September 2008 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 159422 : September 08, 2008] CHINESE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME OF MANILA DOWNTOWN YMCA V. REMINGTON STEEL CORPORATION :
[G.R. No. 159422 : September 08, 2008]
CHINESE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME OF MANILA DOWNTOWN YMCA V. REMINGTON STEEL CORPORATION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 08 September 2008:
G.R. No. 159422 - Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands, doing business under the name of Manila Downtown YMCA v. Remington Steel Corporation
On March 28, 2008, the Court rendered a Decision[1] in the above-entitled case granting the petition insofar as the outright dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 74292 was concerned and set aside the Resolutions dated January 16, 2003 and July 295 2003 of the Court of Appeals. Instead of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for resolution on the merits, the Court held that the final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 of the Court in G.R. No. 171858 entitled "Remington Industrial Steel Corporation v. Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands, doing business in the name of Manila Downtown YMCA" governs the right of the parties insofar as Unit 964 is concerned, under the principle of stare decisis. G.R. No. 171858 refers to a similar ejectment case filed by YMCA against Remington Industrial Steel Corporation involving Unit 966.
On April 28, 2008, Remington filed a Motion for Reconsideration[2] arguing that a ruling that relaxes the requirement of proof at the time of filing of the petition that its signatory has the authority to sign the verification and certification on non-forum shopping on behalf of the petitioner sets back the Court's effort to ensure truth in pleadings; that it was denied its right to due process when the Court, instead of remanding the case to the CA for further proceedings, decided the merits of the case by considering the final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858 as a precedent in the present case, when YMCA raised and discussed only in its Petition and Memorandum the procedural issue of whether Mr. Golangco can sign the verification without having to show that he had the authority to do so at the time of filing; that the principle of stare decisis is not applicable because the parties and facts in the present case differ from those of G.R. No. 171858.
On June 30, 2008, YMCA filed its Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration[3] contending that the first issue raised is a mere rehash of the very same issue that had been resolved by the Court in its Decision dated March 28, 2008; that the Court did not deny Remington its right to due process by resolving the merit of YMCA's appeal before the CA since Remington had the opportunity to file its opposition to the motion of YMCA that the Court take judicial notice of its final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in GTR. No. 171858 and YMCA filed its Reply thereto.
The Motion for Reconsideration is without merit.
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity.[4] In Aguam v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
Furthermore, Remington was not denied its right to due process when the Court considered the final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858 as a precedent in the present case, since Remington had the opportunity to be heard when it filed its Opposition[6] to YMCA's Motion to Take Judicial Notice of the Final Judgment in G.R. No. 171858. It is basic that as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process.[7]
Moreover, it is an accepted rule of procedure for the Court to strive to settle the existing controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.[8] If, based on the records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the dispute can be resolved by the Court, it will do so to serve the ends of justice instead of remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings.[9]
Furthermore, the principle of stare decisis was properly applied by the Court. The doctrine of stare decisis directs that, once a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same, regardless of whether the parties and. property are the same.[10] The common issue of law in the two ejectment cases was whether possession of the ground floor units was unlawfully withheld despite. constructive delivery thereof. In the final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858, the Court held that possession of the leased premises was unlawfully withheld because the constructive delivery did not amount to an effective transfer of possession to YMCA. Once a case has been decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner.'[11]
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. No further motion of similar nature shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159422 - Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands, doing business under the name of Manila Downtown YMCA v. Remington Steel Corporation
On March 28, 2008, the Court rendered a Decision[1] in the above-entitled case granting the petition insofar as the outright dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 74292 was concerned and set aside the Resolutions dated January 16, 2003 and July 295 2003 of the Court of Appeals. Instead of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for resolution on the merits, the Court held that the final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 of the Court in G.R. No. 171858 entitled "Remington Industrial Steel Corporation v. Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands, doing business in the name of Manila Downtown YMCA" governs the right of the parties insofar as Unit 964 is concerned, under the principle of stare decisis. G.R. No. 171858 refers to a similar ejectment case filed by YMCA against Remington Industrial Steel Corporation involving Unit 966.
On April 28, 2008, Remington filed a Motion for Reconsideration[2] arguing that a ruling that relaxes the requirement of proof at the time of filing of the petition that its signatory has the authority to sign the verification and certification on non-forum shopping on behalf of the petitioner sets back the Court's effort to ensure truth in pleadings; that it was denied its right to due process when the Court, instead of remanding the case to the CA for further proceedings, decided the merits of the case by considering the final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858 as a precedent in the present case, when YMCA raised and discussed only in its Petition and Memorandum the procedural issue of whether Mr. Golangco can sign the verification without having to show that he had the authority to do so at the time of filing; that the principle of stare decisis is not applicable because the parties and facts in the present case differ from those of G.R. No. 171858.
On June 30, 2008, YMCA filed its Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration[3] contending that the first issue raised is a mere rehash of the very same issue that had been resolved by the Court in its Decision dated March 28, 2008; that the Court did not deny Remington its right to due process by resolving the merit of YMCA's appeal before the CA since Remington had the opportunity to file its opposition to the motion of YMCA that the Court take judicial notice of its final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in GTR. No. 171858 and YMCA filed its Reply thereto.
The Motion for Reconsideration is without merit.
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity.[4] In Aguam v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
"Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust." Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds ts frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.[5]
Furthermore, Remington was not denied its right to due process when the Court considered the final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858 as a precedent in the present case, since Remington had the opportunity to be heard when it filed its Opposition[6] to YMCA's Motion to Take Judicial Notice of the Final Judgment in G.R. No. 171858. It is basic that as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process.[7]
Moreover, it is an accepted rule of procedure for the Court to strive to settle the existing controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.[8] If, based on the records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the dispute can be resolved by the Court, it will do so to serve the ends of justice instead of remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings.[9]
Furthermore, the principle of stare decisis was properly applied by the Court. The doctrine of stare decisis directs that, once a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same, regardless of whether the parties and. property are the same.[10] The common issue of law in the two ejectment cases was whether possession of the ground floor units was unlawfully withheld despite. constructive delivery thereof. In the final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858, the Court held that possession of the leased premises was unlawfully withheld because the constructive delivery did not amount to an effective transfer of possession to YMCA. Once a case has been decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner.'[11]
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. No further motion of similar nature shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, p. 431,
[2] Id. at 449.
[3] Id. at 477.
[4] Ong Lim Sing, Jr. v. FEB Leasing & Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 168115, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 333, 343. See also Barnes v. Padilla, G. R. No. 160753, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 539.
[5] G.R. No. 137672, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA. 789, 790.
[6] Rollo, p. 407.
[7] Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 168498, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 213, 218; Estares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144755, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 604, 623.
[8] Bunao v. Social Security System, G.R.No. 159606, December 13,2005,477 SCRA 564, 571. See also Vidal v. Escueta, G.R. No. 156228, December 10, 2003,417 SCRA 617; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142649, September 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 279; Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No: 110844, April 27, 2000, 331 SCRA 16.
[9] Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156413, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 65S, 668; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 598, 605 (2001); Chua v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil 262,273 (1997); Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771, 778 (1997).
[10] Black's Law Dictionary 1406 (6th Edition 1990).
