February 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 165035 : February 03, 2010] MARTIN ORTEGA AND MORETO DEVANADERA,PETITIONERS, VS. ZENAIDA ANGELES, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE F & Z GENERAL MERCHANDISE, RESPONDENT. :
[G.R. No. 165035 : February 03, 2010]
MARTIN ORTEGA AND MORETO DEVANADERA,PETITIONERS, VS. ZENAIDA ANGELES, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE F & Z GENERAL MERCHANDISE, RESPONDENT.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 03 February 2010:
G.R. No. 165035: MARTIN ORTEGA and MORETO DEVANADERA,petitioners, versus ZENAIDA ANGELES, doing business under the name and style F & Z General Merchandise, respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated 24 October 2003 and Resolution[3] dated 20 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73724.
Respondent Zenaida Angeles (Angeles) is engaged in the business of buying unproductive coconut trees made into finished lumber for sale to interested parties. Sometime in 1996, Angeles engaged the services of Pablo Royo to buy unproductive coconut trees from Pedro Pisano (Pisano). Pisano applied with the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) for a Permit to Cut coconut trees in Barangay Pook, Rizal, Laguna. After the alleged grant of the application for permit to cut, Pisano applied for a Permit to Transport the finished lumber to the place of destination. The PCA allegedly issued the permit to transport. On 29 May 1996, Angeles paid for the full consideration of the 18 coconut trees.
On 2 June 1996, the finished coconut lumber, with an estimated volume of 3,600 board feet worth P21,600.00, was confiscated by petitioners Martin Ortega (Ortega), the barangay captain, Moreto Devanadera and Marcial Vista, town councilors, and several barangay officials.
Angeles presented the necessary permits to the barangay officials but Ortega declared that the permits were fictitious. Angeles then sought the help of police officials, deputized by the PCA to assist in the implementation of Republic Act No. 8048 (RA 8048) or the Coconut Preservation Act of 1995.
The Chief of Police inspected the coconut lumber and required permits. Upon presentation of the permits, the police chief took the side of Angeles. However, Ortega still refused to release the coconut lumber.
On 6 June 1996, Angeles filed a Complaint[4] for Damages with Application for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Nagcarlan-Rizal, Laguna.
In their Answer with Counterclaim dated 18 July 1996, petitioners interposed special and affirmative defenses: (I) that as Punong Barangay, Ortega, as well as the other barangay officials, was clothed with authority under the Local Government Code to execute and enforce laws and ordinances applicable within the barangay; (2) that there were no existing permits from the PCA in violation of RA 8048; (3) that Ortega and the other barangay officials gathered and placed the lumber in the Barangay Plaza; (4) that the lumber was transported from the place of confiscation to the plaza using Councilor Moreto Devanadera's vehicle; (5) that the lumber was turned over to the Rizal Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP-Rizal Station); and (6) that Angeles should make representations with the PNP-Rizal Station for the release of the lumber.
The PCA filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene which was granted by the MCTC in its Order dated 19 August 1996. The PCA filed its Answer in Intervention dated 9 October 1996 substantially adopting petitioners' defenses. However, PCA never appeared or presented any evidence in support of the intervention.
Angeles then filed her Reply and Answer to the Counterclaim. On 22 November 1996, the MCTC denied Angeles' prayer for injunction. Angeles filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the MCTC in its Order dated 21 January 1997.
On 7 February 2002, the MCTC decided the case in favor of Angeles.[5] The dispositive portion states:
Petitioners filed an appeal[7] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo, Laguna, Branch 29. The RTC directed the parties to file their respective appeal memoranda within 30 days upon receipt of notice.
On 2 April 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal Memorandum which was granted by the RTC on 3 April 2002. On 9 April 2002, the RTC likewise granted the motion of Angeles for extension of time to file her memorandum. On 6 May 2002, respondent filed her appeal memorandum within the 30 day period granted by the RTC.
On 8 August 2002, the RTC dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioners to submit an appeal memorandum within the reglementary period required by the Rules.[8]
On 15 August 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appeal Memorandum which was denied by the RTC, in its Order[9] dated 8 October 2002.
Petitioners then filed a petition for review with the CA. On 24 October 2003, the appellate court dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 20 August 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The issue is whether the appellate court erred in the application of law and jurisprudence in ruling that the negligence of petitioners' former counsel bound petitioners.
Petitioners submit that this Court has in many instances relieved the parties from the gross negligence of their counsel and insist that the present case is one of those exceptions.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that petitioners slept on their right to submit the required memorandum and only took action when the RTC dismissed the appeal on 8 August 2002, or four months after the motion for extension to submit appeal memorandum was granted by the RTC on 3 April 2002.
The petition lacks merit.
In deciding against petitioners, the appellate court made the following
findings:[10]
We agree with the appellate court's observations and find no reversible error. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly dismissed the appeal. Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes the dismissal of an appeal filed with the RTC for failure of the appellant to file a memorandum within the period required by the Rules of Court.
Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court states:
Petitioners' plea for liberality in applying the Rules with regard to the submission of the appeal memorandum deserves scant consideration. The records show that petitioners already filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal Memorandum which was granted by the RTC. Thus, petitioners were given enough time from 3 April to 8 August 2002 or more than 120 days to comply with the directive of the court. However, without any explanation from petitioners or their counsel for the delay or failure to file their appeal memorandum, the RTC was constrained to dismiss the appeal.
Thus, the failure to file an appeal memorandum within the period required by the Rules can only be attributed to petitioners. Such omission is an inexcusable negligence which cannot be countenanced. The right to appeal is a statutory right[11] and a party who seeks to avail of the right must faithfully comply with the rules absent any compelling reason that justifies the exercise of this Court's discretion to set aside procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision dated 24 October 2003 and Resolution dated 20 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73724 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chairperson, Honorable Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad and Jose P. Perez, Members, Second Division, this 3rd day of February, 2010.
G.R. No. 165035: MARTIN ORTEGA and MORETO DEVANADERA,petitioners, versus ZENAIDA ANGELES, doing business under the name and style F & Z General Merchandise, respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated 24 October 2003 and Resolution[3] dated 20 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73724.
Respondent Zenaida Angeles (Angeles) is engaged in the business of buying unproductive coconut trees made into finished lumber for sale to interested parties. Sometime in 1996, Angeles engaged the services of Pablo Royo to buy unproductive coconut trees from Pedro Pisano (Pisano). Pisano applied with the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) for a Permit to Cut coconut trees in Barangay Pook, Rizal, Laguna. After the alleged grant of the application for permit to cut, Pisano applied for a Permit to Transport the finished lumber to the place of destination. The PCA allegedly issued the permit to transport. On 29 May 1996, Angeles paid for the full consideration of the 18 coconut trees.
On 2 June 1996, the finished coconut lumber, with an estimated volume of 3,600 board feet worth P21,600.00, was confiscated by petitioners Martin Ortega (Ortega), the barangay captain, Moreto Devanadera and Marcial Vista, town councilors, and several barangay officials.
Angeles presented the necessary permits to the barangay officials but Ortega declared that the permits were fictitious. Angeles then sought the help of police officials, deputized by the PCA to assist in the implementation of Republic Act No. 8048 (RA 8048) or the Coconut Preservation Act of 1995.
The Chief of Police inspected the coconut lumber and required permits. Upon presentation of the permits, the police chief took the side of Angeles. However, Ortega still refused to release the coconut lumber.
On 6 June 1996, Angeles filed a Complaint[4] for Damages with Application for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Nagcarlan-Rizal, Laguna.
In their Answer with Counterclaim dated 18 July 1996, petitioners interposed special and affirmative defenses: (I) that as Punong Barangay, Ortega, as well as the other barangay officials, was clothed with authority under the Local Government Code to execute and enforce laws and ordinances applicable within the barangay; (2) that there were no existing permits from the PCA in violation of RA 8048; (3) that Ortega and the other barangay officials gathered and placed the lumber in the Barangay Plaza; (4) that the lumber was transported from the place of confiscation to the plaza using Councilor Moreto Devanadera's vehicle; (5) that the lumber was turned over to the Rizal Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP-Rizal Station); and (6) that Angeles should make representations with the PNP-Rizal Station for the release of the lumber.
The PCA filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene which was granted by the MCTC in its Order dated 19 August 1996. The PCA filed its Answer in Intervention dated 9 October 1996 substantially adopting petitioners' defenses. However, PCA never appeared or presented any evidence in support of the intervention.
Angeles then filed her Reply and Answer to the Counterclaim. On 22 November 1996, the MCTC denied Angeles' prayer for injunction. Angeles filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the MCTC in its Order dated 21 January 1997.
On 7 February 2002, the MCTC decided the case in favor of Angeles.[5] The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants Martin Ortega and Moreto Devanadera ordering the latter to jointly and severally [pay] the former the following amounts, to wit:
1. P21,000.00 as actual damages;
2. P60,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees; and
4. P5.000.00 for court appearances.
Plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioners filed an appeal[7] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo, Laguna, Branch 29. The RTC directed the parties to file their respective appeal memoranda within 30 days upon receipt of notice.
On 2 April 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal Memorandum which was granted by the RTC on 3 April 2002. On 9 April 2002, the RTC likewise granted the motion of Angeles for extension of time to file her memorandum. On 6 May 2002, respondent filed her appeal memorandum within the 30 day period granted by the RTC.
On 8 August 2002, the RTC dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioners to submit an appeal memorandum within the reglementary period required by the Rules.[8]
On 15 August 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appeal Memorandum which was denied by the RTC, in its Order[9] dated 8 October 2002.
Petitioners then filed a petition for review with the CA. On 24 October 2003, the appellate court dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 20 August 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The issue is whether the appellate court erred in the application of law and jurisprudence in ruling that the negligence of petitioners' former counsel bound petitioners.
Petitioners submit that this Court has in many instances relieved the parties from the gross negligence of their counsel and insist that the present case is one of those exceptions.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that petitioners slept on their right to submit the required memorandum and only took action when the RTC dismissed the appeal on 8 August 2002, or four months after the motion for extension to submit appeal memorandum was granted by the RTC on 3 April 2002.
The petition lacks merit.
In deciding against petitioners, the appellate court made the following
findings:[10]
Generally, the negligence of counsel binds his client (De Liano vs. Court of Appeals. 370 SCRA 349) except where the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law (Ang mga Kaanib sa Iglesia ng Dios Kay Kristo Hesus, H.S.K. sa Bansang Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Iglesia ng Dios Kay Cristo Hesus, Haligi at Suhay ng Katotohanan, 372 SCRA 171). This is not the case here. The right to appeal is not a part of due process (Villanueva vs. CA, Supra, and Tan vs. CA, Ibid.).
Records of the case reveal that petitioners were given more than ample time to file their appeal memorandum. The excuse of the petitioners' counsel that he was suffering from vertigo is flimsy and lame. It should be noted that on April 3, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal Memorandum which the Court granted in its Order of even date. However, despite of that they never did until the Court dismissed the appeal on August 8, 2002. A lawyer, shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so (Tan vs. Lapak, 350 SCRA 74). Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentire. He who suffers injury through his own fault, is not considered as suffering damage.
We agree with the appellate court's observations and find no reversible error. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly dismissed the appeal. Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes the dismissal of an appeal filed with the RTC for failure of the appellant to file a memorandum within the period required by the Rules of Court.
Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. -
xxx
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellant's memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners' plea for liberality in applying the Rules with regard to the submission of the appeal memorandum deserves scant consideration. The records show that petitioners already filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal Memorandum which was granted by the RTC. Thus, petitioners were given enough time from 3 April to 8 August 2002 or more than 120 days to comply with the directive of the court. However, without any explanation from petitioners or their counsel for the delay or failure to file their appeal memorandum, the RTC was constrained to dismiss the appeal.
Thus, the failure to file an appeal memorandum within the period required by the Rules can only be attributed to petitioners. Such omission is an inexcusable negligence which cannot be countenanced. The right to appeal is a statutory right[11] and a party who seeks to avail of the right must faithfully comply with the rules absent any compelling reason that justifies the exercise of this Court's discretion to set aside procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision dated 24 October 2003 and Resolution dated 20 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73724 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chairperson, Honorable Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad and Jose P. Perez, Members, Second Division, this 3rd day of February, 2010.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 36-42. Penned by Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos with Justices B.A. Adefiiin-De La Cruz and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring.
[3] Id. at 44. Penned by Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos with Justices Jose C. Mendoza and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring.
[4] Docketed as Civil Case No. 782 and entitled "Zenaida Angeles, doing business under the name & style of F & Z General Merchandise v. Zaldy Canapati, Timoteo Orsolino, Remar Orsolino, Norma Sombilta, Rosario Dorado, Brgy. Capt. Martin Ortega, Conn. Marcial Vista & Conn. Moreto Devanadera."
[5] Rollo, pp. 149-158.
[6] Id. at 158.
[7] Docketed as Civil Case No. SP-5891(02).
[8] Under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 52-53.
[9] Rollo, pp. 54-57.
[10] Id. at 40.
[11] Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 820 (1996).
