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Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan's The Labor Code of the Philippines, Annotated Labor Standards & Social Legislation Volume I of a 3-Volume Series 2019 Edition (3rd Revised Edition)
 

 
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
 

 
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
 

   
September-1939 Jurisprudence                 

  • G.R. No. 46562 September 13, 1939 - BARDWIL BROS. v. PHIL. LABOR UNION

    068 Phil 436

  • G.R. No. 46673 September 13, 1939 - ANDRES P. GOSECO v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

    068 Phil 444

  • G.R. No. 45596 September 18, 1939 - MARCOS LIPANA v. DOMlNGO LAO Y OTROS

    068 Phil 451

  • G.R. No. 46412 September 18, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MANOJI

    068 Phil 471

  • G.R. No. 46497 September 18, 1939 - ANTONIO S. SANAGUSTIN v. CONRADO BARRIOS

    068 Phil 475

  • G.R. No. 46170 September 20, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. FERMIN PUNTO

    068 Phil 481

  • G.R. No. 46780 September 20, 1939 - FISCAL OF CAMARINES NORTE v. JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES NORTE

    068 Phil 483

  • G.R. No. 46108 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. DATU GALANTU MEDTED

    068 Phil 485

  • G.R. No. 46109 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. NICOLAS CARPIO

    068 Phil 490

  • G.R. No. 46197 September 22, 1939 - KINKWA MERIYASU CO. v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

    068 Phil 501

  • G.R. No. 46302 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. TORIBIO C. COSTES

    068 Phil 503

  • G.R. No. 46578 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ANICETO MARQUEZ

    068 Phil 506

  • G.R. No. 46580 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. PEDRO DE GUZMAN

    068 Phil 508

  • G.R. No. 46602 September 22, 1939 - YAP TAK WING & CO. v. MUNICIPAL BOARD

    068 Phil 511

  • G.R. No. 46686 September 22, 1939 - TRANQUILINO RUBIS v. PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES

    068 Phil 515

  • G.R. No. 46715 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. EMILIO DE JESUS

    068 Phil 517

  • G.R. No. 46068 September 23, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. EUSTAQUIO CAROZ

    068 Phil 521

  • G.R. No. 46650 September 23, 1939 - MARIO BENGZON v. AUDITOR GENERAL

    068 Phil 527

  • G.R. No. 46652 September 23, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. CASIMIRO CONCEPCION

    068 Phil 530

  • G.R. Nos. 46802-46812 September 23, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. RESURRECCION B. PEÑAS

    068 Phil 533

  • G.R. No. 46739 September 23, 1939 - PAMPANGA BUS CO., INC. v. PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES UNION

    068 Phil 541

  • G.R. No. 46668 September 26, 1939 - GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. v. PAMPANGA SUGAR MILLS

    068 Phil 547

  • G.R. No. 46729 September 25, 1939 - KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA SA PANTRANCO v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

    068 Phil 552

  • Adm. Case No. 879 September 27, 1939 - PEDRO DE GUZMAN v. TOMAS B. TADEO

    068 Phil 554

  • G.R. No. 46080 September 27, 1939 - GUILLERMO A. CU UNJIENG v. HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORP.

    068 Phil 559

  • G.R. No. 46094 September 27, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. FERNANDO C. QUEBRAL

    068 Phil 564

  • G.R. No. 46237 September 27, 1939 - ROSALIO MARQUEZ v. BERNARDO CASTILLO

    068 Phil 568

  • G.R. No. 46350 September 27, 1939 - TAN CHAY v. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL.

    068 Phil 572

  • G.R. No. 46470 September 27, 1939 - JUAN CASTILLO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

    068 Phil 577

  • G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. VALENTIN DOQUEÑA

    068 Phil 580

  • G.R. Nos. 46553-46555 September 27, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. LEON FABILLAR

    068 Phil 584

  • G.R. No. 46615 September 27, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ALBERTO AQUINO

    068 Phil 588

  • G.R. No. 46727 September 27, 1939 - PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES’ UNION v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

    068 Phil 591

  • G.R. No. 46168 September 29, 1939 - INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. OF THE PHIL. v. DELFIN MAHINAY

    068 Phil 597

  • G.R. No. 46336 September 29, 1939 - REVEREND ULRIC ARCAND v. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.

    068 Phil 601

  • G.R. No. 46458 September 29, 1939 - ERLANGER & GALINGER v. HERMENEGILDO G. ALAGAR

    068 Phil 610

  • G.R. No. 46725 September 29, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MAXIMINO AQUINO

    068 Phil 615

  • G.R. No. 46023 September 30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JESUS FLORENDO

    068 Phil 619

  • G.R. No. 46252 September 30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. LEONOR DE MOLL

    068 Phil 626

  • G.R. No. 46298 September 30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. DATU AMBIS

    068 Phil 635

  • G.R. No. 46390 September 30, 1939 - CASIMIRO TIANGCO v. PROCESO FRANCISCO

    068 Phil 639

  • G.R. No. 46396 September 30, 1939 - ALEJANDRO DE GUZMAN v. VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT CO.

    068 Phil 643

  • G.R. No. 46451 September 30, 1939 - PAZ CHUA v. SECRETARY OF LABOR

    068 Phil 649

  • G.R. No. 46484 September 30, 1939 - SANTIAGO SAMBRANO v. RED LINE TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.

    068 Phil 652

  • G.R. No. 46724 September 30, 1939 - CRESCENCIO REYNES v. ROSALINA BARRERA

    068 Phil 656

  • G.R. No. 46728 September 30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. EDUARDO MONTENEGRO

    068 Phil 659

  •  





     
     

    G.R. No. 46739   September 23, 1939 - PAMPANGA BUS CO., INC. v. PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES UNION<br /><br />068 Phil 541

     
    PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

    FIRST DIVISION

    [G.R. No. 46739. September 23, 1939.]

    PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES UNION, INC., Respondent.

    L. D. Lockwood for Petitioner.

    Jose Alejandrino for Respondent.

    SYLLABUS


    1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; FREEDOM OF CONTRACT; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. — The Court of Industrial Relations issued an order directing the petitioner Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., to recruit from the respondent Pambusco Employees’ Union, Inc., new employees or laborers it may need to replace members of the union who may be dismissed from the service of the company, with the proviso that, if the union fails to provide employees possessing the necessary qualifications, the company may employ any other persons it may desire. This order, in substance and in effect, compels the company, against its will, to employ preferentially, in its service, the members of the union. Held: That the court has no authority to issue such compulsory order. The general right to make a contract in relation to one’s business is an essential part of the liberty of the citizens protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. The right of a laborer to sell his labor to such person as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the Constitution. "If the employer can compel the employer to work against the latter’s will, this is servitude. It the employee can compel the employer to give him work against the employees will, this is oppression." (Mills v. United States Printing Co., 99 App. Div., 605; 91 N. Y. S., 185, 189-192.)

    2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. — Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 213 confers upon labor organizations the right "to collective bargaining with employers for the purpose of seeking better working and living conditions, fair wage, and shorter working hours for laborers, and, in general, to promote the material, social and moral well-being of their member." The term "collective bargaining" denotes, in common usage as well as in legal terminology, negotiations looking toward o collective agreement. This provision in granting to labor unions merely the right of collective bargaining, impliedly recognizes the employer’s liberty to enter or not into collective agreements with them. Indeed, we know of no provision of the law compelling such agreements. Such a fundamental curtailment of freedom, if ever intended by law upon grounds of public policy, should be effected in a manner that is beyond all possibility of doubt. The supreme mandates of the Constitution should not be loosely brushed aside.

    3. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER. — The freedom of contract guaranteed by the Constitution may be limited by law through a proper exercise of the paramount police power. Thus, in order to promote industrial peace, certain limitations to the employer’s right to select his employees or to discharge them are provided in action 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 and section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 213. These two provisions were, however, patterned after the Wagner Act, and the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (301 U. S., 1; 81 Law. ed., 893, 916), said: "The Act (Wagner Act) does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever. It does not prevent employer ’from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring individuals on whatever terms’ the employer ’may by unilateral action determine.’ The Act expressly provides in sec. 9 (a) that any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer. The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel . . . The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them. The employer may not, under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with respect to their self-organization and representation, and, on the other hand, the board is not entitled to make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of did charge when that right is exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion."


    D E C I S I O N


    MORAN, J.:


    On May 31, 1939, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order, directing the petitioner herein, Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., to recruit from the respondent, Pambusco Employees’ Union, Inc., new employees or laborers it may need to replace members of the union who may be dismissed from the service of the company, with the proviso that, if the union fails to provide employees possessing the necessary qualifications, the company may employ any other persons it may desire. This order, in substance and in effect, compels the company, against its will, to employ preferentially, in its service, the members of the union.

    We hold that the court has no authority to issue such compulsory order. The general right to make a contract in relation to one’s business is an essential part of the liberty of the citizens protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. The right of a laborer to sell his labor to such person as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the Constitution. "If the employer can compel the employer to work against the latter’s will, this is servitude. If the employer can compel the employer to give him work against the employer’s will, this is oppression." (Mills v. United States Printing Co., 99 App. Div., 605; 91 N. Y. S., 186, 189-192.)

    Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 213 confers upon labor organizations the right "to collective bargaining with employers for the purpose of seeking better working and living conditions, fair wages, and shorter working hours for laborers, and, in general, to promote the material, social and moral well-being of their members." The term "collective bargaining" denotes, in common usage as well as in legal terminology, negotiations looking toward a collective agreement. This provision in granting to labor Unions merely the right of collective bargaining, impliedly recognizes the employer’s liberty to enter or not into collective agreements with them. Indeed, we know of no provision of the law compelling such agreements. Such a fundamental curtailment of freedom, if ever intended by law upon grounds of public policy, should be elected in a manner that is beyond all possibility of doubt. The supreme mandates of the Constitution should not be loosely brushed aside. ·As held by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hitchman Coal & Co. v. Mitchell (245 U. S., 229; 62 Law. ed., 260, 276):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

    ". . .Whatever may be the advantages of ’collective bargaining,’ it is not bargaining at all, in any just sense, unless it is voluntary on both sides. The same liberty which enables men to form unions, and through the union to enter into agreements with employers willing to agree, entitles other men to remain independent of the union, and other employers to agree with them to employ no man who owes any allegiance or obligation to the union. In the latter case, as in the former, the parties are entitled to be protected by the law in the enjoyment of the benefits on any lawful agreement they may make. This court repeatedly has held that the employer is a free to make non-membership in a union a condition of employment, as the working man is free to join the union, and that this is a part of the constitutional rights of personal liberty and private property, not to be taken away even by legislation, unless through some proper exercise of the paramount police power. (Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 174; 52 Law ed., 436, 442; 28 Sup Ct. Rep., 277; 13 Ann Cas., 764; Coppoge v. Kansas, 236 U. S., 1, 14; 59 Law ed., 441, 446; L. R. A., 1915C, 960; 35 Sup. Ct. Rep., 240.)"

    The freedom of contract guaranteed by the Constitution may be limited by law through a proper exercise of the paramount police power. Thus, in order to promote industrial peace, certain limitations to the employer’s right to select his employees or to discharges them, are provided in section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 and section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 213, which read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

    "It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharged of to threaten to discharged, or in other manner discriminate against, any laborer or employee because such person has testified or is about to testify, or because such employer believes that he may testify in any investigation, proceeding or public hearing conducted by the Court or any board of inquiry." (Sec. 21, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)

    "Any person or persons, landlord or landlords, corporation or corporations or their agents, partnership or partnerships or their agents, who intimidate or coerce any employee of laborer or tenant under his or their employ, with the intent of preventing such employee or laborer or tenant from joining any registered legitimate labor organization of his own choosing, or, who dismiss or threaten to dismiss such employee or laborer or tenant from his employment for having joined, or for being a member of, any registered legitimate labor organization, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment of not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos, or both, at the discretion of the court." (Sec. 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

    These two provisions were, however, patterned after the Wagner Act, and the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (301 U. S., 1; 81 Law ed., 893, 916), said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

    "The act (Wagner Act) does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does not compel and agreement whatever. It does not prevent employer ’from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring individuals on whatever terms’ the employer ’may by unilateral action determine.’ The Act expressly provides in sec. 9 (a) that any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer. The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel. As we said in Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R. & S. S. Clerks (281 U. S., 548; 74 Law. ed., 1034; 50 S. Ct., 427, supra), and repeated in Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, R. E. D. (300 U. S., 515, ante, 789; 57 S. Ct., 692), the cases of Adair v. United States (208 U. S., 161; 52 Law. ed., 436; 28 S. Ct., 277; 13 Ann. Cas., 764), and Coppage v. Kansas (236 U. S., 1; 59 Law. ed., 141; 35 S. Ct., 240; L. R. A. 1915C, 960), are inapplicable to legislation of this character. The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them. The employer may not, under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with respect to their self-organization and representation, and, on the other hand, the board is not entitled to make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that right is exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion."cralaw virtua1aw library

    This ruling was reiterated and confirmed in the Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board (301 U. S., 103; 81 Law. ed., 953, 960, 961).

    Thus considered, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs against respondent Pambusco Employees’ Union, Inc.

    Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

    G.R. No. 46739   September 23, 1939 - PAMPANGA BUS CO., INC. v. PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES UNION<br /><br />068 Phil 541


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