Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2008 > July 2008 Resolutions > [G.R. No. 181758 : July 28, 2008] RUPERTO LOPEZ, JR. Y VILLAFLORES, AND ORLANDO BONDALIAN, JR. V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES :

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court dated 28 July 2008.

G.R. No. 181758 � Ruperto Lopez, Jr. y Villaflores, and Orlando Bondalian, Jr. v. People of the Philippines

Petitioners were convicted by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Quezon City (RTC) of two (2) counts of murder for the killing of Eduardo Ty and his driver, Nestor Encarnacion.

In view of the imposition of the penalty of death, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.

Conformably with People v. Mateo (G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640), allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals (CA) before such cases are elevated to this Court, the Court resolved to transfer the case to the CA, for appropriate action and disposition.

In a Decision dated October 30, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC�s judgment of conviction but reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 9346.

Thereafter, petitioners filed instant petition for review or certiorari under Rule 45, alleging that:

1. The prosecution has not discharged its onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of accused-appellants.
   
   
2. The identification of accused-petitioners was done in manner violative of due process for being suggestive, hence casts doubt as their identities as the perpetrators.
   
   
3. In relying on the testimony of the alleged lone eye-witness Delea C. Villanueva, whose testimony (i) has been shown to entirely false, fabricated and completely untrustworthy and unreliable, and (ii) is replete with serious contradictious on material points, inconsistencies, and impossibilities.
   

Clearly, the issues raised in the instant petition require factual determination which is generally outside the province of this Court in a petition for review. (Orquilo v. CA, G.R. No. 141463, August 6, 2002, 386 SCRA 301, 309; Sps. Uy v. CA, G.R. No. 109197, June 21, 2001, 359 SCRA 262) If for this matter alone, the petition should be dismissed because the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law. (Sps. Alfredo v. Sp. Borras, G.R. No. 144225, June 17, 2003, 404 SCRA 145, 156) Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts and the factual findings of the CA are binding and conclusive upon this Court, unless:

(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the interference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its finding are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) the said finding of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner�s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. (Baricuatro v. CA, G.R. No. 105902, February 9, 2000, 325 SCRA 197, 145)

The binding effect of the CA�s factual findings on this Court applies with greater force when both the trial court and the CA are in complete agreement on their factual findings. It is also settled that absent any circumstance requiring the overturning of the factual conclusion made by the trial court, particularly if affirmed by the CA, the Court necessarily upholds such findings of fact. (Sandoval v. CA, G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283, 299.)

Petitioners failed to show, and this Court did not find, any exceptional circumstances which will warrant a deviation from this well-settled rule.

The prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses, among them Delea C. Villanueva (Villanueva) who was the lone eyewitness. Their testimonies, woven together, established the following facts:

Villanueva testified that on December 11, 1995, at around 9:00 a.m., she and her grandchild were riding a passenger jeepney bound for Balintawak at the Novaliches Market. At the corner of Sangandaan, three armed men boarded the jeepney. One of the men sat at the back of the driver, while the two others sat respectively at her right and left side. Then the man seated at the back of the driver instructed the latter to follow the blue Mercedes Benz in front of them, to which the jeepney driver complied. After a few minutes, the man instructed the driver to overtake the Mercedes Benz but when it was about to overtake, a taxi overtook their jeepney, and so the armed men instructed the jeepney driver to follow the Mercedes Benz.

When the jeep was near General Avenue, Villanueva saw three other men in front of a store at the corner of Real Street, about 5 meters away from the jeepney. Two of the three men were seated while the third man was standing. She identified petitioner Ruperto Lopez, Jr. as the man who was standing at the store and petitioner Orlando Bondalian, jr. as the one seated at the store during the incident. Villanueva saw petitioners and the third man walk towards the blue Mercedes Benz. At a distance of about 3 meters, the men repeatedly fired upon the blue Mercedes Benz with use of short firearms. Later, she came to know that the passengers of the blue Mercedes Benz were Leonardo Ty and Nestor Encarnacion. Meanwhile, the three armed men on the board alighted the jeepney and also started shooting at the blue Mercedes Benz. Villanueva escaped through the window of the jeepney and pulled her grandchild. When the six armed men sat that the passengers of the blue Mercedes Benz were already dead, they shouted �Mabuhay ang ABB!� Thereafter, they flagged down a Project 8-bound jeepney and boarded it. Villanueva then looked for a telephone and reported the ambush that took place near her store.

Petitioners contend that there were discrepancies between Villanueva�s affidavit and her testimony in court regarding the identities of the assailants. In the affidavit dated December 11, 1995, she averted that she could not remember the faces of the three (3) persons in front of the store. However, in subsequent statements and her testimony in court, she identified petitioners as part of the group who committed the ambush.

The Court has consistently ruled that whether the discrepancies are minor or major, still, the settled rule is that affidavits are generally subordinate in importance to open court testimonies. (People v. Rivera G.R. No. 139185, September 29, 2003, 412 SCRA 224) Affidavits are not complete reproductions of what affiants have in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiants simply sign them after the same have been read to them. Here, the discrepancies in the first affidavit dated December 11, 1995 were satisfactorily explained by Villanueva when she testified that she had no opportunity to read her affidavit as there were many people asking her questions during that time. She attributed the inconsistencies to the fact that some of the answers were not from her.

As to the out-of-court identifications, we agree with the two courts below that the same were valid. Villanueva's subsequent identification of petitioners in court cured any flaw that may have attended her previous identification. This Court has held that even the inadmissibility of a police line-up identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification. (People v. Lapura, G.R. No. 94494, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 85, 96). The procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identifications were explained in the case of People v. Teehankee, Jr. (G.R. No. 111206-08, October 6, 1996, 249 SCRA 54) in this wise:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose� In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness� opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness� degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

As aptly pointed by the CA, there was neither misidentification nor denial of due process in this case. First, although pictures were shown to Villanueva, those pictures pertained to the faces of (8) persons, including those of the petitioners. Nothing in the record showed that the police suggested the petitioners� identities to Villanueva. Second, the identification through the pictures and video tapes presented to Villanueva took place within one day after the shooting incident. Third, Villanueva was only about five (5) meters from petitioners when they ambushed the victims in broad daylight. Fourth, Villanueva had no ill-motive to testify falsely against petitioners.

Anent Villanueva�s credibility as the prosecution�s sole eyewitness, it is well-settled that in the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, the trial court�s assessment is accorded the highest respect (People v. Quening, G.R. No. 132167, January 8, 2002, 373 SCRA 42, 49). For it is the trial judge who has the untrammeled opportunity to directly observe the demeanor and deportment of a witness, particularly the furtive glance, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh or the scant or full realization of an oath � all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness� honesty and sincerity (People v. Dy, G.R. No. 1152336-37, January 29, 2002, 375 SCRA 15, 50).

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby denied due course.

SO ORDERED.