provided sufficient illumination. 21 She also stressed that while she was being raped by appellant, Mendez’ face was not covered by a blanket but only Madeja’s face as the latter was lying at her side.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
We hold that the testimony of complainant Terez would suffice to support a conviction. Moreover, her narration of the incident was strengthened by the corroboration of another prosecution witness, Erlinda Mendez, a household helper who was inside the room and who witnessed what had happened in the early morning of August 28, 1992. Erlinda Mendez could not be mistaken as to the identity of the appellant as she was also inside the room and was able to observe appellant from the time appellant entered and left their room on that fateful day.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Appellant questions his so called warrantless arrest and the absence of a proper police line-up; that he was presented to the victim already bruised and handcuffed which was done in a suggestive manner to stimulate the mind of the victim to point to the accused as her rapist making such out of court identification invalid and inadmissible.
We are not convinced.
Any irregularity attendant to appellant’s arrest should, not having been raised at an opportune time, be deemed cured by his having voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 22 Such irregularity was only raised in this appeal. In regard to this delay, this Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, 23 otherwise the objection is deemed waived. 24 Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. 25 And it is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed and the accused arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a judgment of conviction rendered against him. 26
Moreover, there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification 27 and there is no basis for the appellant to argue that his identification was merely suggested by the police authorities. It bears stress that Mendez was the one who gave the information to the NBI agents that she saw appellant in a nearby store and she even accompanied them at the time of appellant’s arrest. In fact, when complainant Daisy Terez was called by the NBI on September 14, 1992 to identify the accused, she immediately recognized him and was angry and upset upon seeing him.
We find that the cases cited by appellant where identification was held to be defective are not applicable in the instant case. We quote with approval the Solicitor-General’s disquisition as follows: 28
"In the cited case of People v. Hassan, 157 SCRA 263, the witness for the prosecution briefly saw the assailant stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" thereby rendering positive identification wanting in material points. Confrontation between the witness and the supposed assailant was done without prior description of the assailant given to the investigators. In the case at bar, before the appellant was apprehended, Terez and Mendez gave a description of his features which were made the basis of a cartographic sketch.
The case of Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 335, is not applicable to the case at bar, because, similar to Hassan, there was no positive identification of the author of the crime. There were serious and substantial discrepancies in the description given by the witness in her statement to the police as to the physical appearance of the burglar and the witness was not a victim at close range. In the instant case, appellant was positively identified by Terez and Mendez.
The case of People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54, cited the causes of misidentification and laid down the factors known as the totality test in the out-of-court identification, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Identification testimony has at least three components. First witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must, be able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug-shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-up where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out-of-court rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged irregularities cited by appellant did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino’s identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. (People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 95 and 96)
In the case at bar the show-ups (where the suspect by himself is brought face to face with the witness) was properly done considering that all the six (6) factors, were substantially satisfied: (1) the victim and one eyewitness had more than sufficient time to observe the rapist; (2) Terez and Mendez attention were focused on appellant who struck fear in their hearts, especially Terez who was raped; (3) Terez and her eyewitness, Mendez, gave prior accurate descriptions of appellant which became the source of the cartographic sketch; (4) there is no higher degree of certainty than the testimony of Terez who was raped; (5) the crime was committed on August 28, 1992 and appellant was identified by Mendez on September 13, 1992 while she was buying softdrinks at a store; Terez identified appellant on September 14, 1992; in both instances their memories of appellant were still fresh as only sixteen to seventeen days had passed since the commission of the crime; (6) suggestiveness was non-existent because after the rape, appellant was seen by Mendez at a nearby store and pointed to the authorities. His identity was confirmed by Terez. There is no element of suggestiveness in his identification because the description given by Terez and Mendez came first and was made basis of the cartographic sketch."cralaw virtua1aw library
The alibi resorted to by appellant is worthless in the face of the positive identification made by reliable prosecution witnesses who have not been found to have any reason or motive to falsely testify but whose only motive can well be to bring before the bar of justice the person who committed the crime. 29 Appellant’s alibi that he was in their house sleeping with his wife cannot be accepted in the light of his positive identification by two prosecution witnesses and as the trial court found "it is not impossible for the accused to have been at LOCUS CRIMINIS at the time of the commission of the crime since accused admitted in open court that at the time of the incident, he was merely sleeping some few hundred meters away at Valarao St., Airport Village, Parañaque, from the scene of the crime at No. 26 Texas St., of the Better Living Subdivision in the same locality of Parañaque, that he could traverse the distance by means of brisk walking in thirty eight (38) minutes to his work site at the Fourth Estate, ICA, while passing through the Texas St from his house at Valarao Street." In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant admitted that it would only take him ten minutes from his house to reach the house of the victim. 30 The testimonies of defense witnesses, spouses Clemente and Nilda Socorro did not help appellant considering that they testified that they saw appellant enter his room in the evening of August 27, 1992 and saw him again at 4:30 A.M. of August 28, 1992. It was not impossible for the appellant to have surreptitiously left the house at around 2:00 to 3:00 in the morning of August 28, while the couple was sound asleep, and went to the complainant’s house and returned afterwards It was not physically impossible for accused-appellant to have been at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
As noted from the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, the trial court imposed the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment." Evidently, the said court failed to appreciate the difference between reclusion perpetua under the Revised Penal Code and life imprisonment when imposed as a penalty by a special law. 31 These two penalties are distinct and separate from each other. We, once again refer to the case of People v. Penillos 32 on the correct imposition of the penalties of reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court imposed the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment." Evidently, it considered the latter as the English translation of the former, which is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent case of People v. Baguio, this Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Code does not prescribe the penalty of ‘life imprisonment’ for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special laws. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as ‘life imprisonment’ which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration."cralaw virtua1aw library
As early as 1948, in People v. Mobe, reiterated in People v. Pilones and in the concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People v. Sumadic, this Court already made it clear that reclusion perpetua is not the same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment. Every judge should take note of the distinction and this Court expects that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, except as modified in order to specify that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua, without any alternative reference to "life imprisonment", the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Accused was charged with the crime of rape under the following information: 2
"That on or about the 28th day of August, 1992, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation with the use of a bladed weapon, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, DAISY D. TEREZ against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon arraignment on September 29, 1993, Accused duly assisted by counsel entered a plea of not guilty. 3 Trial thereafter ensued.
The facts established by the prosecution’s evidence are summarized in the People’s brief as follows: 4
On August 28, 1992, between 2:00 and 3:00 o’clock in the morning, Daisy D. Terez, Maribel Madeja and Erlinda Mendez, all household helpers, were suddenly awakened when appellant gained entrance inside their room (maid’s quarter) which adjoins the house of Mrs. Margie Santiago, their employer, at No. 26 Texas Street Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, (TSN, November 8, 1993, pp. 3-5). Upon noticing the presence of the intruder, Maribel Madeja screamed, which roused Terez and Mendez from sleep. (Ibid., 5; TSN, May 30, 1994, p. 3). They saw the appellant wearing short pants and polo shirt and holding a knife (TSN, November 8, 1993, 5-6 & 16). At that instance, the fluorescent lamp inside the room was lighted (Ibid., 7 & 14). Appellant stood beside Terez who shared the lower deck with Mendez, as he looked at Madeja who was occupying the upper deck of the double deck bed (Ibid., 15-16). He commanded Madeja to get down from the upper deck and join Terez and Mendez at the lower deck. He said that if they move, he will kill them. For fear that they would be killed, Madeja complied and went down beside her companions at the lower deck (Ibid., 16-17). Appellant, pretending that he had companions, peeped outside the door and said: "Pare akyatin mo na" and told the girls that he had many armed companions who are more fearless than he, adding that if they (the girls) moved they would be killed. The thought that appellant had several other armed companions made them more afraid (Ibid., pp. 18-20). Appellant sat beside them while holding the bladed weapon and asked them if they were married and their ages. When they did not answer, he peeped out of the door again (Ibid., 21). Then, appellant removed his short pants (Ibid., 21-22). He sat beside Terez and placed his left hand on her legs while his right hand held the knife (December 8, 1993, p. 27.) She pushed him away and shouted (TSN, November 15, 1993, p. 6). That made appellant angry. He went back to Terez and embraced her. Then she pushed him. Appellant became furious and punched her on the chin, stomach and legs (Ibid., 7; December 8, 1993, p. 28). Despite Terez’ plea not to hurt her, appellant lay on top of her (November 15, 1993, 7-8). She pushed him away again and she was boxed again. Then, he raised his hand while holding the knife and pointed the knife at her chest and told her that he was going to kill her. At that juncture, her companions were lying beside her, their bodies covered by appellant with a blanket up to their necks (Ibid., 8-9). He pretended talking to his companions, saying: "Pare ang tigas ng ulo" (Ibid., 11). Appellant continued to forcibly lay on top of her. He tried to open her legs. She fought back, but to no avail due to his superior weight and strength (TSN, November 15, 1993, p. 11). He cursed her and repeatedly boxed her on the stomach. With her beaten and hurt, appellant lay on top of her and embraced her (Ibid., 11). He tore her shorts and panty with his knife (TSN, December 8, 1993, p. 29). He succeeded in opening her legs and, having an erection, told her "magpaparaos lang ako" (TSN, December 8, 1993, p. 28). He inserted his organ ("ari") into her vagina (ari), and she felt pain (mahapdi) (TSN, November 15, 1993, pp. 12 & 14). The sexual intercourse lasted for about one (minute) (Ibid., 14).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Terez’ two companions who were lying beside her were not able to do anything to help her; they could not move as appellant threatened to kill them if they did (Ibid., 15). Appellant stood up, put on his short pants and peeped out of the door. He warned them not to fight back, otherwise, his companions who were more fearless would harm them, including their employer whom he claimed to have been hogtied upstairs by his companions (Ibid., 15-17). He told them to close their doors so that his companions would not be able to molest them, then he left the room (Ibid., 17).
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning, observing that there was silence in the premises, Terez and her companions came out from their quarters and sought the help of their neighbors, namely: Atty. Carbonnel, Mr. Sison, a barangay tanod and others. They found out that the main door of the Santiago house was locked so they woke her through the back door. Mrs. Santiago, who was not harmed or robbed as claimed by appellant, was surprised for she had been completely unaware of the incident as the three helpers relayed the story to her (Ibid., 17-18).
The policemen from Station 5 Bicutan arrived after their neighbors reported the crime. The police examined her (Terez) shorts and torn underwear. The barangay tanod talked with her employer (December 8, 1993, p. 5).
On the same day, accompanied by Mrs. Santiago, Terez reported the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). At about 2:20 in the afternoon, Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, (NBI) Medical Specialist III conducted a medico-legal examination on Terez. The medico-legal expert declared that the Terez suffered from contusions on the chest and chin caused by a hard-blunt object (Living Case No. MG-92-72, Exhibit "D" ; TSN, May 11, 1994, pp. 3-7). The medical report further indicated that upon genital examination, Terez suffered "abrasion at the posterior commissure" and that there was "recent genital injury." The vestibule was congested and the hymenal orifice admitted a tube 2.5 cm. in diameter. Dr. Reyes testified that the cause of the abrasion at the "posterior commissure" was a forcible attempt to introduce a male organ to the private part of the victim. The hymen of private complainant was distensible, meaning, elastic that is why even with the opening of 2.5 there was no laceration (TSN, May 11, 1994, pp. 3-8). The microscopic examination made on the vaginal smears or specimen from the victim’s private part revealed that it was positive of human spermatozoa, indicating that there was recent sexual intercourse, i.e., within 24 hours (NBI Laboratory Report No. S-92-217; TSN, May 11, 1994, p. 11).
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special Operations Group (SOG) headed by Executive Officer Atty. Lauro Reyes took the sworn statement of Terez, wherein she narrated the circumstances of her rape and gave a full description of appellant (TSN, June 6, 1994, p. 4). She requested that a cartographic sketch be drawn based on her description (Exhibit "H" ; TSN, January 31, 1994, p. 7). Whereupon, the NBI artist drew a complete sketch of appellant, a copy of which was given to the NBI investigator concerned (TSN, June 6, 1994, pp. 4-5; Exhibit "H").chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
NBI agents were dispatched to undertake close surveillance at Better Living Subdivision. Copies of the cartographic sketch of the suspect (Exhibit "H") were distributed at the tricycle terminal thereat for possible leads. Evidence was gathered from the Santiago residence. During the surveillance operations there were times when Daisy Terez accompanied the NBI agents (June 6, 1994, pp. 7-8).
On September 13, 1992, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, while Erlinda Mendez was buying softdrinks at a nearby store, she saw appellant drinking beer thereat about 14 feet away from her. She relayed this to Mrs. Santiago and other companions and Mrs. Santiago reported the matter to the NBI (May 25, 1994, pp. 10-11; May 27, 1994, p. 2).
In the morning of September 14, 1992, Mrs. Santiago called the NBI and informed Atty. Lauro Reyes that the suspect had been seen at the vicinity. At about 4:30 in the afternoon, NBI agents headed by Atty. Reyes proceeded to the Santiago residence. Between 5:00 and 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon, the NBI agents were accompanied by Mendez and Mrs. Santiago, since Terez was in school. They positioned themselves at the sari-sari store where the suspect had been seen. They waited for a while, after which Mendez pointed to appellant, who was then walking along the street, as Terez’ rapist. Appellant was accosted and brought to the NBI office for questioning. At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Terez, Mendez, the Santiagos and other companions went to the NBI headquarters. There, appellant was positively identified by Terez as the man who raped her (TSN, September 19, 1994, pp. 19-21; June 6, 1994, p. 9-13; May 29, 1994, pp. 2-4; December 8, 1993, pp. 32-33 & 41; Jan. 31, 1994, p. 8). NBI personnel then took the statements of Terez and Mendez (TSN, May 27, 1994, p. 4). The NBI agents executed a joint affidavit of arrest regarding the investigation and surveillance conducted in the case (Exhibit I, TSN, June 16, 1994, pp. 13-15). On September 15, 1992, the case was referred to the Fiscal’s office for inquest and three other victims namely, Estrella Gobris, Avelina Andrade and Francisca Magdangal, appeared at the Fiscal’s office and identified appellant as the person who raped them (TSN, June 6, 1992, p. 15). Atty. Reyes interviewed and took the statements of the three other victims who positively identified the appellant as their rapist. The NBI recommended in their letter transmittal addressed to the Inquest Fiscal (Exhibit "J") the filing of multiple rape charges against appellant (TSN, June 6, 1992, pp. 16-18). Finally, Atty. Reyes prepared an investigation report relative to this case (Exhibit "K", TSN, pp. 19-20).
For his part, Accused denied the commission of the crime and put up the defense of alibi claiming that at the time the alleged rape incident took place, he was sleeping with his wife in their house at Airport Village, Parañaque. 5 The alibi offered by the accused was corroborated by spouses Clemente and Nilda Socorro who were living in the house of the accused since March 1992 who both testified that the accused was inside his room at the time of the alleged incident since they could have easily noticed if accused left the house at that time considering that they were sleeping near the entrance door of the house.
The trial Court convicted the accused of the crime of rape giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of complainant Daisy Terez and her witness, Erlinda Mendez, who were found to be truthful witnesses without any ill motive to falsely testify against the accused. It ruled that appellant’s alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by these two witnesses and that accused failed to show impossibility to have been at the crime scene at the time of its commission. It also found the corroboration from spouses Clemente and Nilda Socorro as unavailing since they could not have possibly known the departure of the accused from his house. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: 6
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused FERNANDO ARELLANO y ROBLES is found guilty of rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or life imprisonment; and such accessory penalties as may be provided by law; and to pay the victim DAISY D. TEREZ compensatory and moral damages of P100,000.00; and litigation expenses of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
The crime committed by the accused is not yet within the purview of the law on "Heinous Crime" approved on December 13, 1993 otherwise known as Republic Act No. 7659.
The accused is however fully credited to a deduction of the period of his preventive imprisonment during the pendency of the case unless he has been legally ordered detained for another or separate crimes.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
Hence, Accused-appellant files this appeal raising five (5) assignment of errors which can be condensed into whether or not (a) accused appellant was positively identified by Daisy Terez as her rapist; (b) fatal irregularities attended the arrest and identification of the accused; and (c) defense of alibi was sufficiently established by the appellant.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Appellant assails the credibility of the testimony of complainant Daisy Terez claiming that she was uncertain as to the identity of her rapist as shown by the following instances: (a) Terez testified that she saw a man standing in front of the lower deck bed then looking at Madeja who was situated at the upper double deck bed, thus accused claims that Daisy’s line of sight to the man’s face was blocked by the upper deck of the bed, so that even with the lights on, Terez could have only seen the man’s torso and legs; (b) she described her rapist as six (6) feet tall, but appellant was only five feet four (5’4")inches tall; (c) the relative positions of victim Terez and her companions, Mendez and Madeja, in the lower double deck bed made it highly improbable for them to see the face of the man; that Madeja was made to face the wall while Mendez’ face was covered with a blanket.
The appeal has no merit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
We have gone over the records and we find no reversible error committed by the trial court in giving credence to the testimony of victim Daisy Terez and her witness, Erlinda Mendez, pointing to accused-appellant as the person who committed the crime. We entertain no doubt as to the positive identifications made by these two prosecution witnesses since Terez was the victim and Mendez was present when accused-appellant committed the crime.
Complainant Daisy Terez had the opportunity to vividly see the physical features of the accused-appellant before, during and after the rape incident. She narrated that at about 2:00 to 3:00 o’clock in the morning of August 28, 1992, when she was awakened by the scream of Maribel Madeja, who was lying at the upper double deck bed, the light in their room was on, thus, she saw the accused-appellant who was standing about one foot away from the lower double deck bed where she and Erlinda Mendez were lying. 7 Assuming arguendo that her vision was blocked by the upper deck bed, as claimed by the appellant, and she could not have seen the face of the accused at the first instance, the subsequent circumstances showed that appellant’s identity was sufficiently established. Daisy Terez declared that appellant asked Madeja to come down and join her (Daisy) and Erlinda Mendez at the lower double deck bed and after a while, Accused went to the door and peeped uttering "pare, akyatin mo na" to pretend that he had companions; Terez and her two lady companions were watching appellant. 8 Accused, holding a knife in his hand, sat beside them and inquired who were married and their respective ages 9 . Accused-appellant peeped out of the door again and then faced the three ladies focusing on Terez. Terez categorically stated that while this was happening, the light was on and she was looking at appellant’s face thinking that in case of a chance to escape, she would be able to remember appellant’s face. 10 Appellant then sat beside Terez and placed his hand on Terez’s legs but the latter pushed him away and appellant boxed her in different parts of her body; 11 appellant lay on top of Terez pointing a knife at her chest threatening her. 12 Appellant succeeded in opening Terez’ legs enabling him to put his organ into her organ for about one minute and Terez felt pain. 13 Terez emphasized that the penetration happened with the lights on. In consummating the rape, complainant was as close to accused-appellant as is physically possible, for a man and a woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during a sexual intercourse. 14 After appellant had satisfied his lustful desire, he stood up and wore his shorts and before leaving, instructed the women to move the bed to the door and not to go out until they heard the sound of the car engine which appellant claimed he was driving. 15
We are convinced of the accuracy of Terez’ positive identification of the Accused-Appellant. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive and see the looks and faces of their assailant and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and his body movements create lasting impressions which cannot be easily erased from their memory. 16 When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. 17
The actuations of Terez subsequent to the commission of the crime are likewise consistent with her allegation of rape and strengthens her credibility. After she was raped, she sought the help of their employer and immediately underwent a medico-legal examination on the same day, filed her complaint before the NBI on September 1, 1992 where she gave the description of the appellant which was the basis of a cartographic sketch.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Appellant’s claim that he was only 5’4" tall and could not be mistaken for a six footer does not impress us. It must be noted that Daisy was lying at the lower double deck bed while accused was standing about one foot away in front of her creating an illusion that accused-appellant was taller than his actual height. Moreover, familiarity with the physical features of a person is an acceptable way for proper identification. 18
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Daisy Terez before the court and her sinumpaang salaysay such as whether (1) the light was on when she was made to lie down beside Mendez and Madeja (2) they cried and shouted when accused-appellant asked them to sit together at the lower deck bed; (3) the face of Erlinda Mendez was covered by a blanket, refer to trivial and minor details that should not detract from her positive identification of the appellant. The infirmity of affidavits as evidence is a matter of judicial experience. 19 It is settled that no undue importance shall be given to a sworn statement or affidavit as a piece of evidence because being taken ex-parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and inaccurate. 20
Notably, Daisy Terez was consistent in her narration that the light was on when she was awakened by Madeja’s scream, and that the room was bright and she really saw Accused-Appellant. In fact, Terez emphasized that even when there were instances when appellant turned off and on the light inside their room, the light coming from the fluorescent bulb located outside their room penetrated through the window of their room and provided sufficient illumination. 21 She also stressed that while she was being raped by appellant, Mendez’ face was not covered by a blanket but only Madeja’s face as the latter was lying at her side.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
We hold that the testimony of complainant Terez would suffice to support a conviction. Moreover, her narration of the incident was strengthened by the corroboration of another prosecution witness, Erlinda Mendez, a household helper who was inside the room and who witnessed what had happened in the early morning of August 28, 1992. Erlinda Mendez could not be mistaken as to the identity of the appellant as she was also inside the room and was able to observe appellant from the time appellant entered and left their room on that fateful day.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Appellant questions his so called warrantless arrest and the absence of a proper police line-up; that he was presented to the victim already bruised and handcuffed which was done in a suggestive manner to stimulate the mind of the victim to point to the accused as her rapist making such out of court identification invalid and inadmissible.
We are not convinced.
Any irregularity attendant to appellant’s arrest should, not having been raised at an opportune time, be deemed cured by his having voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 22 Such irregularity was only raised in this appeal. In regard to this delay, this Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, 23 otherwise the objection is deemed waived. 24 Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. 25 And it is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed and the accused arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a judgment of conviction rendered against him. 26
Moreover, there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification 27 and there is no basis for the appellant to argue that his identification was merely suggested by the police authorities. It bears stress that Mendez was the one who gave the information to the NBI agents that she saw appellant in a nearby store and she even accompanied them at the time of appellant’s arrest. In fact, when complainant Daisy Terez was called by the NBI on September 14, 1992 to identify the accused, she immediately recognized him and was angry and upset upon seeing him.
We find that the cases cited by appellant where identification was held to be defective are not applicable in the instant case. We quote with approval the Solicitor-General’s disquisition as follows: 28
"In the cited case of People v. Hassan, 157 SCRA 263, the witness for the prosecution briefly saw the assailant stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" thereby rendering positive identification wanting in material points. Confrontation between the witness and the supposed assailant was done without prior description of the assailant given to the investigators. In the case at bar, before the appellant was apprehended, Terez and Mendez gave a description of his features which were made the basis of a cartographic sketch.
The case of Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 335, is not applicable to the case at bar, because, similar to Hassan, there was no positive identification of the author of the crime. There were serious and substantial discrepancies in the description given by the witness in her statement to the police as to the physical appearance of the burglar and the witness was not a victim at close range. In the instant case, appellant was positively identified by Terez and Mendez.
The case of People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54, cited the causes of misidentification and laid down the factors known as the totality test in the out-of-court identification, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Identification testimony has at least three components. First witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must, be able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug-shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-up where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out-of-court rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged irregularities cited by appellant did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino’s identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. (People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 95 and 96)
In the case at bar the show-ups (where the suspect by himself is brought face to face with the witness) was properly done considering that all the six (6) factors, were substantially satisfied: (1) the victim and one eyewitness had more than sufficient time to observe the rapist; (2) Terez and Mendez attention were focused on appellant who struck fear in their hearts, especially Terez who was raped; (3) Terez and her eyewitness, Mendez, gave prior accurate descriptions of appellant which became the source of the cartographic sketch; (4) there is no higher degree of certainty than the testimony of Terez who was raped; (5) the crime was committed on August 28, 1992 and appellant was identified by Mendez on September 13, 1992 while she was buying softdrinks at a store; Terez identified appellant on September 14, 1992; in both instances their memories of appellant were still fresh as only sixteen to seventeen days had passed since the commission of the crime; (6) suggestiveness was non-existent because after the rape, appellant was seen by Mendez at a nearby store and pointed to the authorities. His identity was confirmed by Terez. There is no element of suggestiveness in his identification because the description given by Terez and Mendez came first and was made basis of the cartographic sketch."cralaw virtua1aw library
The alibi resorted to by appellant is worthless in the face of the positive identification made by reliable prosecution witnesses who have not been found to have any reason or motive to falsely testify but whose only motive can well be to bring before the bar of justice the person who committed the crime. 29 Appellant’s alibi that he was in their house sleeping with his wife cannot be accepted in the light of his positive identification by two prosecution witnesses and as the trial court found "it is not impossible for the accused to have been at LOCUS CRIMINIS at the time of the commission of the crime since accused admitted in open court that at the time of the incident, he was merely sleeping some few hundred meters away at Valarao St., Airport Village, Parañaque, from the scene of the crime at No. 26 Texas St., of the Better Living Subdivision in the same locality of Parañaque, that he could traverse the distance by means of brisk walking in thirty eight (38) minutes to his work site at the Fourth Estate, ICA, while passing through the Texas St from his house at Valarao Street." In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant admitted that it would only take him ten minutes from his house to reach the house of the victim. 30 The testimonies of defense witnesses, spouses Clemente and Nilda Socorro did not help appellant considering that they testified that they saw appellant enter his room in the evening of August 27, 1992 and saw him again at 4:30 A.M. of August 28, 1992. It was not impossible for the appellant to have surreptitiously left the house at around 2:00 to 3:00 in the morning of August 28, while the couple was sound asleep, and went to the complainant’s house and returned afterwards It was not physically impossible for accused-appellant to have been at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
As noted from the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, the trial court imposed the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment." Evidently, the said court failed to appreciate the difference between reclusion perpetua under the Revised Penal Code and life imprisonment when imposed as a penalty by a special law. 31 These two penalties are distinct and separate from each other. We, once again refer to the case of People v. Penillos 32 on the correct imposition of the penalties of reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court imposed the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment." Evidently, it considered the latter as the English translation of the former, which is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent case of People v. Baguio, this Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Code does not prescribe the penalty of ‘life imprisonment’ for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special laws. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as ‘life imprisonment’ which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration."cralaw virtua1aw library
As early as 1948, in People v. Mobe, reiterated in People v. Pilones and in the concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People v. Sumadic, this Court already made it clear that reclusion perpetua is not the same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment. Every judge should take note of the distinction and this Court expects that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, except as modified in order to specify that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua, without any alternative reference to "life imprisonment", the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Penned by Judge Omar U. Amin; Criminal Case No. 92-6168; Rollo, pp. 36-46.
2. Rollo, p. 11
3. Records, p. 67.
4. Rollo, pp. 240-250.
5. TSN, February 15, 1995, p. 4.
6. Rollo, pp. 45-46.
7. TSN, Nov. 24, 1993, p. 9.
8. Ibid., p. 20.
9. Ibid., p. 21.
10. TSN, January 31, 1994 p. 13.
11. November 15, 1993, pp. 6-7.
12. Ibid., p. 8.
13. Ibid., pp. 12-15.
14. People v. Castaneda, 252 SCRA 247; People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411; People v. Fuertes, 296 SCRA 602.
15. Ibid., p. 16.
16. People v. Dolar, 231 SCRA 414.
17. People v. Malabago, 271 SCRA 464.
18. People v. Reception, 198 SCRA 670.
19. People v. Nang, 289 SCRA 16, People v. Tanilon, 293 SCRA 220.
20. People v. Lusa, 288 SCRA 296; Salafranca v. Philamlife (Pamplona) Village Homeowners Association, Inc., 300 SCRA 469.
21. TSN, January 31, 1994, p. 17.
22. People v. Barrientos, 285 SCRA 221.
23. People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199; People v. Tidula, 292 SCRA 596.
24. Supra, citing People v. Lopez, Jr., 245 SCRA 95 (1995); People v. Rivera, 245 SCRA 421 (1995).
25. Supra, citing People v. Manzano, 248 SCRA 239.
26. Supra.
27. People v. Espiritu, 191 SCRA 503.
28. Rollo, pp. 282-286.
29. People v. Guerrero 242 SCRA 606.
30. TSN, March 1, 1995, p. 3.
31. People v. Ruelan, 231 SCRA 650.
32. 205 SCRA 546.
