October 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 198064 : October 17, 2011]
ROBINSON'S INCORPORATED AND ROBINSON'S SUPERMARKET V. EUSEBIA ENGLIS
G.R. No. 198064 (Robinson's Incorporated and Robinson's Supermarket v. Eusebia Englis) - We resolve the Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by private complainants Robinson's Incorporated and Robinson's Supermarket from the 5 November 2009 Decision and 21 July 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03937.
The RTC Ruling
In its Decision[1] promulgated 30 June 2008, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City found the accused Eusebia Englis not guilty of the charges of two counts of qualified theft,[2] and exonerated her from civil liability. The RTC held that the prosecution was unable to discharge its evidentiary burden, considering : a) there was no evidence as to the exact amount of money retrieved by the accused on 7-8 July 1999; b) none of the cashiers personally involved in the collection and preparation of remittance slips testified at trial; c) Cheng Go's testimony on how much the balance should be was hearsay; and d) the court could not conceive how the accused allegedly secreted away P1.364 million, considering that she was always accompanied by an auditor to the company's vaults and was subjected to security inspections before and after her work.[3]
The CA Ruling
In dismissing private complainants' Petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals (CA) explained that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the trial court simply because of alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence.[4] Certiorari lies only to correct errors of jurisdiction. Since there was no abusive acquittal on the part of the RTC, the Petition violates the right of the accused against double jeopardy, as it attempts to mask ordinary review with the availment of certiorari.[5]
Our Ruling
We deny the Petition.
Petitioners contend that the CA denied their Petition "without genuinely passing on the issues" therein and thus bring the same issues before us for review. First, they invoke this Court's ruling in People of the Philippines v. Joven de Grano, claiming that by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, such that the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy. They insist that the RTC, in its total indifference to the prosecution evidence, committed not only errors of judgment but grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the accused.
De Grano is not on all fours with the present case. The Court therein reversed the CA, not because of errors in affirming the acquittal, but because 3 of the 4 accused did not appear at the promulgation of the RTC Decision finding them guilty of murder.[6] Neither did the three surrender after conviction, or explain the reason for their absence. When the accused filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof. Thus, upon elevation of their petition to the CA, the accused were never at risk of double jeopardy. But in the case of Estanislao, the lone accused who was present at all times during trial, the Court affirmed his right against double jeopardy:
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction...(Estanislao) was in custody and was present at the promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction over his person. Consequently, the RTC's ruling downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against double jeopardy applies.[7]
The right against double jeopardy is sacrosanct in our jurisdiction,[8] an "impregnable wall,"[9] such that purported errors in the judgment of the trial court are no longer open for review under the guise of a certiorari petition. The CA rightfully saw through petitioners' attempt to pass off an ordinary review under the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. They assert the sufficiency of the unvalidated deposit slips as proof of the accused's culpability, relying on People v. Hipol. That case clearly finds no application here, because: a) Hipol is for malversation of public funds, not qualified theft; b) the RTC's conviction of Hipol was affirmed by the Supreme Court; and c) the RTC considered all evidence, and not just the bank slips, as petitioners would have us believe. According to the trial court:
The undeposited bank slips tallying with the ledgers of the City Treasurer's Office which in turn tally with the Commission on Audit reports, which further tally with Philippine National Bank record of non-deposit, and which finally tally with the accused's attendance in the City Treasurer's Office as shown by his daily time record (DTRs), with the dates of depositing the City's collections to the Bank, are solid evidence of accused's culpability. This is coupled with an observed affluence by the accused during those months.
(T)his Presiding Judge had opportunity to observe the demeanor of accused John Peter Hipol while testifying, and this Judge is convinced that the accused is not telling the truth. The accused's evasive look and manner of testifying give the impression to this Judge of a witness who is lying in his teeth.[10]
Even assuming there is merit in petitioners' contention, the RTC findings would not amount to errors in jurisdiction, but merely errors in judgment, and could not be the proper subject of certiorari.[11] Such errors are of a nature that can no longer be rectified, because they would place the accused in double jeopardy.[12]
Petitioners next argue that double jeopardy, even if applicable, does not preclude the CA from ruling on the civil aspect of the case. But the CA no longer ruled on this matter, as it saw no jurisdictional defect in the RTC Decision. The Rules of Court require the judgment to contain a categorical determination of the accused's civil liability,[13] which the RTC Decision provided, as follows:
Because there is no sufficient evidence that the private complainants lost the money specified in the Informations, the Court must accordingly conclude that the accused has no civil liability to them. In other words, the act or omission from which the civil liability arise did not exist.[14]
Under Rule 120, in case of acquittal, the trial court should state whether the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the court shall determine if the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist.[15] This Court has already held that a civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished, if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.[16] With more reason should the civil liability be extinguished in this case, as it was resolved along with the criminal action, and the act from which the liability arose did not exist, as categorically declared by the RTC.
Again, there is another attempt to have us review the exoneration of the accused from civil liability based on her alleged admission. The RTC was correct when it ruled thus:
Because there is insufficient proof of the body of the crime itself, the alleged admission of the accused becomes irrelevant. This is because an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged. It is less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction. Nonetheless, the written promissory note made by the accused is nothing more than that, a promissory note. There is no admission there that she took the money, only that she incurred a shortage, which is not necessarily equivalent to theft.[17]
There being no reversible error attributable to the appellate court, its findings are affirmed, and the present Petition is denied.
WHEREFORE, the 5 November 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03937 is hereby AFFIRMED. (Perlas-Bernabe, J., designated additional member in lieu of Perez, J., per S.O. No. 1114)
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Penned by Presiding Judge Macaundas M. Hadjirasul, in Criminal Case Nos. CBU- 62391 and 52391-A.[2] As defined under the Revised Penal Code, Art 310 in relation to Art. 308.
[3] Rollo, pp. 217-219.
[4] Decision promulgated 5 November 2009, penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino and concurred in by Associate Justices Manuel M. Barrios and Samuel H. Gaerlan.
[5] Rollo, p. 135.
[6] People of the Philippines v. Joven de Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550.
[7] Id. at 570-571.
[8] Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 21.
[9] Cerezo v. People, G.R. No. 185230, 1 June 2011.
[10] People v. John Peter Hipol, G.R. No. 140549, 22 July 2003, 407 SCRA 179.
[11] Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76591, 6 February 1991, 193 SCRA 563.
[12] People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 174504, 21 March 2011.
[13] Rule 120, Sec. 2, par. 2.
[14] RTC Decision, p. 15, rollo, p. 220.
[15] Garces v. Hernandez, Jr., G.R. No. 180761, 9 August 2010, 627 SCRA 366.
[16] Dayap v. Sendiong, G.R. No. 177960, 29 January 2009, 577 SCRA 134.
[17] RTC Decision, p. 14, rollo, p. 219.