January 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 182717 : January 31, 2012]
LEYMARS P. DECAP v. ROEL G. ENTOC AND COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
"G.R. No. 182717 - (Leymars P. Decap v. Roel G. Entoc and Commission on Elections)
RESOLUTION
By this petition for certiorari, prohibition, with prayer for [issuance of] temporary restraining order, the petitioner seeks the reversal of the Resolution dated January 29, 2008 of the First Division, Commission on Elections (COMHLEC) in SPA (Brgy.) 07-068,[1] disqualifying the petitioner as candidate for Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay Sapa, Claver, Surigao del Norte, in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections; and the Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2008 issued by the COMELEC En Banc denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier resolution.[2]
The petitioner and respondent Roel G. Entoc were both candidates for Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chairman of Barangay Sapa, Municipality of Claver, Surigao del Norte, during the October 29, 2007 Barangay and SK Elections. On October 26, 2007, the respondent filed a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC, stating that the petitioner misrepresented his date of birth in his certificate of candidacy, i.e., to be March 16, 1992, instead of March 16, 1993, in order to be at least 15 years of age on the day of the election. During the pendency of the petition, the petitioner was elected and proclaimed as the SK Chairman.
Subsequent thereto, however, in a Resolution promulgated on January 29, 2008, the First Division of the COMELEC disqualified the petitioner on the ground of ineligibility. On April 9, 2008, the COMELEC En Banc denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier resolution for non-payment of the required legal fees per M.R. No. 02-0130 dated September 18, 2002.
Hence, this petition.[3]
In the meantime, the regular Barangay and SK Elections were held on October 25, 2010, and the winners were proclaimed. They assumed office. In light of this development, the Court dismisses the petition due to the expiration of the term of office being contested.
In Malaluan v. Commission on Election,[4] the court pronounced that the expiration of the challenged term of office renders the petition moot and academic, viz:
It is significant Jo note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has become moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioner's right to the mayoralty seat in his municipality because expiration of the term of office contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering the same moot and academic.
When the appeal from a decision in an election case has already become moot, the case being an election protest involving the office of [the] mayor the term of which had expired, the appeal is dismissible on that ground, unless the rendering of a decision on the merits would be of practical value. This rule we established in the case of Yorac v. Magalona which we dismissed because it had been mooted by the expiration of the term of office of the Municipal Mayor of Saravia, Negros Occidental. [Emphasis supplied.]
Indeed, the expiration of the term of the contested position subject of the petition eliminated any practical or useful purpose for passing on the merits of the petition. Dismissal of the petition should follow, because courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted.[5] It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question,[6] for a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.[7] We also observed in Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment[8]:
It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.cralaw
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DISMISSED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC."
Abad and Sereno, JJ., on leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Penned by Commissioner Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by the First Division's Acting Chairman Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra and Commissioner Moslemen T. Macarambon. Rollo, pp. 46-52.[2] Per Curium, id., 69-72.
[3] Id. 4-15.
[4] G.R. No. 120193, March 6, 1996, 254 SCRA 397, 403-404.
[5] Villarico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132115, January 4, 2002, 373 SCRA 23, 29.
[6] Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines. Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 96663, August 10, 1999, 312 SCRA 104, 114.
[7] Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, 28 March 2005, 454 SCRA 130, 138.
[8] G.R. No 108033, April 14, 1997, 271 SCRA 204, 207-208.