June 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 147608 : June 13, 2007] ALFREDO M. MOCON, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS AND EDGE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS :
[G.R. No. 147608 : June 13, 2007]
ALFREDO M. MOCON, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS AND EDGE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 13 June 2007
G.R. No. 147608: ALFREDO M. MOCON, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGE CORPORATION, respondents.
This petition for review [1] assails the 26 September 2000 Decision [2] and the 12 March 2001 Resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52464. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City (trial court) dismissing Alfredo Mocon's (petitioner) counterclaim and ordering petitioner to pay Edge Corporation (respondent) P27,000 with interest.
Petitioner worked as a plant manager of respondent since January 1980 until his termination on 17 December 1990 "for leading a conspiracy to sabotage or paralyze the manufacturing operations of the company."[5]
On 14 February 1991, petitioner received a letter from respondent's counsel demanding the payment of P27,310 for unliquidated cash advances.
For petitioner's failure and refusal to pay, respondent filed with the trial court a collection suit for P27,000 with interest. Petitioner counterclaimed for P23,384 as value of his unpaid leave of absence and P40,000 as value of the car he allegedly left with respondent. In answer to the counterclaim, respondent alleged that the leave of absence had no cash value and the car was purchased under a simulated, and thus void, contract and the car was never in petitioner's possession.
During the pre-trial, petitioner admitted the computation of the unpaid cash advances. Thus, the remaining issues in this case are (1) whether petitioner's leave of absence had cash value by virtue of an alleged company policy and (2) whether there was a valid sale of the car to petitioner.
The issues in the present case are essentially factual. Resolving them necessarily requires threshing out the facts and the evidence presented by both parties.
It must be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts[6] and only questions of law can be raised in a petition under Rule 45.[7] Petitioner failed to show that the instant controversy falls under the exceptions[8] to these well-entrenched principles. Moreover, the factual findings of the trial court were upheld by the Court of Appeals. Settled is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially when they are in agreement with those of the trial court, are binding and conclusive on this Court.[9]
Both trial and appellate courts found that the petitioner's leave of absence, though approved by respondent, had no cash value. Petitioner did not introduce any clear and convincing evidence that his approved leave of absence had cash value. As held by the trial court, "petitioner has not shown that the 49 days of approved absence was for earned credits arising from law or contract."[10] The appellate court also found petitioner's claim of company policy to grant vacation pay unsubstantiated. The appellate court ruled that "there is no actual proof supporting such claim."[11]
On the second issue, the Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner has no legal claim to the car since he neither paid for nor possessed it. Respondent merely "agreed to provide him with the car for his use as plant manager and, after documenting the purchase, issued instead the newly acquired car to Eduardo Santillan, whose company vehicle in turn was designated for petitioner's use while so employed with respondent."[12] Petitioner admitted that the car was given to him, not because he had paid for it, but because of his long service to respondent. Further, petitioner, after he left respondent, "never bothered to claim or collect the car until he was called to court for the payment" of his cash advances.[13]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 26 September 2000 Decision and the 12 March 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52464 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, J., on official leave.
G.R. No. 147608: ALFREDO M. MOCON, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGE CORPORATION, respondents.
This petition for review [1] assails the 26 September 2000 Decision [2] and the 12 March 2001 Resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52464. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City (trial court) dismissing Alfredo Mocon's (petitioner) counterclaim and ordering petitioner to pay Edge Corporation (respondent) P27,000 with interest.
Petitioner worked as a plant manager of respondent since January 1980 until his termination on 17 December 1990 "for leading a conspiracy to sabotage or paralyze the manufacturing operations of the company."[5]
On 14 February 1991, petitioner received a letter from respondent's counsel demanding the payment of P27,310 for unliquidated cash advances.
For petitioner's failure and refusal to pay, respondent filed with the trial court a collection suit for P27,000 with interest. Petitioner counterclaimed for P23,384 as value of his unpaid leave of absence and P40,000 as value of the car he allegedly left with respondent. In answer to the counterclaim, respondent alleged that the leave of absence had no cash value and the car was purchased under a simulated, and thus void, contract and the car was never in petitioner's possession.
During the pre-trial, petitioner admitted the computation of the unpaid cash advances. Thus, the remaining issues in this case are (1) whether petitioner's leave of absence had cash value by virtue of an alleged company policy and (2) whether there was a valid sale of the car to petitioner.
The issues in the present case are essentially factual. Resolving them necessarily requires threshing out the facts and the evidence presented by both parties.
It must be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts[6] and only questions of law can be raised in a petition under Rule 45.[7] Petitioner failed to show that the instant controversy falls under the exceptions[8] to these well-entrenched principles. Moreover, the factual findings of the trial court were upheld by the Court of Appeals. Settled is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially when they are in agreement with those of the trial court, are binding and conclusive on this Court.[9]
Both trial and appellate courts found that the petitioner's leave of absence, though approved by respondent, had no cash value. Petitioner did not introduce any clear and convincing evidence that his approved leave of absence had cash value. As held by the trial court, "petitioner has not shown that the 49 days of approved absence was for earned credits arising from law or contract."[10] The appellate court also found petitioner's claim of company policy to grant vacation pay unsubstantiated. The appellate court ruled that "there is no actual proof supporting such claim."[11]
On the second issue, the Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner has no legal claim to the car since he neither paid for nor possessed it. Respondent merely "agreed to provide him with the car for his use as plant manager and, after documenting the purchase, issued instead the newly acquired car to Eduardo Santillan, whose company vehicle in turn was designated for petitioner's use while so employed with respondent."[12] Petitioner admitted that the car was given to him, not because he had paid for it, but because of his long service to respondent. Further, petitioner, after he left respondent, "never bothered to claim or collect the car until he was called to court for the payment" of his cash advances.[13]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 26 September 2000 Decision and the 12 March 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52464 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, J., on official leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 22-27. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Bienvenido L. Reyes, concurring.
[3] Id. at 28.
[4] Id. at 29-34. Penned by Assisting Judge Francisco Donato Villanueva.
[5] Id. at 31.
[6] Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 311.
[7] Section 1 of Rule 45 reads:
Filing of petition with Supreme Court. -- A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)
[8] Jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court, such as: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Almendrala v. Ngo, supra)
[9] Amante v. Serwelas, G.R. No. 143572, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 348.
[10] Rollo, p. 32.
[11] Id. at 25.
[12] Id. at 34.
[13] Id. at 26.
