December 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 184539 : December 15, 2010]
MYRNA GRECIA RABAJA V. DINGLE-POTOTAN WATER DISTRICT
G.R. No. 184539 (Myrna Grecia Rabaja v. Dingle-Pototan Water District).
This case is about raising matters on appeal that were not raised before the trial court.
Sometime in 1963, the head of respondent Dingle-Pototan Water District (DPWD), a government corporation supplying water to its service area, agreed to employ the son of Gabriel Daza, administrator of Lot 220 of Barangay Calajunan, Mandurriao, lloilo City, in exchange for DPWD's construction and operation of a water reservoir on the lot.[1] Lot 220 then belonged to Rodolfo Grecia,
Seventeen years later in 1980, soon after petitioner Myrna Grecia Rabaja acquired ownership of Lot 220 from Rodolfo Grecia, she began demanding �2,000.00 monthly rents from DPWD to retroact from the time when it started to use the lot. But DPWD refused the demand. Subsequently it vacated the property in 1995.[2] Rabaja then filed a complaint[3] against DPWD for collection of unpaid rents, damages, and attorney's fees, alleging that the head of DPWD had verbally agreed to pay her rents for its use of the lot.
Answering with counterclaim,[4] DPWD contends that Rabaja's demand for P2,000.00 monthly rents was exorbitant considering that it was collecting only P464.00 monthly from those it was servicing through the reservoir on the lot and that, moreover, she had no right to demand rents since DPWD built the reservoir with the previous owner's consent, given through Gabriel Daza who then administered the lot. The taking into employment of Daza's son served as the full compensation for the use and occupation of the lot.
On May 10, 2005 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment[5] in favor of DPWD, dismissing the complaint and ordering Rabaja to pay DPWD P15,000,00 as attorney's fees; �1,000.00 as appearance fee for every hearing; and P2,000.00 as litigation expenses plus costs. The RTC ruled that Rabaja's claim that DPWD had verbally committed through its manager to pay monthly rents cannot be entertained since she presented no proof that DPWD had authorized the manager mentioned to make such commitment. The DPWD, being a corporation, could enter into a lease contract only with the approval of its Board of Directors. No such approval was shown. Besides, under the Statute of Frauds, a lease contract in excess of one year is unenforceable unless it is in writing and signed by the parties or their agents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision and dismissed the appeal.[6] The CA held that, under Section 17 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 198,[7] DPWD can be held liable for rents for the use of plaintiffs property only if it be shown that it bound itself to pay such rents through an appropriate board resolution. What had been established, said the CA, is merely the verbal agreement in 1963 between the previous owner of Lot 220 and DPWD for the use of the lot in exchange for the latter's employment of the property administrator's son. Further, there was no showing that the alleged agreement to pay rent to Rabaja had been executed, partially or completely.
Upset with the decision, Rabaja filed a motion for its reconsideration[8] but the CA denied the same.[9] Rabaja comes to this Court on petition for review, claiming that the CA erred in denying her motion for reconsideration and not considering the new matters she raised.
It is basic in procedural law that appellate courts cannot entertain for the first time on appeal matters that the parties neither alleged in their pleadings before the trial court nor raised during the proceedings before it.[10]
Here, Rabaja's theory of the case before the RTC was that DPWD had, through its general manager, orally agreed to pay her monthly rents for its use of the property. Only when she filed with the CA a motion for reconsideration of its decision did she allege for the first time that DPWD had occupied the lot in bad faith when its former owner, Rodolfo Grecia, was out of the country and that the latter had not authorized Gabriel Daza to give consent to DPWD's use of the property. Rabaja invoked Articles 450[11] and 451[12] of the New Civil Code that made builders in bad faith liable to the owner of the land.
It is well-settled that points of law, theories, and arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the first time.[13] To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.[14]
Besides, the factual findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the appellate court are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties.[15]
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision dated January 11, 2008 and Resolution dated August 15, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV 00815, which decision and resolution upheld the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case 22458.
SO ORDERED.
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[2] Id.
[3] Id. at 24-26.
[4] Id. at 27-31.
[5] Id. at 34-38.
[6] Id. at 40-46.
[7] Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973.
Section 17. Performance of District Powers. - All powers, privileges, and duties of the district shall be exercised and performed by and through the board: Provided, however, That any executive, administrative or ministerial power shall be delegated and redeiegated by the board to officers or agents designated for such purpose by the board.
[8] Rollo, pp. 54-56.
[9] Id. at 48-50.
[10] Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 261, 277-278 (1997), citing People v. Echegaray, 335 Phil. 343, 349 (1997), citing Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 413, 420 (1995).
[11] Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent. (363a)
[12] Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or sower, (n)
[13] Hufana v. Genato, 417 Phil. 709, 723 (2001); see also San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 631, 648 (1998); Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 155, 186 (1997); First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 280, 326 (1996); Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97753, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 448, 461.
[14] Phil. National Oil Company v. Maglasang, G.R, No. 155407, November 11, 2008, 570 SCRA 560, 570.
[15] Titan Construction Corporation v. Uni-Field Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 153874, March 1, 2007, 517 SCRA 180, 186; Sigaya v. Mayuga, 504 Phil. 600, 611 (2005).
