Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

While this Court's power to cite persons in contempt should be used sparingly, it should be wielded to ensure the infallibility of justice where the defiance or disobedience is patent and contumacious that there is an evident refusal to obey.¹

In criminal contempt proceedings, the presumption of innocence exists. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is but necessary; absent this, the accused cannot be cited in contempt.

This Court resolves a Petition for Indirect Contempt² under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The case was filed against officers of the National Bureau of Investigation, namely: (1) Director Magtanggol B. Gatdula (Gatdula); (2) former Director Carlos S. Caabay (Caabay); (3) former Director Nestor M. Mantaring (Mantaring); (4) Dr. Renato C. Bautista (Dr. Bautista); (5) Dr. Prospero Cabanayan (Dr. Cabanayan); (6) Atty. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr. (Atty. Arizala); (7) Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda (Atty. Esmeralda); (8) Atty. Arturo Figueras (Atty. Figueras);³� (9) Atty. Pedro Rivera (Atty. Rivera); and (10) Agent John Herra (Herra).

This Petition is an offshoot of the rape-homicide case of Lejano v. People.⁴ In that case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb (Webb), among others, was charged with the crime of rape with homicide for allegedly raping Carmela Vizconde (Carmela), then killing her, her mother, and her sister in 1991� the events of which had been infamously called the Vizconde Massacre.⁵

While the criminal case was pending before the trial court, Webb filed a Motion to Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to Submit Semen Specimen to DNA Analysis.� As he claims in his Petition, the DNA testing would establish his innocence since the results would show that the semen found in Carmela did not belong to him.⁶� When the Motion was denied, Webb filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial.⁷

In an April 20, 2010 Resolution, this Court granted Webb�s request to order a testing on the semen specimen found in Carmela�s cadaver, in view of the Rules on DNA Evidence.⁸� It ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to assist the parties in submitting the semen specimen to the University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute.⁹

This Court ruled:

�WHEREFORE, in the higher interest of justice, the request of appellant Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde under the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation is hereby GRANTED.� The NBI is ORDERED to ASSIST the parties in facilitating the submission of said specimen to the UP-Natural Science and Research Institute, Diliman, Quezon City and they (NBI and UP-NSRI) are further ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof regarding compliance with and implementation of this Resolution.�¹⁰

1. Current NBI Director Magtanggol B. Gatdula, Former NBI Director Carlos S. Caabay and Former NBI Director Nestor M. Mantaring
   
   
   • For failing to exercise direct supervision and due diligence in safekeeping the semen specimen which was entrusted to the custody of the NBI since 1997 until the present time and which was the subject matter of a pending Motion to Direct the NBI to Submit Semen Specimen for DNA Analysis.
     
   
   
2. Dr. Renato C. Bautista � Medico-Legal Officer III
   
   
   • For issuing his Certification that the slides were still in the custody of the NBI and later denying that they are.
     
   
   
3. Dr. Prospero Cabanayan � former Chief, Medico-Legal Division
   
   
   • For failing to bring the slides containing the semen specimen during the hearing held on 6 February 1996 as required by the Court, and for falsely claiming that he had already surrendered the slides to the trial court despite all evidence to the contrary.
     
   
   
4. Atty. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr., M.D. � Chief, Medico-Legal Division
   
   
   • For filing and signing, on behalf of the NBI, its Compliance and Manifestation dated 27 April 2010, wherein it was falsely claimed that the desired semen specimen/vaginal smear taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde was no longer in its custody because the same was already submitted as evidence to the trial court when then NBI Medico-Legal Chief Prospero A. Cabanayan testified on January 30, 31 and February 1, 5, 6, and 7, 1996�which the trial court flatly denied.
     
   
   
5. Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda, Deputy Director for Technical Services
   
   
   • For filing and signing, on behalf of the NBI, its Compliance and Manifestation dated 27 April 2010, wherein it was falsely claimed that the desired semen specimen/vaginal smear taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde was no longer in its custody because the same was already submitted as evidence to the trial court when then NBI Medico-Legal Chief Prospero A. Cabanayan testified on January 30, 31, February 1, 5, 6, and 7, 1996�which the trial court flatly denied.
     
   
   
6. NBI�s Atty. Arturo Figueras and Atty. Pedro Rivera
   
   
   • For coaching Jessica Alfaro in the execution of the Second Affidavit which converted her into an instant eyewitness to the crime and cured the �defects� of her First Affidavit.
     
   
   
7. NBI Agent John Herra
   
   
   • For�coaching�Jessica�Alfaro�by�showing�her�picture of Petitioner and asking NBI Agent Mark Anthony So to identify Petitioner and his facial marks so that she would be able to identify him in court even if they knew that Alfaro did not know him.⁴⁷

Like the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy.� Matters settled by a Court�s final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could be devoted to worthier cases.⁹⁰

[W]ell-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.

The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict.� Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must frown� upon� any� attempt� to� prolong� the controversies.⁹³

The doctrine [of conclusiveness of judgment] states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The only identities thus required for the operation of the judgment as an estoppel, in contrast to the judgment as a bar, are identity of parties and identity of issues.

It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be identical.� If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue arising in the second.� In order that this rule may be applied, it must clearly and positively appear, either from the record itself or by the aid of competent extrinsic evidence that the precise point or question in issue in the second suit was involved and decided in the first.� And in determining whether a given question was an issue in the prior action, it is proper to look behind the judgment to ascertain whether the evidence necessary to sustain a judgment in the second action would have authorized a judgment for the same party in the first action.¹⁰⁴� (Citations omitted)

(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.¹⁰⁷

The power of contempt is exercised to ensure the proper administration of justice and maintain order in court processes. In Re: Kelly provides:

The summary power to commit and punish for contempt, tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority, is a part of the law of the land.

Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence and submission to their lawful mandates, and as a corollary to this provision, to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach of insults and pollution.

The existence of the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is essential to the observance of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,� orders, and� writs� of the� courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice.¹¹⁶ (Citations omitted)

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his [or her] official duties or in his [or her] official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him [or her].

Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved.

Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required.� As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant.� So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience.¹³¹� (Citation omitted)

There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense.� Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered.� Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative of its character.� A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights.� To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.¹³⁷� (Citations omitted)

�It is well to remind the parties that a flawed procedure in the conduct of DNA analysis of the semen specimen on the slides used during the trial for microscopic examination of human spermatozoa may yield an inconclusive result and thus will not entitle the accused to an acquittal.� More important, allowing Webb to utilize the latest available DNA technology does not automatically guarantee an exculpatory DNA evidence, but simply to afford appellant� Webb� the fullest� extent� of� his constitutional right to due process.�¹³⁹� (Citation omitted)

COURT:
	Is this slide available now?
FISCAL ZUNO:
	It is not available, Your Honor with these questions propounded by the counsel, we can produce the slide itself, Your Honor, and can be produced by the laboratory technician who examined the slide, Your Honor. So that the doctor will not make any estimate of the slide. Because further questions on the slide, on the size of the slide, Your Honor, we will object to it on the ground that it is not the best evidence. We will be presenting the slide, Your Honor.
. . . .
COURT:
	Is the slide not available today?
FISCAL ZUNO:
	It is not available, Your Honor because we did not expect that questions will be asked on the slide.� We will bring the slide on the next hearing, Your Honor.140

ATTY. AGUIRRE:
	Q:	Yesterday Doctor you were drawing the size of the slides you used in taking the sample of the seminal fluid, but the prosecution objected to and instead they said it would be better they will produce in court the slides which you used for the examination of the seminal fluid or the fluid taken from the genitalia of Carmela Vizconde. Did you bring with you now those three (3) slides?
WITNESS DR. CABANAYAN:
	A:	I am sorry to inform the Honorable Court that I forgot all about it before I came here.141

	ATTY. BAUTISTA:
	Q:	Now, when you went to the room of Jessica Alfaro on the second floor where John Herra was likewise there together with the pictures of Hubert Webb, upon your arrival in the place, what happened?
WITNESS SO:
	A:	Agent John Herra showed me the pictures of Mr. Hubert Webb.
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
	Q:	Yes. And why were the pictures shown to you, were you told why those pictures were being shown to you?
WITNESS SO:
	A:	Agent John Herra asked me, �Is this Hubert?�, �Ito ba si Hubert?�
. . . .
ATTY BAUTISTA:
	Q:	Now, when that question �Ito ba si Hubert?� was asked of you by John Herra, was Jessica Alfaro present?
WITNESS SO:
	A:	Yes, Your Honor.
. . . .
	ATTY. BAUTISTA:
	Q:	Who asked "Saan 'yung nunal ni Huber Webb", who asked that?
WITNESS SO:�
	A:	Agent John Herra, Your Honor.
. . . .
	ATTY. BAUTISTA:
	Q:	When Agent� John Herra asked you kung nasaan �yung nunal [ni] Hubert, was Jessica Alfaro present?
WITNESS SO:
	A:	Yes, Your Honor.148

Endnotes:

¹Oca v. Custodio, 814 Phil. 641, 665 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

²Rollo, pp. 3�64, Petition to Cite Officers of the NBI in Contempt.

³ Died during the pendency of this case.

⁴ 652 Phil. 512 (2010) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].

⁵ Id. at 554.

⁶Rollo, pp. 9 and 52�54.

⁷ Id. at 44.

⁸ Id. at 11.

⁹ Id. at 12.

¹⁰ Id.

¹¹ Id.

¹² Id. at 12�13.

¹³ Id. at 46.

¹⁴ Id. at 12.

¹⁵ Id. at 13.

¹⁶ Id. at 14.

¹⁷ Id. at 47.

¹⁸ Id.

¹⁹ Id. at 49.

²⁰ Id.

²¹ Id. at 50.

²² Id. at 51.

²³ Id.

²⁴ Id.

²⁵ Id. at 55.

²⁶ Id.

²⁷ Id. at 16.

²⁸ Id. at 16�17.

²⁹ Id. at 19.

³⁰ Id. at 20�21.

³¹ Id. at 19�20.

³² Id. at 42.

³³ Id. at 43.

³⁴ Id. at 44.

³⁵ Id. at 20�21.

³⁶ Id. at 25�26.

³⁷ Id. at 25�31.

³⁸ Id. at 31�34.

³⁹ Id. at 33.

⁴⁰ Id. at 35�37.

⁴¹ Id. at 36�37.

⁴² Id. at 41.

⁴³ Id.

⁴⁴ Id. at 43.

⁴⁵ Id. at 56.

⁴⁶ Id.

⁴⁷ Id. at 59�60.

⁴⁸Lejano v. People, People v. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al., 652 Phil. 512 (2010) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].

⁴⁹Rollo, pp. 248�262.� Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General. Respondents Atty. Carlos C. Caabay, Atty. Nestor M. Mantaring, Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, Atty. Arturo A. Figueras, Atty. Pedro L. Rivera and Mr. John Herra were not represented by the Office of the Solicitor General because they were no longer officially connected with the NBI.

⁵⁰ Id. at 249�250.

⁵¹ Id. at 250.

⁵² Id.

⁵³ Id. at 251.

⁵⁴ Id. at 252.

⁵⁵ Id. at 253.

⁵⁶ Id.

⁵⁷ Id. at 253�254.

⁵⁸ Id. at 254.

⁵⁹ Id. at 255.

⁶⁰ Id. at 255�256.

⁶¹ Id. at 256.

⁶² Id. at 213�239.� The Comment dated February 23, 2011 was jointly submitted by Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula and Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda.

⁶³ Id. at 214�215.

⁶⁴ Id.

⁶⁵ Id. at 220�221.

⁶⁶ Id. at 221.

⁶⁷ Id. at 285�286.

⁶⁸ Id.

⁶⁹ Id. at 287.

⁷⁰ Id.

⁷¹ Id. at 305�312.

⁷² Id. at 306.

⁷³ Id. at 306�307.

⁷⁴ Id. at 307.

⁷⁵ Id.

⁷⁶ Id. at 334�337.

⁷⁷ Id. at 335.

⁷⁸ Id. at 405�417.

⁷⁹ Id. at 405�406.

⁸⁰ Id. at 407�408.

⁸¹ Id. at 408�409.

⁸² Id. at 463.

⁸³ Id. at 60.

⁸⁴ Id. at 424�425.

⁸⁵ Id. at 448�452.

⁸⁶People v. Escobar, 814 Phil. 840, 856 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

⁸⁷ Id.

⁸⁸Ligtas v. People, 766 Phil. 750, 775 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

⁸⁹ 766 Phil. 750 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

⁹⁰ Id. at 775 citing Co v. People, 610 Phil. 60, 70�71 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division].

⁹¹Pryce Corporation v. China Banking Corporation, 727 Phil. 1 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

⁹² 505 Phil. 265 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].

⁹³ Id. at 274.

⁹⁴Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 271 Phil. 768, 778 (1991) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].

⁹⁵People v. Escobar, 814 Phil. 840, 856 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376, 382 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

⁹⁶Salud v. Court of Appeals, 303 Phil. 397 (1994) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

⁹⁷ Id. at 406.

⁹⁸ RULES OF COURT, Rule 39, sec. 47(b) provides:
SECTION 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. � The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
. . . .
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity[.]

⁹⁹Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., 665 Phil. 198, 205 (2011) [Per J. Perez, First Division].

¹⁰⁰ RULES OF COURT, Rule 39, Section 47 (c) provides:
SECTION 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. � . . .

. . . .
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

¹⁰¹Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., 665 Phil. 198, 205 (2011) [Per J. Perez, First Division].

¹⁰²Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 271 Phil. 768 (1991) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].

¹⁰³ Id.

¹⁰⁴ Id. at 784�785.

¹⁰⁵Presidential Decree No. 1271 Committee v. De Guzman, 801 Phil. 731 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

¹⁰⁶ Id. at 766.

¹⁰⁷Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., 665 Phil. 198, 206 (2011) [Per J. Perez, First Division].

¹⁰⁸ 564 Phil. 382 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

¹⁰⁹ 814 Phil. 840 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

¹¹⁰Oca v. Custodio, 814 Phil. 641, 665 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 220 Phil. 507 (1985) [Per J. Makasiar, En Banc].

¹¹¹ 710 Phil. 211 (2013) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].

¹¹² Id. at 232 citing Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Calanza, 607 Phil. 547 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].

¹¹³In re: Vicente Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].

¹¹⁴Commissioner of Immigration v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716, 723 (1967) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

¹¹⁵ 805 Phil. 921 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

¹¹⁶ Id. at 942�943.

¹¹⁷ RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Direct Contempt Punished Summarily. � A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.

¹¹⁸ Id.

¹¹⁹Oca v. Custodio, 814 Phil. 641, 666 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

¹²⁰Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, 672 Phil. 1, 14 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

¹²¹Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 220 Phil. 507, 527 (1985) [Per J. Makasiar, En Banc].

¹²² Id.

¹²³People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977, 999 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc] citing 17 C.J.S., Contempt, sec. 5(1), p. 10.

¹²⁴ Id.

¹²⁵ 312 Phil. 977 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].

¹²⁶ Id.

¹²⁷ Id.

¹²⁸ Id.

¹²⁹ Id. at 1000.

¹³⁰ Id.

¹³¹ Id. at 1000�1001.

¹³² Id. at 1002.

¹³³ Id.

¹³⁴Commissioner of Immigration v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716 (1967) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

¹³⁵Lim-Lua v. Lua, 710 Phil. 211 (2013) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].

¹³⁶ 672 Phil. 1 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

¹³⁷ Id. at 16.

¹³⁸People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].

¹³⁹Rollo, p. 11.

¹⁴⁰ Id. at 48 citing TSN dated February 5, 1996, pp. 29�34.

¹⁴¹ Id. at 49 citing TSN dated February 6, 1996, p. 4.

¹⁴² Id. at 49�50.

¹⁴³Oca v. Custodio, 814 Phil. 641, 665 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

¹⁴⁴Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213525, November 21, 2017, 845 SCRA 599 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

¹⁴⁵ Id.

¹⁴⁶In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, 529 Phil. 619 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

¹⁴⁷People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].

¹⁴⁸Rollo, pp. 26-28.

¹⁴⁹Marantan v. Diokno, 726 Phil. 642 (2014)� [Per. J.� Mendoza, Third Division].