June 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 159794 : June 06, 2007] MACLARING M. LUCMAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MANAGER OF THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, MARAWI CITY V. ALIMATAR MALAWI, ABULKHAYR PANGCOGA, SALIMATAR SARIP, LOMALA CADAR, ALIRIBA MACARAMBON AND ABDUL USMAN:
[G.R. No. 159794 : June 06, 2007]
MACLARING M. LUCMAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MANAGER OF THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, MARAWI CITY V. ALIMATAR MALAWI, ABULKHAYR PANGCOGA, SALIMATAR SARIP, LOMALA CADAR, ALIRIBA MACARAMBON AND ABDUL USMAN
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 6 June 2007
G.R. No. 159794 (Maclaring M. Lucman, in his capacity as Manager of the LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Marawi City v. Alimatar Malawi, Abulkhayr Pangcoga, Salimatar Sarip, Lomala Cadar, Aliriba Macarambon and Abdul Usman).
Challenged in respondents' Motion for Reconsideration is the Court's Decision promulgated on 19 December 2006 which reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
In its Decision, this Court stressed that the relationship between the Land Bank of the Philippines, of which petitioner was the branch manager, on one hand, and the barangays, of which respondents are the chairmen, on the other, is that of debtor and creditor. The available remedy for cases involving a contractual relationship is specific performance. Mandamus does not avail since it does not lie to enforce the performance of a contractual obligation.[1]
The Court also ruled that the barangays themselves, as juridical entities, are indispensable parties in this case and should have been impleaded. Without impleading the barangays, no valid judgment can be rendered.
Respondents have sought reconsideration on the grounds: (i) that issues not raised by the parties in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; and (ii) that the Court erred in holding that respondents were not acting for and in behalf of their respective barangays.
It is noteworthy that respondents have not squarely challenged the foundation of the Decision of the Court as they resorted, instead, to tangential arguments. The fact is it was the Court, not petitioner, which brought up the issue of contractual relationship between the parties as this matter is intertwined with the viability of respondents' cause of action. However, the non-joinder of the barangays as parties themselves is a different story. Petitioner adverted to it as a point of controversy in his petition before the Court. For their part, respondents have merely come out with a feeble assertion that they have acted for and in behalf of the barangays, seemingly oblivious of the reality borne out by the records that the barangays though indispensable parties have not been impleaded. But then too, respondents have not pointed to any pleading or submission on record that they were, in fact, authorized to file the complaint before the lower court.
At all events, the untenability of the cause of action and the non-joinder of indispensable parties, though not brought up earlier, can properly serve as basis of the Court's decision. We have consistently held that the general rule of limiting the issues to be resolved to those raised a quo are subject to certain qualifications. In Boston Bank of the Philippines (formerly Bank of Commerce) v. Manalo et al.,[2] it was held that the Court may consider an issue not raised during the trial when there is plain error;[3] or such move is required in the interest of substantial justice, as it finds that to do so is necessary to arrive at a just decision;[4] or when an issue is closely related to an issue raised in the trial court and the Court of Appeals and is necessary for a just and complete resolution of the case;[5] or when the trial court decides a case in favor of a party on certain grounds and the other points in question were ignored or erroneously decided in favor of a party by the trial court or appellate court.[6]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents' Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
G.R. No. 159794 (Maclaring M. Lucman, in his capacity as Manager of the LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Marawi City v. Alimatar Malawi, Abulkhayr Pangcoga, Salimatar Sarip, Lomala Cadar, Aliriba Macarambon and Abdul Usman).
Challenged in respondents' Motion for Reconsideration is the Court's Decision promulgated on 19 December 2006 which reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
In its Decision, this Court stressed that the relationship between the Land Bank of the Philippines, of which petitioner was the branch manager, on one hand, and the barangays, of which respondents are the chairmen, on the other, is that of debtor and creditor. The available remedy for cases involving a contractual relationship is specific performance. Mandamus does not avail since it does not lie to enforce the performance of a contractual obligation.[1]
The Court also ruled that the barangays themselves, as juridical entities, are indispensable parties in this case and should have been impleaded. Without impleading the barangays, no valid judgment can be rendered.
Respondents have sought reconsideration on the grounds: (i) that issues not raised by the parties in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; and (ii) that the Court erred in holding that respondents were not acting for and in behalf of their respective barangays.
It is noteworthy that respondents have not squarely challenged the foundation of the Decision of the Court as they resorted, instead, to tangential arguments. The fact is it was the Court, not petitioner, which brought up the issue of contractual relationship between the parties as this matter is intertwined with the viability of respondents' cause of action. However, the non-joinder of the barangays as parties themselves is a different story. Petitioner adverted to it as a point of controversy in his petition before the Court. For their part, respondents have merely come out with a feeble assertion that they have acted for and in behalf of the barangays, seemingly oblivious of the reality borne out by the records that the barangays though indispensable parties have not been impleaded. But then too, respondents have not pointed to any pleading or submission on record that they were, in fact, authorized to file the complaint before the lower court.
At all events, the untenability of the cause of action and the non-joinder of indispensable parties, though not brought up earlier, can properly serve as basis of the Court's decision. We have consistently held that the general rule of limiting the issues to be resolved to those raised a quo are subject to certain qualifications. In Boston Bank of the Philippines (formerly Bank of Commerce) v. Manalo et al.,[2] it was held that the Court may consider an issue not raised during the trial when there is plain error;[3] or such move is required in the interest of substantial justice, as it finds that to do so is necessary to arrive at a just decision;[4] or when an issue is closely related to an issue raised in the trial court and the Court of Appeals and is necessary for a just and complete resolution of the case;[5] or when the trial court decides a case in favor of a party on certain grounds and the other points in question were ignored or erroneously decided in favor of a party by the trial court or appellate court.[6]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents' Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] See Decision citing Manalo v. PAIC Savings Bank, G.R. No. 146531, 18 March 2005, 453 SCRA 747.
[2] G. R. No. 158149, 9 February 2006, 482 SCRA108.
[3] Id. at 128, citing Del Rosario v. Bonga, G.R. No. 136308, 23 January 2001, 350 SCRA 101, 110.
[4] Id. at 128, citing Abra Valley College, Inc. v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-39086, 15 June 1988, 162 SCRA 106, 116, citing Perez v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 645 (1984).
[5] Id. at 128, citing F.F. Ma�acop Construction Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 208, 212 (1997), citing Garrido v. CA, 236 SCRA 450 (1994).
[6] Id. at 128, citing Relativo v. Castro, 76 Phil. 563 (1946).
