Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2007 > June 2007 Resolutions > [UDK-13812 : June 06, 2007] BENJAMIN ACEJO V. BAGONG TANYAG HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, REPRESENTED BY ALFONSO C. IGNACIO :

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 6 JUNE 2007

UDK-13812 (Benjamin Acejo v. Bagong Tanyag Homeowners Association, represented by Alfonso C. Ignacio)

The instant petition for review assails the twin Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 22 November 2006^[1] and 7 February 2007^[2] dismissing Benjamin Acejo's (petitioner) petition for failure to submit the affidavits required under Section 18, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court pertaining to exemption of indigent litigants from legal fees.

This case stemmed from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the Bagong Tanyag Homeowners Association (respondent) as plaintiff against petitioner as defendant before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Br. 74, Taguig City. Respondent is the owner of Lots 26 and 29 covered by TCT No. 20959 located at Bagong Tanyag, Taguig City. These lots were purchased under a community mortgage program wherein qualified occupants become awardees of the said lots. When the community was surveyed in 1991, petitioner was then an occupant of Lot 30. He later waived his claim over his occupied lot in favor of his daughter, who then sold it to a certain Antonia Pellejeralu. Prior thereto, in 1995, petitioner allegedly took possession of Lots 26 and 29 without respondent's consent. Petitioner proffered the following defenses to the complaint: (1) that he is the lawful possessor of these lots being an incorporator of Bagong Tanyag Homeowners Association; (2) that he is in occupancy by open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of the subject lots, and (3) that respondent had no prior possession of the subject lots.

On 2 December 2003, the MTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to vacate and surrender possession of the subject premises. The MTC found that petitioner was occupying the lots merely by tolerance, and such possession became illegal upon respondent's demand to vacate. The MTC also held that petitioner had already been expelled from respondent corporation, therefore, he cannot invoke any right as an incorporator. Addressing the issue on prescription, the MTC emphasized that constructive possession cannot be considered in cases of possession by mere tolerance.^[3]

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 161, Pasig City, affirmed the MTC Decision on 3 June 2005. The RTC ruled that respondent merely tolerated petitioner's stay on the subject lots until it made its demand in October 1999 for the latter to vacate the lots. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review with Motion for Exemption from Payment of Docket Fees with the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, he filed his petition for review. On 22 November 2006, the Court of Appeals denied his Motion For Exemption From Payment of Docket Fees and consequently dismissed his petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that his failure to submit the affidavits required under Section 18, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court was due to inadvertence and excusable negligence, but the motion was denied on 8 February 2007. In denying the motion for reconsideration, the appellate court noted that no mention was made of the required affidavits in petitioner's Motion for Exemption from Payment of Docket Fees, thereby negating his assertion that he only inadvertently failed to attach the same.

On 1 March 2007, petitioner filed with this Court a Motion For Extension To File His Petition For Review with A Motion For Exemption From Payment Of Docket Fees. This Court in a Resolution dated 19 March 2007 denied his motion for failure to submit a valid affidavit of service of copies of the motion, the date of its notarization appearing to have preceded the date of actual posting of the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed where petitioner explained that the error was inadvertent and clerical in nature. The petition itself has since been filed before us, hence these two matters are now pending resolution.

In this petition, petitioner imputes error to the Court of Appeals in denying his Motion For Exemption From Payment of Docket Fees and dismissing his petition notwithstanding his alleged substantial compliance with the requirements under Section 18, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. He asserts that the rules of procedure may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, adding that there exist legal and valid grounds for the reversal of the decision of the lower courts.

The prevailing rule on indigent litigants is Section 19, Rule 141, which amended Section 18 of Rule 141 in Administrative Matter No. 04-2-04-SC, and we quote:

Section 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. - Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION of more than THREE hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any. shall be attached to the litigant's affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.

To qualify as an "indigent litigant," the applicant's gross monthly income must not exceed an amount twice the monthly minimum wage of an employee and must not own real property with a fair market value of more than three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00). The said rule also requires the execution of at least two (2) affidavits, that of the applicant and one disinterested person, attesting to the presence of the two (2) prerequisites previously mentioned.

Attached to petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 with Motion for Exemption from Payment of Docket Fees filed before this Court are Affidavits of Indigence executed by petitioner and Norma Pineda and a Certification from the Office of the Barangay Chairman stating that petitioner is among the impoverished citizens in the barangay. While these documents constitute substantial compliance with the rules, we deem that the approval of his motion before this Court would be futile in view of the fact that we are denying his main petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for failure to comply with the rules. Indeed, all the rules governing indigent litigants as traced in Spouses Algura v. The Local Government Unit of City of Naga^[4] expressly require the submission of affidavits in order for courts to fully appraise the financial status of a litigant. This is a mandatory requirement, the non-fulfillment of which serves as a valid ground for the dismissal of the motion.

Moreover, in its Resolution dated 8 February 2007, the appellant court found that the RTC did not err in affirming the MTC decision favoring respondent in its complaint for unlawful detainer and ordering petitioner to vacate the subject premises. The rulings were rooted on the factual finding of the MTC that clearly established the right of respondent to evict petitioner. It is well-settled that the factual findings of the MTC, especially when affirmed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court, absent a preponderance of evidence that the trial court ignored, misconstrued or misapplied any cogent fact or circumstance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome of the case.^[5] There is no cogent reason for us to depart from this time-honored rule.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DENY the petition.

Endnotes:

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^[1] Rollo, p. 37.

^[2] Id. at 38.

^[3] Id. at 69-70.

^[4] G.R. No. 150135, 30 October 2006.

^[5] See Tayao v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 162733, 12 April 2005.

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