Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

This administrative case stemmed from the disbarment complaint¹ (1995 complaint) filed by Rosa Yap Paras (complainant) against her husband Justo de Jesus Paras (respondent) for which he was suspended from the practice of law for a year. The issues before the Court now are (a) whether respondent should be held administratively liable for allegedly violating his suspension order and (b) whether his suspension should be lifted.

The Facts

In a Decision² dated October 18, 2000, the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year for immorality and abandonment of his family, with the penalties to be served simultaneously.³ Respondent moved for reconsideration⁴ but the Court denied it with finality in a Resolution⁵ dated January 22, 2001.

On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion⁶ to declare in contempt and disbar respondent and his associate, Atty. Richard R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo), alleging that respondent continued to practice law, and that Atty. Enojo signed a pleading prepared by respondent, in violation of the suspension order.⁷ Moreover, complainant claimed that respondent appeared before a court in Dumaguete City on February 21, 2001, thereby violating the suspension order.⁸ On March 26, 2001, complainant filed a second motion for contempt and disbarment,⁹ claiming that, on March 13, 2001, Atty. Enojo again appeared for Paras and Associates, in willful disobedience of the suspension order issued against respondent.¹⁰ Complainant filed two (2) more motions for contempt dated June 8, 2001¹¹ and August 21, 2001¹² raising the same arguments. Respondent and Atty. Enojo filed their respective comments,¹³ and complainant filed her replies¹⁴ to both comments. Later on, respondent filed a Motion to Lift Suspension¹⁵ dated May 27, 2002, informing the Court that he completed the suspension period on May 22, 2002. Thereafter, respondent admitted that he started accepting new clients and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift Suspension.¹⁶ Also, complainant manifested that respondent appeared before a court in an election case on July 25, 2002 despite the pendency of his motion to lift suspension. In view of the foregoing, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report and recommendation.¹⁷

On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Clarificatory Order¹⁸ on the status of respondent' suspension, essentially inquiring whether respondent can resume his practice prior to the Court's order to lift his suspension.¹⁹ Meanwhile, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the same inquiry through a Letter²⁰ dated March 21, 2003 signed by Acting Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Judge Romeo Anasario of the Second MCTC of Negros Oriental. Accordingly, the Court referred the foregoing queries to the OBC for report and recommendation.²¹

In a Report and Recommendation²² dated June 22, 2004, the OBC recommended that the Court issue an order declaring that respondent cannot engage in the practice of law until his suspension is ordered lifted by the Court.²³ Citing case law, the OBC opined that the lifting of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Court's decision and an order from the Court lifting the suspension is necessary to enable him to resume the practice of his profession. In this regard, the OBC noted that: (a) respondent's suspension became effective on May 23, 2001 upon his receipt of the Court resolution denying his motion for reconsideration with finality; and (b) considering that the suspensions were to be served simultaneously, the period of suspension should have ended on May 22, 2002.²⁴ To date, however, the Court has not issued any order lifting the suspension.

Soon thereafter, in a Resolution²⁵ dated August 2, 2004, the Court directed the IBP to submit its report and recommendation on the pending incidents referred to it. Since no report was received until 2013, the Court was constrained to issue a Resolution²⁶ dated January 20, 2014, requiring the IBP to submit a status report regarding the said incidents. In response, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline sent a letter²⁷ to the Court, conveying that the Board of Governors had passed a Resolution dated April 15, 2013 affirming respondent's suspension from the practice of law.²⁸ However, in view of the pendency of respondent's motion for reconsideration before it, the IBP undertook to transmit the case records to the Court as soon as said motion is resolved.²⁹ Thereafter, in a letter³⁰ dated September 22, 2015, the IBP advised the Court that it denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. The Court received the records and relevant documents only on February 15, 2016.³¹

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In the Report and Recommendation³² dated January 16, 2012, instead of resolving only the pending incidents referred to the IBP, the IBP Investigating Commissioner examined anew the 1995 complaint filed against respondent which had been resolved with finality by the Court in its Decision dated October 18, 2000 and Resolution dated January 22, 2001. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for falsifying his wife's signature in the bank loan documents and for immorality.³³

In a Resolution³⁴ dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation dated January 16, 2012, with modification decreasing the recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.³⁵ Aggrieved, respondent Filed a motion for reconsideration,³⁶ alleging that his administrative liability based on the charges in the 1995 complaint had been settled more than a decade ago in the Court's Decision dated October 18, 2000. He added that to suspend him anew for another year based on the same grounds would constitute administrative double jeopardy. He stressed that the post-decision referral of this case to the IBP was limited only to pending incidents relating to the motion to declare him in contempt and his motion to lift the suspension. Such motion was, however, denied in a Resolution dated June 7, 2015.³⁷

The Issues Before the Court

The core issues in this case are: (a) whether respondent should be administratively held liable for practicing law while he was suspended; and (b) whether the Court should lift his suspension.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, the Court notes that the instant matters referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation pertain to respondent's alleged violation of the suspension order and his request for the Court to lift the suspension order. However, the IBP Investigating Commissioner evidently did not dwell on such matters. Instead, the IBP Investigating Commissioner proceeded to determine respondent's liability based on the 1995 complaint filed by herein complainant � which was already resolved with finality by no less than the Court itself. To make things worse: (a) the IBP Board of Governors failed to see the IBP Investigating Commissioner's mishap, and therefore, erroneously upheld the latter's report and recommendation; and (b) it took the IBP more than a decade to resolve the instant matters before it. Thus, this leaves the Court with no factual findings to serve as its basis in resolving the issues raised before it.

Generally, the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with, except for valid and compelling reasons,³⁸ as it is essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues raised.³⁹ Absent a valid fact-finding investigation, the Court usually remands the administrative case to the IBP for further proceedings.⁴⁰ However, in light of the foregoing circumstances, as well as respondent's own admission that he resumed practicing law even without a Court order lifting his suspension, the Court finds a compelling reason to resolve the matters raised before it even without the IBP's factual findings and recommendation thereon.

According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and experience."⁴¹ During the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing law.⁴² It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period.⁴³ The lawyer must submit the required documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law.⁴⁴

In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that respondent's suspension period became effective on May 23, 2001 and lasted for one (1) year, or until May 22, 2002. Therafter, respondent filed a motion for the lifting of his suspension. However, soon after this filing and without waiting for a Court order approving the same, respondent admitted to accepting new clients and cases, and even working on an amicable settlement for his client with the Department of Agrarian Reform.⁴⁵ Indubitably, respondent engaged in the practice of law without waiting for the Court order lifting the suspension order against him, and thus, he must be held administratively liable therefor.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so � acts which respondent is guilty of in this case � are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law,⁴⁶ to wit:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. � A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, prevailing case law⁴⁷ shows that the Court consistently imposed an additional suspension of six (6) months on lawyers who continue practicing law despite their suspension. Thus, an additional suspension of six (6) months on respondent due to his unauthorized practice of law is proper. The Court is mindful, however, that suspension can no longer be imposed on respondent considering that just recently, respondent had already been disbarred from the practice of law and his name had been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys in Paras v. Paras.⁴⁸ In Sanchez v. Torres,⁴⁹ the Court ruled that the penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be imposed on a lawyer who had been previously disbarred.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the lawyer's administrative liability for recording purposes in the lawyer's personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court held that respondent therein should be suspended from the practice of law, although the said penalty can no longer be imposed in view of his previous disbarment. In the same manner, the Court imposes upon respondent herein the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, although the said penalty can no longer be effectuated in view of his previous disbarment, but nonetheless should be adjudged for recording purposes. That being said, the issue anent the propriety of lifting his suspension is already moot and academic.

As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a pleading dated February 21, 2001⁵¹ and indicating therein the firm name Paras and Associates, Atty. Enojo conspired with respondent to violate the suspension order.

Complainant's contention is untenable.

As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of representing clients before the courts. Thus, he can sign pleadings on their behalf. The Court cannot give credence to complainant's unsubstantiated claim that respondent prepared the pleading and only requested Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore, the pleading averted to by complainant was dated February 21, 2001, when respondent's suspension was not yet effective. Thus, the contempt charge against Atty. Enojo must be denied for lack of merit.

As a final note, the Court reminds the IBP to meticulously, diligently, and efficiently act on the matters referred to it for investigation, report, and recommendation, and to submit its report with reasonable dispatch so as to ensure proper administration of justice. Any inordinate delay cannot be countenanced.

WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. However, considering that respondent has already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed.

The motion to declare Atty. Richard R. Enojo in contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

¹ Dated April 25, 1995. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 1-19.

² 397 Phil. 462 (2000). See also rollo, Vol. I, pp. 608-626.

³ Id. at 475-476.

⁴ See motion for reconsideration dated November 28, 2000; rollo, Vol. I, pp. 509-515.

⁵ Id. at 517.

⁶ See Motion to Declare Atty. Justo J. Paras and Atty. Richard R. Enojo in Contempt and to Order Them Disbarred dated March 1, 2001; id. at 668-675.

⁷ See id. at 673-673A.

⁸ See id. at 673.

⁹ Dated March 15, 2001. Id. at 686-689.

¹⁰ Id. at 687.

¹¹ See Third Motion for Contempt and Motion for Disbarment; id. at 695-699.

¹² See Fourth Motion for Contempt and to Declare Respondent as Disbarred; id. at 721-723.

¹³ See Comment dated September 25, 2001 filed by respondent and Comment dated October 5, 2001 filed by Atty. Enojo; id. at 741-753 and 774-784, respectively.

¹⁴ See Reply to Comment of Respondent Atty. Richard R. Enojo dated October 10, 2001 and Reply to Comment Dated September 25, 2001 dated October 5, 2001; id. at 802-804 and 808-815, respectively.

¹⁵ Id. at 820-821.

¹⁶ See id. at 903.

¹⁷ See Resolutions dated December 10, 2001, September 18, 2002, and October 14, 2002; See id. at 819, 925, and 983-984, respectively.

¹⁸ Dated March 6, 2003. Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1604-1606.

¹⁹ See id. at 1606.

²⁰ Id. at 1614-1615.

²¹ See Resolution dated July 7, 2003; id. at 1619.

²² Id. at 1623-1625. Penned by Court Attorney III Mercedita C. Cari�o, reviewed by Assistant Bar Confidant Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, and approved by Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa.

²³ Id. at 1625.

²⁴ Id. at 1624.

²⁵ Id. at 1626.

²⁶Rollo, Vol. VI, pp. 3266-3268.

²⁷ Dated March 5, 2014. Id. at 3269.

²⁸ Id.

²⁹ Id.

³⁰ Id. at 3556.

³¹See id. at 3579.

³² Id. at 3587-3592. Signed by Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero.

³³ See id. at 3590-3592.

³⁴ See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XX-2013-421 signed by Acting Secretary for the Meeting Dennis A. B. Funa; id. at 3586.

³⁵ Id.

³⁶ See Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation in Accordance with Supreme Court Circular 04-94 and Motion for Consolidation (with Leave of Court) dated September 4, 2015; id. at 3559-3571.

³⁷ See Notice of Resolution Resolution No. XXI-2015-479* signed National Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic; id. at 3584.

³⁸Villanueva v. Deloria, 542 Phil. 1, 6 (2007), citing Baldomar v. Paras, 401 Phil. 370, 373-375 (2000).

³⁹ See Arandia v. Magalong, 435 Phil. 199, 202-203 (2002), citing Baldomar v. Paras, id. at 373-374; further citation omitted.

⁴⁰ See Baldomar v. Paras, id. at 373-375. See also Delos Santos v. Robiso, 423 Phil. 515, 519-522 (2001).

⁴¹J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. De Vera, 422 Phil. 583, 591-592 (2001).

⁴² See Lingan v. Calubaquib, 737 Phil. 191, 193 (2014).

⁴³ See guidelines for lifting an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law; Maniago v. De Dios, 631 Phil. 139, 145-146 (2010).

⁴⁴ See id. See also Ibana-Andrade v. Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 8313, July 14, 2015, 762 SCRA 571, 577-578;

⁴⁵Rollo, Vol. I, p. 903.

⁴⁶ See Eustaquio v. Navales, A.C. No. 10465, June 8, 2016.

⁴⁷ See id. See also Ibana-Andrade v. Paita-Moya, supra note 44; Feliciano v. Bautizta-Lozada, A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015, 752 SCRA 245; Lingan v. Calubaquib, supra note 42; and Molina v. Magat, 687 Phil. 1 (2012).

⁴⁸ See A.C. No. 7348, September 27, 2016.

⁴⁹ A.C. No. 10240, November 25, 2014, 741 SCRA 620.

⁵⁰ See id. at 627.

⁵¹ See Comment on Omnibus Motion of Plaintiff filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities signed by Atty. Enojo; rollo, Vol. I, p. 684.