June 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 174128 : June 06, 2007] JANOS TAMAS HERCZOG V. ROSA C. ROSACAY-HERCZOG & REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES :
[G.R. No. 174128 : June 06, 2007]
JANOS TAMAS HERCZOG V. ROSA C. ROSACAY-HERCZOG & REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 6 June 2007:
G.R. No. 174128 (Janos Tamas Herczog v. Rosa c. Rosacay-Herczog & Republic of the Philippines).
This Petition for Review stemmed from a complaint for annulment of marriage filed in 1994 by petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City alleging psychological incapacity on the part of private respondent. Petitioner, a Dutch national, had married private respondent, a Filipino, at The Hague, Netherlands, on 18 April 1990. Before the RTC, private respondent filed a counter-petition for legal separation and support pendente lite. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision on 26 March 1999 in favor of petitioner, declaring the marriage of the parties null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. This ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals on 11 August 2006, finding the evidence of private respondent's psychological incapacity insufficient. Hence, the present petition.
The Court required both public and private respondents to file their respective comments on the petition. The Comment of public respondent has been duly filed, but the same could not be said of private respondent's comment. It further appears that the present whereabouts of private respondent are unknown either to her counsel or to petitioner, so they declared in their respective manifestations. Nonetheless, the Court has deigned to inquire into the merits of the petition.
Among the determinative grounds cited by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision was the fact that "[a] thorough scrutiny of the records of the case discloses that [private respondent's] alleged psychological incapacity has not been declared to be incurable. There is no answer to the query as to whether her alleged psychological incapacity is permanent or curable."[1] The seminal case of Republic v. Court of Appeals[2] (also known as the Molina case[3]) had set the guidelines for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Among these standards is that the psychological incapacity "must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable."[4]
The petition does advert to a bare statement in the RTC decision that "|t]he incapacity of respondent has become incurable as it is already beyond the means of the party to cure,"[5] but it does not appear that the statement was based on any medical or clinical finding presented in evidence at the trial. Based on Molina, the finding of incurability must be grounded on duly established medical or clinical findings, such as those that should be contained in the psychologist's report. It cannot be grounded solely on the perception of the parties or the trial court judge, for if the conclusion of incurability were to be divorced from its clinical roots, the medical basis in which psychological incapacity is embedded would be substituted by unscientific analysis. The contrary conclusion runs inconsistent with Molina.
Petitioner does rely extensively, on several points, on the more recent ruling in Antonio v. Reyes,[6] a decision which admittedly provided a fresh perspective in the appreciation of petition for annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court acknowledges the continuing vitality of that precedent and the pronouncements therein,[7] yet it must be stressed that Antonio explicitly stated that "t]here is no cause to disavow Molina at present."[8] Indeed, it would be error to propose that Antonio overturned or modified Molina and its guidelines. That point is especially material as we resolve this petition.
Particularly critical is petitioner's allegation that in Antonio, the Court allowed the annulment of marriage despite the fact that no evidence was presented therein that established the incurability of the psychological incapacity suffered by the respondent therein,[9] and notwithstanding the Molina guidelines as well.
There is, however, a critical difference in that respect between Antonio and the case at bar. The trial in Antonio was concluded in 1995, or two years before the promulgation of Molina. Thus, Court in Antonio recognized that since it was Molina which first definitively established the necessity of proving the incurability of the psychological incapacity before annulment of marriage can obtain, the parties therein could not "have impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC."[10]
In contrast, the subject RTC decision was promulgated in 1999, or two years after Molina was handed own. In fact, the RTC decision expressly referred to Molina and the guidelines it prescribed, even citing the critical rule that such psychological incapacity "is shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable."[11] Clearly, all the opportunity was present for petitioner to have adduced medical or clinical evidence that would establish the permanence or incurability of private respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. Petitioner does point out that the psychiatrist and psychologist he presented as witnesses testified before the RTC in 1995, "well before the general guidelines in the Molina case came into existence in 1997."[12] Yet, that circumstance could not detract from the fact that the petitioner could have offered supplemental or additional evidence after Molina was promulgated in 1997, two years before the RTC rendered its decision. In fact, petitioner submitted his Memorandum before the RTC only in June of 1998, and certainly there was sufficient time for the offer of such pertinent evidence establishing psychological incapacity that would conform to the Molina guidelines.
Accordingly, the grant of this petition can only be obtained if the Court were, through this petition, to modify or overturn Molina, particularly as to its requirement of proof that the psychological incapacity "is shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable." Notably, petitioner makes no such submission. After careful deliberation on the matter, the Court decided that there is no cause presented by the petition at hand for us to revisit, modify or overturn Molina at the present time. Consequently, the denial of the petition is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 174128 (Janos Tamas Herczog v. Rosa c. Rosacay-Herczog & Republic of the Philippines).
This Petition for Review stemmed from a complaint for annulment of marriage filed in 1994 by petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City alleging psychological incapacity on the part of private respondent. Petitioner, a Dutch national, had married private respondent, a Filipino, at The Hague, Netherlands, on 18 April 1990. Before the RTC, private respondent filed a counter-petition for legal separation and support pendente lite. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision on 26 March 1999 in favor of petitioner, declaring the marriage of the parties null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. This ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals on 11 August 2006, finding the evidence of private respondent's psychological incapacity insufficient. Hence, the present petition.
The Court required both public and private respondents to file their respective comments on the petition. The Comment of public respondent has been duly filed, but the same could not be said of private respondent's comment. It further appears that the present whereabouts of private respondent are unknown either to her counsel or to petitioner, so they declared in their respective manifestations. Nonetheless, the Court has deigned to inquire into the merits of the petition.
Among the determinative grounds cited by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision was the fact that "[a] thorough scrutiny of the records of the case discloses that [private respondent's] alleged psychological incapacity has not been declared to be incurable. There is no answer to the query as to whether her alleged psychological incapacity is permanent or curable."[1] The seminal case of Republic v. Court of Appeals[2] (also known as the Molina case[3]) had set the guidelines for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Among these standards is that the psychological incapacity "must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable."[4]
The petition does advert to a bare statement in the RTC decision that "|t]he incapacity of respondent has become incurable as it is already beyond the means of the party to cure,"[5] but it does not appear that the statement was based on any medical or clinical finding presented in evidence at the trial. Based on Molina, the finding of incurability must be grounded on duly established medical or clinical findings, such as those that should be contained in the psychologist's report. It cannot be grounded solely on the perception of the parties or the trial court judge, for if the conclusion of incurability were to be divorced from its clinical roots, the medical basis in which psychological incapacity is embedded would be substituted by unscientific analysis. The contrary conclusion runs inconsistent with Molina.
Petitioner does rely extensively, on several points, on the more recent ruling in Antonio v. Reyes,[6] a decision which admittedly provided a fresh perspective in the appreciation of petition for annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court acknowledges the continuing vitality of that precedent and the pronouncements therein,[7] yet it must be stressed that Antonio explicitly stated that "t]here is no cause to disavow Molina at present."[8] Indeed, it would be error to propose that Antonio overturned or modified Molina and its guidelines. That point is especially material as we resolve this petition.
Particularly critical is petitioner's allegation that in Antonio, the Court allowed the annulment of marriage despite the fact that no evidence was presented therein that established the incurability of the psychological incapacity suffered by the respondent therein,[9] and notwithstanding the Molina guidelines as well.
There is, however, a critical difference in that respect between Antonio and the case at bar. The trial in Antonio was concluded in 1995, or two years before the promulgation of Molina. Thus, Court in Antonio recognized that since it was Molina which first definitively established the necessity of proving the incurability of the psychological incapacity before annulment of marriage can obtain, the parties therein could not "have impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC."[10]
In contrast, the subject RTC decision was promulgated in 1999, or two years after Molina was handed own. In fact, the RTC decision expressly referred to Molina and the guidelines it prescribed, even citing the critical rule that such psychological incapacity "is shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable."[11] Clearly, all the opportunity was present for petitioner to have adduced medical or clinical evidence that would establish the permanence or incurability of private respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. Petitioner does point out that the psychiatrist and psychologist he presented as witnesses testified before the RTC in 1995, "well before the general guidelines in the Molina case came into existence in 1997."[12] Yet, that circumstance could not detract from the fact that the petitioner could have offered supplemental or additional evidence after Molina was promulgated in 1997, two years before the RTC rendered its decision. In fact, petitioner submitted his Memorandum before the RTC only in June of 1998, and certainly there was sufficient time for the offer of such pertinent evidence establishing psychological incapacity that would conform to the Molina guidelines.
Accordingly, the grant of this petition can only be obtained if the Court were, through this petition, to modify or overturn Molina, particularly as to its requirement of proof that the psychological incapacity "is shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable." Notably, petitioner makes no such submission. After careful deliberation on the matter, the Court decided that there is no cause presented by the petition at hand for us to revisit, modify or overturn Molina at the present time. Consequently, the denial of the petition is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, p. 45.
[2] 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[3] The petitioning spouse and co-respondent in the case being Roridel O. Molina. Id.
[4] Id. at 677-678.
[5] See rollo, p. 31.
[6] G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006, 464 SCRA 353.
[7] In that respect, a brief comment is warranted on the Office of the Solicitor General's present submission that "[a]n unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties." Insofar as this statement may foster the impression that the Constitution itself prohibits or dissuades from the dissolution of marriages, we reiterate our pronouncement in Antonio that: "All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Secs. 1 and 2, Art. XV of the Constitution x x x. But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. x x x While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. x x x Indeed, Art. 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life." Id. at 371-373.
[8] Id. at 370.
[9] See rollo, p. 33.
[10] Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 6 at 388.
[11] See rollo, p. 204
[12] Id. at 32
