February 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 180424 : February 16, 2011]
LILIA CHENG V. SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 180424 (LILIA CHENG v. SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.) - For Resolution is the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Resolution[1] of the Department of Justice (DOJ), dated March 15, 2007, directing the filing of an Information charging herein petitioner with violation of the Anti-Dummy Law, and the DOJ Resolution[2] dated October 16, 2007, denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Resolution, be reversed and set aside.
Petitioner is a director of the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) which was granted the franchise to operate and maintain the NAIA III during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules and other terms and conditions stipulated in the Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), and three other Supplements thereto.
In 1998, PIATCO hired Fraport AG (Fraport), a German company engaged in the business of airport construction and operation, as a technical consultant and finance arranger to facilitate the funding for the NAIA III project. On July 6, 1999, Fraport bought shares of stock in PIATCO. It also bought stocks in Philippine Airport and Ground Services Terminals, Inc. (PTI), which also had shares of stock in PIATCO. Then, Fraport also subscribed to shares of stock in Philippine Airport and Ground Services Terminals Holdings, Inc. (PTH), which in turn owned shares of stock in PTI. Fraport, likewise, bought from another German corporation, GlobeGround GmbH, the latter's shares of stock in Philippine Airport and Ground Services, Inc. (PAGS), a corporation that also owned shares of stock in both PIATCO and PTH.
On November 28, 2002, the DOJ issued a Memorandum to the Executive Secretary stating that "[t]he 1997 CA [Concession Agreement], including the ARCA and the Supplements thereto, has inherent defects that render such agreements intrinsically void and non-negotiable." In 2003, the Court rendered the Decision in Agon v. PIATCO,[3] where it voided the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and Supplements thereto.
Thereafter, a complaint was filed with the DOJ against petitioner and others affiliated with PIATCO, accusing petitioner and the others with violation of the Anti-Dummy Law. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 2006-817, entitled NBI-AFCCD v. Cheng Yong, et al. The DOJ then issued a Resolution dated December 27, 2006, dismissing the complaint against herein petitioner and her co-respondents. However, the complainant moved for reconsideration and, on March 15, 2007, the DOJ issued the assailed Resolution reversing the first Resolution dated December 27, 2006 and, instead, directed the filing of an Information for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law against petitioner and her co-respondents. Petitioner and the others filed separate motions for reconsideration, but on October 16, 2007, the DOJ issued the Resolution denying said motions. A Petition for Review was filed by petitioner before the Office of the Secretary of Justice. However, fearing that the proceedings before said office would merely be a farce, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.
The various grounds alleged by petitioner for allowance of the petition all boil down to whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it found probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law. Petitioner argues that: (1) under Section 3(A) of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA), the "Control Test," and not the "Grandfather Rule" should be applied in determining the nationality of a corporation, hence, PIATCO should be considered a Philippine National; (2) since the Court ruled in Agan v. PIATCO that the Concession Agreement and the ARCA and the Supplements thereto are null and void, then PIATCO never ripened into an active public utility franchise operator, making the Anti-Dummy Law, which allegedly applies only to fully operational franchisees, inapplicable to PIATCO's officers and directors, including petitioner; and (3) even assuming arguendo that the "Grandfather Rule" is still applicable in determining the nationality of a corporation, PIATCO's officers and directors still do not have any criminal liability due to the constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws under Section 22, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, respondents counter that the petition should be dismissed outright for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for violating the rule on hierarchy of courts. Respondents also point out that they committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against petitioner, considering that: (1) the Anti-Dummy Law may be violated even by Filipino citizens and corporations; and (2) petitioner and her co-accused were indicted not only for violation of the nationality requirement, but rather for specific criminal acts in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law. They further argue that the Foreign Investments Act does not specifically provide for the application of the control test in determining Philippine nationality, and the Anti-Dummy Law does not require the actual operation of a public utility franchise for a violation thereof. Lastly, respondents also assert that there is no violation of petitioner's right against ex post facto laws.
The Court resolves to dismiss the petition on the following grounds.
It must be emphasized that the remedy of certiorari is available only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[4] The Court does not re-examine evidence nor delve into the correctness of the evaluation thereof.[5] It is also settled jurisprudence that the Court shuns interference with the prosecutor's finding of probable cause unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, in Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.,[6] the Court expounded, thus:
These findings of probable cause fall within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor or fiscal in the exercise of executive power, which the courts do not interfere with unless there is grave abuse of discretion. x x x To emphasize, the determination of probable cause for the filing of information in court is an executive function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice, who may direct the filing of the corresponding information or move for the dismissal of the case. Ultimately, whether or not a complaint will be dismissed is dependent on the sound discretion of the Secretary of Justice. And unless made with grave abuse of discretion, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review.
For this reason, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.[7]
Petitioner's allegations in this case do not constitute errors of jurisdiction. Petitioner's allegations and arguments mainly assail the State Prosecutor's act of reversing its Resolution dated December 27, 2006 dismissing the complaint against petitioner and her co-respondents and instead directing the filing of an Information, interpreting this as an act of persecution, constituting grave abuse of discretion. However, in the Resolution dated October 16, 2007, the State Prosecutor amply justified its position, enumerating the evidence and its analysis thereof that led to the finding of probable cause, pointing out that even if Section l(b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Foreign Investments Act recognized the Control Test as applicable in determining the nationality of a corporation, it also qualified that "mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential. Thus, stocks the voting rights of which have been assigned or transferred to aliens cannot be considered held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals. Individuals or juridical entities not meeting the aforementioned qualifications are considered as non-Philippine nationals."[8] Respondents, therefore, emphasized that even if PIATCO is considered a Philippine national, its directors can still be criminally liable for violating the Anti-Dummy Law if it is shown that aliens had been allowed control of the management, operation and administration of the corporation that had been granted a franchise reserved for Philippine nationals.
Respondents' mere act of reversing its original Resolution dated December 27, 2006 should not be considered as a badge of grave abuse of discretion. Rules of procedure provide for a mechanism, i.e., the filing of a motion for reconsideration, for the parties to bring to the attention of judicial or quasi-judicial bodies possible errors that have been committed, which is precisely why courts, tribunals and agencies have the prerogative to modify, amend or reverse their rulings.
The manner in which respondents ascribed weight or credibility on the pieces of evidence and the correctness of their analysis and interpretation thereof is not for this Court to interfere with in the present action for certiorari, unless it is shown that respondents did so in a way that is absolutely lacking in rhyme or reason. The Resolution dated October 16, 2007 shows that that is not the case here. After all, as held in Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.,[9] to wit:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.[10]
The records show that respondents based their ruling on sufficient evidence presented by the parties. Hence, the Court does not find any capricious, arbitrary or despotic exercise of power by respondents.
Lastly, petitioner is sternly admonished to observe the rule on hierarchy of courts. In Chong v. Dela Cruz,[11] the Court clearly stated that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking a review of a resolution of the Secretary of the DOJ should be filed with the Court of Appeals, which also has jurisdiction over such actions. The petition should be filed with the CA instead of directly invoking this Court's jurisdiction, as disregard of the rule on hierarchy of courts would result in the unnecessary clogging of the Court's docket. Although there are exceptions to this rule, as in cases where public welfare and the interest of justice strongly call for action from this Court, the present case does not fall into such category.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to rule on issues regarding the main merits of the case pending against petitioner before respondents' office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio and Nachura, JJ., no part.
Del Castillo and Villarama, Jr., JJ., designated additional member per Raffle dated February 14, 2011.
Very truly yours,
MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Penned by State Prosecutor Phillip L. Dela Cruz and approved by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zu�o; rollo, pp. 68-81.[2] Id. at 82-94.
[3] 450 Phil. 744 (2003).
[4] Soriano v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 160772, July 13, 2009, 592 SCRA 394, 400.
[5] First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171989, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 564, 578.
[6] G.R. No. 171435, July 30, 200S, 560 SCRA 518.
[7] Id. at 535-536. (Emphasis supplied.)
[8] Rollo, p. 90.
[9] Supra note 6.
[10] Id. at 534-535.
[11] G.R. No. 184948, July 21, 2009, 593 SCRA 311, 314-315.
