September 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 163894 : September 07, 2011]
TEODORA VDA. DE SEBASTIAN, PETITIONER, V. GREGORIO SANTIAGO, JR. AND ANTONIO SANTIAGO, RESPONDENTS.
"G.R. No. 163894 - TEODORA VDA. DE SEBASTIAN, Petitioner, v. GREGORIO SANTIAGO, JR. and ANTONIO SANTIAGO, Respondents.
By petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner seeks to reverse the March 19, 2004 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69265 that found no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC) for issuing the following interlocutory orders in Civil Case No. 682-M-2001, namely: (a) the order dated November 19, 2001[2] granting the immediate execution pending appeal of the March 13, 2001 decision in an ejectment case docketed as Civil Case No 120-2000 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pandi, Bulacan that ordered the petitioner to vacate the lot with an area of 800 square meters belonging to the respondents;[3] (b) the writ of execution pending appeal dated November 27, 2001;[4] and (c) the order dated January 29, 2002, denying the motion for reconsideration with motion to recall the writ of execution pending appeal.cralaw [5]
The 800 square-meter lot formed part of the landholding located in Bunsuran II, Pandi, Bulacan, and co-owned by respondents (who are brothers) registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-264226 (M) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.[6] The landholding had a total area of 1.9507 hectares. The 800 square-meter lot was one of several adjoining residential lots at the edge of the 1.9507-hectare property that skirted a provincial road and had been devoted exclusively for residential purposes. The lots were leased to several families, with the back portions of the lots being primarily devoted to agriculture. In 1973, the petitioner's husband, Valeriano Sebastian (Valeriano), and the respondents' predecessor, Macaria M. Santiago, entered into an agricultural tenancy agreement covering the agricultural portion of the property. The agreement was embodied in a so-called kasunduan sa buwisan. According to the respondents, Valeriano had been assigned a homelot inside the agricultural area, but when one of the lots devoted to residential purposes (i.e., the 800 square-meter lot subject of this case) had been vacated by its lessee, Valeriano requested to transfer to the lot. The respondents allowed Valeriano to temporarily occupy the lot under the condition that he and his family would vacate it upon demand. Valeriano then built a concrete house, introduced improvements, and fenced the lot clearly aiming to establish a permanent place of residence thereon. After five years, or in 1994, the respondents needed to use the residential portion of their property and required the petitioner to vacate it on September 6, 1999. With her defiant refusal coupled with her non-payment of rentals, the respondents commenced the ejectment case.cralaw
In her defense, the petitioner sought protection under Section 22, paragraph 3,[7] of Republic Act No. 1199,[8] as amended by Republic Act No. 2263, and under Section 24[9] of Republic Act No. 3844,[10] as amended by Republic Act No. 6389. She asserted that the 800 square-meter lot was her family's established homelot; that although she acknowledged the ownership of the respondents, she claimed that the lot was agricultural on which she had been the tenant, presenting as proof the kasunduan sa buwisan entered into in 1973 between her husband and the respondents' predecessor-in-interest; and that jurisdiction over the case belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not to the MTC.cralaw
In view of her claim, the petitioner filed on February 14, complaint in the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, seeking to maintain her peaceful possession of a homelot. The case, docketed as DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3006-01, proceeded simultaneously with the ejectment case.cralaw
On March 13, 2001, the MTC rendered its decision in favor of the respondents, ordering the petitioner to vacate and to pay reasonable compensation for the use of the premises. The MTC confirmed that the property covered by TCT No. T-264226 (M) consisted of both residential and agricultural lands, and that the 800 square-meter lot being claimed by the petitioner as her homelot was part of the front portion adjacent to the road classified as residential in Tax Declaration No. 99-16006-00915.cralaw
The petitioner appealed the decision to the RTC.
In the RTC, the respondents sought the immediate execution pending appeal of the MTC decision on account of the petitioner's failure to deposit the rentals due under the judgment of the MTC and to periodically deposit the rentals during the pendency of the appeal. The RTC issued the contested writ of execution pending appeal on November 19, 2001 in order to restore the possession of the lot to the respondents.cralaw
The petitioner sought reconsideration, but the RTC denied her motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The respondents then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition, which the RTC set for hearing on February 22, 2002. Facing the imminent danger of losing her house, the petitioner filed on February 22, 2002 in the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order in order to enjoin her eviction and the demolition of her house.
The CA found that prior to the filing of the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, the RTC had dismissed the appeal on February 15, 2002 due to the petitioner's failure to timely file her memorandum in violation of Rule 40, Section 7 (b) of the Rules of Court;[11] and that she had filed a motion for reconsideration that the RTC denied on April 22, 2002.[12]
On March 19, 2004, the CA rendered its judgment,[13] viz:cralaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order dated November 19, 2001, the Writ of Execution dated November 27, 2001 and the Order dated January 29, 2002 rendered in Civil Case No. 682-M-2001 by public respondent of the RTC, Branch 18 Malolos, Bulacan are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The CA held that the lot the petitioner was claiming had been classified as residential, and that her husband had already been granted a homelot; that execution pending appeal became ministerial on the part of the RTC after she did not deposit the rentals due as fixed in the judgment of the MTC, as well as to periodically deposit the rentals accruing during the pendency of the appeal; and that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the assailed order for execution pending appeal.
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on June 3, 2004.cralaw [14]
Hence, this further appeal upon the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER CAN BE EJECTED FROM THE HOMELOT WHICH FORMS PART OF HER TILLAGE.
The appeal has no merit.
The petition for review fails to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in passing upon whether the RTC had been guilty of any grave abuse of discretion in its issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal.
Indeed, the act of the RTC was in full accord with Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which provides:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. - If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.cralaw
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.cralaw
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.
The rule is clear that to stay the immediate execution of a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer action while an appeal is pending the defendant should: (a) perfect his appeal; (b) file a supersedeas bond; and (c) periodically deposit the rentals as they become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the execution of the judgment despite the pendency of the appeal, and the duty of the court in this respect is "ministerial and imperative."[15] The petitioner violated the rule by not depositing the rentals due as decreed in the MTC decision. In view thereof, we have no cogent reason to reverse the CA's holding that the RTC committed no grave abuse of its discretion in the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal.
It is not amiss to determine whether the MTC's decision of the issue of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case was correct considering that such issue was intimately related to the legitimacy of the writ of execution pending appeal.cralaw
Under Section 22, paragraph 3, of Republic Act No. 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act), as amended by Republic Act No. 2263, the option of designating the place where the tenant should establish his homelot belongs to the landowner, not otherwise. The law states:
Section 22.
xxx
(3) The tenant shall have the right to demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling with an area of not more than 3 per cent of the area of his landholding provided that it does not exceed one thousand square meters and that it shall be located at a convenient and suitable place within the land of the landholder to be designated by the latter where the tenant shall construct his dwelling and may raise vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals and engage in minor industries, the products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively. The tenant's dwelling shall not be removed from the lot already assigned to him by the landholder, except as provided in section twenty-six unless there is a severance of the tenancy relationship between them as provided under section nine, or unless the tenant is ejected for cause, and only after the expiration of forty-five days following such severance of relationship or dismissal for cause. [emphasis supplied]cralaw
Giving to the landowner the right to designate enforces one of the declared purposes of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, that is, "to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and landholders," to wit:
Section 2. Purpose. � It is the purpose of this Act to establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and tenants upon the principle of social justice; to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and landholders; to insure the equitable division of the produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-farmers with incentives to greater and more efficient agricultural production; to bolster their economic position and to encourage their participation in the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities. [emphasis supplied]cralaw
There is no question that the fact that the land is under agricultural tenancy does not ipso facto deprive the landowner of the right of dominion over the landholding. The main reason for providing the tenant a homelot within his tenanted landholding is convenience alone, which is designed for the tenant's more efficient agricultural production. Verily, the tenant's right to a homelot and the owner's right to designate where the tenant builds his home are complementary rights that are "merely incidental to the tenancy and to afford (the tenant) the convenience of attending to the cultivation of the land."[16] As such, the law cannot sanction giving the tenant the right of preference that may result in the inordinate deprivation of the landowner's right over his property.cralaw
Here, the petitioner conceded that her late husband, the original agricultural lessee, had already been awarded a homelot located within the agricultural portion of the tillage. Although she deliberately withheld this fact and made it appear that her possession of the 800 square-meter lot had been by virtue of her personal agricultural tenancy relationship with the respondents, as the MTC found, she did not acknowledge their right to choose the location of her homelot. Instead, her sinumpaang salaysay[17] boldly declared that from the very beginning her family had immediately built a house fronting the street (Sapasimulang aming pagsasaka, nagtayo agad kami ng aming bahay sa bahagi ng lupa na nakaharap sa kalsada), without mentioning that her late husband had been assigned a homelot.cralaw
It was disclosed in the certification issued on February 3, 2000 by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Pandi, Bulacan,[18] marked as Annex 1 of the petitioner's answer to the complaint for ejectment, that only 1.5-hectare portion of the entire 1.9507 hectares of the land covered by TCT No. T-264226 (M) had been registered as Valeriano's agricultural tenancy. This proves that the whole area covered by TCT No. T-264226 (M) consisted of both residential and agricultural lands, and that not all of the area was subject of the agricultural lease-holding agreement between Valeriano and the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. Consequently, that a portion of the land was devoted to agriculture did not ipso facto deprive the MTC of its jurisdiction to determine whether the lot subject matter of the ejectment case was within the portion under agricultural tenancy. The MTC properly exercised its original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine the parties' right of possession under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court in respect of the lot in question that was established to be outside the area subject of the tenancy agreement. According to Tecson v. Gutierrez,[19] the mere allegation that the lot was the defendant's homelot did not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case; otherwise, the defendant may easily trifle with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the disputed property.cralaw
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM the decision promulgated on March 19, 2004.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 91-100; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired) and Associate Jusutice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (retired) concurring.[2] CA rollo, pp. 30-31.
[3] Id., pp. 54-61.
[4] Id., pp. 32-33.
[5] Id., p. 35.
[6] Id., p. 154.
[7] Section 22.
x x x
(3) The tenant shall have the right to demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling with an area of not more than 3 percent of the area of his landholding provided that it does not exceed one thousand square meters and that it shall be located at a convenient and suitable place within the land of the landholder to be designated by the latter where the tenant shall construct his dwelling and may raise vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals and engage in minor industries, the products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively. The tenant's dwelling shall not be removed from the lot already assigned to him by the landholder, except as provided in section twenty-six, unless there is a severance of the tenancy relationship between them as provided under section nine, or unless the tenant is ejected for cause and only after the expiration of forty-five days following such severance of relationship or dismissal for cause, (emphasis supplied)
[8] Entitled The Agricultural Tenancy Act.
[9] Section 24.
xxx the agricultural lessee shall have the right to continue in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have upon the effectivity of this Code, which shall be considered as included in the leasehold.
[10] Entitled The Agricultural Land Reform Code.
[11] CA rollo, p. 137.
[12] Id., p. 139.
[13] Rollo, p. 99.
[14] Id., p. 109.
[15] Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113886, February 24, 1998, 286 SCRA 437, 444.
[16] Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 819, 827.
[17] CA rollo, pp. 110-111.
[18] Id., p. 49.
[19] G.R. No. 152978, March 4, 2005, 452 SCRA 781, 786-787.cralaw
