Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 19 November 2007:

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1640 [Formerly O.C.A. I.P.I No. 05-1751-MTJ] - ATTY. WILFREDO M. GARRIDO, JR. v. JUDGE YOLANDA M. LEONARDO, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 9, Manila

By Complaint^[1] dated July 20, 2005, Atty. Wilfredo M. Garrido, Jr. (complainant), counsel of record of the Spouses Ramon Ong and Ana Go-Ong who were the private complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 330063-66, "People of the Philippines v. Lucy Lee-Go for four counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 which were lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 9, charged the said court's Presiding Judge Yolanda M. Leonardo (respondent) with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment and Violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Code of Professional Responsibility.

On April 29, 2005, the accused filed a Motion For Leave to File and to Admit Demurrer to Evidence^[2] to which herein complainant filed an Opposition^[3] on the ground that the Motion was filed, out of time, the accused having five days after receipt on March 22, 2005 Order of respondent's April 7, 2005^[4] (admitting the evidence for the prosecution) or until April 12, 2005 to file a Demurrer to Evidence, following Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. - After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

The motion for leave of court of file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period often (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave of court file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (Underscoring supplied)

By Order dated June 8, 2005,^[5] respondent granted the Demurrer, holding that while a demand letter was sent by the private complainants, there was no showing that it was received by the accused; and that:

. . . while the fixing of the periods for the presentation of a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence is designed to expedite the resolution of such a motion, it is not the intent of the law to deny the accused his day in Court, and in greater accord with the constitutional intent to give the accused in a criminal case all possible venues to prove his innocence as expressed in the latest revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,^[6]

citing People v. Mahinay.^[7]

Hence, arose the present administrative complaint.

Complainant proffers that respondent's citation of Mahinay is misplaced because there was no ruling therein to justify respondent's failure to apply the reglementary period in Section 23, Rule 119.

Complainant also proffers that respondent misappreciated the evidence when she declared that there is no showing that a demand letter was received by the accused for, so complainant asserts, there appears on the demand letter a notation reading "received by: [signature] 11/12/98."^[8]

In her Comment^[9] dated September 2, 2005, respondent considers it "highly preposterous if not absurd" for complainant to consider her ignorant of Section 23, Rule 119.^[10] She admits that the Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Demurrer was indeed filed out of time, which is precisely the reason why she stated in her Order of June 8, 2005 that "it is not the intent of the law to deny the accused his day in court." She explains that she departed from the rule in order to "serve the paramount interest of justice which is not only the concern of the private complainant or the accused but of the Court as well."^[11]

As to her alleged misappreciation of the evidence, respondent maintains that while a demand letter to the accused was in fact sent by the complainant, the prosecution failed to convincingly establish that the same was personally received by the accused. In any event, respondent contends, even if she misappreciated the evidence, the remedy is judicial, not administrative.^[12]

By Report dated April 24, 2006,^[13] the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) came up with the following evaluation and recommendation:

x x x x

. . . The instant case is an offshoot of the dismissal by respondent Judge of Criminal Case Nos. 330063-66 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Lucy Lee-Go", for violation of BP Blg. 22 based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed out of time by the counsel for the accused.

Respondent erred. Records show that the prosecution rested its case on March 22, 2005 as shown in the court's order after Exhibits "A to H" and its sub-markings were admitted. On April 12, 2005, or twenty one (21) days after the prosecution has rested its case, the counsel for the accused filed the Motion for Leave and to Admit Demurrer to Evidence (Annex "C").

The Rule provides that "the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case xxx."

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period often (10) days from notice, x x x (pars. 3 and 4, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court).

The [phrase] "shall be filed within a non-extendible period" is not an empty phrase. The period within which a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, and if granted, the period within which the demurrer to evidence, should be filed is mandatory. The word SHALL when used in laws, regulations or directives expresses] what is mandatory. Hence, respondent judge abused her discretion when she admitted the motion for leave to file and admit demurrer to evidence twenty one (21) days after the prosecution has rested its case.

The provisions in Section 23, Rule 119 of me Rules of Criminal Procedure limiting the periods within which a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence are new. They are found only in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that took effect on December 1, 2000. xxxx

The fundamental difference between the 1985 and 2000 rule on demurrer to evidence is that the latter limits the periods within which the motion for leave, and the demurrer to evidence should be filed. The reason for amending the rule on demurrer to evidence by limiting the period the motion for leave should be filed is to put a stop to unnecessary delays in the disposition of cases.

A judge is mandated to observe and follow the provisions of the Rules of Court strictly. Procedural rules should not be disregarded or dismissed by a judge simply because it would prejudice a party. The filing of a demurrer to evidence is only a statutory privilege and must be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Section 9 (4) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies violation of Supreme Court rules as a less serious charge while Section 11 of the same Rule provides that if the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanction shall be imposed:

(1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or

(2) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00

Since it is not true that complainant was completely left with no remedy but an administrative complaint as he could have interposed an appeal from the dismissal upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or denial of due process [People vs. Sandiganbayan and Tan, Jr., G.R. No. 152532, August 16, 2005] and considering that this respondent's first offense, the imposition of a fine in the amount of Ten Thousand One Hundred One Pesos [Pl0,^[1]01.00 is a reasonable penalty.^[14] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Resolution of July 10, 2006,^[15] this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case on the basis of the pleadings and records already filed and submitted. Respondent answered in the affirmative, by Manifestation^[16] of November 30, 2006. As for complainant, he instead filed on August 3, 2006 a Motion to Withdraw Complaint,^[17] stating that after a "year of reflection and introspection," he would rather concentrate on prosecuting the civil aspect of the case which had been transferred to Branch 7 of the MeTC of Manila.^[18]

This Court finds in order the evaluation and recommendation of the OCA. That complainant decided to withdraw his complaint does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent. Boiser v. Aguirre, Jr.^[19], is instructive:

. . . [T]he Court must reiterate the rule that mere desistance on the part of the complainant does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint against any member of the bench. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. The court's interest in the affairs of the judiciary is a paramount concern that must not know bounds.^[20]

While respondent indeed erred in granting the demurrer, it does not amount to gross ignorance of law or procedure. For liability for such charge to attach, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but, most importantly, that he was actuated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive.^[21] This complainant failed to prove.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Yolanda M. Leonardo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 9, Manila, is found guilty of violation of the Rules of Court for which she is FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand One Hundred One Pesos (P10,101), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.