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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2015 > January 2015 Decisions > G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015 - GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner, v. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.:




G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015 - GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner, v. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015

GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner, v. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

REYES, J.:

For review is the Decision1 rendered on January 29, 2013 and Resolution2 issued on August 7, 2013 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the Decision3 dated January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. SP-6564(09), which declared the marriage between Glenn Viñas (Glenn) and Mary Grace Parel-Viñas (Mary Grace) as null and void.cralawred

Antecedents

On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married in civil rites held in Lipa City, Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infant’s death was caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.

The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a production engineer.

Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.

On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked heavily even when she was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to perform even the most essential household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death of the infant whom she delivered. She lived as if she were single and was unmindful of her husband’s needs. She was self-centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her about her behavior, she showed indifference. She eventually left their home without informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she left for an overseas employment in Dubai.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends. They informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken family and was left to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The foregoing circumstance must have contributed to her sense of insecurity and difficulty in adjusting to married life.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as “amply aware of his marital roles” and “capable of maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual relationship.”9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Grace way back in college.

Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college graduate. She belongs to a middle class family. Her father is an overseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the time Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in Dubai and romantically involved with another man.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed Glenn during the couple’s fights. Mary Grace is also ill-tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-oriented.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious, grave, permanent and chronic in proportion and is incurable by any form of clinical intervention. It has already been deeply embedded within her system as it was found to have started as early as her childhood years. Because of such, it has caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and functionally[-]impaired especially with regards to heterosexual dealings.

Such disorder of [Mary Grace] is mainly characterized by grandiosity, need for admiration and lack of empathy[,] along with her pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,] which utterly distorted her perceptions and views especially in terms of a fitting marital relationship. Such disorder manifested in [Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of entitlement and arrogance. Throughout her union with [Glenn], she has exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her marked inability to show proper respect for her husband. x x x She is too headstrong that most of the time[,] she would do things her own way and would not pay close attention to what her husband needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled for power and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn], being too considerate to her, was often subjected to her control. x x x She is into many vices and loved hanging out with her friends at night[,] and she even got involved in an illicit relationship[,] which was still going on up to the present time. x x x.

The root cause of [Mary Grace’s] personality aberration can be said to have emanated from the various forms of unfavorable factors in her milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,] which is the crucial stage in the life of a person as this is the time when the individual’s character and behavior are shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and tolerating parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon] their children. Considering such fact, she apparently failed to feel the love and affection of the nurturing figures that she had[,] who were supposed to be the first to show concern [for] her. x x x She has acquired a domineering character as she was not taught to have boundaries in her actions because of the laxity she had from her caregivers and also because she grew up to be the eldest in the brood. She sees to it that she is the one always followed with regards to making decisions and always mandates people to submit to her wishes. She has not acquired the very essence of morality [and] has certainly learned set of unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to assume mature roles. Morals and values were not instilled in her young mind that as she went on with her life, she never learned to restrain herself from doing ill-advised things even if she is amply aware of the depravity of her actions.

The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical antecedence as it was already in her system even prior to the solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x.13 (Underlining ours)
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. Substituted service of summons was made upon Mary Grace through her aunt, Susana Rosita.14 Mary Grace filed no answer and did not attend any of the proceedings before the RTC.

During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were offered as evidence. Glenn and Rodelito described Mary Grace as outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact opposite of Glenn, who is conservative and preoccupied with his work.15 On her part, Dr. Tayag reiterated her findings in the psychological report dated December 29, 2008.cralawred

Ruling of the RTC

On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the following as grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the] grant of the petition.

Reconciliation between the parties under the circumstances is nil. For the best interest of the parties, it is best that the legal bond between them be severed.

The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the miserable life [Glenn] had with [Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic Personality Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who does not treat him as her husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are separated in fact since the year 2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned [Glenn] without telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it not for the insistence of [Glenn] that he would not know the whereabouts of his wife. The law provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are obliged to live together, [and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x x x For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a quandary on what it really means. x x x.

From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace] failed to comply with the basic marital obligations of mutual love, respect, mutual help and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have their marriage saved but [Mary Grace] did not cooperate with him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of her marital obligations.

The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a clinical psychologist with sufficient authority to speak on the subject of psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and was able to gather sufficient data and information about [Mary Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic] personality disorder of [Mary Grace] is ingrained in her personality make-up, so grave and so permanent, incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this personal incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is already pre-existing before the marriage and was only manifested after. It has become grave, permanent and incurable.17 (Underlining ours and italics in the original)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its Order18 dated December 1, 2010.cralawred

The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA

On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite the root cause of Mary Grace’s disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayag’s statements anent the gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The RTC resorted to mere generalizations and conclusions sans details. Besides, what psychological incapacity contemplates is downright incapacity to assume marital obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown, but these do not warrant the grant of Glenn’s petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this does not translate into a psychological illness.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSG’s appeal.

On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA stated the reasons below:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The psychological condition must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace] was carefree, outgoing, immature, and irresponsible which made her unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He likewise alleged that she refused to communicate with him to save the marriage and eventually left him to work abroad. To Our mind, the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a case of psychological incapacity on her part.

While it is true that [Glenn’s] testimony was corroborated by [Dr. Tayag], a psychologist who conducted a psychological examination on [Glenn], however, said examination was conducted only on him and no evidence was shown that the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.

Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive value in determining the psychological incapacity of a person as she would be in the best position to assess and evaluate the psychological condition of the couple, she being an expert in this field of study of behavior. Although the psychologist stated that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, she did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she make a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. Moreover, she admitted that she was not able to examine the respondent[,] hence, the information provided to her may be subjective and self-serving.

Essential in this petition is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse’s psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.

Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did not establish the root cause of the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] nor was such ground alleged in the complaint. We reiterate the ruling of the Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision.

Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, has this to say:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
“Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,] such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.”
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that “Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves”. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.” Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage of the parties for the obvious failure of [Glenn] to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for his failure to observe the guidelines outlined in the afore-cited cases.

Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted from the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.20 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis and italics in the original)
The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution21 dated August 7, 2013, denied the Motion for Reconsideration22 filed by Glenn.cralawred

Issue

Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.

In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage should be judged according to its own set of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions, predilections or generalizations. The RTC judge should painstakingly examine the factual milieu, while the CA must refrain from substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.23 Further, Glenn argues that in Marcos v. Marcos,24 the Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non requirement for the respondent spouse to be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before a marriage could be declared as a nullity.25 However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his or her testimony should be considered as decisive evidence.26 Besides, the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of the witnesses should be respected.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes that the arguments Glenn raise for our consideration are mere reiterations of the matters already resolved by the CA.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Ruling of the Court

The instant petition lacks merit.

The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. “If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”29chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is romantically-involved with another man. She has not been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the latter filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity. Rumbaua v. Rumbaua30 is emphatic that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.

In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.

x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.31 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis in the original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her husband.

Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the former’s condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn’s testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn’s statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary Grace’s traits and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before they got married, they saw each other almost everyday.32 Glenn saw “a loving[,] caring and well[-]educated person”33 in Mary Grace.

Anent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s condition, the Court finds the same as unfounded. Rumbaua34 provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who “believes that the world revolves around him”; and who “used love as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.” x x x.

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent’s narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered “Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable” – is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

x x x x

A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondent’s condition was grave and incurable. x x x

x x x x

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.

Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. x x x If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondent’s early life and associations, and about events on or about the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meagre facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. x x x.35 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Grace’s status as the eldest among her siblings,36 her father’s being an overseas contract worker and her very tolerant mother, a housewife.37 These, however, are not sufficient to establish and explain the supposed psychological incapacity of Mary Grace warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couple’s marriage.

The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2013 and Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Bersamin,* and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:


* Additional member per Raffle dated January 12, 2015 vice Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, concurring; rollo, pp. 26-33.

2 Id. at 24.

3 Rendered by Acting Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr.; CA rollo, pp. 7-13.

4See Certificate of Marriage, id. at 22.

5 Original Records, pp. 4-13.

6 Id. at 5.

7 Id. at 6-7.

8 Id. at 8.

9 Id. at 8-10.

10 Please see the psychological report of Dr. Tayag, dated December 29, 2008, Folder of Exhibits, p. 20.

11 Id.

12 Id. at 23, 26.

13 Id. at 23-26.

14 Original Records, pp. 18, 20.

15 CA rollo, pp. 82-83.

16 Id. at 7-13.

17 Id. at 12-13.

18 Id. at 14-15.

19 Please see Appellant’s Brief, id. at 40, 44-46.

20Rollo, pp. 30-33.

21 Id. at 24.

22 CA rollo, pp. 88-92.

23 Id. at 6.

24 397 Phil. 840 (2000).

25Rollo, p. 6.

26 Id.

27 Id. at 7.

28 Id. at 45-47.

29Zamora v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 701, 708 (2007).

30 612 Phil. 1061 (2009).

31 Id. at 1083-1084.

32 TSN, October 5, 2009, p. 19.

33 Original Records, p. 5.

34 Supra note 30.

35 Id. at 1084-1092.

36 TSN, September 14, 2009, p. 12.

37 Id. at 18.



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  • G.R. No. 200797, January 12, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANOLITO OPIANA Y TANAEL, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 207993, January 21, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. GERARDO ENUMERABLE Y DE VILLA, Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015 - ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner, ALFREDO S. LIM, Petitioner-Intervenor, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 200333, January 21, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINGO DILLA Y PAULAR, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 191540, January 21, 2015 - SPOUSES JOSE O. GATUSLAO AND ERMILA LEONILA LIMSIACO-GATUSLAO, Petitioners, v. LEO RAY V. YANSON, Respondent.

  • A.M. No. P-11-2940, January 21, 2015 - JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., Complainant, v. GEORGE E. VIAJAR, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 4, BUTUAN CITY, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 209605, January 12, 2015 - NEIL B. AGUILAR AND RUBEN CALIMBAS, Petitioners, v. LIGHTBRINGERS CREDIT COOPERATIVE, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 212196, January 12, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMIL DORIA DAHIL AND ROMMEL CASTRO Y CARLOS, Accused-Appellants.

  • A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015 - ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.

  • A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015 - DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 211211, January 14, 2015 - ROMMEL B. DARAUG, Petitioner, v. KGJS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA, INC., KRISTIAN GERHARD JEBSEN SKIPSREDER, MR. GUY DOMINO A. MACAPAYAG AND/OR M/V “IBIS ARROW,” Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 192270, January 26, 2015 - IRENE D. OFILADA, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES RUBEN ANDAL AND MIRAFLOR ANDAL, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 193451, January 28, 2015 - ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, Petitioner, v. ISIDORO A. ANTE, RAUL C. ADDATU, NICANOR B. PADILLA, JR., DANTE Y. CEÑIDO, AND RHAMIR C. DALIOAN, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 197011, January 28, 2015 - ESSENCIA Q. MANARPIIS, Petitioner, v. TEXAN PHILIPPINES, INC., RICHARD TAN AND CATHERINE P. RIALUBIN-TAN, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 206562, January 21, 2015 - UNICOL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., LINK MARINE PTE. LTD. AND/OR VICTORIANO B. TIROL, III, Petitioners, v. DELIA MALIPOT, IN BEHALF OF GLICERIO MALIPOT, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 192406, January 21, 2015 - ONE SHIPPING CORP., AND/OR ONE SHIPPING KABUSHIKI KAISHA/JAPAN, Petitioner, v. IMELDA C. PEÑAFIEL, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015 - GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner, v. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015 - THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA AND THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 190912, January 12, 2015 - GARY FANTASTICO AND ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, v. ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR. AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 204702, January 14, 2015 - RICARDO C. HONRADO, Petitioner, v. GMA NETWORK FILMS, INC., Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 178169, January 12, 2015 - NFF INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. G & L ASSOCIATED BROKERAGE AND/OR GERARDO TRINIDAD, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015 - VIRGILIO C. BRIONES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND CASH ASIA CREDIT CORPORATION, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015 - FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 210760, January 26, 2015 - KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

  • G.R. Nos. 183152-54, January 21, 2015 - REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA AND ANTONIO G. HABALO, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HEIRS OF COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG AND AVELINO MANGUERA, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015 - CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner, v. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE WESTGROVE AND/OR SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 191470, January 26, 2015 - AUGUSTO M. AQUINO, Petitioner, v. HON. ISMAEL P. CASABAR, AS PRESIDING JUDGE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA, BRANCH 33 AND MA. ALA F. DOMINGO AND MARGARITA IRENE F. DOMINGO, SUBSTITUTING HEIRS OF THE DECEASED ANGEL T. DOMINGO, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 193468, January 28, 2015 - AL O. EYANA, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., ALAIN A. GARILLOS, CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC. (U.S.A.), Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 189571, January 21, 2015 - THE HONORABLE MONETARY BOARD AND GAIL U. FULE, DIRECTOR, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION DEPARTMENT II, AND BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 202837, January 21, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAKIM MINANGA Y DUMANSAL, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 194885, January 26, 2015 - C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. AND REEDEREI CLAUS PETER OFFEN, Petitioners, v. CLEMENTE M. PEREZ, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 205433, January 21, 2015 - OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. AVELINO DE ZOSA AND BARTOLOME DELA CRUZ, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 204866, January 21, 2015 - RUKS KONSULT AND CONSTRUCTION, Petitioner, v. ADWORLD SIGN AND ADVERTISING CORPORATION* AND TRANSWORLD MEDIA ADS, INC., Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 163928, January 21, 2015 - MANUEL JUSAYAN,ALFREDO JUSAYAN, AND MICHAEL JUSAYAN, Petitioners, v. JORGE SOMBILLA, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 195272, January 14, 2015 - BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (FORMERLY PRUDENTIAL BANK), Petitioner, v. SPOUSES DAVID M. CASTRO AND CONSUELO B. CASTRO, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 176508, January 12, 2015 - SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioner, v. HON. TEODORO T. RIEL, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 85, QUEZON CITY, Respondent.; UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.

  • G.R. No. 202687, January 14, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERIC PAVIA Y PALIZA aka “JERIC” AND JUAN BUENDIA Y DELOS REYES aka “JUNE”, Accused-Appellants.

  • G.R. Nos. 193383-84, January 14, 2015 - CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.; G.R. NOS. 193407-08 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 206832, January 21, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALFREDO MORALES Y LAM, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 212932, January 21, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNEL BALUTE Y VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. Nos. 209655-60, January 14, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PALMY TIBAYAN AND RICO Z. PUERTO, Accused-Appellants.

  • A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ], January 12, 2015 - ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA D. TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L. NOGUERA, FIDEL S. SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T. TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M. COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA, AND MARIVEL B. ISON, Complaints, v. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., BRANCH 45, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE OCCIDENTAL MINDORO, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 198756, January 13, 2015 - BANCO DE ORO, BANK OF COMMERCE, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK AND PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioners, RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION AND RCBC CAPITAL CORPORATION, Petitioners, CAUCUS OF DEVELOPMENT NGO NETWORKS, Petitioner-Intervenor, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL TREASURER AND BUREAU OF TREASURY, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015 - RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION GONZALES AND LUIS MANALANG, Petitioners, v. BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 207942, January 12, 2015 - YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 185544, January 13, 2015 - THE LAW FIRM OF LAGUESMA MAGSALIN CONSULTA AND GASTARDO, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND/OR REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR. IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONER, RESPECTIVELY, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. CHI CHAN LIU A. K. A. CHAN QUE AND HUI LAO CHUNG A.K.A. LEOFE SENGLAO, Appellants.

  • G.R. Nos. 209672-74, January 14, 2015 - EDMUND SIA, Petitioner, v. WILFREDO ARCENAS, FERNANDO LOPEZ, AND PABLO RAFANAN, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 184458, January 14, 2015 - RODRIGO RIVERA, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES SALVADOR CHUA AND S. VIOLETA CHUA, Respondents.; G.R. NO. 184472 - SPS. SALVADOR CHUA AND VIOLETA S. CHUA, Petitioners, v. RODRIGO RIVERA, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 195671, January 21, 2015 - ROGELIO J. GONZAGA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

  • A.M. No. P-14-3281 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3998-P), January 28, 2015 - FELISICIMO* R. SABIJON AND ZENAIDA A. SABIJON, Complainants, v. BENEDICT** M. DE JUAN, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF KABACAN, NORTH COTABATO, BRANCH 22, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 188016, January 14, 2015 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. TEAM (PHILS.) ENERGY CORPORATION (FORMERLY MIRANT (PHILS.) ENERGY CORPORATION), Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 182864, January 12, 2015 - EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP., & MITSUI SUMITOMO INSURANCE CO., LTD., Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015 - VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, v. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 195580, January 28, 2015 - NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., AND MCARTHUR MINING, INC., Petitioners, v. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP., Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 210660, January 21, 2015 - FLOR G. DAYO, Petitioner, v. STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION AND/OR NAFTO TRADE SHIPPING COMMERCIAL S.A., Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 204689, January 21, 2015 - STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES RUNE AND LEA STROEM, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 206526, January 28, 2015 - WINEBRENNER & IÑIGO INSURANCE BROKERS, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 203351, January 21, 2015 - PANAY POWER CORPORATION (FORMERLY AVON RIVER POWER HOLDINGS CORPORATION), Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.

  • UDK-15143, January 21, 2015 - IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT v. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY.

  • G.R. No. 209499, January 28, 2015 - MA. CHARITO C. GADIA, ERNESTO M. PEÑAS, GEMMABELLE B. REMO, LORENA S. QUESEA, MARIE JOY FRANCISCO, BEVERLY A. CABINGAS, IVEE U. BALINGIT, ROMA ANGELICA O. BORJA, MARIE JOAN RAMOS, KIM GUEVARRA, LYNN S. DE LOS SANTOS, CAREN C. ENCANTO, EIDEN BALDOVINO, JACQUELINE B. CASTRENCE, MA. ESTRELLA V. LAPUZ, JOSELITO L. LORD, RAYMOND G. SANTOS, ABIGAIL M. VILORIA, ROMMEL C. ACOSTA, FRANCIS JAN S. BAYLON, ERIC O. PADIERNOS, MA. LENELL P. AARON, CRISNELL P. AARON, AND LAWRENCE CHRISTOPHER F. PAPA, Petitioners, v. SYKES ASIA, INC./ CHUCK SYKES/ MIKE HINDS/ MICHAEL HENDERSON, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015 - RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner v. EDNA G. SIASAT, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 199648, January 28, 2015 - FIRST OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SECURITRON SECURITY SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

  • A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015 - FERNANDO W. CHU, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR., Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 180147, January 14, 2015 - SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL.,1 Respondents.; G.R. NO. 180148 - ARIS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents.; G.R. NO. 180149 - SARA LEE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents.; G.R. NO. 180150 - CESAR C. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents.; G.R. NO. 180319 - FASHION ACCESSORIES PHILS., INC., Petitioner, v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Respondents.; G.R. NO. 180685 - EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., Petitioners, v. NLRC, ARIS PHILIPPINES, INC., FASHION ACCESSORIES PHILS., INC., SARA LEE CORPORATION, SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC., COLLIN BEAL AND ATTY. CESAR C. CRUZ, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015 - MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 203026, January 28, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATHANIEL PASION Y DELA CRUZ A.K.A. “ATHAN” AND DENNIS MICHAEL PAZ Y SIBAYAN, Accused-Appellants.

  • G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015 - IMELDA, LEONARDO, FIDELINO, AZUCENA, JOSEFINA, ANITA AND SISA, ALL SURNAMED SYJUCO, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner-Intervenor, v. FELISA D. BONIFACIO AND VSD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 206393, January 21, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL JOSON Y ROGANDO, Defendant-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 168406, January 14, 2015 - CLUB FILIPINO, INC. AND ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON, Petitioners, v. BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, RONIE SUALOG, JOEL CALIDA, JOHNNY ARINTO, CARLITO PRESENTACION, AND ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 191972, January 26, 2015 - HENRY ONG LAY HIN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (2ND DIVISION), HON. GABRIEL T. INGLES, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC BRANCH 58, CEBU CITY, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015 - RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 174184, January 28, 2015 - G.J.T. REBUILDERS MACHINE SHOP, GODOFREDO TRILLANA, AND JULIANA TRILLANA, Petitioners, v. RICARDO AMBOS, BENJAMIN PUTIAN, AND RUSSELL AMBOS, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 109645, January 21, 2015 - ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Petitioner, v. JUDGE TIRSO VELASCO AND DOLORES V. MOLINA, Respondents.; [G.R. No. 112564] - DOLORES V. MOLINA, Petitioner, v. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, QUEZON CITY, BR. 105 AND MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondents.; [G.R. No. 128422] - DOLORES V. MOLINA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND EPIMACO ORETA, Respondents.; [G.R. No. 128911] - THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION AND ALBERTO V. REYES, Petitioners, v. DOLORES V. MOLINA AND HON. MARCIANO BACALLA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 216, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 167519, January 14, 2015 - THE WELLEX GROUP, INC., Petitioner, v. U-LAND AIRLINES, CO., LTD., Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 201151, January 14, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NESTOR SUAREZ Y MAGTAGNOB, Accused-Appellant.

  • G.R. No. 191710, January 14, 2015 - DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS OLGA C. BARBASO AND NOLI G. CEMENTTNA;* LOLITA A. DE GUZMAN; ESTHER G.MILAN; BANAAG A. DE GUZMAN; AMOR G. APOLO, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS ALBERTO T. APOLO, MARK APOLO AND GEORGE APOLO;* HERMINIO A. DE GUZMAN; LEONOR G. VTVENCIO; NORMA A. DE GUZMAN; AND JOSEFINA G. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, v. FBLINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 168616, January 28, 2015 - HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LA SAVOIE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

  • G.R. No. 200628, January 13, 2015 - MARIA THERESA G. GUTIERREZ, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND AUDITOR NARCISA DJ JOAQUIN, Respondents.

  • G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015 - SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA J. BETIA, Petitioners, v. MA. JOPETTE M. REBESENCIO, MONTASSAH B. SACAR-ADIONG, ROUEN RUTH A. CRISTOBAL AND LORAINE S. SCHNEIDER-CRUZ, Respondents.