Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2016 > April 2016 Decisions > G.R. No. 216572, April 19, 2016 - FELICIANO LEGASPI, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALFREDO D. GERMAR, AND ROGELIO P. SANTOS, JR., Respondent.:

The opportunities for the Court to revisit its ruling in Mendoza vs. COMELEC¹ (Mendoza) are sparse. It is a rarity for us to be presented a case assailing the COMELEC en banc's reversal of its division's ruling notwithstanding the former's failure to muster the four (4) votes required under our Constitution to do so. In fact, the September 1, 2015 Decision in the case at bench is only second to the seminal case of Mendoza to have resolved such an issue. The Court must, therefore, take advantage of this rare opportunity, on reconsideration, to modify the Mendoza doctrine before it further takes root, deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence.

The facts of this case are simple and undisputed.

To recapitulate, petitioner Feliciano Legaspi (Legaspi) and private respondent Alfredo D. Germar (Germar) both ran as mayoralty candidates in Norzagaray, Bulacan while private respondent Rogelio Santos (Santos) was a candidate for councilor in the May 13, 2013 elections.² On May 14, 2013 Legaspi filed a Petition for Disqualification against private respondents, docketed as SPA No. 13-353 (DC). There, petitioner averred that from May 11, 2013 until election day, private respondents engaged in massive vote-buying, using their political leaders as conduits. As per witness accounts, said political leaders, while camped inside the North Hills Village Homeowners Association Office in Brgy. Bitungol, Norzagaray, Bulacan, were distributing to voters envelopes containing Php 500.00 each and a sample ballot bearing the names of private respondents. Through military efforts, the vote-buying was foiled and the office, which served as the venue for distribution, padlocked. The newly-minted Chief of Police, P/Supt. Dale Soliba, and his subordinates then attempted to force open the office and retrieve from inside four (4) boxes containing the remaining undistributed envelopes with an estimated aggregate amount of Php800,000.00, but a group of concerned citizens were able to thwart their plan in flagrante delicto and intercept the said evidence of vote-buying.³

In answer, private respondents denied the allegations and raised the alibi that from 3:00 o'clock to 11:00 o'clock in the evening of May 11, 2013, they attended the Liberal Party's meeting de avance at the San Andres Parish church grounds, and that they did not go to nor visit the office of the Homeowner's Association of North Hills Village at the time the election offenses were allegedly committed.⁴

Giving due credence and consideration to the evidence adduced by petitioner,⁵ the COMELEC Special First Division, by a 2-1 vote on October 3, 2013, disqualified private respondents from the 2013 electoral race. The dispositive portion of the COMELEC resolution⁶ reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to:

(1) DISQUALIFY Respondents Alfredo M. Gesmar (sic) and Rogelio C. Santos, Jr. for the positions of Mayor and Councilor of Norzagaray, Bulacan;

(2) REFER the criminal aspect of this case against Germar (sic), Roberto Esquivel, Rogelio Santos, Jr., Dale Soliba, Dominador Rayo, Marivic Nunez, Adelaida Auza, Amelia Cruz, and Leonardo Ignacio to the Law Department for preliminary investigation; and

(3) ORDER the Regional Election Director of COMELEC Region III to implement this Resolution, following the rules on succession as provided in R.A. 7160.

SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, private respondents moved for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc but the latter, through its July 10, 2014 Resolution,⁷ resolved to deny private respondents' motion thusly:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY this Motion for Reconsideration for LACK OF MERIT. Consequently, the October 3, 2013 Resolution of the Special First Division (1) disqualifying respondents Alfredo M. Germar and Rogelio C. Santos, Jr. for the positions of Mayor and Councilor of Norzagaray, Bulacan; (2) referring the criminal aspect of this case against Alfredo M. Germar, Roberto Esquivel, Rogelio Santos, Jr., Dale Soliba, Dominador Rayo, Marivic Nunez, Adelaida Auza, Amelia Cruz and Leonardo Ignacio to the Law Department for preliminary investigation and (3) ordering the Regional Election Director of COMELEC Region III to implement this Resolution, following the Rules on Succession as provided under R.A. 7160 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The adverted Resolution had a vote of 3-2-1-1, as follows: three (3) commissioners, namely Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, voted for the denial of the motion, while two (2) commissioners, Christian Robert S. Lim and Luie Tito F. Guia, dissented. Commissioner Al A. Parreno took no part in the deliberations and Commissioner Maria Grace Cielo M. Padaca did not vote as her ad interim appointment had already expired, vacating a seat in the electoral tribunal.⁸

Since the Resolution was not concurred in by four (4) votes or a majority of all the members of the COMELEC, a re-deliberation of the administrative aspect of the case was conducted pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The re-deliberation resulted in the issuance of the assailed Order⁹ dated January 28, 2015 with a 3-2-2 vote: the previously voting commissioners maintained their respective positions while then newly-appointed commissioner Arthur D. Lim took no part in the deliberations and abstained from voting.¹⁰ Citing the same procedural rule, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the original Petition for Disqualification filed by Legaspi in the following wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative aspect of this Petition for Disqualification for FAILURE TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY MAJORITY VOTES AFTER RE-DELIBERATION/REHEARING by the members of the Commission en banc.

SO ORDERED.

Perplexed as to how he who prevailed before the COMELEC Special First Division can face defeat before the COMELEC en banc when three (3) commissioners voted to deny private respondents' motion for reconsideration and only two (2) commissioners voted to reverse the judgment in his favor, Legaspi launched a Rule 64 petition assailing the January 28, 2015 COMELEC en banc Order before this Court. Regrettably, the Court, on September 1, 2015, voted to dismiss the petition.

From the September 1, 2015 Decision, petitioner Legaspi interposed the instant motion for reconsideration. Hence, the Court is faced once again with the issue on how to treat the rulings of the COMELEC en banc when less than four (4) votes were cast to either grant or deny the motion for reconsideration pending before it.

The Court's Ruling

The Court GRANTS petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The September 1, 2015 Decision in the case at bar is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the instant petition is GRANTED.

Primarily, the Court is called to interpret Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules on Procedure. The provision reads:

Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. - When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied." (emphasis added)

As framed in the September 1, 2015 Decision, the afore-cited provision outlines the effects of the COMELEC en banc's failure to decide:

1. If the action or proceeding is originally commenced in the COMELEC, such action or proceeding shall be dismissed;
   
2. In appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; or
   
3. In incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

In dismissing Legaspi's petition on September 1, 2015, the Court first categorized SPA No. 13-353 (DC) as an action "originally commenced with the Commission" warranting the entire case's dismissal should the en banc fail to reach the required majority vote, regardless of the COMELEC division's ruling. This, according to the ponencia, is the first effect of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as previously applied in Mendoza.

To summarize Mendoza, therein petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza (Mendoza) was proclaimed winner of the 2007 gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan, besting respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan). On June 1, 2007, Pagdanganan filed an election protest that the COMELEC Second Division eventually granted, thereby annulling Mendoza's proclamation. Aggrieved, Mendoza moved for reconsideration with the en banc, but the COMELEC failed to reach a majority vote to either grant or deny the motion. Pursuant to its rules, the COMELEC en banc reheard the case but was, nevertheless, unsuccessful in obtaining the required majority vote to render a valid ruling. Thus, in a 3-1 vote, with three votes denying the motion, the COMELEC en banc sustained the ruling of its Second Division.¹¹

On petition with the Court, Mendoza pointed out that because the necessary majority vote of four (4) was not obtained by the COMELEC en banc, Pagdanganan's election protest ought to be dismissed. Agreeing, the Court, on March 25, 2010, ruled for Mendoza and explained that as an original action before the Commission, failure to muster the required majority vote on reconsideration would lead to the election protest's dismissal, not just of the motion for reconsideration.¹²

Aside from relying on the Mendoza ruling, the September 1, 2015 Decision discussed that a motion for reconsideration lodged with the COMELEC en banc is not an "action or proceeding" within the contemplation of the rules; that the phrase ought to be construed as pertaining to Part V of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, denominated as "Particular Actions or Proceedings" and covering Rules 20-34. Thus, the Court applied the first effect and ordered that Legaspi's Petition for Disqualification, the alleged "action or proceeding" in this case, be dismissed in its entirety.

The interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 18
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in Mendoza
and in the September 1, 2015 Decision
renders the rule unconstitutional

The Mendoza doctrine, as reiterated in the September 1, 2015 Decision, deviated from the 1987 Constitution. Not only does it circumvent the four-vote requirement under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution, it likewise diminishes the adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC Divisions under Sec. 3, Article IX-C.¹⁴

Under Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution,¹⁵ the COMELEC Divisions are granted adjudicatory powers to decide election cases, provided that the COMELEC en banc shall resolve motions for reconsideration of the division rulings. Further, under Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution,¹⁶ four (4) votes are necessary for the COMELEC en banc to decide a case. Naturally, the party moving for reconsideration, as the party seeking affirmative relief, carries the burden of proving that the division committed reversible error. The movant then shoulders the obligation of convincing four (4) Commissioners to grant his or her plea.¹⁷

This voting threshold, however, is easily rendered illusory by the application of the Mendoza ruling, which virtually allows the grant of a motion for reconsideration even though the movant fails to secure four votes in his or her favor, in blatant violation of Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution. In this case, in spite of securing only two (2) votes to grant their motion for reconsideration, private respondents were nevertheless declared the victors in the January 28, 2015 COMELEC en banc Resolution.¹⁸

To exacerbate the situation, the circumvention of the four-vote requirement, in turn, trivializes the proceedings before the COMELEC divisions and presents rather paradoxical scenarios, to wit:¹⁹

1. The failure of the COMELEC en banc to muster the required majority vote only means that it could not have validly decided the case. Yet curiously, it managed to reverse the ruling of a body that has properly exercised its adjudicatory powers; and
   
   
2. A motion for reconsideration may be filed on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling; or that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to law. If the COMELEC en banc does not find that either ground exists, there would be no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the COMELEC division. Otherwise stated, failure to muster four votes to sustain the motion for reconsideration should be understood as tantamount to the COMELEC en banc finding no reversible error attributable to its division's ruling. Said decision, therefore, ought to be affirmed, not reversed nor vacated.

These resultant paradoxes have to be avoided. Under the prevailing interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a movant, in situations such as this, need not even rely on the strength of his or her arguments and evidence to win a case, and may, instead, choose to rest on inhibitions and abstentions of COMELEC members to produce the same result. To demonstrate herein, it is as though the two (2) abstention votes were counted in favor of the private respondents to reach the majority vote of four (4). This impedes and undermines the adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC divisions by allowing their rulings to be overruled by the en banc without the latter securing the necessary number to decide the case.²⁰

From the foregoing disquisitions, it is then difficult to see how the Mendoza doctrine "complements our Constitution."²¹ Far from it, the prevailing interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure severely suffers from constitutional infirmities and calls for the nullification of the rule itself.

The motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC en banc
is an "incidental matter"

Proceeding to the core of the controversy, we now apply Sec. 6, Rule 18 in the case at bar. As discussed in the September 1, 2015 ponencia:

xxx [T]he effects of the COMELEC en banc's failure to decide vary depending on the type of case or matter that is before the commission. Thus, under the provision, the first effect (i.e., the dismissal of the action or proceeding) only applies when the type of case before the COMELEC is an action or proceeding "originally commenced in the commission"; the second effect (i.e., the affirmance of a judgment or order) only applies when the type of case before the COMELEC is an "appealed case"; and the third effect (i.e., the denial of the petition or motion) only applies when the case or matter before the COMELEC is an "incidental matter." (emphasis added)

Verily, classifying the pending case or matter before the COMELEC is a prerequisite to identifying the applicable effect. Here, while the case originated from Legaspi's filing of a Petition for Disqualification, said petition has already been passed upon and decided by the COMELEC Special First Division on October 3, 2013. Instead, what was under consideration when Sec. 6, Rule 18 was invoked was no longer Legaspi's petition for disqualification itself but his motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. The pending issue at the time was not directly private respondents' qualification or disqualification to run for or hold office, but, more precisely, whether or not the COMELEC division committed reversible error in its October 3, 2013 ruling.

For the first effect to apply, the pending case or matter must be an original action or proceeding originally commenced before the COMELEC. This could take either of two forms: those originally commenced with the COMELEC Division or those originally commenced with the COMELEC en banc.

Under Article IX-C, Sec. 2(2) of the Constitution, actions originally commenced before the COMELEC Division consist of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials.²² On the other hand, the cases directly filed with the COMELEC en banc are those specifically provided in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, such as petitions for postponement of elections under Sec. 1, Rule 26, petitions for failure of election under Sec. 2, Rule 26, complaints or charges for indirect contempt under Sec. 2, Rule 29, preliminary investigation of election offenses under Sec. 1, Rule 34, and all other cases where the COMELEC division is not authorized to act.²³

In this case, while the motion for reconsideration was filed with the COMELEC en banc in the first instance, it cannot strictly be considered as an "action or proceeding" originally commenced with the commission as contemplated by the rules. As held in the September 1, 2015 Decision, the coverage of the phrase is limited to those itemized in Part V of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, viz:

COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE - PART V
PARTICULAR ACTIONS OR PROCEEDINGS

A. ORDINARY ACTIONS

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