November 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 185014 : November 22, 2010] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VERSUS EDUARDO DACOYCOY, APPELLANT, AND JOHN DOE, ACCUSED.:
[G.R. No. 185014 : November 22, 2010]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VERSUS EDUARDO DACOYCOY, APPELLANT, AND JOHN DOE, ACCUSED.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated 22 November 2010, which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 185014 - THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, versus EDUARDO DACOYCOY, appellant, and JOHN DOE, accused.
RESOLUTION
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, Branch 35, found appellant Eduardo Dacoycoy guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to death in a Decision[1] dated November 18, 1999.
During trial, the prosecution was able to establish the following facts: In the afternoon of June 5, 1997, Janet Corpin (Janet) and her live-in partner Frank Buno (Frank), an Australian national, together with Janet's cousin Aina Corpin, were inside the Ormoc City terminal waiting for a bus ride to Naval Biliran, Leyte. Suddenly, appellant grabbed Janet's necklace hut succeeded only in taking the pendant. As Janet shouted for help, Frank came to her rescue and grabbed appellant's jacket. Appellant fell down infront of Janet but was able to get up immediately and run towards a waiting motorcycle. When Frank gave chase, appellant shot him twice. The first shot missed Frank, but the second one fatally wounded him. Appellant and his companion escaped aboard the motorcycle and fled toward the direction of the police station. Frank died at around or.e o'clock in the morning of June 6, 1997.
In the face of the positive identification made by Janet, the main prosecution's witness, appellant invoked the idefense of denial and alibi. He claimed that at the time of the incident, lie was in the house of Atty. Lucenario, his former lawyer, in Dagami, Leyte where there was a drinking spree. The visitors at that time included (Atty. Lucenario's wife, PNP member Nestor Kahano, his mother, and a singer. Upon invitation, he stayed in Atty. Lucenario's house for five days. Appellant never met Janet before and said that the police pointed his picture to Janet and told her that he was the perpetrator of the crime.
The RTC held that the physical evidence presented dovetailed the straightforward, spontaneous, and positive identification of Janet that she saw appellant shoot Frank with a gun. There was even a momentary struggle between Janet and the appellant since the necklace worn by Janet was quite thick making the forceful taking difficult. In fact, only the pendant was taken. Also, there was a struggle between Frank and appellant infront of Janet. Appellant fell down when Frank grabbed him. Janet saw all these. As against these positive and detailed evidence of the prosecution, appellant's simple denial and negative testimony must fail, according to the trial court. The trial court emphasized that positive testimony prevails over negative ones and denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. The RTC also noted that appellant was evasive, during questioning. Appellant was uneasy, indicating fear or nervousness. Moreover, prior to this incident, appellant was facing at least six more cases of robbery, three of these were then pending before the court a quo, and there was a standing warrant of arrest issued against him for these cases. Thus, there is moral certainty in convicting appellant. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced appellant to death for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, after finding that the generic aggravating circumstance of the commission of the crime.
On automatic review, the Court ordered the transfer of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo.[2] On March 25, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction. The CA did not give credence to appellant's claim that he was simply pointed out to Janet by the police as he was not able to prove this claim, The CA also held that there was no basis for his insistence that a police line-up should have been made since there are other valid forms of ascertaining a culprit's identity and the method adopted would be sustained as long as it is devoid of suggestion from the police. Moreover, evidence shows that it was really Janet who picked appellant from the rogues' gallery shown to her, and that she spontaneously and positively identified appellant as the perpetrator during trial. As to appellant's alibi, while it was corroborated by policeman Nestor Kahano, its probative weight was weak in light of Janet's positive identification. Janet had no ulterior motive to testify against appellant whom she had not met before the incident. Janet lost her loved one, Frank, and her pendant to appellant, and it was only natural that she would exact justice from the perpetrator. But while it affirmed the RTC, the appellate court modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua since under Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a generic aggravating circumstance, although proven at trial cannot be appreciated against the accused if such was not stated in the information.
Unsatisfied with these disquisitions, appellant filed a notice of appeal before this Court.
We affirm the decision of the CA. Appellant failed to show any error of law or of fact committed by the lower courts that would merit a reversal of the judgment of conviction. Appellant merely rehashed his arguments and banked on the seeming discrepancy between Janet's testimony and the affidavit which she executed wherein she stated that the perpetrator was an "unidentified person." This could be easily explained since it is likely that at the time the affidavit was executed, Janet did not yet know the name of appellant. And considering that the contents of the affidavit clearly corroborated her testimony as to the events that transpired, we find no reason to disbelieve her truthfulness especially since Janet positively identified the appellant from among the pictures shown to her and also during the trial. The court a quo was correct in its observation that there were many opportunities for Janet to see the appellant's face during the incident. The physical evidence also bolstered Janet's testimony since appellant left his jacket behind when he struggled with Frank and fell down before Janet. As this Court has repeatedly held, experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before witnesses' eyes, witnesses remember with a high degree o criminals.[3]
Moreover, the burden is on appellant to prove that the mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. There is no evidence that the authorities had supplied or even suggested to Janet that appellant was the perpetrator. We therefore fail to see any flaw that would invalidate the eyewitness' identification. In any event, the in-court identification of the appellant later on dispels any doubt as to the correctness of his identity.[4] Absent any showing that the trial court overlooked or misappreciated certain significant facts or circumstances, which if,properly considered would change the result, we find no reason to overturn the trial court's assessment of Janet's credibility. Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand, a vantage point denied appellate courts. Their assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and even finality especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[5]
Defense witness Nestor Kahano's testimony cannot exonerate appellant since the latter's testimony did not establish appellant's alibi. To establish alibi, appellant must prove (1) that he was present at another place at the time the crime was perpetrated; and (2). that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places."[6] Nestor Kahano's testimony did not prove the physical impossibility for appellant to be at the scene of the crime as the former did not categorically specify the time he was with appellant on the date of the incident. His testimony did not preclude the possibility of appellant perpetrating the crime after their meeting. The distance was also i not such as to make it physically impossible for appellant to go to the scene of the crime then return to the house of Atty. Lucenario where he stayed until he was arrested. Most important, appellant's defense of denial and alibi must fall in the face of Janet's positive identification.
Finally, on the claims made by appellant's counsel, Atty. Dionisio C. Delgado of partiality, corruption and bribery against Judge Fortunito Madrona in connivance with complainant Janet, allegedly acting in a cover-up of the real perpetrator of the crime, we find the same baseless and unfounded. No iota of evidence was presented by Atty. Delgado to substantiate this grave accusation. Also, his disclosure of the name of the supposed true killer of Frank, and of the witness, admittedly came from appellant's mother, allegedly based on the "information" she had gathered. If Atty. Delgado strongly believes the truth of the acts of bribery and corruption committed by the judge who rendered the judgment of conviction against his client, he should instead file an administrative complaint, against Judge Madrona, pursuant to the Code of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
It bears to state that mere imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same and reliance on secondhand information cannot be countenanced.[7] Verily, an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove and hence the complainant must present evidence that is more than substantial, inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench.[8] In a long line of cases decided by this Court, it was held that bare allegations of bias are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor.[9]
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Eduardo Dacoycoy is hereby DISMISSED. The March 25, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00583 is AFFIRMED.
With costs against the accused-appellant].
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185014 - THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, versus EDUARDO DACOYCOY, appellant, and JOHN DOE, accused.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, Branch 35, found appellant Eduardo Dacoycoy guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to death in a Decision[1] dated November 18, 1999.
During trial, the prosecution was able to establish the following facts: In the afternoon of June 5, 1997, Janet Corpin (Janet) and her live-in partner Frank Buno (Frank), an Australian national, together with Janet's cousin Aina Corpin, were inside the Ormoc City terminal waiting for a bus ride to Naval Biliran, Leyte. Suddenly, appellant grabbed Janet's necklace hut succeeded only in taking the pendant. As Janet shouted for help, Frank came to her rescue and grabbed appellant's jacket. Appellant fell down infront of Janet but was able to get up immediately and run towards a waiting motorcycle. When Frank gave chase, appellant shot him twice. The first shot missed Frank, but the second one fatally wounded him. Appellant and his companion escaped aboard the motorcycle and fled toward the direction of the police station. Frank died at around or.e o'clock in the morning of June 6, 1997.
In the face of the positive identification made by Janet, the main prosecution's witness, appellant invoked the idefense of denial and alibi. He claimed that at the time of the incident, lie was in the house of Atty. Lucenario, his former lawyer, in Dagami, Leyte where there was a drinking spree. The visitors at that time included (Atty. Lucenario's wife, PNP member Nestor Kahano, his mother, and a singer. Upon invitation, he stayed in Atty. Lucenario's house for five days. Appellant never met Janet before and said that the police pointed his picture to Janet and told her that he was the perpetrator of the crime.
The RTC held that the physical evidence presented dovetailed the straightforward, spontaneous, and positive identification of Janet that she saw appellant shoot Frank with a gun. There was even a momentary struggle between Janet and the appellant since the necklace worn by Janet was quite thick making the forceful taking difficult. In fact, only the pendant was taken. Also, there was a struggle between Frank and appellant infront of Janet. Appellant fell down when Frank grabbed him. Janet saw all these. As against these positive and detailed evidence of the prosecution, appellant's simple denial and negative testimony must fail, according to the trial court. The trial court emphasized that positive testimony prevails over negative ones and denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. The RTC also noted that appellant was evasive, during questioning. Appellant was uneasy, indicating fear or nervousness. Moreover, prior to this incident, appellant was facing at least six more cases of robbery, three of these were then pending before the court a quo, and there was a standing warrant of arrest issued against him for these cases. Thus, there is moral certainty in convicting appellant. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced appellant to death for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, after finding that the generic aggravating circumstance of the commission of the crime.
On automatic review, the Court ordered the transfer of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo.[2] On March 25, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction. The CA did not give credence to appellant's claim that he was simply pointed out to Janet by the police as he was not able to prove this claim, The CA also held that there was no basis for his insistence that a police line-up should have been made since there are other valid forms of ascertaining a culprit's identity and the method adopted would be sustained as long as it is devoid of suggestion from the police. Moreover, evidence shows that it was really Janet who picked appellant from the rogues' gallery shown to her, and that she spontaneously and positively identified appellant as the perpetrator during trial. As to appellant's alibi, while it was corroborated by policeman Nestor Kahano, its probative weight was weak in light of Janet's positive identification. Janet had no ulterior motive to testify against appellant whom she had not met before the incident. Janet lost her loved one, Frank, and her pendant to appellant, and it was only natural that she would exact justice from the perpetrator. But while it affirmed the RTC, the appellate court modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua since under Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a generic aggravating circumstance, although proven at trial cannot be appreciated against the accused if such was not stated in the information.
Unsatisfied with these disquisitions, appellant filed a notice of appeal before this Court.
We affirm the decision of the CA. Appellant failed to show any error of law or of fact committed by the lower courts that would merit a reversal of the judgment of conviction. Appellant merely rehashed his arguments and banked on the seeming discrepancy between Janet's testimony and the affidavit which she executed wherein she stated that the perpetrator was an "unidentified person." This could be easily explained since it is likely that at the time the affidavit was executed, Janet did not yet know the name of appellant. And considering that the contents of the affidavit clearly corroborated her testimony as to the events that transpired, we find no reason to disbelieve her truthfulness especially since Janet positively identified the appellant from among the pictures shown to her and also during the trial. The court a quo was correct in its observation that there were many opportunities for Janet to see the appellant's face during the incident. The physical evidence also bolstered Janet's testimony since appellant left his jacket behind when he struggled with Frank and fell down before Janet. As this Court has repeatedly held, experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before witnesses' eyes, witnesses remember with a high degree o criminals.[3]
Moreover, the burden is on appellant to prove that the mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. There is no evidence that the authorities had supplied or even suggested to Janet that appellant was the perpetrator. We therefore fail to see any flaw that would invalidate the eyewitness' identification. In any event, the in-court identification of the appellant later on dispels any doubt as to the correctness of his identity.[4] Absent any showing that the trial court overlooked or misappreciated certain significant facts or circumstances, which if,properly considered would change the result, we find no reason to overturn the trial court's assessment of Janet's credibility. Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand, a vantage point denied appellate courts. Their assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and even finality especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[5]
Defense witness Nestor Kahano's testimony cannot exonerate appellant since the latter's testimony did not establish appellant's alibi. To establish alibi, appellant must prove (1) that he was present at another place at the time the crime was perpetrated; and (2). that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places."[6] Nestor Kahano's testimony did not prove the physical impossibility for appellant to be at the scene of the crime as the former did not categorically specify the time he was with appellant on the date of the incident. His testimony did not preclude the possibility of appellant perpetrating the crime after their meeting. The distance was also i not such as to make it physically impossible for appellant to go to the scene of the crime then return to the house of Atty. Lucenario where he stayed until he was arrested. Most important, appellant's defense of denial and alibi must fall in the face of Janet's positive identification.
Finally, on the claims made by appellant's counsel, Atty. Dionisio C. Delgado of partiality, corruption and bribery against Judge Fortunito Madrona in connivance with complainant Janet, allegedly acting in a cover-up of the real perpetrator of the crime, we find the same baseless and unfounded. No iota of evidence was presented by Atty. Delgado to substantiate this grave accusation. Also, his disclosure of the name of the supposed true killer of Frank, and of the witness, admittedly came from appellant's mother, allegedly based on the "information" she had gathered. If Atty. Delgado strongly believes the truth of the acts of bribery and corruption committed by the judge who rendered the judgment of conviction against his client, he should instead file an administrative complaint, against Judge Madrona, pursuant to the Code of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
It bears to state that mere imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same and reliance on secondhand information cannot be countenanced.[7] Verily, an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove and hence the complainant must present evidence that is more than substantial, inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench.[8] In a long line of cases decided by this Court, it was held that bare allegations of bias are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor.[9]
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Eduardo Dacoycoy is hereby DISMISSED. The March 25, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00583 is AFFIRMED.
With costs against the accused-appellant].
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUClTA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUClTA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] CA rollo, pp. 14-21. Penned by Presiding Judge Fortunito L. Madrona.
[2] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[3] People v. Foncardas, 466 Phil. 992, 1006 (2004).
[4] People v. Rivera, 458 Phil. 856, 876-877 (2003).
[5] Heirs of Florentino Remetio v. Villareal, G.R. No. 132357, May 31, 2006,490 SCRA 43,47. Resolution G.R. No. 185014
[6] People v. Esoy, G.R. No. 185849, April 7, 2010, p. 7.
[7] See Espa�ol v. Mupas, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348, Novemberil 1, 2004, 442 SCRA 13, 37-38.
[8] Casta�os v. Esca�o, Jr., Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-955, Depember 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 174, 184-185, cited in Cea v. Paguio, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1479, February 17, 2003; 397 SCRA 494, 499.
[9] Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation, Inc. v. Pizarro, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1750, January 14, 2005 448 SCRA 140, 155-156.
