June 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 171895 : June 16, 2010] HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SOLED AD F. VDA. DE BENGSON, AURORO BENGSON, SR., LEONARDA BENGSON-MANLONGAT AND MARCOS BENGSON, JR., PETITIONERS, V. SPOUSES CRESENCIO FERNANDEZ AND AQUILINA FERNANDEZ AND SPOUSES ROMUALDO AND BRENDA BENGSON, RESPONDENTS. :
[G.R. No. 171895 : June 16, 2010]
HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SOLED AD F. VDA. DE BENGSON, AURORO BENGSON, SR., LEONARDA BENGSON-MANLONGAT AND MARCOS BENGSON, JR., PETITIONERS, V. SPOUSES CRESENCIO FERNANDEZ AND AQUILINA FERNANDEZ AND SPOUSES ROMUALDO AND BRENDA BENGSON, RESPONDENTS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 16 June 2010, which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 171895 (HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SOLED AD F. VDA. DE BENGSON, AURORO BENGSON, SR., LEONARDA BENGSON-MANLONGAT and MARCOS BENGSON, JR., Petitioners, v. SPOUSES CRESENCIO FERNANDEZ and AQUILINA FERNANDEZ and SPOUSES ROMUALDO and BRENDA BENGSON, Respondents.)
This is a petition for review[1] of the 19 December 2005 Decision[2] and the 13 March 2006 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81869. The 19 December 2005 Decision affirmed the 28 July 2003 Resolution[4] of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26 (trial court) denying the Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer/Answer-in-Intervention and Cross-claim with Motion to Implead Indispensable/Real Parties-in-Interest with Motion to Admit Attached Amended Answer/Answer-in-Intervention and Cross-claim filed by the heirs of the deceased Soledad F. Vda. De Bengson, Auroro Bengson, Leonarda Bengson-Manlongat and Marcos Bengson, Jr. (petitioners). The 13 March 2006 Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On 18 January 1999, respondent spouses Cresencio and Aquilina Fernandez (spouses Fernandez) filed a complaint against Soledad Vda. De Bengson (Soledad) for specific performance and damages.[5] Spouses Fernandez alleged that Soledad conditionally sold to them a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-288 (OCT No. 0-288). When Soledad failed to comply with the conditions stipulated in the conditional deed of sale, spouses Fernandez filed the complaint to compel Soledad to surrender possession of the land to them and to cancel OCT No. 0-288.
In her 8 June 1999 Answer, Soledad argued that the conditional deed of sale was "simulated."[6] According to Soledad, the property was only a guaranty for the loans secured by respondents Romualdo and Brenda Bengson.
After the pre-trial conference, the trial of the case ensued.
On 20 December 2002, Soledad died. Soledad's counsel filed a Motion for Substitution of Deceased Defendant by Heirs and Motion with Prior Leave to Allow the Heirs as Substituted Party to File Appropriate Pleadings to Protect their Rights, Interests, Participation to the Property Subject of Litigation. The trial court granted the motion.
On 13 May 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Answer/Answer-in-Intervention and Cross-claim with Motion to Implead Indispensable/Real Parties-in-Interest.[7] Petitioners also attached their Amended Answer/Answer-in-Intervention with Cross-claim.[8] Petitioners alleged that the property was not Soledad's paraphernal property but was the conjugal property of spouses Marcos Bengson, Sr. and Soledad.
On 28 July 2003, the trial court denied petitioners' motion because in the 15 May 2001 pre-trial order Soledad admitted that the property was her paraphernal property. The trial court said that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. The trial court also noted that during the trial, the issue of whether the property was paraphernal or conjugal was never discussed. According to the trial court, as substituted defendants, petitioners are bound by Soledad's admissions. Moreover, the trial court noted that the motion appears to have been filed with intent to delay the disposition of the case since Soledad was supposed to present her last witness just before her death but that the trial was continuously postponed upon Soledad's motion. The trial court even warned Soledad to wind up her presentation of evidence.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 12 January 2004 Order, the trial court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its 19 December 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying petitioners' motion. The Court of Appeals noted that petitioners filed the motion long after the date of the pre-trial conference and during the presentation of Soledad's evidence. The Court of Appeals declared that to allow the said motion would have the effect of "unnecessarily prolonging the trial and disposition of the case." The Court of Appeals also noted that petitioners failed to show sufficient and justifiable reasons why the new defenses raised in the proposed amendment were not pleaded in the original answer. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the motion was filed with intent to delay the proceedings.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 13 March 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners raise the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying petitioners' motion.
The petition has no merit.
Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
In this case, petitioners belatedly filed their motion after spouses Fernandez have rested their case and Soledad was already warned by the trial court to wrap up her presentation of evidence. To admit petitioners' amended answer would require a re-opening of spouses Fernandez's case to refute the new defenses raised by petitioners in the said pleading and thus delay the proceedings further. We note that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals declared that petitioners filed the motion with the intent to delay the proceedings.
Similarly, in Garcia, Jr. v. Ranada, Jr.,[11] we said:
SO ORDERED. (Mendoza, J., on leave; Perez, J., designated additional member per Special Order No. 842)
G.R. No. 171895 (HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SOLED AD F. VDA. DE BENGSON, AURORO BENGSON, SR., LEONARDA BENGSON-MANLONGAT and MARCOS BENGSON, JR., Petitioners, v. SPOUSES CRESENCIO FERNANDEZ and AQUILINA FERNANDEZ and SPOUSES ROMUALDO and BRENDA BENGSON, Respondents.)
This is a petition for review[1] of the 19 December 2005 Decision[2] and the 13 March 2006 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81869. The 19 December 2005 Decision affirmed the 28 July 2003 Resolution[4] of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26 (trial court) denying the Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer/Answer-in-Intervention and Cross-claim with Motion to Implead Indispensable/Real Parties-in-Interest with Motion to Admit Attached Amended Answer/Answer-in-Intervention and Cross-claim filed by the heirs of the deceased Soledad F. Vda. De Bengson, Auroro Bengson, Leonarda Bengson-Manlongat and Marcos Bengson, Jr. (petitioners). The 13 March 2006 Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On 18 January 1999, respondent spouses Cresencio and Aquilina Fernandez (spouses Fernandez) filed a complaint against Soledad Vda. De Bengson (Soledad) for specific performance and damages.[5] Spouses Fernandez alleged that Soledad conditionally sold to them a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-288 (OCT No. 0-288). When Soledad failed to comply with the conditions stipulated in the conditional deed of sale, spouses Fernandez filed the complaint to compel Soledad to surrender possession of the land to them and to cancel OCT No. 0-288.
In her 8 June 1999 Answer, Soledad argued that the conditional deed of sale was "simulated."[6] According to Soledad, the property was only a guaranty for the loans secured by respondents Romualdo and Brenda Bengson.
After the pre-trial conference, the trial of the case ensued.
On 20 December 2002, Soledad died. Soledad's counsel filed a Motion for Substitution of Deceased Defendant by Heirs and Motion with Prior Leave to Allow the Heirs as Substituted Party to File Appropriate Pleadings to Protect their Rights, Interests, Participation to the Property Subject of Litigation. The trial court granted the motion.
On 13 May 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Answer/Answer-in-Intervention and Cross-claim with Motion to Implead Indispensable/Real Parties-in-Interest.[7] Petitioners also attached their Amended Answer/Answer-in-Intervention with Cross-claim.[8] Petitioners alleged that the property was not Soledad's paraphernal property but was the conjugal property of spouses Marcos Bengson, Sr. and Soledad.
On 28 July 2003, the trial court denied petitioners' motion because in the 15 May 2001 pre-trial order Soledad admitted that the property was her paraphernal property. The trial court said that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. The trial court also noted that during the trial, the issue of whether the property was paraphernal or conjugal was never discussed. According to the trial court, as substituted defendants, petitioners are bound by Soledad's admissions. Moreover, the trial court noted that the motion appears to have been filed with intent to delay the disposition of the case since Soledad was supposed to present her last witness just before her death but that the trial was continuously postponed upon Soledad's motion. The trial court even warned Soledad to wind up her presentation of evidence.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 12 January 2004 Order, the trial court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its 19 December 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying petitioners' motion. The Court of Appeals noted that petitioners filed the motion long after the date of the pre-trial conference and during the presentation of Soledad's evidence. The Court of Appeals declared that to allow the said motion would have the effect of "unnecessarily prolonging the trial and disposition of the case." The Court of Appeals also noted that petitioners failed to show sufficient and justifiable reasons why the new defenses raised in the proposed amendment were not pleaded in the original answer. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the motion was filed with intent to delay the proceedings.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 13 March 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners raise the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying petitioners' motion.
The petition has no merit.
Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court. - Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. x x xThe granting of leave to file an amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitation that the amendment was not made to delay the action.[9] Moreover, while courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits, this liberality is greatest in the early stages of the case, decreases as it progresses, and changes at times to a strictness, amounting to a prohibition.[10]
In this case, petitioners belatedly filed their motion after spouses Fernandez have rested their case and Soledad was already warned by the trial court to wrap up her presentation of evidence. To admit petitioners' amended answer would require a re-opening of spouses Fernandez's case to refute the new defenses raised by petitioners in the said pleading and thus delay the proceedings further. We note that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals declared that petitioners filed the motion with the intent to delay the proceedings.
Similarly, in Garcia, Jr. v. Ranada, Jr.,[11] we said:
The possible delay and prejudice to be occasioned to private respondent as plaintiff by the admission of the amended answer negate grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court. Since the prerogative writ of certiorari does not lie except to correct, not every misstep, but a grave abuse of discretion, i.e., capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, respondent Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the special civil action for certiorari filed by the petitioner. For even if the view taken thereon by the respondent judge is considered hypothetically erroneous, said view would connote a mere mistake of judgment not constituting an abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, to affect the jurisdiction of the lower court and to warrant our intervention by certiorari.[12]WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 19 December 2005 Decision and 13 March 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81869.
SO ORDERED. (Mendoza, J., on leave; Perez, J., designated additional member per Special Order No. 842)
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Rollo, pp. 9-14. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring.
[3] Id. at 16-17.
[4] Id. at 131-135.
[5] Id. at 149-152.
[6] Id. at 155-160.
[7] Id. at 167-171.
[8] Id. at 172-190.
[9] Tiu v. Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R. No. 151932, 19 August 2009, 596 SCRA 432.
[10] Garcia, Jr. v. Ranada, Jr., 248 Phil. 239 (1988).
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 246.
