Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2020 > June 2020 Decisions > G.R. Nos. 234886-911 & 235410 - EDILBERTO M. PANCHO, PETITIONER, V. SANDIGANBAYAN (6TH DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari¹ filed by Edilberto M. Pancho (petitioner) pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolutions dated August 4, 2017² and October 4, 2017³ of the Sandiganbayan Sixth Division (SB) in SB-17-CRM-0130-142 for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019⁴ and SB-17-CRM-0143-0155 for violation of Section 52(g), in relation to Section 6(b), of RA 8291.⁵ The Resolution dated August 4, 2017 denied petitioner's Motion to Quash/Dismiss the Informations⁶ dated May 17, 2017, while the Resolution dated October 4, 2017 denied petitioner's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.⁷

The antecedents, as gathered by the SB, are as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On October 21, 2013, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman through Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) I Marie Beth S. Almero (Almero) filed a Complaint-Affidavit dated January 16, 2013 with the Office of the Ombudsman. Said complaint-affidavit charged former Nueva Ecija Governor Tomas Joson III (Joson) and [petitioner] Edilberto M. Pancho, former Provincial Treasurer, with violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code (R.P.C.), R.A. No. 8291, R.A. No. 7875, R.A. No. 9679, R.A. No. 8424, and gross neglect of duty for failure to remit the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) premiums and other trust liabilities of the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija from 1997 to June 2007.

On October 31, 2013, the complaint-affidavit was referred to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The records of the complaint-affidavit were received by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon on November 7, 2013.

On January 7, 2014, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon through GIPO II Paul Elmer M. Clemente (Clemente) directed [petitioner] and Joson to submit their respective counter-affidavits.

On January 28, 2014, [petitioner] submitted his Counter�-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014. [Petitioner] subsequently sought the correction of a clerical error in his counter-affidavit on February 11, 2014.

On February 25, 2014, Joson sought an extension of time to submit his counter-affidavit Joson submitted his counter-affidavit on March 20, 2014.

On March 18, 2015, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon approved the request for an extension of time to resolve the complaint. The records, however, do not show who filed the said request and the reason for such approval.

On July 1, 2015, the Special Panel of Investigators through GIPO I Maxlen C. Balanon (Balanon) and GIPO I Elbert L. Bunagan (Bunagan) submitted their draft resolution finding probable cause against [petitioner] for violation of Section 52 (g), in relation to Section 6 (b), of R.A. No. 8291 and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said draft resolution, however, dismissed the rest of the charges against [petitioner] and all the charges against Joson. On July 6, 2015, Director Joaquin F. Salazar (Salazar) of Evaluation and Investigation Office-Bureau A reviewed the said draft resolution.

On September 15, 2016,⁸ Ombudsman Conchita Carpio�-Morales (Carpio-Morales) approved the Resolution dated July 1, 2015.

[Petitioner] did not seek a reconsideration of the resolution of the Ombudsman. Thus, on January 31, 2017, the [Office of the Special Prosecutor] filed the informations for thirteen (13) counts of Violation of Section 52 (g), in relation to Section 6 (b), of R.A. No. 8291, and another thirteen (13) counts of Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against [petitioner] with [SB].⁹

On May 17, 2017, petitioner filed with the SB a Motion to Quash/Dismiss Informations¹⁰ contending that the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) is without authority or has lost jurisdiction to file the cases due to inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. Petitioner averred that despite the approval by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales (Ombudsman Carpio-Morales) of the Resolution dated July 1, 2015 on September 15, 2015, it still took one (1) year and three (3) months to cause the filing of the informations before the SB. Therefore, the OMB spent three (3) years and two (2) months, more or less, to conduct the preliminary investigation and the filing of the informations before the SB.¹¹

In its Comment/Opposition (In re: [Petitioner's] Motion to Quash/Dismiss Informations dated 17 May 2017),¹² the People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), argued that there was no inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. It contended that the sheer volume of the documents to be thoroughly reviewed and considered by the OMB as well as the complexity of the nature of the cases filed demanded considerable time in order to resolve all the issues involved therein, including the determination of the respective criminal and/or administrative liabilities of petitioner and former Nueva Ecija Governor Tomas N. Joson III (Joson).¹³ Hence, it maintained that there was no violation of petitioner's right to speedy disposition of the cases filed against him.¹⁴

On August 4, 2017, the SB issued the first assailed Resolution¹⁵ denying petitioner's Motion to Quash/Dismiss the Informations dated May 17, 2017. It ruled that under the circumstances of the case, the total period of three (3) years and twenty-eight (28) days devoted to the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the filing of the informations is justified, acceptable, and not capricious, oppressive and vexatious.¹⁶ Thus, it directed the continuation of petitioner's arraignment as scheduled.¹⁷

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration¹⁸ of the Resolution dated August 4, 2017, alleging that the date of approval by Ombudsman Carpio-Morales of the draft resolution of the cases was erroneously indicated as "September 15, 2016" instead of "September 15, 2015" in the timeline of events.¹⁹ Petitioner argued that the period of one (1) year and three (3) months, more or less, from the approval of the draft Resolution by Ombudsman Carpio-Morales on September 15, 2015 to the filing of the Informations with the SB on January 31, 2017 constituted inordinate delay that would justify the dismissal of the cases against him.²⁰

In its Comment/Opposition (In re: [Petitioner's] Motion for Reconsideration dated 16 August 2017),²¹ the People, through the OSP, asserted that the assailed Resolution must be appreciated in its entirety and not on a piecemeal basis.²² It emphasized that apart from the approval of the draft resolution, the drafting of the informations to be filed before the SB also has to pass the scrutiny of the different offices within the OMB; otherwise, the informations would not be able to stand the rigors of trial or would fail to charge the correct offenses.²³

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.²⁴ He prayed that the Informations charging him with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Section 52(g) of RA 8291 be dismissed on the following grounds: (1) inordinate delay; and (2) the allegations in the Informations do not constitute an offense.²⁵

On October 4, 2017, the SB issued the second assailed Resolution²⁶ denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and affirming the first assailed Resolution dated August 4, 2017. It held that its inadvertent mistake of indicating the date of approval by Ombudsman Carpio-Morales of the draft resolution as "September 15, 2016" instead of "September 15, 2015" does not materially affect its discussion in the assailed Resolution; and it does not change the fact that the total period spent by the OMB to finish its preliminary investigation and for the OSP to file the corresponding informations is still three (3) years and twenty�-eight (28) days. Thus, the SB upheld its previous finding that this period is not unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive because of the volume of the records, the nature of the cases, and the peculiar incidents involved.²⁷

As to the contention that the facts alleged in the informations do not constitute the offenses charged against petitioner, the SB ruled that petitioner's belated attempt to insert this ground in his Motion for Reconsideration constitutes a blatant disregard of procedures. It held that petitioner should have raised this ground in his Motion to Quash/Dismiss Informations.^28]

Hence, this petition relying upon the following grounds: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. THE UNJUSTIFIED FAILURE AND REFUSAL OF RESPONDENT [SB] TO CONSIDER THE THREE (3) YEARS AND TWO MONTHS (2) IT TOOK THE [OMB] TO TERMINATE THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND FILE THE INFORMATIONS AS CONSTITUTING INORDINATE DELAY THAT IMPELS THE DISMISSAL OF THE INFORMATIONS CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO WANT OR ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF THE [SB].
   
   
2. THE FAILURE AND REFUSAL OF THE [SB] TO ACT AND TO DISMISS THE INFORMATIONS FILED BY THE [OMB] FOR THE REASON THAT THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE AMOUNTS TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION EQUIVALENT TO ABSENCE OR WANT OF JURISDICTION.²⁹
   

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution), all persons are guaranteed the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This constitutional right is available not only to the accused in criminal proceedings but to all parties in all cases, whether civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.³⁰Ergo, any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice,³¹ including the Ombudsman.

No less than the Constitution expressly tasks the OMB to resolve complaints lodged before it with dispatch from the moment they are filed. Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution commands: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

Section 13 of RA 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," magnifies the above constitutional mandate. It reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 13. Mandate. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.

Both the Constitution and RA 6770, however, are silent with respect to what constitutes a "prompt" action on a complaint. They do not provide for a definite period within which to measure promptness. Neither do they lay out specific criteria or factors in determining the existence of delay in the disposition of complaints.

In Magante v. Sandiganbayan³² (Magante), the Court underscored that the lack of statutory definition on what constitutes a prompt action on a complaint had opened the gates for judicial interpretation, which did not draw definite lines, but merely listed factors to consider in treating petitions invoking the right to speedy disposition of cases.³³ These factors are: (1) length of the delay, (2) reasons for the delay, (3) assertion of right by the accused, and (4) prejudice to the respondent.³⁴

It was clarified in Magante that delay begins to run on the date of the filing of a formal complaint by a private complainant or the filing by the Field Investigation Office with the OMB of a formal complaint based on an anonymous complaint or as a result of its motu proprio investigations.³⁵ Consistent with Magante, the subsequent En Banc Decision in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan³⁶ (Cagang) declared that the ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, et al.³⁷ that fact-finding investigations are included in the period for the determination of inordinate delay is abandoned. The reason for the abandonment is that the proceedings at this stage are not yet adversarial. This period cannot be counted even if the accused is invited to attend the investigations since these are merely preparatory to the filing of a formal complaint. At this point, the OMB will not yet determine if there is probable cause to charge the accused.³⁸

In addition, Cagang pronounced: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The period for the determination of whether inordinate delay was committed shall commence from the filing of a formal complaint and the conduct of the preliminary investigation. The periods for the resolution of the preliminary investigation shall be that provided in the Rules of Court, Supreme Court Circulars, and the periods to be established by the Office of the Ombudsman. Failure of the defendant to file the appropriate motion after the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods shall be considered a waiver of his or her right to speedy disposition of cases.³⁹

Taking into account the foregoing factors, the Court finds that there was no inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the filing of the informations by the OMB. The Court is mindful of the duty of the OMB under the Constitution and RA 6770 to act promptly on complaints brought before it. Such duty, however, should not be mistaken with a hasty resolution of cases at the expense of thoroughness and correctness.⁴⁰ Further, inordinate delay is determined not through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.⁴¹ Further, as enunciated in Cagang: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result. x x x⁴²

In ruling that there was no inordinate delay, the SB had rendered a thorough and judicious explanation: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Here, the Court takes into account the following factors: 1) the complexity and number of the charges filed against [petitioner] and Joson; 2) the number of the persons involved and the nature of their participation; 3) the number of years covered in the preliminary investigation; 4) the number of employees and the amount involved in the said non-remittance of their government contributions; and 5) voluminous records subject of examination and verification by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Based on these factors, it is understandable for the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to finish the preliminary investigation and draft a resolution in these cases after one (1) year, three (3) months and eleven (11) days from receipt of Joson's counter-affidavit.

x x x x

x x x While the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed said complaint [for non-remittance of government contributions in the province of Nueva Ecija] against Joson, the resolution of said complaint did not allege or discuss the participation of [petitioner]. Thus, the assigned GIPOs who handled these cases for the first time cannot be faulted for taking more time to review the records of the complaint and draft the resolution. In fact, [petitioner] benefited from this lapse of time because the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause only for violations of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 52 (g), in relation to Section 6 (b), of R.A. No. 8291, and dismissed all the other criminal and administrative charges against him.

The period from July 1, 2015 to September 15, 2016, or one (1) year, two (2) months, and fourteen (14) days, is attributed to the Office of the Ombudsman. During this period, the Resolution dated July 1, 2015 was submitted for approval to Ombudsman Carpio-�Morales. The lapse of time is also justified because the Office of the Ombudsman needed to ensure that the proper, correct, and strong cases are filed against [petitioner]. The verification and further evaluation of the case takes time considering the complexity of the cases and the voluminous records involved. x x x

The period from September 15, 2016 to January 31, 2017, or four (4) months and sixteen (16) days, is also attributed to the Office of the Ombudsman. This period is justified because the OSP reviewed the cases again and made sure that the cases to be filed could stand the rigors of trial.

Based on the foregoing, the total period of one (1) month and four (4) days, is attributed to the accused. This period should be excluded from the time spent by the Office of the Ombudsman to terminate its preliminary investigation, and for the OSP to file the corresponding informations with this Court. Again, this period is attributed to the accused because of the submission of his counter�-affidavit and its subsequent correction.

The total period of one (1) month and nine (9) days should also be excluded from the computation of the period attributed to the Office of the Ombudsman. As explained above, this period was spent by Joson in seeking an extension of time to submit his counter�-affidavit and filing the same afterwards. Said incidents were beyond the control of the Office of the Ombudsman and [petitioner].

Subtracting the periods attributable to [petitioner] and those beyond the control of the Office of the Ombudsman, the total period spent by the Office of the Ombudsman to finish its preliminary investigation, and for the OSP to file the corresponding informations is three (3) years and twenty-eight (28) days.

x� x x Under the circumstances discussed above, the total period of three (3) years and twenty-eight (28) days is justified, acceptable, and not capricious, oppressive and vexatious.⁴³ (Emphasis omitted.)

It is significant to note that despite the pendency of the case since 2013, petitioner only invoked his right to speedy disposition of cases when he filed the Motion to Quash/Dismiss Informations dated May 17, 2017. As noted by the SB, petitioner's motion was filed only after three (3) years, five (5) months, and twenty-four (24) days from the issuance by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon of the order to submit his counter�-affidavit.⁴⁴

It must be emphasized that the accused must invoke his or her constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases in a timely manner and failure to do so constitutes a waiver of such right even when he or she has already suffered or will suffer the consequences of delay.⁴⁵ Notably, petitioner had the opportunity to seek reconsideration or move for a reinvestigation of the draft resolution approved by Ombudsman Carpio-�Morales. Pursuant to Section 7(a), Rule II of Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 07, otherwise known as the "Rules of Procedure of the OMB," petitioner could have filed a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of the approved resolution within five days from notice thereof with the OMB. He chose not to do so. Instead, he dept on his rights and merely waited until the informations were filed against him with the SB.

It is petitioner's assertion that the SB erroneously indicated that Ombudsman Carpio-Morales approved the draft resolution of the cases on "September 15, 2016" instead of "September 15, 2015"; hence, it actually took one (1) year and three (3) months, more or less, before the OSP filed the corresponding informations on January 31, 2017. Petitioner claims that this delay violated his right to speedy disposition of cases.

To the Court, the foregoing assertion does not help petitioner's cause; instead, it reinforces the SB's finding that there was no inordinate delay. Significantly, petitioner's asseveration only means that it actually took a shorter period of time to complete the preliminary investigation since Ombudsman Carpio-Morales approved the draft resolution a year earlier than that indicated by the SB. In any case, the total period of three (3) years and twenty-eight (28) days that was devoted to the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the filing of the informations remains the same.

The question now is whether the period between the approval by Ombudsman Carpio-Morales of the draft resolution of the cases on September 15, 2015 and the filing of the informations by the OSP on January 31, 2017, or one (1) year, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days, violated petitioner's constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.

The Court answers in the negative. It is worth mentioning that the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.⁴⁶ Admittedly, the period in question is a considerable length of time. However, the prosecution was able to satisfactorily explain the delay by stating that the drafting of the informations to be filed before the SB also has to pass the scrutiny of the different offices within the OMB; otherwise, the informations would not be able to stand the rigors of trial or would fail to charge the correct offenses.⁴⁷ On the other hand, petitioner, despite having actual knowledge of the pendency of the criminal complaint against him, neglected to assert his rights during the period in question. Considering his failure to timely question the alleged delay in the filing of the informations, he is deemed to have assented to the delay and to have ultimately abandoned or waived his right to the speedy disposition of his cases. At any rate, the Court does not find the period in question to be vexatious, capricious, or oppressive to petitioner as would warrant the dismissal of the cases on the ground of inordinate delay.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the SB did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash/Dismiss Informations. For failure to timely raise his right to the speedy disposition of his cases, petitioner has acquiesced to the alleged delay and, thus, has waived such right.⁴⁸

The Court similarly does not find grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the SB's failure and refusal to act on petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that the allegations in the informations do not constitute an offense. As correctly ruled by the SB, petitioner should have raised this ground in his Motion to Quash/Dismiss Informations. Notably, petitioner belatedly added this ground in his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of his Motion to Quash/Dismiss Informations. This is not sanctioned under the Rules of Court. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules, commonly referred to as the "Omnibus Motion Rule," explicitly states: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 8. Omnibus Motion. - Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.

In turn, Section 1 of Rule 9 as mentioned in the above provision states that "[d]efenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." However, this rule is subject to the following exceptions: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription. Since the ground raised by petitioner is not one of these exceptions, the SB was correct in refusing to act on the motion to dismiss based on such ground.⁴⁹

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated August 4, 2017 and October 4, 2017 of the Sandiganbayan Sixth Division in SB-17-CRM-0130-142 and SB-17-CRM-0143-0155 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Hernando, Delos Santos, and Gaerlan,^*JJ., concur.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Endnotes:

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^* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2780 dated May 11, 2020.

¹Rollo, pp. 3-35.

²Id. at 152-164; penned by Associate Justice Karl B. Miranda with Associate Justices Rodolfo A. Ponferrada and Michael Frederick L. Musngi, concurring.

³Id. at 200-203; penned by Associate Justice Karl B. Miranda with Associate Justices Sarah Jane T. Fernandez and Michael Frederick L. Musngi, concurring.

⁴ Entitled "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," approved on August 17, 1960.

⁵ Entitled "An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended, Expanding and Increasing the Coverage and Benefits of the Government Service Insurance System, Instituting Reforms therein and for Other Purposes," approved on May 30, 1997.

⁶Rollo, pp. 130-141.

⁷Id. at 165-168.

⁸ Should be September 15, 2015; see Resolution dated July 1, 2015, id. at 50.

⁹Id. at 153-154.

¹⁰Id. at 130-141.

¹¹Id. at 131.

¹²Id. at 143-150.

¹³Id. at 147.

¹⁴Id. at 149.

¹⁵Id. at 152-164.

¹⁶Id. at 160.

¹⁷Id. at 164.

¹⁸Id. at 165-168.

¹⁹Id. at 166.

²⁰Id. at 167-168.

²¹Id. at 195-198.

²²Id. at 196.

²³Id.

²⁴Id. at 176-194.

²⁵Id. at 193.

²⁶Id. at 200-203.

²⁷Id. at 202.

²⁸Id.

²⁹Id. at 10-11.

³⁰Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 714 Phil. 55, 61 (2013).

³¹Roquero v. The Chancellor of UP-Manila, et al., 628 Phil. 628, 639 (2010), citing Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, 417 Phil. 39, 49 (2001).

³² G.R. Nos. 230950-51, July 23, 2018.

³³Id.

³⁴ See Revuelta v. People, G.R. No. 237039, June 10, 2019; Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 and 210141-42, July 31, 2018, citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) as cited in Martin v. Ver, 208 Phil. 658, 664 (1983); Magante v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 32; and The Ombudsman v. Jurado, 583 Phil. 132, 145 (2008), citing Dela Pe�a v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 929 (2001).

³⁵Supra note 32.

³⁶ G.R. Nos. 206433, 206458 and 210141-42, July 31, 2018, 875 SCRA 374.

³⁷ 723 Phil. 444 (2013).

³⁸Supra note 36 at 435.

³⁹Id. at 451-452.

⁴⁰Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 390 Phil. 917, 948 (2000), citing Dansal v. Judge Fernandez, Sr., 383 Phil. 897, 908 (2000).

⁴¹Supra note 36 at 391.

⁴²Id. at 446.

⁴³Rollo, pp. 158-160.

⁴⁴Id. at 160.

⁴⁵Salcedo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 223869-960, February 13, 2019, citing Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 36.

⁴⁶People v. Sandiganbayan, 5^th Div., et al., 791 Phil. 37, 53 (2016), citing Dela Pe�a v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 929 (2001), further citing Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 360 Phil. 559, 587 (1998). See also Blanco v. Sandiganbayan, 399 Phil. 674, 682 (2000).

⁴⁷ See Comment/Opposition (In re: Accused's Motion for Reconsideration dated 16 August 2017), rollo, pp. 195-198 at 196.

⁴⁸ See People v. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 240776, November 20, 2019; People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 233557-67, June 19, 2019; Doroteo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232765-67, January 16, 2019; Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 36 at 451; and Magante v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 32, citing Dela Pe�a v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 932 (2001).

⁴⁹City of Tuguig v. City of Makati, 787 Phil. 367, 396 (2016).chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary