Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2017 > March 2017 Decisions > G.R. No. 224834, March 15, 2017 - JONATHAN Y. DEE, Petitioner, v. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BONDEAST PRIVATE LIMITED, AND ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, AS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, AS DIRECTOR AND SHAREHOLDER OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents.; G.R. NO. 224871 - HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BONDEAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, AS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, AS A DIRECTOR AND SHAREHOLDER OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners, v. ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, AND BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS, Respondents.:

Assailed in these consolidated petitions¹� for review on certiorari are the Decision²� dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution³� dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213, which reversed the Resolution⁴ dated August 24, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 (RTC) in COMM'L. CASE NO. 15-234 and, accordingly, reinstated the case and remanded the same to the court a quo for further proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees.

The Facts

Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bondeast Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy S.C. Yap Chua (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own capacities, minority stockholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc. (Alliance), with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua acting as a member of Alliance's Board of Directors.⁵� As per Alliance's by-laws, its Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) is held every June 15.⁶� However, in a Special Board of Directors Meeting held at three (3) o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 2015, the Board of Directors, over Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's objections, passed a Board Resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance's� 2015 ASM pending complete subscription to its Stock Rights Offering (SRO) consisting of shares with total value of Pl Billion which was earlier approved in a Board Resolution passed on February 17, 2015. As per Alliance's Disclosure dated May 29, 2015 filed before the Philippine Stock Exchange, such postponement was made "to give the stockholders of [Alliance] better representation in the annual meeting, after taking into consideration their subscription to the [SRO] of [Alliance]."⁷� This prompted Harvest All, et al. to file the instant Complaint (with Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining� Order/Writ� of Preliminary� Injunction)⁸� involving� an� intra�-corporate� controversy� against� Alliance, and� its other� Board� members, namely, George E. Sycip, Jonathan Y. Dee, Raymund K.H. See, Mary Grace T. Vera- Cruz, Antonio C. Pacis, Erwin M. Elechicon, and Barbara Anne C. Migallos (Alliance Board). In said complaint, Harvest All, et al. principally claimed that the subscription to the new shares through the SRO cannot be made a condition precedent to the exercise by the current stockholders of their right to vote in the 2015 ASM; otherwise, they will be deprived of their full� voting� rights� proportionate� to� their� existing� shareholdings.⁹ Thus, Harvest All, et al., prayed for, inter alia, the declaration of nullity of the Board Resolution dated May� 29, 2015� indefinitely� postponing� the� 2015 ASM, as well as the Board Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SR0.¹⁰� The Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et al. with filing fees amounting to P8,860.00 which they paid accordingly.¹¹� Later on, Harvest All, et al. filed an Amended Complaint:¹²� (a) deleting its prayer to declare� null� and� void� the� Board� Resolution� dated� February� 17,� 2015 approving the SRO; and (b) instead, prayed that the Alliance Board be enjoined from implementing and carrying out the SRO prior to and as a condition for the holding of the 2015 ASM.¹³

For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground of Harvest All, et al.' s failure to pay the correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should have paid P20 Million, more or less, in filing fees based on the SRO which was valued at P1 Billion. However, Harvest All, et al. did not mention such capital infusion in their prayers and, as such, were only made to pay the measly sum of P8,860.00. On the other hand, Harvest� All,� et� al.� maintained� that� they� paid the� correct� filing� fees, considering that the subject of their complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM and not a claim on the aforesaid value of the SRO. Harvest All, et al. likewise pointed out that they simply relied on the assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no intention to defraud the government.¹⁴


In a Resolution¹⁵� dated� August� 24,� 2015,� the� RTC� dismissed� the instant complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay� the� correct� filing� fees.¹⁶� Citing� Rule 141 of� the� Rules of� Court,� as amended� by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC,¹⁷� and the Court's� pronouncement in Lu v. Lu Ym,� Sr. (Lu),¹⁸ the RTC found� that the basis for the computation� of filing fees should have been the PI Billion value of the SRO, it being the property in litigation.� As such,� Harvest All, et al. should� have paid filing fees in the amount of more or less P20 Million and not just P8,860.00.� In this� regard,� the� RTC� also� found� that� Harvest� All,� et� al.'s payment� of incorrect filing fees was done in bad faith and with clear intent to defraud the government, considering� that: (a)� when the issue on correct filing fees was first raised during the hearing on the application for TRO, Harvest All, et al. never manifested their willingness to abide by the Rules by paying additional filing fees when so required; (b) despite Harvest All, et al.'s admission� in their complaint� that the SRO was valued at P1 Billion, they chose to keep mum on the meager assessment made by the Clerk of Court; and (c) while Harvest All, et al. made mention of the SRO in the body of their complaint,� they� failed� to� indicate� the� same� in� their� prayer,� thus, preventing the Clerk of Court from making the correct assessment of filing fees.¹⁹

Aggrieved, Harvest All, et al. appealed²⁰ to the CA.



In a Decision²¹ dated February� I5, 20I6,� the CA reversed the RTC's order� of dismissal� and, accordingly,� reinstated� the case and remanded� the same to the court a quo for further proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees.²² Also citing Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, and Lu, the CA held that the prevailing rule is that all intra-corporate controversies� always� involve� a� property� in� litigation. Consequently, it� agreed� with� the RTC's finding� that� the� basis� for� the computation of filing fees should have been the PI� Billion value of the SRO and, thus, Harvest All, et al. should have paid filing fees in the amount of more or less P20 Million and not just P8,860.00.²³� However, in the absence of contrary� evidence,� the CA held that Harvest All, et al. were not in bad faith� and� had� no intention� of� defrauding� the� government,� as they� merely relied� in� the assessment� of� the� Clerk� of� Court.� Thus,� in� the� interest� of substantial justice, the CA ordered the reinstatement� of Harvest All, et al.'s complaint and the remand of the same to the RTC for further proceedings, provided that they pay the correct filing fees.²⁴

The parties moved for reconsideration,²⁵ which were, however, denied in a Resolution²⁶ dated May 25, 2016. Hence, these consolidated petitions.


The� primordial issues� raised for the� Court's resolution are: (a) whether� or� not� Harvest All,� et� al.� paid� insufficient filing fees� for� their complaint, as the same should have been based on the P1 Billion value of the SRO; and� (b)� if� Harvest� All,� et� al.� indeed� paid insufficient� filing� fees, whether or not such act was made in good faith and without any intent to defraud the government.


The petition in G.R. No. 224834 is denied, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is partly granted.


At the outset, the Court notes that in ruling that the correct filing fees for Harvest All, et al.'s complaint should be based on the P1 Billion value of the SRO - and, thus, essentially holding that such complaint was capable of pecuniary� estimation� - both� the� RTC� and� the� CA� heavily� relied� on� the Court's� pronouncement� in Lu. In Lu, the Court� mentioned� that in view of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 which introduced Section 21 (k)²⁷� to� Rule� 141� of� the� Rules� of� Court,� it� seemed that� "an� intra-corporate controversy always involves a property in litigation" and that "there� can be no case of intra-corporate� controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated."²⁸

However, after a careful reading of Lu, it appears that Harvest All, et al. correctly pointed out²⁹� that the foregoing statements were in the nature of an obiter dictum.

To recount, in Lu, the Court ruled, inter alia, that the case involving an intra-corporate controversy instituted therein, i.e., declaration of nullity of share� issuance,� is incapable� of pecuniary estimation� and, thus, the correct docket� fees were paid.³⁰ Despite� such pronouncement,� the Court still went on to say that had the complaint therein been filed during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, then it would have ruled otherwise because the amendments� brought about by the same "seem to imply that there can be no case� of� intra-corporate� controversy� where� the� value� of the� subject matter cannot be estimated,"³¹viz.:

The� new� Section� 21� (k)� of� Rule� 141� of the� Rules� of� Court,� as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC (July 20, 2004), expressly provides that "[f]or petitions� for� insolvency� or� other cases� involving intra-corporate controversies,� the fees prescribed� under Section 7 (a) shall apply." Notatu dignum is that paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of Section 7 thereof was omitted from the� reference.� Said� paragraph refers to� docket� fees� for� filing� "[a]ctions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" and "all other actions not involving property."

By referring the� computation of such docket fees to paragraph (a) only, it denotes that an intra-corporate� controversy� always� involves a property in litigation, the value of which is always the basis for computing the applicable filing fees. The latest amendments seem to imply that there can be� no� case� of� intra-corporate controversy where the� value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. Even one for a mere inspection of corporate books.

If the complaint were� filed� today,� one could safely find� refuge in the express phraseology of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141� that paragraph (a) alone applies.

In� the� present case, however, the original Complaint was filed on August 14, 2000 during which� time Section� 7, without qualification, was the applicable provision. Even the Amended Complaint was filed on March 31, 2003 during which time the applicable rule expressed that paragraphs (a) and (b) 1 & 3 shall be the basis for computing the filing fees� in� intra-corporate� cases,� recognizing that� there� could� be� an� intra�-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated, such� as� an� action� for� inspection� of� corporate books.� The immediate illustration shows� that� no mistake can even be attributed to the RTC clerk of court in the assessment of the docket fees. ³² (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Accordingly, the passages in Lu that "an intra-corporate controversy always involves a property� in litigation" and that "there� can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" are clearly non-determinative� of the antecedents� involved in that case and, hence, cannot be controlling jurisprudence to bind our courts when it� adjudicates� similar cases� upon� the� principle� of� stare� decisis.� As� it� is evident,� these� passages� in Lu only constitute� an opinion� delivered� by the Court as a "by the way" in relation to a hypothetical scenario (i.e., if the complaint was filed during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which it was not) different from the actual case before it.

In� Land� Bank� of� the� Philippines v.� Santos, ³³� the� Court� had� the opportunity� to� define� an obiter� dictum� and� discuss� its� legal� effects� as follows:

[An obiter dictum] "x x x is a remark made,� or opinion� expressed, by a judge, in his decision� upon� a cause by the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon� the question before� him,� or� upon� a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause,� or introduced by way� of illustration, or analogy� or� argument.� It does not embody� the� resolution or determination of the� court, and� is� made� without argument, or full consideration of the� point. It lacks� the force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of an� opinion� with� no� binding force� for� purposes of res judicata."³⁴� (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

For these� reasons, therefore,� the courts a quo� erred� in applying� the case of Lu.


In any event, the Court finds that the obiter dictum stated in Lu was actually incorrect. This is because depending� on the nature of the principal action� or� remedy� sought,� an� intra-corporate controversy� may� involve� a subject matter which is either capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation.

In Cabrera v. Francisco,³⁵� the Court laid down the parameters� in determining whether an action is considered capable of pecuniary estimation or not:

In� determining whether an� action� is one the subject matter of which� is not� capable of pecuniary estimation this� Court has� adopted the criterion of first� ascertaining the� nature of the principal action� or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is� in� the municipal courts� or� in� the [C]ourts of� [F]irst [I]nstance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic� issue� is� something other than the� right to� recover a� sum� of money, where� the� money� claim is purely� incidental� to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such� actions� as� cases� where� the� subject of the litigation may� not� be estimated in terms� of money, and are cognizable exclusively by [C]ourts of� [F]irst [I]nstance (now Regional Trial Courts). ³⁶ (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

This� case� is� a� precise illustration as� to� how� an� intra-corporate controversy may be classified as an action whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary� estimation.� A� cursory perusal� of� Harvest All,� et� al.'s Complaint� and� Amended� Complaint� reveals� that� its� main purpose is� to have Alliance� hold its 2015 ASM on the date� set in the corporation's� by� laws, or at the time when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully materialize, so that their� voting� interest� with� the corporation� would� somehow� be� preserved. Thus,� Harvest� All,� et� al.� sought� for� the� nullity� of the� Alliance� Board Resolution passed on May 29, 2015 which indefinitely postponed the corporation's 2015 ASM pending completion� of subscription� to the SR0.³⁷� Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as the concomitant relief of holding the 2015 ASM as scheduled in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of sum of money. The mere mention of Alliance's� impending SRO valued at P1 Billion cannot transform the nature of Harvest All, et al.'s action to one capable of pecuniary estimation, considering� that: (a) Harvest All, et al. do not claim ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the shares subject of� the SRO; and (b) such mention was� merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the severe dilution that their voting interest as minority shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be held after the SRO was completed. If, in the end, a sum of money or anything capable of pecuniary estimation would be recovered by virtue of Harvest All, et al.'s complaint, then it would simply be the consequence of their principal action. Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

At this juncture,� it should be mentioned that the Court passed A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC³⁸� dated October 5, 2016, which introduced amendments to the� schedule� of� legal� fees� to� be� collected� in� various commercial� cases, including those involving intra-corporate controversies. Pertinent portions of A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC read:

x x x

Whereas, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.� No. 04-2-04-SC� effective 16 August 2004,� incorporated� the equitable schedule of legal fees prescribed for petitions for rehabilitation under Section 21 (i)� thereof and, furthermore, provided under Section 21(k) thereof that the fees prescribed under Section 7(a) of the said rule shall� apply� to� petitions� for� insolvency or� other� cases� involving� intra-�corporate controversies;

x x x

NOW, THEREFORE, the Court resolves to ADOPT a new schedule of filing fees as follows:

x x x

4.Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court� is hereby� DELETED as� the� fees covering� petitions� for� insolvency� are already provided for in this Resolution. As for cases involving intra� corporate controversies, the� applicable� fees shall� be those� provided under� Section 7 (a), 7 (b) (1), or 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court� depending� on the nature of the action.

x x x

This Resolution shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of national circulation. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) is directed to circularize the same upon its effectivity. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Verily, the deletion� of Section� 21 (k) of Rule 141 and in lieu thereof, the application of Section 7 (a) [fees for� actions where� the value� of the subject matter can� be determined/estimated], 7 (b) (1) [fees for� actions where� the value� of the subject matter cannot be estimated], or 7 (b) (3) [fees for all� other� actions not� involving� property] of the� same� Rule� to cases� involving� intra-corporate controversies for� the� determination� of the correct filing fees, as the case may be, serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, the amendments concretize the Court's recognition that the subject matter of an intra-corporate controversy may or may not be capable of pecuniary estimation; and on the other hand, they were also made to correct the anomaly created by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu obiter dictum) implying that all intra-corporate cases involved a subject matter which is deemed capable of pecuniary estimation.

While the Court is not unaware� that the amendments brought� by A.M. No.� 04-02-04-SC dated� October� 5, 2016� only� came� after� the� filing� of� the complaint� subject� of this case, such amendments may nevertheless be given retroactive effect� so� as� to� make� them� applicable to� the� resolution of the instant� consolidated petitions� as they� merely� pertained� to a procedural� rule, i.e.,� Rule� 141,� and� not� substantive� law.� In� Tan, Jr. v. CA,³⁹� the� Court thoroughly explained the retroactive� effectivity� of procedural� rules, viz.:

The general� rule that statutes� are prospective� and� not retroactive does� not� ordinarily� apply� to procedural� laws.� It� has� been� held� that� "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches� a new� disability,� in respect� of transactions� or considerations� already past. Hence,� remedial� statutes� or statutes relating to remedies or� modes of procedure, which� do not create new or� take� away� vested rights, but� only� operate in� furtherance of� the remedy� or confirmation of rights� already existing,� do not come within the� legal� conception of a� retroactive law, or� the� general rule� against the� retroactive operation of statutes." The general� rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract� or� to disturb� vested� rights� does� not� prevent� the application� of statutes to proceedings� pending at the time of their enactment� where they neither� create� new� nor� take� away� vested� rights.� A� new statute� which deals� with� procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions� - those which have accrued or are� pending.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to� actions� pending and� undetermined at� the� time� of� their passage.� Procedural� laws are retroactive� in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural� statutes may somehow affect the litigants'� rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative� of any� right of� a� person who� may� feel� that he� is adversely affected. Nor� is� the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The� reason is that� as a general rule no vested� right� may attach to,� nor� arise from, procedural laws.� It has� been� held� that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of� any� other� than� the� existing� rules� of� procedure." ⁴⁰� (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In view� of the� foregoing,� and� having� classified� Harvest� All,� et al.'s action as one incapable of pecuniary� estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should� be made� to pay the appropriate docket� fees in accordance with� the applicable fees provided� under� Section� 7 (b) (3) of Rule� 141 [fees for all other actions not involving� property]� of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with� A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated� October� 5, 2016.� The matter is therefore� remanded� to the RTC in order:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a)� to� first determine� if Harvest,� et� al.'s payment� of filing fees in the amount of P8,860.00, as initially assessed� by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with� A.M. No. 04-02-04- SC;

(b) if Harvest All, et al.'s� payment of P8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest,� et al.'s payment� of any discrepancy� within� a period� of fifteen� (15)� days� from� notice, and after such payment, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch; or

(c)� if Harvest� All,� et� al.'s payment� of� P8,860.00� is already sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch.

WHEREFORE,� the petition in G.R. No. 224834� is DENIED, while the petition� in G.R.� No. 224871� is PARTLY� GRANTED.� The� Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM'L.� CASE NO. 15-234 is hereby REMANDED� to the Regional� Trial Court� of Pasig� City, Branch� 159 for further proceedings as stated in the final paragraph of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Velasco, JR.,^*� Leonardo-De Castro,� and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

---

^* Designated Additional Member per Raffle dated February 22, 2017.

¹Rollo (G.R. No. 224834),� Vol. I, pp. 45-108; rollo (G.R. No. 224871),� Vol. I, pp. 14-44.

²Rollo� (G.R.� No.� 224834), Vol. I, pp. 12-22.� Penned� by� Associate� Justice� Mario� V. Lopez with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez concurring.

³ Id. at 24-28.

⁴ Id. at 311-318. Penned by Presiding Judge Elma M. Rafallo-Lingan.

⁵ See rollo (G.R. No. 224871), Vol. I, pp. 14 and 19.

⁶ See id. at 121.

⁷ See id. at 19-20. See also rollo (G.R. No. 224834),� Vol. I, p. 13.

⁸ Dated July 31, 2015. Rollo (G.R. No. 224871), Vol. I, pp. 544-577.

⁹ See id. at 558-568.

¹⁰ See id. at� 575.

¹¹ See rollo (G.R. No. 224834),� Vol. I, p. 14.

¹² See Amended Complaint; rollo (G.R. No. 224871), Vol. I, pp. 107-144.

¹³ See id. at 137-138.

¹⁴ See rollo (G.R. No. 224834), Vol. I, pp. 13-14.

¹⁵ Id. at 311-318.

¹⁶ See id. at 311-317.

¹⁷ Entitled "RE: PROPOSED REVISION OF RULE 141, REVISED RULES OF COURT, LEGAL FEES" (August� 16, 2004).

¹⁸ 658 Phil.156 (2011).

¹⁹ See rollo (G.R.� No. 224834),� Vol. I, pp. 312-316.

²⁰ See Petition for Review (with� Prayer for the Issuance� of a Temporary Restraining Order� and/or Preliminary Injunction) dated September 8, 2015; id. at 331-377.

²¹ Id. at 12-22.

²² See id. at 21.

²³ See id. at 15-18.

²⁴ See id. at 19-21.

²⁵ See id. at 24.

²⁶ Id. at 24-28.

²⁷ Section 21 (k), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 21. Other fees. -The following fees shall also be collected� by the clerks of the Regional Trial Courts or courts of the first level, as the case may be:

x x x

(k) For petitions for insolvency or other cases involving intra-corporate controversies, the fees prescribed under Section 7 (a) shall apply.

²⁸Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr., supra note 18, at 190.

²⁹ See rollo (G.R. No. 224871),� Vol. I, pp. 39-40

³⁰ See Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr., supra note 18, at 179-184.

³¹ Id. at 190.

³² Id. at 190-191.

³³ See G.R. Nos. 213863 and 214021, January 27, 2016.

³⁴ See id.; citations omitted.

³⁵ 716 Phil. 574 (2013).

³⁶ Id. at 586-587, citing De Ungria v. CA, 669� Phil. 585, 597 (2011).

³⁷ See rollo (G.R. No. 224871), Vol.� I, pp. 138 and 575.

³⁸� Entitled� "THE LEGAL� FEES TO BE COLLECTED IN� CASES OF LIQUIDATION� OF SOLVENT JURIDICAL DEBTORS, LIQUIDATION� OF INSOLVENT JURIDICAL� AND INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS, CONVERSION FROM REHABILITATION TO LIQUIDATION� PROCEEDINGS, SUSPENSION OF PAYMENTS OF INSOLVENT INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS AND PETITIONS IN AN OUT OF COURT RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT PROVIDED UNDER A.M. Nos. 12-12-11-SC AND 15-04-06-SC."

³⁹ 424 Phil. 556 (2002).

⁴⁰ Id. at 569; citation omitted.