December 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 194246 : December 01, 2010] FILINVEST LAND, INC., ET AL. V. JUDGE MANUEL ROBIN TARO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 75, SAN MATEO, RIZAL; ET AL. :
[G.R. No. 194246 : December 01, 2010]
FILINVEST LAND, INC., ET AL. V. JUDGE MANUEL ROBIN TARO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 75, SAN MATEO, RIZAL; ET AL.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 01 December 2010 which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 194246 (Filinvest Land, Inc., et al. v. Judge Manuel Robin Taro, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal; et al.). - We are urged in this Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to set aside the Order[1] dated June 15, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75, denying petitioners' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the Order[2] dated August 27, 2010, denying their motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Filinvest Land, Inc. (FLI) is the developer of Timberland Heights in San Mateo, Rizal. In October 2008, FLI noticed some clearing activities near its project site in Barangays Guinayang and Maly. Upon inquiries, FLI found that the 19-hectare site was being prepared to host a sanitary landfill. FLI claimed that it was not consulted on the application for any sanitary landfill. It further claimed that its existence inside a productive and protected forest and so close to a residential project endangers the health and safety of the residents not only in the immediate vicinity of the landfill, but also those along the route leading to the dumpsite. FLI sought a cease and desist order against the sanitary landfill from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), but the latter turned a deaf ear.
On February 9, 2009, FLI and its First Vice-President, Antonio E. Cenon, (herein petitioners) filed a complaint[3] for injunction and damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) with the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, against herein respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2273-09 and raffled to Branch 75. Petitioners asserted that the sanitary landfill must be closed for (i) not having an environmental compliance certificate (ECC); (ii) lack of consultation with and consent from the barangay officials and residents of these two barangays; (iii) it is located in a protected and productive forest, in violation of the municipal zoning ordinance of San Mateo; (iv) it is being constructed outside the framework of a comprehensive local government solid waste management plan; and (v) it is a public nuisance.
On February 12, 2009, petitioners' application for a TRO was heard. After the hearing, the RTC issued an Order, viz.:
Respondents, thereafter, filed their separate answers to the complaint. Respondent Mayor Jose Rafael E. Diaz (Diaz)[6] denied all the material allegations in the complaint and averred that the establishment of the sanitary landfill was duly approved by the Barangay Council of Pintong Bukawe, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Rizal. The DENR also approved the ECC of San Mateo Sanitary Landfill & Development Corporation (SMSLDC). Respondent Diaz asserted that petitioners have no cause against him. The establishment of a sanitary landfill is authorized by law and by jurisprudence. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
SMSLDC, on the other hand, averred that fifteen (15) barangays of San Mateo, Rizal, including Barangays Guinayang and Maly, passed a resolution for the opening of a new sanitary landfill. It added that the DENR has already issued ECC with Reference Number No. ECC-LDBW-08-111-9003 for the new San Mateo sanitary landfill. It denied that the sanitary landfill was located within the protected area. SMSLDC asserted that the sanitary landfill project passed the test of the land use and other pertinent environmental laws; hence, it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.[7]
Respondent barangay captains, for their part, adopted the answers of respondents Diaz and SMSLDC.
A hearing on petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction then ensued. On June 15, 2010, the RTC issued an Order denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, viz.:
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners assert that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their application for a writ of preliminary injunction. They argue that the grant of preliminary injunction is warranted especially in this case where the construction and operation of a sanitary landfill may lead to serious and irreversible damage to the environment, water resources, and communities. Petitioners claim that they filed the instant petition to preserve the environment and in accord with the constitutionally protected right of the people to a balance and healthful ecology.
Petitioners further assert that the sanitary landfill so close to the Timberland Heights projects constitutes taking and deprivation of property without due process of law. It depreciates the project, laying to waste the tremendous investments in the amount of P970,000,000.00. They further aver that the Timberland Heights residents are now complaining of the effect of the sanitary landfill; and that prospective buyers have changed their minds and desisted from buying, upon knowing about the construction of the sanitary landfill. They allege that the injury is continuing, real, and substantial; and that, unless restrained, the injury may well be irreparable. Thus, they pray for a status quo order or a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement and execution of the assailed Orders of the RTC, and to enjoin the RTC from further hearing the case.
The petition must fail.
It must be noted that what is being assailed before this Court are the Orders dated June 15, 2010 and August 27, 2010, which respectively denied petitioners' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration. The Order denying petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order. In Albay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Santelices,[10] we held that the remedy against an interlocutory order is not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course; and, when unfavorable verdict is handed down, tlie remedy is to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law, incorporating in the said appeal the ground for assailing the interlocutory order. Petitioners acted precipitately in resorting to certiorari to assail the denial of their application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
It is true that an interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts.[11]
Even assuming, arguendo, that certiorari may lie, the Court cannot grant the instant petition because it violates the principle of hierarchy of courts.
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction) is not exclusive, but concurrent with the RTC and the CA, in certain cases. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as granting to the parties, seeking any of the writs, an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.[12] The choice of where to file the petition for certiorari is not left to the party seeking the writ.[13] There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[14]
In the present case, petitioners adduced no special and important reason why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. Thus, we reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari.
En passant, the dismissal of the petition notwithstanding, petitioners are not without remedy. If petitioners are certain that the construction and operation of the sanitary landfill will lead to serious and irreversible damage to the environment, water resources, and communities, they may bring the proper action provided in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194246 (Filinvest Land, Inc., et al. v. Judge Manuel Robin Taro, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal; et al.). - We are urged in this Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to set aside the Order[1] dated June 15, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75, denying petitioners' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the Order[2] dated August 27, 2010, denying their motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Filinvest Land, Inc. (FLI) is the developer of Timberland Heights in San Mateo, Rizal. In October 2008, FLI noticed some clearing activities near its project site in Barangays Guinayang and Maly. Upon inquiries, FLI found that the 19-hectare site was being prepared to host a sanitary landfill. FLI claimed that it was not consulted on the application for any sanitary landfill. It further claimed that its existence inside a productive and protected forest and so close to a residential project endangers the health and safety of the residents not only in the immediate vicinity of the landfill, but also those along the route leading to the dumpsite. FLI sought a cease and desist order against the sanitary landfill from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), but the latter turned a deaf ear.
On February 9, 2009, FLI and its First Vice-President, Antonio E. Cenon, (herein petitioners) filed a complaint[3] for injunction and damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) with the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, against herein respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2273-09 and raffled to Branch 75. Petitioners asserted that the sanitary landfill must be closed for (i) not having an environmental compliance certificate (ECC); (ii) lack of consultation with and consent from the barangay officials and residents of these two barangays; (iii) it is located in a protected and productive forest, in violation of the municipal zoning ordinance of San Mateo; (iv) it is being constructed outside the framework of a comprehensive local government solid waste management plan; and (v) it is a public nuisance.
On February 12, 2009, petitioners' application for a TRO was heard. After the hearing, the RTC issued an Order, viz.:
At the hearing of the Application for TRO, [petitioners] presented [their] witness in the person of Engr. Antonio E. Cenon. After his direct testimony, [petitioner] admitted in effect that they are not yet in possession of authenticated copies of the document they wanted to present[,] as in fact[;] they manifested their intention to file a motion for the production of other documents in the custody of the different government agencies. Both parties agreed to reset the continuation of the hearing to February 18, 2009 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the RTC denied it on March 6, 2009.[5]
In the light of the foregoing, it will appear that there is no urgency for the resolution of the prayer for a TRO. The said prayer is therefore denied. The hearing of this case will be for the purpose of determining whether or not preliminary injunction should issue.[4]
Respondents, thereafter, filed their separate answers to the complaint. Respondent Mayor Jose Rafael E. Diaz (Diaz)[6] denied all the material allegations in the complaint and averred that the establishment of the sanitary landfill was duly approved by the Barangay Council of Pintong Bukawe, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Rizal. The DENR also approved the ECC of San Mateo Sanitary Landfill & Development Corporation (SMSLDC). Respondent Diaz asserted that petitioners have no cause against him. The establishment of a sanitary landfill is authorized by law and by jurisprudence. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
SMSLDC, on the other hand, averred that fifteen (15) barangays of San Mateo, Rizal, including Barangays Guinayang and Maly, passed a resolution for the opening of a new sanitary landfill. It added that the DENR has already issued ECC with Reference Number No. ECC-LDBW-08-111-9003 for the new San Mateo sanitary landfill. It denied that the sanitary landfill was located within the protected area. SMSLDC asserted that the sanitary landfill project passed the test of the land use and other pertinent environmental laws; hence, it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.[7]
Respondent barangay captains, for their part, adopted the answers of respondents Diaz and SMSLDC.
A hearing on petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction then ensued. On June 15, 2010, the RTC issued an Order denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, viz.:
Without necessarily prejudging the merits of the petition, the court, after painstaking review of the voluminous testimonial and documentary evidence/s both for plaintiffs and defendants, has to deny the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.FLI filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on August 27, 2010.[9]
For one, there exists no actual or present rights that need to be protected in esse. The location of the property remains unsettled, for while [FLIJ insists Brgy. Guinayang as its location, [respondents] claim it to be in Brgy. Pintong Bukawe. The determination of said location at this point in time would be premature. This Court opted to resolve it after a full blown trial.
Besides, consummated acts and those of expectancy cannot be the subject of ancilliary writ. The landfill development appeared to be authorized as per Environmental Clearance Certificate issued by the DENR. The issuance of the said ECC is presumed regular unless proven otherwise. Its validity or veracity has never been ably contradicted by [FLI] before the DENR prior to the filing of this case.
Finally, wanting clear and strong proof of a concrete improper waste management, fear of probable repercussions thereof to ecology and its dimishing effect on the value of [FLFs] property remains only a perceived injury that is more apparent than real, not ripe for immediate relief pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the prayer for issuance of [a] writ of preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED. Let this case be set for Pre-Trial on August 18, 2010 at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners assert that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their application for a writ of preliminary injunction. They argue that the grant of preliminary injunction is warranted especially in this case where the construction and operation of a sanitary landfill may lead to serious and irreversible damage to the environment, water resources, and communities. Petitioners claim that they filed the instant petition to preserve the environment and in accord with the constitutionally protected right of the people to a balance and healthful ecology.
Petitioners further assert that the sanitary landfill so close to the Timberland Heights projects constitutes taking and deprivation of property without due process of law. It depreciates the project, laying to waste the tremendous investments in the amount of P970,000,000.00. They further aver that the Timberland Heights residents are now complaining of the effect of the sanitary landfill; and that prospective buyers have changed their minds and desisted from buying, upon knowing about the construction of the sanitary landfill. They allege that the injury is continuing, real, and substantial; and that, unless restrained, the injury may well be irreparable. Thus, they pray for a status quo order or a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement and execution of the assailed Orders of the RTC, and to enjoin the RTC from further hearing the case.
The petition must fail.
It must be noted that what is being assailed before this Court are the Orders dated June 15, 2010 and August 27, 2010, which respectively denied petitioners' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration. The Order denying petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order. In Albay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Santelices,[10] we held that the remedy against an interlocutory order is not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course; and, when unfavorable verdict is handed down, tlie remedy is to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law, incorporating in the said appeal the ground for assailing the interlocutory order. Petitioners acted precipitately in resorting to certiorari to assail the denial of their application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
It is true that an interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts.[11]
Even assuming, arguendo, that certiorari may lie, the Court cannot grant the instant petition because it violates the principle of hierarchy of courts.
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction) is not exclusive, but concurrent with the RTC and the CA, in certain cases. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as granting to the parties, seeking any of the writs, an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.[12] The choice of where to file the petition for certiorari is not left to the party seeking the writ.[13] There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[14]
In the present case, petitioners adduced no special and important reason why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. Thus, we reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari.
En passant, the dismissal of the petition notwithstanding, petitioners are not without remedy. If petitioners are certain that the construction and operation of the sanitary landfill will lead to serious and irreversible damage to the environment, water resources, and communities, they may bring the proper action provided in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[2] Id. at 46-47.
[3] Id. at 56-80.
[4] Id. at 108.
[5] Id. at 144-145.
[6] Id. 148-149.
[7] Id. at 160-173.
[8] Id. at 44-45.
[9] Supra note 2.
[10] G.R. No. 132540, April 16.2009, 585 SCRA 103, 114.
[11] Id. at 113.
[12] Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 428, 443.
[13] Abadilla v. Hofile�a-Europa, G.R. No. 146769, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 458, 466.
[14] Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila, 465 Phil. 529, 542-543 (2004).
