October 2008 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1-777 : October 08, 2008] (AIDA B. CALLOS, ET AL. V. JUDGE ROMULO SG. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-LIGAO CITY, BRANCH 12) A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1778 (SIMEON P. DIMABOGTE V. JUDGE ROMULO SG. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-LIGAO CITY, BRANCH 12) :
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1-777 : October 08, 2008]
(AIDA B. CALLOS, ET AL. V. JUDGE ROMULO SG. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-LIGAO CITY, BRANCH 12)
A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1778 (SIMEON P. DIMABOGTE V. JUDGE ROMULO SG. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-LIGAO CITY, BRANCH 12)
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereimder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 08 October 2008:
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1-777 (Aida B. Callos, et al. v. Judge Romulo SG. Villanueva, Presiding Judge, RTC-Ligao City, Branch 12)
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1778 (Simeon P. Dimabogte v. Judge Romulo SG. Villanueva, Presiding Judge, RTC-Ligao City, Branch 12)
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These two consolidated cases involve different complaints against Judge Romulo SG. Villanueva, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Branch 12 in Ligao City, Albay. The complainants are employees of the said branch.
In A.M. No. RTJ-03-1778, Simeon P. Dimabogte, Deputy Sheriff IV of Branch 12, filed a complaint charging Judge Villanueva with grave abuse of authority and oppression. In his complaint dated July 3, 2002. Dimabogte averred that the judge started to harass him after he filed his complaint thus constraining him to file an urgent motion for transfer of assignment. The judge opposed his transfer. Subsequently, he said, he was informed that there was no vacancy for the position of sheriff in Albay and Legaspi City where he hoped to be transferred.
More than three months after, on October 14, 2002, in A.M. No. RTJ-03-1777. Court Stenographers III Aida Callos, Marlene Nobleza, Margarita M. Trinidad; Process Server Raul Hingco; Clerk III Rodolfo Nojara, Jr.: Utility Worker 1 Charlie Larcena: and Dimabogte lodged another complaint, docketed as OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1601-RTJ, against Judge Villanueva, charging him with (1) Falsification of Certificates of Service: (2) Not Penning any Decision in Civil Cases; (3) Theft of Evidence; (4) Immorality: (5) Trying a Case that He Himself Caused to be Instituted in behalf of the Plaintiff: (6) Non-Disclosure of Property in His Statement of Assets. Liabilities, and Networth (SALN); and (7) Tampering with Daily Time Records (DTRs). They also filed an ex-pane motion to transfer or re-assign Judge Villanueva to a different court.
On the recommendation of then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) now Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, the complaints were consolidated and the Court referred the matter to a justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report, and recommendation. After hearings and submission of affidavits and testimonies of witnesses, complainants, and respondent, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, the CA Investigating Justice, reported the following:
In A.M. No. RTJ-03-1778, Dimabogte, the Deputy Sheriff in the ,RTC. Branch 12 charged Judge Villanueva with grave abuse of authority and oppression.
According to complainant Dimabogte, it was Judge Villanueva who recommended him as deputy sheriff and, as a show of gratitude, he did not mind doing odd jobs and personal errands for the judge. The judge asked him to facilitate the application of Josef Earl Villanueva, the judge's son. for accreditation of the latter's company with the Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board (PCAB). Dimabogte claimed that when the approval of the application was delayed, Judge Villanueva vented his frustration on him and their relationship started to sour. Thereafter, starting June 2001, he received angry text messages from the judge blaming him for the delay Dimabogte claimed the stress brought about by the hostile attitude of Judge Villanueva towards him caused his ulcers that resulted in his absence from work from June 4 to June 7, 2002. Dimabogte surmised that the judge thought he deliberately absented himself. When he returned to work on June 13, 2002. the judge told him to resign.
Dimabogte also narrated an incident on June 28, 2002 when Judge Villanueva called him while he was in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC. The judge was then with Court Interpreter Domingo Uvero. When they were out of the Hall of Justice, Judge Villanueva tried to kick him but he successfully evaded the kick.
Judge Villanueva's version is that Dimabogte's performance started to deteriorate after the latter completed the required seminar for sheriffs. He had repeatedly reminded Dimabogte of Office Memorandum No. 02-00 requiring employees to be in their stations except when they were elsewhere on official duty. According to the judge, despite the warnings and the threat that the judge would recall his recommendation for permanent appointment if he did not mend his ways, Dimabogte persisted on his "disappearing" acts.
As to the application of his son's construction company with the PCAB, what Judge Villanueva asked of Dimabogte was to merely follow-up the status of the application from the latter's neighbor, Yolly Ong, who was with the PCAB.
Judge Villanueva also denied the "kicking" incident allegedly outside the main door of the Hall of Justice. He denied there-was such an incident. He explained that it would be folly to pick a fight with Dimabogte who was twice his size�6'2" in height and 210 lbs against the Judge's 5'6" and lighter weight�more so, in a very public place.
We are inclined to believe Judge Villanueva's version. In this complaint, we have only the words of a disgruntled and resentful employee against a judge who had on several occasions tried to discipline the complainant and other employees. Judge Villanueva's attempts at reform upon being appointed Executive Judge are backed by office memoranda.1 As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.2
Three months after A.M. No. RTJ-03-1778, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1777 was filed. It included the following charges against Judge Villanueva:
(1) He falsified his Certificates of Service
Complainants averred that since Judge Villanueva was appointed Presiding Judge of Branch 12, he gave instructions specifically to Ana Alejo, the court interpreter, not to set cases for hearings on Mondays because he was coming all the way from Las Pinas City in Metro Manila, where he spent weekends with his family, a practice that continued until the time Rodolfo Nojara, Jr. became the court interpreter. To prove that the judge did not set hearings on Mondays, they presented a perpetual calendar that served as logbook of the cases set for hearing. The calendar did not show any hearing set on Mondays. Complainants also averred that on the days the judge came on Mondays, he stayed only for about 15 minutes. Hebegan to set hearings on Mondays only starting December 9, 2002, after they had filed their complaint. They asserted that the judge was guilty of falsifying his certificates of service submitted to the Supreme Court because therein he certified that he held sessions from Mondays to Fridays when in truth he did not.
In his defense, Judge Villanueva denied he had given instructions that no hearings be set on Mondays, but admitted that indeed he did not conduct court hearings on Mondays because, as borne by an affidavit of the public prosecutor assigned to Branch 12, the prosecutor scheduled his preliminary investigations on Mondays and was unavailable for court trials on these days. He also discredited the perpetual calendar saying that he had nothing to do with the calendar. He explained that he spent Mondays attending to his other judicial tasks like resolving motions and writing decisions, or following up official matters in the Supreme Court whenever he spent weekends with his family in Manila.
In his report, the Investigating Justice said that the phrase in the certificate of service that states, "x x x that I have complied with the provisions of Section 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296, as amended) by holding daily sessions during the hours therein specified x x x," upon which complainants based their charge that Judge Villanueva falsified his certificate of service, cannot be given a strictly literal meaning because the work of a judge is not limited to holding sessions.
The Investigating Justice, unfortunately, also observed that the supposed proof, the perpetual calendar, was not an official record whose entries are prima facie evidence of the facts entered in it.3 Neither was it officially approved as a daily logbook of the court schedule of Branch 12. Further, it was not authenticated by the different persons who made the entries. From the scribblings on the calendar, different persons made the entries and it was apparent that there was unregulated access to it. Under the above circumstances, we are inclined to agree with the Investigating Justice that the calendar was open to tampering, substitution, and intercalation, whether innocent or malicious. Thus, it cannot be relied on to establish that Judge Villanueva falsified his certificates of service.
We likewise agree with the Investigating Justice that the affidavit of the driver attesting that he did not drive for Judge Villanueva on Mondays is inconclusive proof that the latter did not report to his court on Mondays. Just as inconclusive is the testimony of complainant Callos that Judge Villanueva stayed only for about 15 minutes on the Mondays he reported to work. For one, she could not give the specific Mondays when this happened. Her statement that Judge Villanueva came on some Mondays but stayed only for 15 minutes even belies Lasema's statement that the Judge did not report on Mondays. Furthermore, Nojara and Clerk of Court Atty. Wilfredo Gerardo T. Guerrero, Jr. admitted they could not recall the specific Mondays when the Judge was not in court.
We also find it disturbing, as the Investigating Justice observed, that complainants denounced Judge Villanueva only in 2002 when they claimed he had not been reporting on Mondays since 1991. Their belated action puts in doubt their motives in filing their complaint.
Now, as far as the charge of falsification of the certificates of service is concerned, complainants had not been able to convincingly substantiate their charge. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be sufficiently established by substantial evidence. In this charge, the body of evidence to establish the fact that Judge Villanueva's certificates of service were falsified is not only unsubstantial but also unreliable, unpersuasive, and contradictory. As we have earlier noted, the perpetual calendar with its entries was unreliable because it was not an official document, the entries had not been authenticated by those who made the entries, and the access to the calendar logbook was unregulated. In addition, the testimonies of Larcena and Callos tended to contradict each other; and Nojara and Atty. Guerrero were uncertain on the Mondays the Judge allegedly did not report to the court. Administrative cases leveled against judges must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal such that judges could be dismissed or disbarred.4
But as the Investigating Justice recommended, Judge Villanueva on the basis of his own admission, should still be sanctioned for not conducting trials on Mondays, in violation of Sec. 58 of the Judiciary Act of 19485 viewed in relation with paragraph I of Administrative Circular No. 3-99 as follows:
But it has not escaped this Court that the unavailability of prosecutors on Mondays is beyond Judge Villanueva's control. No less than the prosecutor attested that indeed the. Public Attorneys Office lacked lawyers and on Mondays, no lawyers were available for hearings inasmuch as the prosecutors used Mondays for preliminary investigations, preliminary conferences, briefing of witnesses, etc' Moreover, the records of this case also contain several certificates of appearances from the Office of then DCA Perez that on several Mondays Judge Villanueva consulted with DCA Perez pertaining matters involving his court.
Nonetheless, as a judge, Judge Villanueva was aware of Sec. 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and Administrative Circular No. 3-99, par. I. What he should have done was to coordinate with the Office of the City Prosecutor to make sure that another prosecutor could be temporarily assigned to Branch 12. Judge Villanueva could also have scheduled other cases aside from criminal cases on Mondays.
(2) Judge Villanueva never penned decisions in civil cases
Complainants claimed that Judge Villanueva never penned a single civil case decision since he assumed office and it was always Atty. Guerrero. Branch Clerk of Court, and Nonita Red, legal researcher, who prepared the drafts of the decisions, after Judge Villanueva told them what/who should win. According to complainants, Judge Villanueva merely approved the drafts for typing and promulgation.
The allegation is totally without merit. There is nothing wrong with Atty. Guerrero and Red assisting Judge Villanueva in summarizing the facts and the testimonies of witnesses, researching the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, preparing the initial drafts, and proofreading drafts. Complainants themselves testified that Judge Villanueva told them who of the parties should prevail and the judge makes the final decision. Judge Villanueva had not been remiss on his duties as a judge when he let* his legal staff do the research and drafting of the decision. Again, only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned.8
(3) Judge Villanueva ordered the theft of evidence in a criminal case
Complainants charged that one Saturday, September 29, 2001, Judge Villanueva intimidated and ordered his driver, Uvero, to bring out of the court premises an armalite rifle and some other evidence in a criminal case involving illegal possession of firearms. According to Uvero, he, at first, refused but was pressured to do it. Immediately the following day. he confided the plan to Clerk of Court Atty. Guerrero, who in turn went to Judge Sanez for advice. Judge Sanez did not want to get involved so Atty. Guerrero and Uvero went to the National Intelligence Coordinating Council to report the alleged plan. Uvero averred he spread the news of the plan among his other officemates. Uvero testified that when September 29, 2001 came, he asked Larcena for the stockroom key, took the armalite, placed it inside a sack, and carried it out to the parked car of Judge Villanueva who drove away after Uvero loaded the armalite inside the trunk of the car. According to Uvero, he deliberately made the barrel of the gun stick out of the sack to catch the attention of the guards whom he had informed about the plan. To his disappointment, the guards did not do anything. A National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) report stated that the judge hid the gun under his bed.9 When Uvero told Atty. Guerrero that the gun had been taken, the latter made an inventory of all exhibits in the stockroom and discovered that the armalite was not the only evidence missing, but all exhibits in the Macasaya case. For his own protection, Atty. Guerrero asked Judge Villanueva to sign a receipt covering the exhibits in the Macasaya case including the armalite to which the judge agreed. According to complainants, it was only after they filed the administrative case against Judge Villanueva when the Judge instructed Atty. Guerrero to surrender the armalite to the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit (PNP-FEU). The camp authorities, however, refused to receive the rifle without a court order from Judge Villanueva himself.
For his part, Judge Villanueva claimed that complainants resented his strictness and the reforms he instituted since he became the Acting Executive Judge. Among them: (1) He caused the removal of Dimabogte as deputy sheriff when he withdrew his indorsement of the former's permanent appointment. (2) He filed an administrative case against Hingco and Larcena lor falsification and dishonesty and for drinking alcohol during office hours. He also gave them ratings of "Unsatisfactory" for two consecutive rating periods. (3) He had reprimanded Nojara for resetting cases without his knowledge nor consent. (4) He called the attention of Trinidad for leaving without punching her DTR and sleeping during office hours. (5) He disapproved a vacation leave application of Nobleza and warned her against using office hours for personal business like enrolling her kids, bringing them to the doctor, and following up her loan applications. (6) He often called the attention of Callos for sleeping during working hours. (7) He issued a memorandum on the strict monitoring of the punching of the DTR to discourage employees who lived nearby from punching in, then leaving for home, and returning only to punch out. (8) He issued a memorandum on the use of the office computer for strictly office use only. (9) He issued a memorandum prohibiting television viewing during office hours. (10) He issued a memorandum to court stenographers to transcribe/type their stenographic notes within 15 days after the day of the hearing. And (11) he ordered that those who leave their stations for more than two hours be marked absent.10
Judge Villanueva denied that he ordered Uvero to sneak the armalite out of the stockroom and out of the courthouse. He claimed he only prdered the transfer of the exhibits from the stockroom to his chambers, apprehensive that the disgruntled and vengeful employees of Branch 12 might take them and put the blame of the loss on him. He also felt that he could use the armalite for his protection against New People's Army attacks so he kept the armalite in an unlocked cabinet in his chambers. Since Larcena kept the key to his chambers, he also got this from Larcena and gave it to Uvero. Judge Villanueva explained that indeed he signed the custody receipt of the armalite only after Atty. Guerrero objected to its transfer from the stockroom to the judge's chambers. He admitted he ordered the turn over of the exhibits to the PNP- FEU on November 25, 2002, that was after he had received the complaint against him by his staff that included the theft of evidence. He explained that he had not earlier ordered the turn over of the firearm to the PNP-FEU because it was still needed as evidence against one of the accused who was still at large. When this was turned over, he made it clear that it was for safekeeping only as it would still be needed as evidence.
As to the police blotter report of the two security guards, Rodrigo C. Sevilla and Wilfredo Propogo, that they allegedly saw the barrel of a gun being loaded in a white car with plate number PDJ-450, Judge Villanueva explained that what they saw was the stand of a black clothes hanger. Furthermore, he owned a blue car with plate number PDJ-540, unlike what the security guards reported. He averred that if the guards were mistaken about the color and plate number of his car on broad daylight, it was highly likely that they also made a mistake about seeing the barrel of a gun, casting doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the two guard's testimony.
We have reviewed the assertions of complainants and respondent judge and our assessment lead us towards believing Judge Villanueva that his staff conspired in their testimonies to implicate him in an alleged theft of evidence. First, we note that the sworn statements and testimonies of Nobleza, Trinidad, and Callos on this matter are all hearsay as the pieces of information they testified to on the plot to smuggle out evidence were only told to them by Uvero.11 Second, in the NBI Report, Uvero disclosed that when he visited Judge Villanueva, he saw the armalite under the Judge's bed. and the bonnet that was part of the evidence smuggled out of the courtroom was what the Judge used when he traveled to Manila.12 We find rather unbelievable and contrary to the experience and training of a judge that Judge Villanueva would expose in plain sight the firearm he had allegedly stolen and wear the bonnet/evidence in public. Third, we are inclined to believe Judge Villanueva that he signed the receipt of the custody of the armalite upon Atty. Guerrero's insistence; to appease the former. As the Investigating Justice observed, Judge Villanueva did not deny he had custody of the firearm; he actually signed the receipt for it; he had jurisdiction over the Macasaya case, thus had discretion on where to keep the evidence for safekeeping; and he had a valid reason for not immediately surrendering the firearm to the PNP-FEU. Lastly, as earlier discussed, the joint affidavit of the guards Sevilia and Propogo, stating therein their erroneous identification of the car where Uvero allegedly loaded the sack with a barrel of a rifle protruding, is inconsistent with the evidence on record. The Official Receipt and Certification dated December 2, 2002 issued by the Land Transportation Office attest that the color of Judge Villanueva's car was Caspian blue and the license number was PDJ-540.13
Altogether, the evidence and circumstances in this case are unreliable for this Court to conclude that Judge Villanueva is guilty of the charge of theft of evidence.
(4) Judge Villanueva tried a case that he himself caused to be filed on behalf of the plaintiff
This charge is completely without basis. As the Investigating Justice observed, no proof was presented to substantiate the accusation that Judge Villanueva instructed Atty. Guerrero to prepare a complaint, for the annulment of the marriage of Solomon and Maria Tabligan and had the complaint raffled to his branch. It is highly speculative on the part of complainants to say that Judge Villanueva himself caused the filing of the annulment case to please his alleged long-time mistress. Carmen Monsalve, in the hope that Judge Villanueva could eventually "broker a legal marriage" between Solomon and Carmen's daughter Catherine Altarejos, who allegedly Solomon got pregnant.14 This highly speculative proposition has no basis in fact and in law and cannot be entertained. Even Atty. Guerrero himself denied that he prepared the civil complaint of Solomon. This Court cannot be an instrument to a ploy that would destroy the reputation of a judge by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation.15
(5) Judge Villanueva had an immoral and illicit affair
In this charge of immorality, Larcena and his wife, Belen, and Nojara testified that on several occasions and places, they witnessed and were present during the clandestine meetings between Judge Villanueva and one Monsalve. Belen narrated how she was instrumental in the meeting of the two and how the affair progressed. She hinted that Judge Villanueva and Monsalve had immoral activities when Monsalve would stay in the Judge's house and tryst at the Badjao Lodge in Oas, Albay, or in a lodge in Rawis, Legaspi City, or in a beach in Bacacay, Albay. Belen said the two would meet clandestinely every Tuesday and Thursday from lunch breaks till afternoons. Yet, Belen admitted that she had never seen the two comport themselves as lovers, nor as husband and wife. Neither could any of the witnesses testify that the judge and Monsalve cohabitted nor behaved scandalously.
Dimabogte testified that Judge Villanueva boasted to him that Monsalve was his "chick'" and he was the judge's constant companion when the judge and Monsalve trysted in a house in Tuburan, Ligao City. Nojara said Judge Villanueva boasted that Monsalve was his pampabuenas (lucky charm).
While no position in government exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness than employees of the Judiciary, still, a charge of immorality or maintaining an illicit relationship must be firmly grounded on credible evidence and credible witnesses. The affidavit of Larcena mentioned dates and times and places where allegedly the judge and Monsalve had illicit rendezvous. Yet, these alleged illicit meetings were not supported by corroborative evidence except by testimonies of other hostile co-workers. In addition, the testimony of Trinidad that she knew of the relationship of the judge and Monsalve, through Monsalve's sister, Phoebe, is hearsay. Considering the animosity and hostile relations between the complainants/witnesses and the judge, this Court cannot with certainty and with moral conviction conclude that there is reliable and solid basis to find Judge Villanueva guilty of immorality or maintaining an illicit relationship.
(6) Judge Villanueva did not disclose ownership of one property in his SALN
Complainants averred that Judge Villanueva did not declare in his 1997 SALN, a property in Tuburan, Ligao City acquired on July 19. 1997. Judge Villanueva admitted he did not include the property in his SALN because he honestly believed he did not have to declare it since he had donated the property to his only son. Josef Earl, on November 8, 1997 by way of a Deed of Donation,16 although he had not yet transferred the title in his son's name because there was no money yet to pay for the donee's tax. Further, he added that the failure of the notary public to include the Deed of Donation in his notarial report should not be blamed on him.17
We are not unaware that Judge Villanueva's failure to declare the property in his SALN constitutes a violation of Rule 140, Sec. 9, par. 4.18 We. however, believe Judge Villanueva that he had no intention to conceal ownership of any property and it was an honest belief that he did not have to declare the lot he donated to his son in his 1997 SALN. The notarized Deed of Donation19 executed on November 8, 1997 in Iriga City that he executed in favor of his son is proof that he had no malicious intention to conceal any property nor not declare the subject lot in his SALN.
(7) Judge Villanueva tampered with his employees' DTRs
Complainants Larcena, Hingco, and Dimabogte charged that Judge Villanueva tampered with their DTRs when the judge got their DTRs and crossed out the machine-validated entries and instead wrote the phrase, "half day not in the office," to make it appear that they were not in the office on certain hours of the day. Judge Vilianueva admitted that he indeed crossed out some entries in the DTRs of Larcena, Hingco and Dimabote and wrote "half-day only" or "absent" or "not in office" because these employees were not actually in the office on the times their DTRs reflected that they were. He claimed that it was his way of disciplining his employees and correcting the DTRs to make them truthful.
We note that earlier, Judge Vilianueva issued Office Memorandum No. 02-0020 stating that anyone not in the office during office hours shall be considered absent, and Office Memorandum No. 02-200121 warning that those not in their assigned tables for more than two hours shall be considered absent. In our view, Judge Villanueva was well within his authority to impose discipline and had authority to correct untruthful entries in the DTRs. Just as this Court had earlier dismissed an earlier complaint of Hingco against Judge Vilianueva in OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1533-RTJ for grave misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and oppression with the very same complaints as this present charge, we likewise dismiss this charge for lack of merit.
As to the unsatisfactory ratings complained of by Larcena and Hingco, the matter of rating performances of employees is the discretion of the head of the office as long as this prerogative is exercised with fairness. Recall that the Performance Rating Form used by the judiciary is a pre-determined, itemized, and detailed rating instrument so designed to make it a reliable tool for measuring performance. Judge Vilianueva has convincingly shown the failings of each of the complainants and has cited instances where complainants had failed to perform their tasks. We find no abuse of authority nor act of oppression on the part of Judge Vilianueva when he gave
unsatisfactory ratings to some complainants.
Administrative proceedings against judges are by nature highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases--the quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges should thus be more than substantial and they must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.22 On the whole, it appears to this Court that most of the charges against Judge Villanueva were filed not for the purpose of justice to the aggrieved persons but for other ulterior motives, even for the purpose of embarrassing the judge. Unless proved beyond any doubt, we cannot allow this kind of harassment to a member of the bench.
WHEREFORE, in A.M. No. RTJ-03-1778, the charge of grave abuse of authority and oppression filed by Dimabogte against Judge Villanueva is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In A.M. No. RTJ-03-1777, the complaints against Judge Villanueva for (1) Falsification of Certificates of Service, (2) Not Penning any Decision in Civil Cases, (3) Theft of Evidence, (4) Immorality, (5) Trying a Case that He Himself Caused to be Instituted in behalf of a Plaintiff, and (6) Tampering with Daily Time Records are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The charge of immorality is likewise DISMISSED for inconclusive evidence.
For his failure to include in his 1997 SALN a parcel of land in a subdivision in Tuburan, Ligao City that he had "donated" to his son the donee"s tax of which had not been paid. Judge Villanueva is hereby REPRIMANDED with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Judge Villanueva violated Sec. 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 when he did not conduct sessions on Mondays. We believe, however, that the unavailability of the public prosecutor, his 17 years of service in the judiciary, and his earnest efforts to reform the culture of the employees in Branch 12 serve to mitigate his failure to conduct sessions on Mondays. For this. Judge Villanueva is hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with most sternly.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1-777 (Aida B. Callos, et al. v. Judge Romulo SG. Villanueva, Presiding Judge, RTC-Ligao City, Branch 12)
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1778 (Simeon P. Dimabogte v. Judge Romulo SG. Villanueva, Presiding Judge, RTC-Ligao City, Branch 12)
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These two consolidated cases involve different complaints against Judge Romulo SG. Villanueva, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Branch 12 in Ligao City, Albay. The complainants are employees of the said branch.
In A.M. No. RTJ-03-1778, Simeon P. Dimabogte, Deputy Sheriff IV of Branch 12, filed a complaint charging Judge Villanueva with grave abuse of authority and oppression. In his complaint dated July 3, 2002. Dimabogte averred that the judge started to harass him after he filed his complaint thus constraining him to file an urgent motion for transfer of assignment. The judge opposed his transfer. Subsequently, he said, he was informed that there was no vacancy for the position of sheriff in Albay and Legaspi City where he hoped to be transferred.
More than three months after, on October 14, 2002, in A.M. No. RTJ-03-1777. Court Stenographers III Aida Callos, Marlene Nobleza, Margarita M. Trinidad; Process Server Raul Hingco; Clerk III Rodolfo Nojara, Jr.: Utility Worker 1 Charlie Larcena: and Dimabogte lodged another complaint, docketed as OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1601-RTJ, against Judge Villanueva, charging him with (1) Falsification of Certificates of Service: (2) Not Penning any Decision in Civil Cases; (3) Theft of Evidence; (4) Immorality: (5) Trying a Case that He Himself Caused to be Instituted in behalf of the Plaintiff: (6) Non-Disclosure of Property in His Statement of Assets. Liabilities, and Networth (SALN); and (7) Tampering with Daily Time Records (DTRs). They also filed an ex-pane motion to transfer or re-assign Judge Villanueva to a different court.
On the recommendation of then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) now Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, the complaints were consolidated and the Court referred the matter to a justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report, and recommendation. After hearings and submission of affidavits and testimonies of witnesses, complainants, and respondent, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, the CA Investigating Justice, reported the following:
In A.M. No. RTJ-03-1778, Dimabogte, the Deputy Sheriff in the ,RTC. Branch 12 charged Judge Villanueva with grave abuse of authority and oppression.
According to complainant Dimabogte, it was Judge Villanueva who recommended him as deputy sheriff and, as a show of gratitude, he did not mind doing odd jobs and personal errands for the judge. The judge asked him to facilitate the application of Josef Earl Villanueva, the judge's son. for accreditation of the latter's company with the Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board (PCAB). Dimabogte claimed that when the approval of the application was delayed, Judge Villanueva vented his frustration on him and their relationship started to sour. Thereafter, starting June 2001, he received angry text messages from the judge blaming him for the delay Dimabogte claimed the stress brought about by the hostile attitude of Judge Villanueva towards him caused his ulcers that resulted in his absence from work from June 4 to June 7, 2002. Dimabogte surmised that the judge thought he deliberately absented himself. When he returned to work on June 13, 2002. the judge told him to resign.
Dimabogte also narrated an incident on June 28, 2002 when Judge Villanueva called him while he was in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC. The judge was then with Court Interpreter Domingo Uvero. When they were out of the Hall of Justice, Judge Villanueva tried to kick him but he successfully evaded the kick.
Judge Villanueva's version is that Dimabogte's performance started to deteriorate after the latter completed the required seminar for sheriffs. He had repeatedly reminded Dimabogte of Office Memorandum No. 02-00 requiring employees to be in their stations except when they were elsewhere on official duty. According to the judge, despite the warnings and the threat that the judge would recall his recommendation for permanent appointment if he did not mend his ways, Dimabogte persisted on his "disappearing" acts.
As to the application of his son's construction company with the PCAB, what Judge Villanueva asked of Dimabogte was to merely follow-up the status of the application from the latter's neighbor, Yolly Ong, who was with the PCAB.
Judge Villanueva also denied the "kicking" incident allegedly outside the main door of the Hall of Justice. He denied there-was such an incident. He explained that it would be folly to pick a fight with Dimabogte who was twice his size�6'2" in height and 210 lbs against the Judge's 5'6" and lighter weight�more so, in a very public place.
We are inclined to believe Judge Villanueva's version. In this complaint, we have only the words of a disgruntled and resentful employee against a judge who had on several occasions tried to discipline the complainant and other employees. Judge Villanueva's attempts at reform upon being appointed Executive Judge are backed by office memoranda.1 As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.2
Three months after A.M. No. RTJ-03-1778, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1777 was filed. It included the following charges against Judge Villanueva:
(1) He falsified his Certificates of Service
Complainants averred that since Judge Villanueva was appointed Presiding Judge of Branch 12, he gave instructions specifically to Ana Alejo, the court interpreter, not to set cases for hearings on Mondays because he was coming all the way from Las Pinas City in Metro Manila, where he spent weekends with his family, a practice that continued until the time Rodolfo Nojara, Jr. became the court interpreter. To prove that the judge did not set hearings on Mondays, they presented a perpetual calendar that served as logbook of the cases set for hearing. The calendar did not show any hearing set on Mondays. Complainants also averred that on the days the judge came on Mondays, he stayed only for about 15 minutes. Hebegan to set hearings on Mondays only starting December 9, 2002, after they had filed their complaint. They asserted that the judge was guilty of falsifying his certificates of service submitted to the Supreme Court because therein he certified that he held sessions from Mondays to Fridays when in truth he did not.
In his defense, Judge Villanueva denied he had given instructions that no hearings be set on Mondays, but admitted that indeed he did not conduct court hearings on Mondays because, as borne by an affidavit of the public prosecutor assigned to Branch 12, the prosecutor scheduled his preliminary investigations on Mondays and was unavailable for court trials on these days. He also discredited the perpetual calendar saying that he had nothing to do with the calendar. He explained that he spent Mondays attending to his other judicial tasks like resolving motions and writing decisions, or following up official matters in the Supreme Court whenever he spent weekends with his family in Manila.
In his report, the Investigating Justice said that the phrase in the certificate of service that states, "x x x that I have complied with the provisions of Section 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296, as amended) by holding daily sessions during the hours therein specified x x x," upon which complainants based their charge that Judge Villanueva falsified his certificate of service, cannot be given a strictly literal meaning because the work of a judge is not limited to holding sessions.
The Investigating Justice, unfortunately, also observed that the supposed proof, the perpetual calendar, was not an official record whose entries are prima facie evidence of the facts entered in it.3 Neither was it officially approved as a daily logbook of the court schedule of Branch 12. Further, it was not authenticated by the different persons who made the entries. From the scribblings on the calendar, different persons made the entries and it was apparent that there was unregulated access to it. Under the above circumstances, we are inclined to agree with the Investigating Justice that the calendar was open to tampering, substitution, and intercalation, whether innocent or malicious. Thus, it cannot be relied on to establish that Judge Villanueva falsified his certificates of service.
We likewise agree with the Investigating Justice that the affidavit of the driver attesting that he did not drive for Judge Villanueva on Mondays is inconclusive proof that the latter did not report to his court on Mondays. Just as inconclusive is the testimony of complainant Callos that Judge Villanueva stayed only for about 15 minutes on the Mondays he reported to work. For one, she could not give the specific Mondays when this happened. Her statement that Judge Villanueva came on some Mondays but stayed only for 15 minutes even belies Lasema's statement that the Judge did not report on Mondays. Furthermore, Nojara and Clerk of Court Atty. Wilfredo Gerardo T. Guerrero, Jr. admitted they could not recall the specific Mondays when the Judge was not in court.
We also find it disturbing, as the Investigating Justice observed, that complainants denounced Judge Villanueva only in 2002 when they claimed he had not been reporting on Mondays since 1991. Their belated action puts in doubt their motives in filing their complaint.
Now, as far as the charge of falsification of the certificates of service is concerned, complainants had not been able to convincingly substantiate their charge. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be sufficiently established by substantial evidence. In this charge, the body of evidence to establish the fact that Judge Villanueva's certificates of service were falsified is not only unsubstantial but also unreliable, unpersuasive, and contradictory. As we have earlier noted, the perpetual calendar with its entries was unreliable because it was not an official document, the entries had not been authenticated by those who made the entries, and the access to the calendar logbook was unregulated. In addition, the testimonies of Larcena and Callos tended to contradict each other; and Nojara and Atty. Guerrero were uncertain on the Mondays the Judge allegedly did not report to the court. Administrative cases leveled against judges must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal such that judges could be dismissed or disbarred.4
But as the Investigating Justice recommended, Judge Villanueva on the basis of his own admission, should still be sanctioned for not conducting trials on Mondays, in violation of Sec. 58 of the Judiciary Act of 19485 viewed in relation with paragraph I of Administrative Circular No. 3-99 as follows:
I. The session hours of all Regional Trial Courts. Metropolitan Trial Courts. Municipal Trial Courts in Cities. Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall be from 8:30 A.M. to noon and from 2:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M.. from Mondays to Friday. The hours in the morning shall be devoted to the conduct of trial, while the hours in the afternoon shall be utilized for (1) the conduct of pre-trial conferences: (2) writing of decisions, resolutions, or orders; or (3) the continuation of trial on the merits, whenever rendered necessary, as may be required by the Rules of Court, statutes or circular in specified cases. [Took effect on February 1. 1999]Judge Villanueva was required to render eight hours of service every working day, five hours of each day devoted to trial. He admitted he did not conduct trials on Mondays. Judge Villanueva has violated Sec. 9, par. 4 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.6
But it has not escaped this Court that the unavailability of prosecutors on Mondays is beyond Judge Villanueva's control. No less than the prosecutor attested that indeed the. Public Attorneys Office lacked lawyers and on Mondays, no lawyers were available for hearings inasmuch as the prosecutors used Mondays for preliminary investigations, preliminary conferences, briefing of witnesses, etc' Moreover, the records of this case also contain several certificates of appearances from the Office of then DCA Perez that on several Mondays Judge Villanueva consulted with DCA Perez pertaining matters involving his court.
Nonetheless, as a judge, Judge Villanueva was aware of Sec. 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and Administrative Circular No. 3-99, par. I. What he should have done was to coordinate with the Office of the City Prosecutor to make sure that another prosecutor could be temporarily assigned to Branch 12. Judge Villanueva could also have scheduled other cases aside from criminal cases on Mondays.
(2) Judge Villanueva never penned decisions in civil cases
Complainants claimed that Judge Villanueva never penned a single civil case decision since he assumed office and it was always Atty. Guerrero. Branch Clerk of Court, and Nonita Red, legal researcher, who prepared the drafts of the decisions, after Judge Villanueva told them what/who should win. According to complainants, Judge Villanueva merely approved the drafts for typing and promulgation.
The allegation is totally without merit. There is nothing wrong with Atty. Guerrero and Red assisting Judge Villanueva in summarizing the facts and the testimonies of witnesses, researching the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, preparing the initial drafts, and proofreading drafts. Complainants themselves testified that Judge Villanueva told them who of the parties should prevail and the judge makes the final decision. Judge Villanueva had not been remiss on his duties as a judge when he let* his legal staff do the research and drafting of the decision. Again, only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned.8
(3) Judge Villanueva ordered the theft of evidence in a criminal case
Complainants charged that one Saturday, September 29, 2001, Judge Villanueva intimidated and ordered his driver, Uvero, to bring out of the court premises an armalite rifle and some other evidence in a criminal case involving illegal possession of firearms. According to Uvero, he, at first, refused but was pressured to do it. Immediately the following day. he confided the plan to Clerk of Court Atty. Guerrero, who in turn went to Judge Sanez for advice. Judge Sanez did not want to get involved so Atty. Guerrero and Uvero went to the National Intelligence Coordinating Council to report the alleged plan. Uvero averred he spread the news of the plan among his other officemates. Uvero testified that when September 29, 2001 came, he asked Larcena for the stockroom key, took the armalite, placed it inside a sack, and carried it out to the parked car of Judge Villanueva who drove away after Uvero loaded the armalite inside the trunk of the car. According to Uvero, he deliberately made the barrel of the gun stick out of the sack to catch the attention of the guards whom he had informed about the plan. To his disappointment, the guards did not do anything. A National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) report stated that the judge hid the gun under his bed.9 When Uvero told Atty. Guerrero that the gun had been taken, the latter made an inventory of all exhibits in the stockroom and discovered that the armalite was not the only evidence missing, but all exhibits in the Macasaya case. For his own protection, Atty. Guerrero asked Judge Villanueva to sign a receipt covering the exhibits in the Macasaya case including the armalite to which the judge agreed. According to complainants, it was only after they filed the administrative case against Judge Villanueva when the Judge instructed Atty. Guerrero to surrender the armalite to the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit (PNP-FEU). The camp authorities, however, refused to receive the rifle without a court order from Judge Villanueva himself.
For his part, Judge Villanueva claimed that complainants resented his strictness and the reforms he instituted since he became the Acting Executive Judge. Among them: (1) He caused the removal of Dimabogte as deputy sheriff when he withdrew his indorsement of the former's permanent appointment. (2) He filed an administrative case against Hingco and Larcena lor falsification and dishonesty and for drinking alcohol during office hours. He also gave them ratings of "Unsatisfactory" for two consecutive rating periods. (3) He had reprimanded Nojara for resetting cases without his knowledge nor consent. (4) He called the attention of Trinidad for leaving without punching her DTR and sleeping during office hours. (5) He disapproved a vacation leave application of Nobleza and warned her against using office hours for personal business like enrolling her kids, bringing them to the doctor, and following up her loan applications. (6) He often called the attention of Callos for sleeping during working hours. (7) He issued a memorandum on the strict monitoring of the punching of the DTR to discourage employees who lived nearby from punching in, then leaving for home, and returning only to punch out. (8) He issued a memorandum on the use of the office computer for strictly office use only. (9) He issued a memorandum prohibiting television viewing during office hours. (10) He issued a memorandum to court stenographers to transcribe/type their stenographic notes within 15 days after the day of the hearing. And (11) he ordered that those who leave their stations for more than two hours be marked absent.10
Judge Villanueva denied that he ordered Uvero to sneak the armalite out of the stockroom and out of the courthouse. He claimed he only prdered the transfer of the exhibits from the stockroom to his chambers, apprehensive that the disgruntled and vengeful employees of Branch 12 might take them and put the blame of the loss on him. He also felt that he could use the armalite for his protection against New People's Army attacks so he kept the armalite in an unlocked cabinet in his chambers. Since Larcena kept the key to his chambers, he also got this from Larcena and gave it to Uvero. Judge Villanueva explained that indeed he signed the custody receipt of the armalite only after Atty. Guerrero objected to its transfer from the stockroom to the judge's chambers. He admitted he ordered the turn over of the exhibits to the PNP- FEU on November 25, 2002, that was after he had received the complaint against him by his staff that included the theft of evidence. He explained that he had not earlier ordered the turn over of the firearm to the PNP-FEU because it was still needed as evidence against one of the accused who was still at large. When this was turned over, he made it clear that it was for safekeeping only as it would still be needed as evidence.
As to the police blotter report of the two security guards, Rodrigo C. Sevilla and Wilfredo Propogo, that they allegedly saw the barrel of a gun being loaded in a white car with plate number PDJ-450, Judge Villanueva explained that what they saw was the stand of a black clothes hanger. Furthermore, he owned a blue car with plate number PDJ-540, unlike what the security guards reported. He averred that if the guards were mistaken about the color and plate number of his car on broad daylight, it was highly likely that they also made a mistake about seeing the barrel of a gun, casting doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the two guard's testimony.
We have reviewed the assertions of complainants and respondent judge and our assessment lead us towards believing Judge Villanueva that his staff conspired in their testimonies to implicate him in an alleged theft of evidence. First, we note that the sworn statements and testimonies of Nobleza, Trinidad, and Callos on this matter are all hearsay as the pieces of information they testified to on the plot to smuggle out evidence were only told to them by Uvero.11 Second, in the NBI Report, Uvero disclosed that when he visited Judge Villanueva, he saw the armalite under the Judge's bed. and the bonnet that was part of the evidence smuggled out of the courtroom was what the Judge used when he traveled to Manila.12 We find rather unbelievable and contrary to the experience and training of a judge that Judge Villanueva would expose in plain sight the firearm he had allegedly stolen and wear the bonnet/evidence in public. Third, we are inclined to believe Judge Villanueva that he signed the receipt of the custody of the armalite upon Atty. Guerrero's insistence; to appease the former. As the Investigating Justice observed, Judge Villanueva did not deny he had custody of the firearm; he actually signed the receipt for it; he had jurisdiction over the Macasaya case, thus had discretion on where to keep the evidence for safekeeping; and he had a valid reason for not immediately surrendering the firearm to the PNP-FEU. Lastly, as earlier discussed, the joint affidavit of the guards Sevilia and Propogo, stating therein their erroneous identification of the car where Uvero allegedly loaded the sack with a barrel of a rifle protruding, is inconsistent with the evidence on record. The Official Receipt and Certification dated December 2, 2002 issued by the Land Transportation Office attest that the color of Judge Villanueva's car was Caspian blue and the license number was PDJ-540.13
Altogether, the evidence and circumstances in this case are unreliable for this Court to conclude that Judge Villanueva is guilty of the charge of theft of evidence.
(4) Judge Villanueva tried a case that he himself caused to be filed on behalf of the plaintiff
This charge is completely without basis. As the Investigating Justice observed, no proof was presented to substantiate the accusation that Judge Villanueva instructed Atty. Guerrero to prepare a complaint, for the annulment of the marriage of Solomon and Maria Tabligan and had the complaint raffled to his branch. It is highly speculative on the part of complainants to say that Judge Villanueva himself caused the filing of the annulment case to please his alleged long-time mistress. Carmen Monsalve, in the hope that Judge Villanueva could eventually "broker a legal marriage" between Solomon and Carmen's daughter Catherine Altarejos, who allegedly Solomon got pregnant.14 This highly speculative proposition has no basis in fact and in law and cannot be entertained. Even Atty. Guerrero himself denied that he prepared the civil complaint of Solomon. This Court cannot be an instrument to a ploy that would destroy the reputation of a judge by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation.15
(5) Judge Villanueva had an immoral and illicit affair
In this charge of immorality, Larcena and his wife, Belen, and Nojara testified that on several occasions and places, they witnessed and were present during the clandestine meetings between Judge Villanueva and one Monsalve. Belen narrated how she was instrumental in the meeting of the two and how the affair progressed. She hinted that Judge Villanueva and Monsalve had immoral activities when Monsalve would stay in the Judge's house and tryst at the Badjao Lodge in Oas, Albay, or in a lodge in Rawis, Legaspi City, or in a beach in Bacacay, Albay. Belen said the two would meet clandestinely every Tuesday and Thursday from lunch breaks till afternoons. Yet, Belen admitted that she had never seen the two comport themselves as lovers, nor as husband and wife. Neither could any of the witnesses testify that the judge and Monsalve cohabitted nor behaved scandalously.
Dimabogte testified that Judge Villanueva boasted to him that Monsalve was his "chick'" and he was the judge's constant companion when the judge and Monsalve trysted in a house in Tuburan, Ligao City. Nojara said Judge Villanueva boasted that Monsalve was his pampabuenas (lucky charm).
While no position in government exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness than employees of the Judiciary, still, a charge of immorality or maintaining an illicit relationship must be firmly grounded on credible evidence and credible witnesses. The affidavit of Larcena mentioned dates and times and places where allegedly the judge and Monsalve had illicit rendezvous. Yet, these alleged illicit meetings were not supported by corroborative evidence except by testimonies of other hostile co-workers. In addition, the testimony of Trinidad that she knew of the relationship of the judge and Monsalve, through Monsalve's sister, Phoebe, is hearsay. Considering the animosity and hostile relations between the complainants/witnesses and the judge, this Court cannot with certainty and with moral conviction conclude that there is reliable and solid basis to find Judge Villanueva guilty of immorality or maintaining an illicit relationship.
(6) Judge Villanueva did not disclose ownership of one property in his SALN
Complainants averred that Judge Villanueva did not declare in his 1997 SALN, a property in Tuburan, Ligao City acquired on July 19. 1997. Judge Villanueva admitted he did not include the property in his SALN because he honestly believed he did not have to declare it since he had donated the property to his only son. Josef Earl, on November 8, 1997 by way of a Deed of Donation,16 although he had not yet transferred the title in his son's name because there was no money yet to pay for the donee's tax. Further, he added that the failure of the notary public to include the Deed of Donation in his notarial report should not be blamed on him.17
We are not unaware that Judge Villanueva's failure to declare the property in his SALN constitutes a violation of Rule 140, Sec. 9, par. 4.18 We. however, believe Judge Villanueva that he had no intention to conceal ownership of any property and it was an honest belief that he did not have to declare the lot he donated to his son in his 1997 SALN. The notarized Deed of Donation19 executed on November 8, 1997 in Iriga City that he executed in favor of his son is proof that he had no malicious intention to conceal any property nor not declare the subject lot in his SALN.
(7) Judge Villanueva tampered with his employees' DTRs
Complainants Larcena, Hingco, and Dimabogte charged that Judge Villanueva tampered with their DTRs when the judge got their DTRs and crossed out the machine-validated entries and instead wrote the phrase, "half day not in the office," to make it appear that they were not in the office on certain hours of the day. Judge Vilianueva admitted that he indeed crossed out some entries in the DTRs of Larcena, Hingco and Dimabote and wrote "half-day only" or "absent" or "not in office" because these employees were not actually in the office on the times their DTRs reflected that they were. He claimed that it was his way of disciplining his employees and correcting the DTRs to make them truthful.
We note that earlier, Judge Vilianueva issued Office Memorandum No. 02-0020 stating that anyone not in the office during office hours shall be considered absent, and Office Memorandum No. 02-200121 warning that those not in their assigned tables for more than two hours shall be considered absent. In our view, Judge Villanueva was well within his authority to impose discipline and had authority to correct untruthful entries in the DTRs. Just as this Court had earlier dismissed an earlier complaint of Hingco against Judge Vilianueva in OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1533-RTJ for grave misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and oppression with the very same complaints as this present charge, we likewise dismiss this charge for lack of merit.
As to the unsatisfactory ratings complained of by Larcena and Hingco, the matter of rating performances of employees is the discretion of the head of the office as long as this prerogative is exercised with fairness. Recall that the Performance Rating Form used by the judiciary is a pre-determined, itemized, and detailed rating instrument so designed to make it a reliable tool for measuring performance. Judge Vilianueva has convincingly shown the failings of each of the complainants and has cited instances where complainants had failed to perform their tasks. We find no abuse of authority nor act of oppression on the part of Judge Vilianueva when he gave
unsatisfactory ratings to some complainants.
Administrative proceedings against judges are by nature highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases--the quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges should thus be more than substantial and they must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.22 On the whole, it appears to this Court that most of the charges against Judge Villanueva were filed not for the purpose of justice to the aggrieved persons but for other ulterior motives, even for the purpose of embarrassing the judge. Unless proved beyond any doubt, we cannot allow this kind of harassment to a member of the bench.
WHEREFORE, in A.M. No. RTJ-03-1778, the charge of grave abuse of authority and oppression filed by Dimabogte against Judge Villanueva is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In A.M. No. RTJ-03-1777, the complaints against Judge Villanueva for (1) Falsification of Certificates of Service, (2) Not Penning any Decision in Civil Cases, (3) Theft of Evidence, (4) Immorality, (5) Trying a Case that He Himself Caused to be Instituted in behalf of a Plaintiff, and (6) Tampering with Daily Time Records are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The charge of immorality is likewise DISMISSED for inconclusive evidence.
For his failure to include in his 1997 SALN a parcel of land in a subdivision in Tuburan, Ligao City that he had "donated" to his son the donee"s tax of which had not been paid. Judge Villanueva is hereby REPRIMANDED with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Judge Villanueva violated Sec. 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 when he did not conduct sessions on Mondays. We believe, however, that the unavailability of the public prosecutor, his 17 years of service in the judiciary, and his earnest efforts to reform the culture of the employees in Branch 12 serve to mitigate his failure to conduct sessions on Mondays. For this. Judge Villanueva is hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with most sternly.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-03-I777). pp. 695-696.
[2]Sarmiento v. Leonardo. A.M. No. MTJ-06-1644. July 31, 2006. 497 SCRA 139. 145.
[3] RULES OF COURT. Rule 130. Sec. 44.
[4] Dayag v. Gonzalez. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1903. June 27. 2006. 493 SCRA 51.61.
[5] Sec. 58. Hours of daily sessions of the court.�The hours for the daily session for Courts of First Instance shall be from nine to twelve in the morning and from three lo live in the afternoon, except on Saturday, when a morning session only shall be required: but the judge may extend the hours of session whenever in his judgment it is proper to do so. The Judge holding any court may also, in his discretion, order that but one session per day shall be held instead of two. at such hours as he may deem expedient for the convenience both of the court and the public: but the number of hours that the court shall be in session per day shall not be less than five.
[6] SEC. 9. Less Serious Charges.�Serious charges include:
4 Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars.
[7] Rollo (A.M. No RTJ-03-1777). p. 427.
[8] Sarmiento. supra note 2: Cua Shuk Yin v. Perello. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1961. November I I. 2005. 474 SCRA 472. 476-477.
[9] Temporary rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-03-1777). NBI Report. Disposition Form dated January 30. 2003. p. 3.
[10] Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-O3-I777). pp. 200-203.
[11] Temporary rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-03-1777). NBI Report. Annexes "B." "B3." and "B4." Sinumpaang Salawsav of Nobleza. Trinidad, and Callus.
[12] Id. Disposition Form dated January 30. 2003. p. 3.
[13] Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-03-1777). pp. 43 I-431
[14] TSN. October 8. 2O04. pp. 170-174. 186-187.
[15] Duduacov. Laquindaman, A.M. No. MTJ-035-1601, August 11, 2003. 466 SCRA 428, 436.
[16] Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-03-1777). p. 69.1
[17] Id. at 619.
[18] Supra note 6.
[19] Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-03-177-7). pp. 436-437.
[20] Id. at 695.
[21] Id at 696.
[22] Duduaco, supra note 15. at 434.
