September 2009 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 176079 : September 09, 2009] RICARCEN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, HEREIN DULY REPRESENTED BY JOSEFELIX R. VILLANUEVA V. SPOUSES AW PENG LAM AND YAP SUI LUN:
[G.R. No. 176079 : September 09, 2009]
RICARCEN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, HEREIN DULY REPRESENTED BY JOSEFELIX R. VILLANUEVA V. SPOUSES AW PENG LAM AND YAP SUI LUN
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 09 September 2009:
G.R. No. 176079 (Ricarcen Development Corporation, herein duly represented by Josefelix R. Villanueva v. Spouses Aw Peng Lam and Yap Sui Lun).
Assailed in this petition for review on cerliorari is the September 19, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 93002 and its Resolution[2] of December 21, 2006, which dismissed petitioner Ricarcen Development Corporation's (Ricarcen) petition for certiorari.
In 2002, petitioner Ricarcen Look a loan of PI0,000.000.00 from respondent Aw Peng Lam secured by a mortgage on its Banawe, Quezon City property:[3] When Ricarcen failed to pay the loan, Lam foreclosed extrajudicially on the mortgage. The Banawe property was thus sold at public auction, with Lam as the highest bidder at P15,000,000.00. The corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued and registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on January 9, 2004.
After petitioner Ricarcen foiled to timely redeem the properly, respondent Lam consolidated his ownership over the same under a new title (TCT N-260868) issued in his name and on March 14, 2005 filed a petition[4] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 215, for the issuance of a writ of possession over it. Ricarcen opposed the petition, claiming that in 2003, it filed Civil Case Q-03-50686[5] before Branch 87 of the Quezon City RTC, which sought the annulment of the real estate mortgage over the property.
On May 16, 2005 certain corporate officers of petitioner Ricarcen moved for intervention in the writ of possession case, arguing that, while the issuance of a writ of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135 as amended is ministerial, the same admits of exceptions, such as when the property is in possession of a third party - in this ease, Ricarcen's corporate officers - claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor (Ricarcen). The writ of possession, they claim, cannot apply to them.
In an August 10, 2005 Order, the trial court denied the Ricarcen corporate officers' motion for intervention. On August 30, 2005 petitioner Ricarcen filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 10, 2005 Order together with a motion for consolidation of the case with Civil Case O-03-50686, the case for annulment of the real estate mortgage. In a November 21, 2005 Order, the trial court denied both motions for reconsideration and consolidation, and considered the case submitted for resolution.
On December 16, 2005 the trial court issued a "Decision"[6] directing the issuance of a writ of possession in respondent Lam's favor.[7]
On January 2, 2006 petitioner Ricarcen filed a motion for reconsideration of the "Decision". Lam opposed it. In a January 20. 2006 Order, the trial court denied Ricarcen's motion, prompting it to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 93002. asserting essentially (a) that the trial court's December 16, 2005 "Decision" is null and void for violating Section 14, Article VIII, of the Constitution which requires that a decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, and (b) that the trial court erred in not ordering the consolidation of LRC No. Q-l9550(05) with Civil Case No. Q-03"-50686. On September 19, 2006 the CA rendered a Decision dismissing petitioner Ricarcen's petition for lack of merit,[8] thus, the present petition.
The CA held that since the trial court's December 16, 2005 "Decision" was not a judgment on the merits but was a mere Order that it issued pursuant to a ministerial duty. Section 14, Article VIII of (he Constitution did not apply.
The appellate court is correct. The trial court has the ministerial duly to issue to a purchaser in an auction sale, be it foreclosure or execution, the writ of possession he asks. The court exercises neither official discretion nor judgment.[9]
Nor is there basis for the consolidation of LRC Q-1955U(05), the writ of possession case, with Civil Case Q-03-50686, the annulment of foreclosure case. Consolidation is unnecessary for the proper determination of each case. Quite the contrary, as the CA correctly held, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a ground for denial of a writ of possession. It must issue as a matter of course, without prejudice to the outcome of the other case.[10]
Indeed, the pendency of an action questioning the validity of a mortgage cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession after title to the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee. At the expiration of the period of redemption, the mortgagee who acquires the property at the foreclosure sale can proceed to have the title consolidated in his name and a writ of possession issued in his favor.[11]
Regarding Ricarcen's final argument, that the intervention of its officers in LRC No. Q-l9550(05) should have been allowed, the same likewise fails. Intervention contemplates a suit and is, therefore, proper to a case that requires a trial where the parties adduce evidence on the issues that the case presents. It does not apply to a.proceeding for the issuance of a writ of possession, which is summary nature. Us simple mandate is to allow the purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession being founded on his right of ownership.[12]
The petition is denied. Quisumbing, J., on sabbatical leave.
WITNESS the Honorable Conchita Carpio Morales, Acting Chairperson, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (designated additional member per S.O. No. 691), Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C Del Castillo and Roberto A. Abad, Members, Second Division, this 9th day of September, 2009.
G.R. No. 176079 (Ricarcen Development Corporation, herein duly represented by Josefelix R. Villanueva v. Spouses Aw Peng Lam and Yap Sui Lun).
Assailed in this petition for review on cerliorari is the September 19, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 93002 and its Resolution[2] of December 21, 2006, which dismissed petitioner Ricarcen Development Corporation's (Ricarcen) petition for certiorari.
In 2002, petitioner Ricarcen Look a loan of PI0,000.000.00 from respondent Aw Peng Lam secured by a mortgage on its Banawe, Quezon City property:[3] When Ricarcen failed to pay the loan, Lam foreclosed extrajudicially on the mortgage. The Banawe property was thus sold at public auction, with Lam as the highest bidder at P15,000,000.00. The corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued and registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on January 9, 2004.
After petitioner Ricarcen foiled to timely redeem the properly, respondent Lam consolidated his ownership over the same under a new title (TCT N-260868) issued in his name and on March 14, 2005 filed a petition[4] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 215, for the issuance of a writ of possession over it. Ricarcen opposed the petition, claiming that in 2003, it filed Civil Case Q-03-50686[5] before Branch 87 of the Quezon City RTC, which sought the annulment of the real estate mortgage over the property.
On May 16, 2005 certain corporate officers of petitioner Ricarcen moved for intervention in the writ of possession case, arguing that, while the issuance of a writ of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135 as amended is ministerial, the same admits of exceptions, such as when the property is in possession of a third party - in this ease, Ricarcen's corporate officers - claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor (Ricarcen). The writ of possession, they claim, cannot apply to them.
In an August 10, 2005 Order, the trial court denied the Ricarcen corporate officers' motion for intervention. On August 30, 2005 petitioner Ricarcen filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 10, 2005 Order together with a motion for consolidation of the case with Civil Case O-03-50686, the case for annulment of the real estate mortgage. In a November 21, 2005 Order, the trial court denied both motions for reconsideration and consolidation, and considered the case submitted for resolution.
On December 16, 2005 the trial court issued a "Decision"[6] directing the issuance of a writ of possession in respondent Lam's favor.[7]
On January 2, 2006 petitioner Ricarcen filed a motion for reconsideration of the "Decision". Lam opposed it. In a January 20. 2006 Order, the trial court denied Ricarcen's motion, prompting it to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 93002. asserting essentially (a) that the trial court's December 16, 2005 "Decision" is null and void for violating Section 14, Article VIII, of the Constitution which requires that a decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, and (b) that the trial court erred in not ordering the consolidation of LRC No. Q-l9550(05) with Civil Case No. Q-03"-50686. On September 19, 2006 the CA rendered a Decision dismissing petitioner Ricarcen's petition for lack of merit,[8] thus, the present petition.
The CA held that since the trial court's December 16, 2005 "Decision" was not a judgment on the merits but was a mere Order that it issued pursuant to a ministerial duty. Section 14, Article VIII of (he Constitution did not apply.
The appellate court is correct. The trial court has the ministerial duly to issue to a purchaser in an auction sale, be it foreclosure or execution, the writ of possession he asks. The court exercises neither official discretion nor judgment.[9]
Nor is there basis for the consolidation of LRC Q-1955U(05), the writ of possession case, with Civil Case Q-03-50686, the annulment of foreclosure case. Consolidation is unnecessary for the proper determination of each case. Quite the contrary, as the CA correctly held, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a ground for denial of a writ of possession. It must issue as a matter of course, without prejudice to the outcome of the other case.[10]
Indeed, the pendency of an action questioning the validity of a mortgage cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession after title to the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee. At the expiration of the period of redemption, the mortgagee who acquires the property at the foreclosure sale can proceed to have the title consolidated in his name and a writ of possession issued in his favor.[11]
Regarding Ricarcen's final argument, that the intervention of its officers in LRC No. Q-l9550(05) should have been allowed, the same likewise fails. Intervention contemplates a suit and is, therefore, proper to a case that requires a trial where the parties adduce evidence on the issues that the case presents. It does not apply to a.proceeding for the issuance of a writ of possession, which is summary nature. Us simple mandate is to allow the purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession being founded on his right of ownership.[12]
The petition is denied. Quisumbing, J., on sabbatical leave.
WITNESS the Honorable Conchita Carpio Morales, Acting Chairperson, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (designated additional member per S.O. No. 691), Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C Del Castillo and Roberto A. Abad, Members, Second Division, this 9th day of September, 2009.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 34-17: penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Rosas, and concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
[2] Id. at 76-77; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, and concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Apolinario D. Bruselas Jr.
[3] Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-101161 (155923).
[4] Docketed as Land Registration Case(LRC) No. Q-19550(05) will Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
[5] Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-03-50686 with Branch V of the Quezon City RTC.
[6] Rollo, pp. 181-182.
[7] Id. at 182.
[8] Id. at 46.
[9] Philippine National Oil Company v. National College of Business and Arts. G.R. No. 155698.January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 298. citing A.G. Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals. GR No. 111662. 23 October 1997. 281 SCRA 155
[10] Citing Ong v. Court of Appeals. GR No. 121494, 8 June 2000, 333 SCRA 189.
[11] Union Bank of the Philippines v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134068. 25 June 2001. 359 SCRA 480.
[12] Ancheta v. Metrobank, GR No. 163410. September 16. 2005. 470 SCRA 157.
