Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2007 > September 2007 Resolutions > [G.R. No. 161758 : September 17, 2007] DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS), DIVISION OF ALBAY ETC., ET. AL. V. CELSO OÑATE :

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 17 September 2007:

G.R. No. 161758 (Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Division of Albay etc., et. al. v. Celso O�ate)

On June 6, 2007, this Court issued a Resolution in this case which reads:

Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY DUE COURSE to the petition for failure to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

On June 8, 2007, a Decision was then promulgated by this Court involving the same case, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the January 14, 2004 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 affirming the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1) Declaring the DepEd (formerly DECS), Division ofAlbay to have the rights of possession and usufruct over Lot 6849-A with an area of 13,072 square meters under TCT No. T-83946 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay, as a result of laches on the part of respondent Celso O�ate and his predecessors-in-interest. Respondent Celso O�ate, his heirs, assigns, and successors-in-interest are prohibited from selling, mortgaging, or encumbering Lot 6849-A while the said lot is still being used and occupied by petitioner DECS. However, the rights of possession and usufruct will be restored to respondent the moment petitioner DECS no longer needs the said lot. The Registry of Deeds of Albay is ordered to annotate the aforementioned restrictions and conditions at the back of TCT No. T-83946-A in the name of respondent Celso O�ate. Item No. 2 of the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is modified accordingly;

2) Declaring Celso O�ate as the true and legal owner in fee simple of the following lots:

a. Lot 6849-C with an area of 10,000 square meters under

TCT No. T-83948 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay;

b. Lot 6849-D with an area of 1,127 square meters under TCT No. T-83949 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay; and

c. Lot 6849-E with an area of 608 square meters under TCT No. T-83950 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay.

3) Declaring Mariano M. Lim as true and legal owner of Lot 6849-B with an area of 3,100 square meters under TCT No. T-84049 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay;

4) Ordering petitioner DECS and all other persons claiming under said department to return the possession of Lots 6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E to respondent Celso O�ate and Lot 6849-B to Mariano M. Lim; and

5) Deleting Item No. 4 of the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC, which ordered respondent Celso O�ate to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP 50,000) to defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay.

The November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

No costs.

Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration^[1] which was posted on July 24, 2007 and received by this Court on August 1, 2007. A Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification^[2] was posted by respondent on August 9, 2007, which was received by this Court on August 21, 2007.

Although this Court, as a rule, does not allow the filing of a Motion for Extension to file Motion for Reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading, nonetheless, this Court takes into consideration the circumstances surrounding this case and deems it prudent to admit said motion. As was held in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.^[3]

In said Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification, respondent prays that a clarification be made regarding the June 6, 2007 Resolution of the Second Division and the June 8, 2007 Decision, and that DECS be ordered to pay rentals from 1960 up to the present or that DECS be ordered to buy said lot under TCT No. T-83946 through negotiated sale in the highest interest of justice. Respondent submits that the June 6, 2007 Resolution of the Court is valid and binding; hence, the Decision promulgated on June 8, 2007 has no legal force and effect.

A Motion for Reconsideration is a remedy in law which grants a party the opportunity to point out any mistakes which it believes the Court committed in its penned decision, whereas for the latter, the opportunity to correct itself in order to avoid an injustice. Likewise, it will give said party chance to amplify its stand on the issues that it raised before the Court.

The Motion for Reconsideration should be denied.

During the division session on June 6, 2007, the draft ponencia submitted by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was deliberated upon and approved. However, through human error and inadvertence, the action taken in another case, which was the denial of the petition, was applied in the instant case. As a result, a Minute Resolution dated June 6, 2007, denying due course to the petition for lack of reversible error, was erroneously prepared and released.

The Court therefore regrets the mistake committed and the confusion that resulted from it.

Anent the issue on the prayer of the respondent that DECS be ordered to pay rentals from 1960 up to the present or that DECS be ordered to buy said lot under TCT No. T-83946 through negotiated sale in the highest interest of justice, the Court reproduces its discussion in the June 8, 2007 Decision:

Laches has set in

A brief scrutiny of the records does show tell-tale signs of laches. The first element is undisputed: the then Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was constructed in 1940 on a portion of disputed Lot 6849, specifically Lot No. 6849-A containing 13,072 square meters under TCT No. T-83946. Moreover, Mrs. Toribia Milleza, a retired government employee and resident of Bagumbayan, Daraga since 1955 pertinently testified, thus:

Q:	How long have you been residing in this place, Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay?
A:	Maybe I stayed there in 1955 until the present.
	x x x x
Q:	Now, can you further recall the kind of building that was constructed in this property?
A:	Seva type, building.
Q:	At present how many buildings were constructed in this property?
A:	Plenty of school buildings.
Q:	Now, how many buildings were first constructed in [sic] this property?
A:	In 1955 only one, the Seva type, then there was constructed five (5) Marcos Type buildings during the Marcos time.

The devotion of Lot No. 6849-A to education started in 1940 and continued up to December 21, 1988 when said lot was donated to the DECS. From then on, DECS built various buildings and introduced improvements on said lot. Lot No. 6849-A was continuously used for public education until March 18, 1993 when respondent O�ate filed Civil Case No. 8715 and thereafter up to the present.

Thus, for a total period of more than fifty-two (52) years, Lot No. 6849-A was exclusively and completely utilized by DECS for public education. This fact was not successfully challenged nor refuted by respondent.

The second element of laches was likewise proven. No evidence was presented to show that respondent or his predecessors-in-interest ever took any action, administrative or judicial, nor either party questioned or protested the Municipality's adverse occupation of a portion of Lot 6849. As petitioner had demonstrated laches by persuasive and credible

evidence, it is incumbent upon respondent to show that his predecessors-in-interest indeed protected their rights of ownership over the lot. Thus, as early as 1940, when the first Seva type school building was constructed over a portion of the disputed lot, now Lot 6849-A, respondent must prove that his predecessors-in-interest indeed undertook activities to contest the occupation of the portion of the lot by the Municipality and subsequently by petitioner DECS. Unfortunately, respondent failed to substantiate such defense of ownership and possession of the lot and even skirted this issue.

Respondent testified that he came to know of Lot 6849 only in 1973 when he was 23 years old. He asserted that he took possession of said lot in the same year when his two (2) uncles, the brothers of his late father, passed on to him the disputed lot as his father's share of the inheritance from the late Claro O�ate and Gregoria Los Banos (his grandparents). However, it is interesting to note that he testified that he only came to know in 1991 that the elementary school was built on a portion of Lot 6849, now Lot 6849-A. These assertions are irreconcilable. Common experience tells us that one who owns a property and takes possession of it cannot fail to discover and know that an existing elementary school was built and standing on the lot from the time that the owner starts possessing a property.

Nonetheless, even granting that respondent indeed only came to know of such encroachment or occupation in 1991, his rights cannot be better than that of his predecessors-in-interest, that is, Claro O�ate and his uncles, Antonio and Rafael, who died in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Since respondent's right over the lot originated from his predecessors-in-interest, then he cannot have better rights over Lot No. 6849-A than the latter. The spring cannot rise higher than its source. Besides, respondent has not proffered any explanation why his predecessors-in-interest did not protest and challenge the Municipality's occupancy over a portion of their lot. Verily, with the span of around 52 years afforded respondent and his predecessors-in-interest, their inaction and delay in protecting their rights were certainly excessive and unjustified.

In the third element, the records clearly bear out the fact that petitioner DECS did not know nor anticipate that their possession and occupancy of a portion of Lot 6849 would later be questioned. In fact, petitioner built additional school buildings and facilities on the school site amounting to more than PhP 11 million. Mr. Jose Adra, School Principal of the Daraga North Central Elementary School, testified on the donation of the disputed lot to petitioner and the cost of the improvements on it. After more than forty-eight (48) years of unquestioned, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession by petitioner DECS, it had no knowledge nor reason to believe that respondent would assert any right over the lot after the lapse of such long occupation coupled with a tax declaration in the name of the Daraga Municipality.

Finally, the last element is likewise proven by the antecedent facts that clearly show grave prejudice to the government, in general, and to petitioner, in particular, if the instant action is not barred without even considering the cost of the construction of the school buildings and facilities and the deleterious effect on the school children and affected school teachers and personnel if Lot No. 6849-A would be returned to respondent.

Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court as its application is controlled by equitable considerations. In the instant case, with the foregoing considerations, we are constrained from giving approbation to the trial and appellate courts' ruling that the application of the principle of laches would subvert the ends of justice. Indeed, it is unjust for the State and the affected citizenry to suffer after respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had slept on their rights for 52 years.

Also, the inaction of respondent O�ate and his predecessors-in-interest for over 50 years has reduced their right to regain possession of Lot 6849-A to a stale demand.

Based on the foregoing discussion, respondent's prayer that DECS be made to pay rentals cannot be granted as DECS has acquired the right of usufruct over the property based on the equitable ground of laches. Anent the plea to require DECS to buy said lot, it is a matter to be negotiated by the parties and outside the ambit of the instant petition.

In light of these conflicting issuances, the Court RECALLS the June 6, 2007 Minute Resolution, and AFFIRMS the June 8, 2007 Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

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^[1] Rollo, pp. 245-246.

^[2] Id. at 248-249.

^[3] No. L-70895, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 208, 212.