February 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 192178 : February 21, 2011]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ARMANDO TINGSON
G.R. No. 192178 (People of the Philippines v. Armando Tingson). - In an Information dated December 18, 2000, appellant Armando Tingson was charged with rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
That on the 11th day of November 1999 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay Hibod-hibod. Municipality of Sogod, Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lustful intent and lewd designs, and by means of force and taking advantage of the mental condition of the victim x x x as being feebleminded, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ravish said victim and successfully had carnal knowledge with the offended party without her consent and against her will to the damage and prejudice of the offended party and of social order.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant pleaded not guilty.
During trial, the following facts were established:
In the afternoon of November 11, 1999, complainant was playing tong-its in the house of Felix Baguhin with the latter�s wife and children. Appellant was also there, drinking tuba with Felix, his half-brother. Appellant jokingly told complainant that he would match her with his son who was still single. Complainant replied that she would report what he said to her father. She asked appellant for tuba and she was given one glass of it. When complainant noticed that it was already dark, she asked permission to go home. When she stepped outside the house, appellant pulled her arm and forced her to go with him to Brgy. Hibod-hibod. She told him that she did not want to go with him but he pulled her and held her hands.
In Brgy. Hibod-hibod, they went to a nipa hut. There, appellant took off her short pants and underwear while holding her hands so that she could not resist. He threatened to stab her with the knife that he was carrying if she told anybody. Complainant could not shout for help because appellant's hand was covering her mouth. Appellant took off his pants and underwear. Appellant forced complainant to lie down on the floor. He then masturbated and inserted his penis into her vagina. She cried because she felt pain. She was lying on her back while appellant was on top. She tried to resist but appellant, who was stronger, held her hands. Appellant penetrated her four times. Every time appellant raped her, a white substance came out of his penis. Thereafter, appellant and complainant slept in the hut.
That night, complainant's mother looked for complainant in Baguhin's house and the entire municipality. Later, she was informed by Hardy Amorin that, while he was riding a motorcycle on his way from Brgy. Liloan, he saw complainant and appellant in Brgy. Hibod-hibod. They proceeded to the place but they could not find complainant.
On the following day, appellant and complainant boarded a motorcab bound for poblacion Sogod. Upon reaching the place, the two went their separate ways and complainant proceeded to her house. Complainant was later brought by her mother to the hospital for examination.
Dr. Imelda T. Palanca, Medical Officer IV at the Sogod District Hospital, examined complainant. Her initial findings showed that complainant's body was negative for hematoma or contusion. Her second findings showed hyperemia or redness in the lower aspect of introitus of the female genital organ. She opined that the redness could have been caused by any kind of trauma or force such as sexual intercourse or penetration of the penis. There was also an old hymenal tear at 3:00 o'clock and 6:00 o'clock positions which could have been the result of contact with the private part for one or two months before or longer. She also found sperm cells in the vaginal canal.
As testified to by Dr. Renato D. Obra, who conducted a psychiatric examination of complainant in April 1998, complainant is suffering from mental retardation, mild to moderate category. It means that she has an IQ below 70 and that she is not in a normal psychiatric condition. Although the victim is already 24 years old, her mental age is only that of a 10-year-old child.
In his defense, appellant averred that he and complainant were sweethearts and that the latter voluntarily had sexual intercourse with him. On cross-examination, he admitted that he met complainant for the first time on November 11, 1999, the same day he had sexual intercourse with her. That same day, he allegedly courted complainant who immediately accepted him and agreed to go with him.
On August 8, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision convicting appellant of rape, viz:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined under Art. 266-A and Alt. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, this Court hereby renders judgment sentencing (he accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Costs de officio.[1]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision with modification. The dispositive portion of its decision dated December 4, 2009 reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated August 8, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Sogod, Southern Leyte, in Criminal Case No. R-233 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION awarding private complainant Evelyn Autida P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The CA held that complainant clearly established that appellant forced and intimidated her into having sexual intercourse with him. She narrated that appellant covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting and threatened to kill her to make her yield to the sexual assault.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal, which was granted by the CA. Accordingly, the records of the case were elevated to this Court. In a Resolution dated June 23, 2010, this Court required the parties to submit, if they so desire, their respective supplemental briefs. Both parties manifested that they were adopting their respective briefs before the CA.
Appellant insists that he did not employ force, threat or intimidation in having sexual intercourse with complainant. He points out that Brgy. Hibod-hibod is 12 kilometers away from Baguhin�s house and the two of them walked and passed through many roads in the presence of several people. She would have had every opportunity to escape or shout for help if she was being forced into going with him. The fact that she did not protest meant that she acquiesced to appellant's plan. As another indication that complainant was not raped, complainant even waited until morning, and after appellant brought bread for her, before she went home. Appellant posits that the impulse of a rape victim is to immediately escape at the slightest opportunity.[3]
Appellant contends that complainant has sufficient level of intelligence to understand the consequences of her actions as shown by the fact that she was able to execute a sworn statement before the police investigator and to give a clear and comprehensive testimony in court. She can even play tong-its. According to appellant, in order to constitute rape, the law requires that the victim must be demented and not just feebleminded.[4]
The petition is devoid of merit.
We agree with both the CA and the trial court that appellant employed force and intimidation in having sexual intercourse with complainant. This is clearly supported by the following testimony of complainant:
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A COURT A PROS. VIVARES: A Q A Q A Q A Q A
Despite complainant being mentally challenged, she was able to narrate the ordeal she suffered in the hands of appellant in a straightforward, categorical, and consistent manner. As often declared by this Court, mental retardation, by itself, does not disqualify a person from testifying. What is essential is the quality of perception and the manner in which this perception is made known to the court.[6] The victim's mental deficiency even lends credence to her testimony, as someone feebleminded and guileless would [not] speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of a rape if it has not, in fact, happened to her.[7]
Appellant attempts to infuse doubt in our minds by broaching complainant's lack of resistance in going with him to Brgy. Hibod-hibod, which is 12 kms away from Baguhin's house, and her failure to take every opportunity to escape from him during that time. We are not convinced. Complainant's lack of resistance during their trip to Brgy. Hibod-hihod cannot be construed as acquiescence to appellant's plan to have sexual intercourse with her. Her acts during the time when the rape was being committed belied such conclusion. While they were on their way to Brgy. Hibod-hibod, complainant might not have known what appellant's intention was in bringing her there.
Appellant argues that, in order to constitute rape, the law requires that the victim must be demented and not just feebleminded. This argument actually serves no purpose as the prosecution has already proven that force and intimidation attended the sexual act. Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there are four circumstances under which a man having carnal knowledge of a woman may be guilty of rape. The victim being demented is just one of these circumstances; force, threat or intimidation is another. To constitute rape, it is enough that one of these four circumstances is proven.
WHEREFORE, the court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Decision dated December 4, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 00748, finding appellant Armando Tingson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, and AFFIRMS said Decision.
SO ORDERED.
[Carpio, J., no part due to close relation to a member of the Court of Appeals which gave due course to the instant appeal; Velasco, Jr., J., designated additional member per Raffle dated August 16, 2010.]
Very truly yours,
MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] CA rollo, p. 50.[2] Rollo, p. 20.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 26-29.
[4] Id. at 29-33.
[5] Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[6] People v. Paler, G.R. No. 18641 1, July 5, 2010.
[7] People v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 177294, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 363, 381-382.
