September 2008 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. Nos. 182625 & 182635-41 : September 01, 2008] ROLANDO B. MONTEJO V. SANDIGANBAYAN 4TH DIVISION AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES :
[G.R. Nos. 182625 & 182635-41 : September 01, 2008]
ROLANDO B. MONTEJO V. SANDIGANBAYAN 4TH DIVISION AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 01 September 2008:
G.R. Nos. 182625 & 182635-41 (Rolando B. Montejo v. Sandiganbayan 4th Division and People of the Philippines).�This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration[1] of this Court�s Resolution[2] dated 18 June 2008, which dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner Rolando B. Montejo in G.R. Nos. 182625 and 182635-41 entitled Rolando B. Montejo v. Sandiganbayan 4th Division and People of the Philippines.
Briefly, petitioner, together with several other accused,[3] was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e)[4] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.[5] The seven criminal informations, similarly worded, substantially charged all accused with conspiracy and connivance in awarding contracts of supplies in favor of certain private individuals without the requisite public bidding, taking advantage and while in the performance of their official duties and functions, to the damage and prejudice of the provincial government.[6]
Petitioner moved to quash the informations and to suspend the conduct of the pre-trial, but his motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. He sought for reconsideration of the said denial but
the motion was likewise denied. Forthwith, he instituted a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order)[7] before this Court imputing to the Sandiganbayan grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to quash the informations and in declaring that he (petitioner) may be held liable as having conspired with the other accused when in fact the informations lacked specific allegation of the ultimate facts to support the charge of conspiracy.[8]
In a minute resolution issued on 18 June 2008, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[9]
In the instant motion for reconsideration, petitioner essentially argues that (a) the Court, in dismissing the petition through a mere minute resolution, did not comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that every decision express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based[10] and that (b) the facts alleged in the informations are insufficient to charge petitioner of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e)�a ground for the quashal of the informations under Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in relation to Sections 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 110. He adds that even if the allegations be hypothetically admitted, the same would still not establish the essential elements of the charge principally because petitioner, as provincial administrative officer IV, is not even a member of the bids and awards committee and as such has no title or authority to award contracts of supplies.[11]
We deny reconsideration.
First, the requirement found in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions on the merits and orders of dismissal on the merits. It does not apply to minute resolutions.[12]
The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis. The Court is not duty-bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.[13]
Second, the denial of a motion to quash as well as of the reconsideration of such denial does not automatically give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is that, where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said motion, and if after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law[14] inasmuch as certiorari, an extraordinary remedy, does not lie when there are alternative plain, speedy and adequate remedies that may be pursued.
In any event, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it denied petitioner�s motions to quash and reconsideration. The criminal informations in this case are sufficient to charge the offense defined under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, at least for purposes of initiating the prosecution of the accused.
Petitioner's assertion in his petition before the Court that the allegation of conspiracy must be supported by a statement of the ultimate facts, is misplaced. A statement of the ultimate facts in the information is required only with respect to the elements of the offense being charged. The offense defined under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 requires the concurrence of the following elements: (i) the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (ii) he must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (iii) his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or entailed giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions,[15] Nowhere is it indicated that conspiracy is an element of the said offense. Thus, conspiracy as a mere mode of committing the offense need not be substantiated in the information. It is enough that it is sufficiently alleged and later on proven at the trial. The assailed informations in these cases sufficiently allege that there was conspiracy between and among the accused in entering into the subject transactions.
It is also by reason of the allegation of conspiracy that the question of whether petitioner could be held liable even though he allegedly had no power or authority to perform the acts complained of, is rendered immaterial. Furthermore, as provincial administrative officer, petitioner is, for purposes of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, a public officer exercising administrative functions. Hence, whether or not it is within his title or authority to bind the provincial government under a contract with a private individual is immaterial in a prosecution under the law�especially in view of the conspiracy aspect that is sufficiently alleged in the informations.
Basically, whether herein petitioner, one of the accused, is a member of the bids and awards committee responsible in awarding the supposed anomalous contracts of supplies and whether it is in fact within petitioner�s power and authority to bind the provincial government under the said contracts, are factual questions which cannot be passed upon in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In other words, the Court, in such a petition, is bound not to venture further than the question of whether the questioned issuance was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or particularly, whether the Sandiganbayan properly denied petitioner�s motion to quash upon the finding that the informations are sufficient to indict the accused. Suffice it to say that only after trial on the merits can it be determined whether petitioner indeed participated in the commission of the offense charged and if so to what degree he did participate, as these questions are inherently factual in nature.
WHEREFORE, finding no substantial arguments in the instant motion for reconsideration, the Court resolves to DENY the same with FINALITY.
G.R. Nos. 182625 & 182635-41 (Rolando B. Montejo v. Sandiganbayan 4th Division and People of the Philippines).�This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration[1] of this Court�s Resolution[2] dated 18 June 2008, which dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner Rolando B. Montejo in G.R. Nos. 182625 and 182635-41 entitled Rolando B. Montejo v. Sandiganbayan 4th Division and People of the Philippines.
Briefly, petitioner, together with several other accused,[3] was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e)[4] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.[5] The seven criminal informations, similarly worded, substantially charged all accused with conspiracy and connivance in awarding contracts of supplies in favor of certain private individuals without the requisite public bidding, taking advantage and while in the performance of their official duties and functions, to the damage and prejudice of the provincial government.[6]
Petitioner moved to quash the informations and to suspend the conduct of the pre-trial, but his motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. He sought for reconsideration of the said denial but
the motion was likewise denied. Forthwith, he instituted a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order)[7] before this Court imputing to the Sandiganbayan grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to quash the informations and in declaring that he (petitioner) may be held liable as having conspired with the other accused when in fact the informations lacked specific allegation of the ultimate facts to support the charge of conspiracy.[8]
In a minute resolution issued on 18 June 2008, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[9]
In the instant motion for reconsideration, petitioner essentially argues that (a) the Court, in dismissing the petition through a mere minute resolution, did not comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that every decision express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based[10] and that (b) the facts alleged in the informations are insufficient to charge petitioner of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e)�a ground for the quashal of the informations under Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in relation to Sections 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 110. He adds that even if the allegations be hypothetically admitted, the same would still not establish the essential elements of the charge principally because petitioner, as provincial administrative officer IV, is not even a member of the bids and awards committee and as such has no title or authority to award contracts of supplies.[11]
We deny reconsideration.
First, the requirement found in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions on the merits and orders of dismissal on the merits. It does not apply to minute resolutions.[12]
The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis. The Court is not duty-bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.[13]
Second, the denial of a motion to quash as well as of the reconsideration of such denial does not automatically give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is that, where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said motion, and if after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law[14] inasmuch as certiorari, an extraordinary remedy, does not lie when there are alternative plain, speedy and adequate remedies that may be pursued.
In any event, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it denied petitioner�s motions to quash and reconsideration. The criminal informations in this case are sufficient to charge the offense defined under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, at least for purposes of initiating the prosecution of the accused.
Petitioner's assertion in his petition before the Court that the allegation of conspiracy must be supported by a statement of the ultimate facts, is misplaced. A statement of the ultimate facts in the information is required only with respect to the elements of the offense being charged. The offense defined under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 requires the concurrence of the following elements: (i) the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (ii) he must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (iii) his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or entailed giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions,[15] Nowhere is it indicated that conspiracy is an element of the said offense. Thus, conspiracy as a mere mode of committing the offense need not be substantiated in the information. It is enough that it is sufficiently alleged and later on proven at the trial. The assailed informations in these cases sufficiently allege that there was conspiracy between and among the accused in entering into the subject transactions.
It is also by reason of the allegation of conspiracy that the question of whether petitioner could be held liable even though he allegedly had no power or authority to perform the acts complained of, is rendered immaterial. Furthermore, as provincial administrative officer, petitioner is, for purposes of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, a public officer exercising administrative functions. Hence, whether or not it is within his title or authority to bind the provincial government under a contract with a private individual is immaterial in a prosecution under the law�especially in view of the conspiracy aspect that is sufficiently alleged in the informations.
Basically, whether herein petitioner, one of the accused, is a member of the bids and awards committee responsible in awarding the supposed anomalous contracts of supplies and whether it is in fact within petitioner�s power and authority to bind the provincial government under the said contracts, are factual questions which cannot be passed upon in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In other words, the Court, in such a petition, is bound not to venture further than the question of whether the questioned issuance was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or particularly, whether the Sandiganbayan properly denied petitioner�s motion to quash upon the finding that the informations are sufficient to indict the accused. Suffice it to say that only after trial on the merits can it be determined whether petitioner indeed participated in the commission of the offense charged and if so to what degree he did participate, as these questions are inherently factual in nature.
WHEREFORE, finding no substantial arguments in the instant motion for reconsideration, the Court resolves to DENY the same with FINALITY.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 152-176.
[2] Id. at 151.
[3] Also charged are Milagros Tee Tan (provincial governor of Western Samar), Damiano Conde (provincial treasurer), Romeo Reales (provincial accountant), Maximo Sison (provincial budget officer), Aurelio Bardaje, Jr. (general services officer), Numeriano Legaspi (record officer and inspector of the General Services Office), Reynaldo Angeles Yahut and several other unnamed accused. The cases are docketed as CC No. SB-06-CRM-0457 to 0464.
[4] Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
X X X
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
[5] ENTITLED THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT..
[6] Rollo, pp. 75-106.
[7] ld. at 3-31.
[8] Id. at 12, 16 and 22.
[9] ld. at 151.
[10] Id. at 153.
[11] id. at 158-173.
[12] Mendoza v. CFI, G.R. Nos. L-35612-14, 27 June 1973, 51 SCRA 369, 379.
[13] Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990, 186 SCRA 1, 5.
[14] Lee v. People, G.R. No. 159288, 19 October 2004, 440 SCRA 662, 681-682.
[15] Cabrera, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 162314-17, October 25, 2004.
