Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2008 > October 2008 Resolutions > [G.R. No. 156073 : October 06, 2008] STO. NINO DE NOVALICHES SCHOOL, INC. AND FATIMA MEDALLA-ESTACIO VS. HELEN B. DEL ROSARIO AND LELOISA C. SAHAGUN:

Quoted hereunder, for your Information, is a resolution of this Court dated 06 October 2008:

G.R. No. 156073 - STO. NINO DE NOVALICHES SCHOOL, INC. and FATIMA MEDALLA-ESTACIO versus HELEN B. DEL ROSARIO and LELOISA C. SAHAGUN

Belen B. del Rosario and Leloisa C. Sahagun (respondents) resigned as teachers at petitioner Sto. Nino de Novaliches School. Inc. (the school) at Buenamar Subdivision. Novaliches, Quezon City.

Claiming that no separation pay and other money claims were given to them, they filed on May 26, 1999 with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLR.C), Quezon City a joint complaint for -non-payment of separation pay, service incentive leave pay, proportionate 13th month pay, and attorney's fees against petitioners, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-05955-99.

By Decision^[1] of November 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter found in favor of respondents and against petitioners, disposing thus:

CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING-judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents (now petitioners) liable in solidum to complainants (now respondents), and are ordered to pay as follows:

1.	Ms. Belen B. del Rosario
	a)	P29,826.60 as separation pay (1/8 month per year of service)
	b)	P4,997.ll as SIL;
	c)	P2,485.55 [as] 13th month pay (proportionate): and
	d)	10% as attorney's fees based on the money awards.
2.	Ms. Leloisa C. Sahagun
	a)	P34,823.71 as separation pay (1/2 month per year of service);
	b)	P4,997.11 as SSL;
	c)	P2,485.55 as 13th month pay (proportionate); and
	d)	10% as attorney's fees based on the money awards.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED

Petitioners appealed to the NLRC. In their appeal memorandum, they attributed to the Labor Arbiter the commission of grave abuse of discretion in awarding respondents separation pay despite their voluntary resignation, service incentive leave pay, 13^th month (proportionate) pay, and attorney's fees in the absence of factual basis, and of serious errors in the appreciation of facts and application of laws.^[2]

On February 17, 2000, respondents, apparently unaware that petitioners had posted a surety bond on February 8, 2000. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal for failure of petitioners to file surety bond, citing Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, reading:

ART. 223. Appeal- - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;

(b)    If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption:

(c)    If made purely on questions of law; and

(d)    If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

x x x x   (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal, contending that, contrary to respondent's allegation in their motion, they had posted a surety bond.

By Order^[3] of May 30, 2000, the NLRC dismissed petitioners' appeal upon the ground that it was not perfected within the 10-day reglementary period, petitioners having received a copy of the Decision on January 13, 2000 but posted their surety bond only on February 8, 2000 or 16 days late.

The NLRC cited Section 3 of Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, viz:

SECTION 3. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL. -a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule: shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule: x x x

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running, of the period for perfecting an appeal (Underscoring supplied),

and Lucero v. NLRC (203 SCRA 218) which held that it is settled rule that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.

Petitioners promptly filed a motion for reconsideration ^[4] alleging, inter alia, that since the)'' filed their appeal memorandum and paid their appeal fees within the reglementary period, the posting of their surety bond, though late "due to delay in the processing by the bonding company," should have been considered as substantial compliance with the appeal requirements. What is more important, they earnestly pleaded, is the resolution of the substantial issues they raised in their appeal.

Respondents did not oppose petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Still the NLRC, by Resolution of July 31, 2000, denied the motion.

Petitioners thereupon filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. By the now assailed Decision dated April 19, 2002, the appellate court dismissed the petition as it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC. And by Resolution of November 18, 2002, it denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioners proffer that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their petition:

.   .   .   DESPITE   THE   FACT   THAT   THE   RULES   GOVERNING APPEAL WERE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH: AND

. . . DESPITE THE CLEARLY MERITORIOUS GROUNDS RELIED UPON THEREIN.^[5] (Capitalization in the original)

On the first assigned error, the Court finds no merit.

Without doubt, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal is fatal and has the effect of rendering the assailed judgment final and executory,^[6] following the above-quoted Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 3 of Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure.

Specifically with respect to an appeal by an employer from a judgment involving a monetary award, it is perfected only upon payment of the required cash or surety bond within the 10-day reglementary period.^[7]

In the present case, while petitioners filed their appeal memorandum and paid the appeal fees within the reglementary period, they posted their surety bond 16 days beyond said period. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled:

Although petitioners were able to post a surety bond as required under Article 223 of the Labor Codes yet, its posting was sixteen (16) days late and nowhere in the record did it show that the late posting of the surety bond by herein petitioners was justified nor was there any satisfactory explanation advanced by herein petitioners as to why the posting of the surety bond was late which would justify the relaxation of the bond requirement.

Settled is the rule that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory (Cabillan vs. Conn of Appeals, 304 SCRA 119).

X X X X

In this case, public respondent acted within its jurisdiction when it dismissed petitioners appeal for failure of the latter to perfect the same, there being no surety bond posted within the reglementary period and since public respondent was correct in denying petitioners" appeal, x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As reflected in petitioners' Opposition to respondents' Motion to Dismiss Appeal, they were glaringly silent about their belated posting of the surety bond. It was only after the NLRC ordered the dismissal of their appeal that they, in their Motion for Reconsideration thereof, furnished the reason behind the belated posting of the bond as due to the "delay in the processing of surety bond."Such was found to be unsatisfactory by the appellate court. So does this Court. There are other surety companies from which petitioners could have turned to if they found the one they chose could not toe the deadline.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.


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Endnotes:

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^[1] Exhibit "E," rollo, pp. 48-54.

^[2] Petitioners raised the following issues before the NLRC: (1) whether respondents who voluntarily resigned from employment are entitled to separation pay; (2) whether Fatima's alleged verbal promise to pay respondents separation pay is enforceable or binding against her and the school; (3) whether such promise is cognizable by the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC; (4) whether the Labor Arbiter gravely erred or acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the monetary awards to respondents; and (5) whether the Labor Arbiter seriously erred in finding Fatima solidarily liable with the school to pay such monetary awards.

^[3] Annex "I," rollo, pp. 71-74.

^[4] Annex "J," id. at 75-82.

^[5] Id. at 15.

^[6]  Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC, 352 Phil. 1013, 1028 (1998); Laza v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 631,640(1997).

^[7] Sections 4(a) and 6, Rule VI of the National Labor Relations Commission Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002. Vide Chidad Fernandina Food Corporation Employees Union-Associated Labor Unions v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166594. July 20. 2006. 495 SCRA 807, 823.

^[8] Assailed Decision dated April 19. 2002. rollo, pp. 112, 117.