June 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 175903 : June 13, 2007] FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT, INC. V. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 275 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY AND THE HEIRS OF TEODERICO MALACA AND MARIA ESPIRITU MALACA :
[G.R. No. 175903 : June 13, 2007]
FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT, INC. V. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 275 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY AND THE HEIRS OF TEODERICO MALACA AND MARIA ESPIRITU MALACA
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 13 June 2007:
G.R. No. 175903 (Fil-Estate Management, Inc. v. Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 275 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pi�as City and the Heirs of Teoderico Malaca and Maria Espiritu Malaca).- This treats of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated 14 February 2007, which denied the petition for review on certiorari for lack of sufficient showing that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error to warrant the exercise by the Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated 23 June 2006 found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pi�as City, when he denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint for quieting of title, accion publiciana and damages filed by respondent heirs against petitioner.
The 10 December 1996 Order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss states in part:
According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by Judge Maceda when he denied its motion to dismiss. Because the grounds of the motion to dismiss were not indubitable, Judge Maceda should have deferred the resolution of its motion to dismiss instead of denying the motion outright, petitioner contends.
The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that the trial judge had acted well within his discretion when he denied petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that the issues raised by petitioner would have to be resolved in a full-blown trial.
The Court finds no reason to reverse the conclusion of the Court of Appeals.
More precisely, Judge Maceda denied petitioner's motion to dismiss because he was of the view that the evaluation of the antecedent facts and the pertinent documents on which the motion to dismiss is hinged requires further proceedings. In any case, it is discretionary on the court where the case is pending whether to grant the motion to dismiss or deny the same.[3]
In upholding the issuances of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals took into account that at the time he acted on petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was already in effect and Section 3, Rule 16[4] thereof prohibits the deferment of the resolution of a motion to dismiss for the reason that the ground relied upon is indubitable.
The Court finds no plausible reason to preclude the application of the new rule, more so because said case remains pending to this day. Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Such retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from procedural laws and rules.[5]
The retroactive application of the rule will not result in great injustice to petitioner because the grounds alleged in the motion to dismiss may well be raised in the answer and proven at the trial. A full-blown trial on the merits will not only serve the interest of fair play but will also aid in the appellate review of the case.
The Court is also satisfied with respondent judge's ratiocination of its order of denial, as it is in conformity with the requirement that the resolution must state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.[6] The trial court denied the motion to dismiss because it was of the view that a pre-trial was warranted so that the court could "look into the factual averments and confirm the authenticity of the documents as well as secure stipulations on the chronology of the events."
In any event, the pre-trial is held, among others, for the purpose of determining the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist.[7]
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that respondent judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged orders. Accordingly, the Court reiterates that the petition before it does not present any reversible error on the part of the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's 14 February 2007 Resolution is DENIED with FINALITY. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pi�as City is ordered to hear and resolve with deliberate speed Civil Case No. 95-1118. Quisumbing, J., on official leave.
G.R. No. 175903 (Fil-Estate Management, Inc. v. Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 275 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pi�as City and the Heirs of Teoderico Malaca and Maria Espiritu Malaca).- This treats of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated 14 February 2007, which denied the petition for review on certiorari for lack of sufficient showing that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error to warrant the exercise by the Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated 23 June 2006 found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pi�as City, when he denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint for quieting of title, accion publiciana and damages filed by respondent heirs against petitioner.
The 10 December 1996 Order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss states in part:
xxxx Assessing the grounds relied upon by defendant-movant, the Court is of the considered view that such grounds are not indubitable to merit dismissal even if the Amended Complaint, which is hereby admitted, there being no objection to its admission (sic).Judge Maceda denied petitioner's motion to dismiss before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1997, when it was still provided in Rule 16, Section 3[2] thereof that the court may defer the resolution of a motion to dismiss until trial if the ground alleged does not appear to be indubitable. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the denial of its motion to dismiss. In an Order dated 11 September 2002, Judge Maceda denied the motion for reconsideration.
The averment of antecedent facts to sustain the ground relied upon [by] the motion to dismiss nudges the court to look into these averments and confirm the authenticity of the documents in support thereof as well as secure stipulations on the chronology of the events and documents issued from the time plaintiffs' predecessors (sic). This may properly be done at pre-trial.[1]
According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by Judge Maceda when he denied its motion to dismiss. Because the grounds of the motion to dismiss were not indubitable, Judge Maceda should have deferred the resolution of its motion to dismiss instead of denying the motion outright, petitioner contends.
The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that the trial judge had acted well within his discretion when he denied petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that the issues raised by petitioner would have to be resolved in a full-blown trial.
The Court finds no reason to reverse the conclusion of the Court of Appeals.
More precisely, Judge Maceda denied petitioner's motion to dismiss because he was of the view that the evaluation of the antecedent facts and the pertinent documents on which the motion to dismiss is hinged requires further proceedings. In any case, it is discretionary on the court where the case is pending whether to grant the motion to dismiss or deny the same.[3]
In upholding the issuances of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals took into account that at the time he acted on petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was already in effect and Section 3, Rule 16[4] thereof prohibits the deferment of the resolution of a motion to dismiss for the reason that the ground relied upon is indubitable.
The Court finds no plausible reason to preclude the application of the new rule, more so because said case remains pending to this day. Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Such retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from procedural laws and rules.[5]
The retroactive application of the rule will not result in great injustice to petitioner because the grounds alleged in the motion to dismiss may well be raised in the answer and proven at the trial. A full-blown trial on the merits will not only serve the interest of fair play but will also aid in the appellate review of the case.
The Court is also satisfied with respondent judge's ratiocination of its order of denial, as it is in conformity with the requirement that the resolution must state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.[6] The trial court denied the motion to dismiss because it was of the view that a pre-trial was warranted so that the court could "look into the factual averments and confirm the authenticity of the documents as well as secure stipulations on the chronology of the events."
In any event, the pre-trial is held, among others, for the purpose of determining the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist.[7]
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that respondent judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged orders. Accordingly, the Court reiterates that the petition before it does not present any reversible error on the part of the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's 14 February 2007 Resolution is DENIED with FINALITY. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pi�as City is ordered to hear and resolve with deliberate speed Civil Case No. 95-1118. Quisumbing, J., on official leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, p. 2 14. Emphasis supplied.
[2] RULES OF COURT (1964), Rule 16, Sec. 3. Hearing and order. � After hearing the court may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of pleading, or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable.
[3] Sta. Rosa Mining v. Zabala, G.R. No. L-44723, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 367, 371.
[4] Sec. 3. Resolution of motion. � After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.
[5] Spouses Calo v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 151266, 29 November 2005, 476 SCRA 438.
[6] RULES OF COURT, Rule 16, Sec. 3.
[7] RULES OF COURT, Rule 18, Sec. 2, par. (g).
