Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence


Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1929 > August 1929 Decisions > G.R. No. 31025 August 15, 1929 - FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ ET AL. v. JUAN CARPIO

053 Phil 334:




PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 31025. August 15, 1929.]

FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JUAN CARPIO, Defendant-Appellant.

Eusebio Orense and Marcelino Aguas for Appellant.

Gutierrez David, Dizon & David for Appellees.

SYLLABUS


1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; "MONTH," COMPUTATION OF. — Article 7 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which "month" now means the civil or calendar month, and not the thirty-day month. (Guzman v. Lichauco, 42 Phil., 291.)

2. ID.; ID.; CIVIL MONTH, DEFINITION. — The civil or solar month is that which agrees with the Gregorian calendar; and these months are known by the names of January, February, March, etc. They are composed of unequal portions of time. (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary.)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 13, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. — In computing any fixed period of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done at a certain time or within a certain limit of time, the day of date, or day from which the time is reckoned, is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise provided. (Sec. 13, Adm. Code.) Similar provisions are found in article 1130 of the Civil Code, and in section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

4. REDEMPTION BY MEANS OF CHECK. — Payment by check does not per se have the effect of such payment. (Sec. 189, Act No. 2031; art. 1170, Civ. Code; Bryan, Landon Co. v. American Bank, 7 Phil., 255; and Tan Sunco v. Santos, 9 Phil., 44; 21 R. C. L., 60, 61.)

5. ID.; ESTOPPEL. — The defendant having given his consent to the redemption of the land in question by check, and having signified that by reason of such redemption the plaintiffs could return to their house, said defendant was in estoppel and could not, on the following day, refuse to accept such payment by check, because he induced the plaintiffs to act upon the belief that he had consented to said manner of payment.


D E C I S I O N


ROMUALDEZ, J.:


The litigants herein compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing that if within one month from the date thereof the plaintiffs failed to repurchase certain land, its ownership would vest in the defendant.

The question now raised is whether or not the plaintiffs duly tendered the amount of the reimbursement agreed upon in the proper form of money to the defendant.

The court below held in the affirmative, but the defendant, appealing from such judgment, maintains that on August 13, when the plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated period had already elapsed; that the tender of reimbursement made by check is insufficient; and that the holding of the trial court that the land in question is valued at P27,000 is groundless.

When did the stipulated month terminate? This is the first point in controversy, the determination of which depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties, and on the day from which it should be counted.

As to the kind of month, it is to be noted that, according to the ruling in the case of Guzman v. Lichauco (42 Phil., 291), article 7 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which "month" now means the civil or calendar month and not the regular thirty-day month.

And the civil or calendar month is defined as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The civil or solar month is that which agrees with the Gregorian calendar; and these months are known by the names of January, February, March, etc. They are composed of unequal portions of time . . ." (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary.)

"A calendar month is a month as designated in the calendar, without regard to the number of days it may contain. In commercial transactions it means a month ending on the day in the succeeding month corresponding to the day in the preceding month from which the computation began, and if the last month have not so many days, then on the last day of that month. Daley v. Anderson, 48 Pac., 839, 840; 7 Wyo., 1; 75 Am. St. Rep., 870 (citing Migotti v. Colvill, 4 C. P. Div., 233)." (1 Words and Phrases, 943.)

Hence, this court held in the case of Villegas v. Capistrano (9 Phil., 416), that the period of three months counted from February 13 did not expire on the 12th of the following May.

As to when said month began, said section 13 of the Administrative Code provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In computing any fixed period of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done at a certain time or within a certain limit of time, the day of date, or day from which the time is reckoned, is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise provided." (Italics ours.)

Similar provisions may be found in article 1130 of the Civil Code, and in section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

There is nothing in the agreement under discussion providing otherwise, and according to the phrase therein contained, "one month from this date," said date, which was July 13, 1928, is exactly the date which must be excluded being the "day from which the time is reckoned," according to the words of the aforementioned section 13 of the Administrative Code, which we have italicized above.

Wherefore, that civil month of thirty-one days began on July 14 and terminated with the end of the thirteenth day of the following August. And as it has been proved without discussion that the plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land from the defendant on August 13th, it follows that such offer was made within the period stipulated.

But the defendant alleges that the offer to repurchase made by check was legally insufficient. We agree that the payment by check does not per se have the effect of such payment. (Section 189, Act No. 2031, on Negotiable Instruments; article 1170, Civil Code; Bryan, Landon Co. v. American Bank, 7 Phil., 255; and Tan Sunco v. Santos, 9 Phil., 44; 21 R. C. L., 60, 61.) But it appears from Felipe Gutierrez’s testimony that the defendant told him on August 12th that he would accept the repurchase by check. Felipe Gutierrez is not very explicit about it, but we deem this to be the drift of his testimony. The defendant must have so understood it, seeing that he thought it necessary to rebut said detail in his testimony which, notwithstanding the defendant’s denial, we hold to be established by a preponderance of evidence, considering all the circumstances of the case. The defendant having thus consented to the repurchase by check and having signified that by reason of such repurchase the plaintiffs could return to their home, said defendant was in estoppel, and could not, on the following day, refuse to accept such payment by check, because he induced the plaintiffs to act upon the belief that he had consented to said manner of payment.

From this it follows that by virtue of the defendant’s having consented to that payment by check, which was neither alleged nor proved to be in any way defective, that offer to repurchase was legally effective and sufficient to compel the defendant to accept it.

We conclude that the offer to repurchase was made within the stipulated period and in the form of money accepted by the defendant, from whose refusal to allow the repurchase in such terms originates the plaintiffs’ right of action herein.

The last assignment of error touching the value of the land, cannot be a cause for the reversal of the judgment appealed from for under the circumstances of the case, it has no bearing on the decision of the case nor affects the result thereof.

The judgment appealed from is modified, and it is hereby ordered that the plaintiffs may, within ten days from the date on which this judgment becomes final, repurchase the land, the subject matter of these proceedings, through the delivery to the defendant at the latter’s residence in the municipality of Santa Rita, Pampanga, of the sum of fourteen thousand six hundred forty three pesos and forty-three centavos (P14,643.43), Philippine currency (in coin or paper money). The judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.




Back to Home | Back to Main




















chanrobles.com





ChanRobles On-Line Bar Review

ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : www.chanroblesbar.com

ChanRobles MCLE On-line

ChanRobles Lawnet Inc. - ChanRobles MCLE On-line : www.chanroblesmcleonline.com






August-1929 Jurisprudence                 

  • G.R. No. 31342 August 3, 1929 - VICENTE ONG CHIONGCHI v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ORIENTAL NEGROS

    053 Phil 264

  • G.R. No. 30532 August 5, 1929 - GODOFREDO MENDOZA v. TEODORO MENDIOLA ET AL.

    053 Phil 267

  • G.R. No. 31251 August 6, 1929 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MAGUIA DE TAGA

    053 Phil 273

  • G.R. No. 31255 August 7, 1929 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ISAIAS GEYROSAGA

    053 Phil 278

  • G.R. No. 30724 August 8, 1929 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MARIANO DUCUSIN

    053 Phil 280

  • G.R. No. 31070 August 8, 1929 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. CHARLES E. T. WADE

    053 Phil 292

  • G.R. Nos. 30486 & 30487 August 9, 1929 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. LUIS MAALIHAN

    053 Phil 295

  • G.R. No. 31814 August 9, 1929 - FELIX ARAMBULO v. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LAGUNA ET AL.,

    053 Phil 302

  • G.R. No. 29412 August 10, 1929 - VICTORIANO OMBALINO v. FELIPA SALDARIAGA ET AL.

    053 Phil 306

  • G.R. No. 30840 August 10, 1929 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. DANIEL RIVERA

    053 Phil 308

  • G.R. No. 30427 August 12, 1929 - HARRY MARTIN v. AGUSAN COCONUT CO.

    053 Phil 311

  • G.R. No. 30686 August 12, 1929 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JUAN MONTES ET AL.

    053 Phil 323

  • G.R. No. 31075 August 12, 1929 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. TELESFORO APIADO

    053 Phil 325

  • G.R. No. 31680 August 14, 1929 - DIONISIO SAN PABLO v. FRANCISCO ENAGE

    053 Phil 328

  • G.R. No. 30366 August 15, 1929 - SOCORRO SANCHEZ DE STRONG v. WILLIAM BEISHIR

    053 Phil 331

  • G.R. No. 31025 August 15, 1929 - FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ ET AL. v. JUAN CARPIO

    053 Phil 334

  • G.R. No. 30745 August 20, 1929 - J. V. HOUSE v. JUAN POSADAS

    053 Phil 338

  • G.R. No. 31024 August 22, 1929 - RICARDO DE MESA v. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE

    053 Phil 342

  • G.R. No. 29780 August 23, 1929 - GOV’T. OF THE PHIL. v. ASIA LUMBER CO.

    053 Phil 346

  • G.R. No. 30234 August 23, 1929 - CLARO VILLAROSA ET AL. v. ULDARICO VILLAMOR

    053 Phil 350

  • G.R. No. 30240 August 23, 1929 - AQUILINA TACAS ET AL. v. EVARISTO TOBON

    053 Phil 356

  • G.R. No. 31101 August 23, 1929 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. PEDRO DURANTE

    053 Phil 363

  • G.R. No. 30495 August 24, 1929 - ERLANGER & GALINGER v. JUAN POSADAS

    053 Phil 372

  • G.R. No. 30279 August 26, 1929 - MAXIMO GUILLENA v. CANDELARIO BORJA

    053 Phil 379

  • G.R. No. 31273 August 26, 1929 - CORNELIO ALBA v. FORTUNATO ACUÑA ET AL.,

    053 Phil 380

  • G.R. No. 31636 August 26, 1929 - SATURNINO GALLARDO v. ELIAS ALDANA

    053 Phil 388

  • G.R. No. 30783 August 27, 1929 - JUAN B. ALEGRE v. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

    053 Phil 394

  • G.R. No. 31123 August 27, 1929 - PHIL. GUARANTY CO. v. CARMEN BELANDO

    053 Phil 410

  • G.R. No. 30421 August 28, 1929 - GOV’T. OF THE PHIL. v. AGUSTIN JAVIER

    053 Phil 415

  • G.R. No. 30668 August 28, 1929 - SABAS BUSTAMANTE ET AL. v. JOSE M. RATO Y TUASON ET AL.

    053 Phil 418

  • G.R. No. 30829 August 28, 1929 - GOV’T. OF THE PHIL. v. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE ET AL.

    053 Phil 423

  • G.R. No. 31120 August 28, 1929 - JESUSA LACSON DE ARROYO v. VISAYAN GENERAL SUPPLY CO.

    053 Phil 432

  • G.R. No. 31137 August 30, 1929 - CING HONG SO v. TAN BOON KONG ET AL.

    053 Phil 437

  • G.R. No. 30246 August 31, 1929 - AGRIPINO DE OCAMPO ET AL. v. JUAN ZAPORTEZA ET AL.

    053 Phil 442