November 2008 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[A.C. No. 7952 : November 24, 2008] EMMANUEL I. CRUZ V. ATTY. OSCAR L. KARAAN :
[A.C. No. 7952 : November 24, 2008]
EMMANUEL I. CRUZ V. ATTY. OSCAR L. KARAAN
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your Information, is a resolution of this Court dated 24 November 2008:
A.C. No. 7952 {Emmanuel I. Cruz v. Atty. Oscar L. Karaan)
Complainant Rev. Fr. Emmanuel I. Cruz is the only son of the late Evelina I. Cruz, who executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Ma. Nieves Celeste, the defendant in Civil Case No. 76-M-2008 for Annulment of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Foreclosure Sale with Damages before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78 in Malolos City filed by Fr. Emmanuel and his siblings, Dra. Ma. Alicia I. Cruz and Ma. Emelinda I. Cruz. Atty. Oscar L. Karaan is the counsel of Celeste.
In the Answer to the complaint in the said civil case, Atty. Karaan made the following statements:
The diatribe "estafa queen" was in reference to a newspaper article published on page five of the June 20, 1993 issue of the People's Bagong Taliba, with the headline "Estafa Queen, bumagsak na!" that referred to the deceased Evelina.
Complainant avers that the statements cast dishonor on him and his family, and blacken the memory of his deceased mother. He asserts that Atty. Karaan's statements clearly violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that states, "A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings use language which is abusive, offensive and otherwise improper."
Hence, complainant prays that Atty. Karaan be disciplinarily dealt with.
In his defense, Atty. Karaan points out that the statements Fr. Emmanuel complained of were made in the course of a judicial proceeding and are considered absolute privileged communication that is not actionable. He avers that the statements in his client's Answer were material and relevant to the defense of his client since complainant's mother placed the property involved in Civil Case No. 76-M-2008 and her many other properties in the name of her children, complainant included, to defraud creditors. Atty. Karaan explains that the deceased mother had many criminal cases of estafa against her, and conspired with her children to place these properties beyond the reach of creditors who had filed the criminal cases. Among these creditors are Celeste and her father, Atty. Jose Bordador, who were left with paper victories in the civil and criminal cases they lodged against the deceased mother of the complainant because the latter's properties had been transferred to her children.
Atty. Karaan cites a long line of cases holding that the doctrine of absolute privileged communication is a matter of public policy that allowed lawyers great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and were pardoned some infelicities in their language.[1]' According to Atty. Karaan, assuming his statements were harsh, pungent, and sarcastic, they are still covered by the absolute privileged communication doctrine.
We find for respondent.
Indeed in a string of cases, we have given lawyers great latitude in their overzealous language in espousing their client's cause. For as long as the statements are made in the course of judicial proceedings, we considered them absolutely privileged. As early as the 1961 case of Sison v. David, we said that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to a class of communications that are absolutely privileged. No actions for libel may be founded thereon when pertinent and relevant to the subject under inquiry, however false and malicious such statements may be.[2]
Later in People v. Aquino, we said that privileged communications, regardless of their defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice, if they are relevant, pertinent, or material to the cause in hand or the subject of the inquiry, the communication is privileged, such that the person who makes them�such as the judge, lawyer, or witness�does not thereby incur the risk of being found liable.[3] Moreover, we explained in Deles v. Aragona, Jr. that a privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice and falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.[4]
There is no question that the alleged improper statements made by the respondent were made in the course of a judicial proceeding�Civil Case No. 76-M-2008. To be sure, respondent's allusion to a newspaper article referring to the deceased with the diatribe, the "estafa queen," besides being relevant and pertinent to the subject matter of the case, was motivated by a legitimate desire to serve the interest of his client. We said in Navarrete v. Court of Appeals, "In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy."[5] Furthermore, within the context of the case, the statements in the Answer do not appear to be intemperate, undignified, nor abusive to render counsel liable for violating the canons of his profession. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the statements were derogatory to the memory of the deceased and offensive to the complainants. To our mind, the statements complained of are fully covered by the relevancy test, thus, precluding any liability on the part of Atty. Karaan. All told, we do not find any actionable misconduct against Atty. Karaan.
WHEREFORE, the instant disciplinary complaint against Atty. Oscar L. Karaan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7952 {Emmanuel I. Cruz v. Atty. Oscar L. Karaan)
Complainant Rev. Fr. Emmanuel I. Cruz is the only son of the late Evelina I. Cruz, who executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Ma. Nieves Celeste, the defendant in Civil Case No. 76-M-2008 for Annulment of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Foreclosure Sale with Damages before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78 in Malolos City filed by Fr. Emmanuel and his siblings, Dra. Ma. Alicia I. Cruz and Ma. Emelinda I. Cruz. Atty. Oscar L. Karaan is the counsel of Celeste.
In the Answer to the complaint in the said civil case, Atty. Karaan made the following statements:
3. She (Celeste) admits paragraph 3 of the plaintiffs complaint with the qualification that the deceased Evelina Cruz deliberately placed the said property and her many other properties in the names of the plaintiffs because the said deceased Evelina Cruz had many criminal cases before and was even labeled as the estafa queen, hence, the said deceased is even guilty of conspiring with the plaintiffs to defraud her creditors. Plaintiffs should explain adequately to this Honorable Court why they were able to amass or acquire many properties which are even disproportionate to their income.
The diatribe "estafa queen" was in reference to a newspaper article published on page five of the June 20, 1993 issue of the People's Bagong Taliba, with the headline "Estafa Queen, bumagsak na!" that referred to the deceased Evelina.
Complainant avers that the statements cast dishonor on him and his family, and blacken the memory of his deceased mother. He asserts that Atty. Karaan's statements clearly violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that states, "A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings use language which is abusive, offensive and otherwise improper."
Hence, complainant prays that Atty. Karaan be disciplinarily dealt with.
In his defense, Atty. Karaan points out that the statements Fr. Emmanuel complained of were made in the course of a judicial proceeding and are considered absolute privileged communication that is not actionable. He avers that the statements in his client's Answer were material and relevant to the defense of his client since complainant's mother placed the property involved in Civil Case No. 76-M-2008 and her many other properties in the name of her children, complainant included, to defraud creditors. Atty. Karaan explains that the deceased mother had many criminal cases of estafa against her, and conspired with her children to place these properties beyond the reach of creditors who had filed the criminal cases. Among these creditors are Celeste and her father, Atty. Jose Bordador, who were left with paper victories in the civil and criminal cases they lodged against the deceased mother of the complainant because the latter's properties had been transferred to her children.
Atty. Karaan cites a long line of cases holding that the doctrine of absolute privileged communication is a matter of public policy that allowed lawyers great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and were pardoned some infelicities in their language.[1]' According to Atty. Karaan, assuming his statements were harsh, pungent, and sarcastic, they are still covered by the absolute privileged communication doctrine.
We find for respondent.
Indeed in a string of cases, we have given lawyers great latitude in their overzealous language in espousing their client's cause. For as long as the statements are made in the course of judicial proceedings, we considered them absolutely privileged. As early as the 1961 case of Sison v. David, we said that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to a class of communications that are absolutely privileged. No actions for libel may be founded thereon when pertinent and relevant to the subject under inquiry, however false and malicious such statements may be.[2]
Later in People v. Aquino, we said that privileged communications, regardless of their defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice, if they are relevant, pertinent, or material to the cause in hand or the subject of the inquiry, the communication is privileged, such that the person who makes them�such as the judge, lawyer, or witness�does not thereby incur the risk of being found liable.[3] Moreover, we explained in Deles v. Aragona, Jr. that a privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice and falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.[4]
There is no question that the alleged improper statements made by the respondent were made in the course of a judicial proceeding�Civil Case No. 76-M-2008. To be sure, respondent's allusion to a newspaper article referring to the deceased with the diatribe, the "estafa queen," besides being relevant and pertinent to the subject matter of the case, was motivated by a legitimate desire to serve the interest of his client. We said in Navarrete v. Court of Appeals, "In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy."[5] Furthermore, within the context of the case, the statements in the Answer do not appear to be intemperate, undignified, nor abusive to render counsel liable for violating the canons of his profession. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the statements were derogatory to the memory of the deceased and offensive to the complainants. To our mind, the statements complained of are fully covered by the relevancy test, thus, precluding any liability on the part of Atty. Karaan. All told, we do not find any actionable misconduct against Atty. Karaan.
WHEREFORE, the instant disciplinary complaint against Atty. Oscar L. Karaan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours.
LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd. ) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Asst. Clerk
LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd. ) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Asst. Clerk
Endnotes:
[1] People v. Sesbreno, No. L-62449, July 16, 1984, 130 SCRA 465, 468; Deles v. Aragona, Jr., Adm. Case No. 598, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 633, 643.
[2] No. L-11268, January 28, 1961,1 SCRA 60, 71.
[3] No. L-23908, October 29, 1966,18 SCRA 555, 558.
[4] Supra note 1, at 642; citing U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 743.
[5] G.R. No. 124245, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 540, 548.
