September 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 159301 : September 14, 2011]
ROSALINDA DELESTE, PETITIONER v. ARACELI EBARLE-THOMMES AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 159301 - ROSALINDA DELESTE, Petitioner v. ARACELI EBARLE-THOMMES AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE CORPORATION, Respondents.
Their merits, not technicality, should decide litigations. This paradigm demands that every party litigant is afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, unhampered by technicalities.
This appeal seeks the modification of the decision the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on April 11, 2002 in C.A.-G.R. CV. No. 49920 entitled Araceli Ebarle-Thommes v. Ismael Salcedo, Rosalinda Deleste, and Private Enterprise Corporation,[1] remanding four interrelated cases, specifically: LRC Case No. 1561,[2] Civil Case No. 10553,[3] Civil Case No. 91-410,[4] and Civil Case No. 91-415[5] to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Misamis Oriental for further proceedings, on the ground that the CA's dismissal on October 25, 1996 of respondent Araceli Ebarle-Thommes' appeal (because of her failure to file her appellant's brief),[6] which already attained finality on February 24, 1997,[7] rendered the appealed March 28, 1994 omnibus resolution of the RTC conclusive upon Ebarle-Thommes, eliminating the need to remand Civil Case No. 10553 and LRC Case 1561, the proceedings involving Ebarle-Thommes.
By its assailed decision of April 11, 2002, the CA nullified and set aside the March 28, 1994 omnibus resolution, whereby Branch 21 of the RTC in Misamis Oriental declared the November 21, 1990 order of Branch 20 of the RTC, a co-equal court, void and dismissed Civil Case No. 91415 on the ground of non-joinder of indispensable party and litis pendentia, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Resolution dated March 28, 1994 of the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Branch 21, is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the cases are hereby ordered remanded to the trial court for trial and further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Antecedents
On January 10, 1977, one Ismael, Salcedo filed a petition for re-adjudication vis-a-vis Lot No. 639 and Lot No. 2051 in the RTC (LRC Case No. 1561). On February 16, 1977, with the re-adjudication having been granted, Decree No. 165298 was issued, and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-686 was issued in the name of Salcedo.
Salcedo's title did not go unchallenged for long, however, because Ebarle-Thommes surfaced to claim dominion over Lot 639. On December 22, 1977, Ebarle-Thommes brought a petition for review and for the annulment of the proceedings and of Decree No. N-165298 in the RTC of Misamis Oriental, assigned to Branch 20 (Civil Case No. 10553), but the petition was dismissed on October 13, 1983 for failure to prosecute. Although she moved to lift the order of dismissal on the same date, the RTC denied her motion on August 15, 1990. However, on November 21, 1990, the RTC set aside the dismissal upon her motion for reconsideration.
Pending resolution of Ebarle-Thommes' petition, Salcedo sold a portion of Lot 639, designated as Lot 639-B, to Rosalinda Deleste, petitioner herein, who subdivided the lot into two smaller lots now registered under TCT No. T-43063 and TCT No. T-43064 under her name. Upon learning of the sale to Deleste, Ebarle-Thommes commenced on March 14, 1986 in the RTC (Branch 17) an action for the annulment of the deed of sale, the declaration of ownership, and damages (Civil Case No. 10553). According to the CA,[9] Civil Case No. 10553 was dismissed on January 31, 1990. It is undetermined if this dismissal attained finality.
On August 21, 1990, Ebarle-Thommes leased Lot 639 to respondent Private Enterprise Corporation (PEC), which immediately fenced the premises. Coming to know of the fencing by PEC, Deleste and her husband, Rey, instituted a suit for injunction and damages against Ebarle-Thommes, PEC and City Engineer Jorie Bingonan (Civil Case No. 91-410) in the RTC (Branch 24).
Subsequently, on October 10, 1991, PEC filed a special civil action for interpleader against Ebarle-Thommes and Deleste in the RTC (Branch 20), docketed as Civil Case No. 91-415. However, Deleste moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 91-415 on February 14, 1993 upon two grounds: (a) for nonjoinder of a party because her husband Rey Deleste had not been made a defendant; and (b) for litis pendentia in view of the pendency of Civil Case No. 91-410. On November 26, 2002, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
On October 29, 1991, the RTC directed the consolidation of Civil Case No. 91-410 with LRC Case No 1561 then pending in Branch 20 of the RTC. Notwithstanding the silence of the order thereon, Civil Case No. 10533 and Civil Case No. 91-415 were deemed included in the consolidation due to their being assigned also to Branch 20.[10]
The four consolidated cases were ultimately assigned to Branch 21, which rendered on March 28, 1994 the assailed omnibus resolution declaring the November 21, 1990 order of Branch 20 void and dismissing Civil Case No. 91-415 due to the non-joinder of an indispensable party-in-interest and litis pendentia, to wit:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby declares the order it issued on November 21, 1990. as null and void ab initio, and for all pleadings filed subsequently from the order of this Court dated August 15, 1990, as expunged from the records as those referring to or related or connected with LRC Case No. 1561 and Civil Case No. 10553; and hereby orders Civil Case No. 91-145 (sic) dismissed on grounds of non-joinder of an indispensable party in-interest, conjugal owner of the property involved therein, husband of Rosalinda Deleste, and for litis pendencia.
Costs against plaintiff, Phil town/Private Enterprise Corporation.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Upon the appeal of PEC and Ebarle-Thommes, the CA annulled and set aside the omnibus resolution of March 28, 1994, but dismissed Ebarle-Thommes' appeal on the ground of her failure to file her appellant's brief. The dismissal of the appeal became final as to her on February 24, 1997.[12]
On April 11, 2002, the CA rendered the assailed decision, ruling that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties could ipso facto serve as a ground for the dismissal of the action; that the remedy was for the trial court to first order the joinder of the party, and the non-compliance with such order would then constitute the ground for dismissing the action; that litis pendentia was not attendant from the filing of Civil Case No. 91-410; and that Deleste's prior action for injunction with damages could not defeat the special civil action for interpleader due to the latter action presenting different issues and prayers, that is, Deleste sought in the injunction suit to prevent Ebarle-Thommes and PEC from fencing the lot in question, while PEC merely prayed in the interpleader suit that the defendants interplead and litigate their respective claims between themselves.
Not satisfied, Deleste appeals upon a lone assignment of error, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PROMULGATING THE DECISION OF APRIL 11, 2002 WHICH ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE OMNIBUS RESOLUTION OF THE RTC OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 21, AND REMANDING THE RECORDS TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR TRIAL AND FURTHER PROCEEDINGS AFTER SAID CASE HAD LONG BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE OF RESPONDENT ARACELI EBARLE THOMMES TO FILE APPELLANT'S BRIEF, WHICH DISMISSAL HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
Deleste contends that the remand of Civil Case No 10553 and LRC Case No. 1561 erroneously disregarded and overlooked the indubitable fact that the CA had already dismissed the appeal of Ebarle-Thommes via its resolution dated October 25, 1996,[13] which dismissal became final and executory on February 24, 1997; that the CA could not anymore consider the issues raised by Ebarle-Thommes due to such dismissal; that her reason for appealing was to insist that the March 28, 1994 omnibus resolution bound Ebarle-Thommes, leaving nothing more to be done as far as Ebarle-Thommes was concerned; that the remand should be limited only to PEC; and that consequently Civil Case No 10553 and LRC Case No. 1561 should no longer be remanded for trial and further proceedings.
In their comment,[14] Ebarle-Thommes and PEC counter that the subject matters of the assailed resolution were Civil Case No. 91-410 and Civil Case No.91-415, in relation to Civil Case No. 10553; that the conduct of a fullblown trial in the RTC was for the sole purpose of ascertaining the rights of the parties in the land in litis; that as far as PEC was concerned, the best interest of the parties would be best served if the four consolidated cases, were remanded to the RTC for trial and further proceedings.
Ruling
We deny the petition for review and affirm the decision of the CA.
The subject of the appeal in the CA had concerned only whether the dismissal of the interpleader action had been proper or not. The appeal did not involve or decide the four consolidated cases upon their merits. Notwithstanding the dismissal of Ebarle-Thommes' appeal, therefore, there remained the essential need to finally determine the dispute about the rights of the parties in the lot in question.
The dismissal of the interpleader action was, of course, not proper. From the standpoint of law, Branch 21 could not validly void the November 21, 1990 order of Branch 20, a co-equal tribunal, considering that under Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 the jurisdiction to annul a judgment or final order of a Regional Trial Court pertained exclusively and originally to the CA.[15] Accordingly, the CA correctly annulled the assailed order, and such annulment redounded to Ebarle-Thommes' benefit despite the dismissal of her appeal.
Nor did the dismissal of Ebarle-Thommes� appeal either moot or decide the issue of ownership of the lot. Were the Court to follow Deleste's argument, the cloud over each party's alleged right in the lot in litis would persist and never be cleared. On the other hand, the definitive and final resolution of all the consolidated cases would still depend on the correct adjudication of the issue of ownership arising between Salcedo (Deleste's transferor) and Ebarle-Thommes (from whom PEC's leasehold right derived).
It serves well to note that the consolidation of the four cases did not destroy their individual distinctiveness, with each case averring a cause of action different from that of the others. Civil Case No 10553 (styled as an action for "Annulment of Deed of Sale, Declaration of Ownership and Damages") has challenged Deleste's right in the lot by seeking to declare void the very legal connection Deleste had to the land. LRC Case No. 1561 concerned Salcedo's petition for the re-adjudication of Lot No. 639 and by which was issued in his name OCT No. 0-686, the mother title from which Deleste had derived her own title. Ebarle-Thommes had a pending petition for review or annulment of the proceedings whose grant would adversely affect Deleste's right in the lot. Indeed, disallowing the remand of Civil Case No. 10553 and LRC Case No. 1561 but allowing the remand of Civil Case No. 91-410 and Civil Case No. 91-415 for trial and further proceedings would lead to the incomplete determination of the controversy between the parties in the lot in question.
In this regard, we reiterate that the only objectives of allowing consolidation is to avoid the multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression or abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, to ensure the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the litigants.[16] Yet, such worthy objectives will not be fully achieved here if Deleste's insistence were followed.
On the other hand, permitting Ebarle-Thommes to remain as an appellant will not prejudice Deleste, considering that PEC and Ebarle-Thommes pose common assignment of errors on appeal by virtue of PEC having derived its rights and interests from Ebarle-Thommes. Despite her appeal being dismissed due to her failure to file her appellant's brief, Ebarle-Thommes stands to benefit from the favorable resolution of the errors assigned by PEC.
The dismissal of the appeal of Ebarle-Thommes is but a technicality to be overlooked in order not to obstruct the judicious resolution of the more substantial right of the parties to have their conflicting claims of ownership settled with finality. As we held in Aguam v. Court of Appeals,[17] "(l)itigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities."cralaw
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision dated April 11, 2002 promulgated in C.A.-G.R. CV. No. 49920.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 17-26; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (later a Member of the Court, but already retired) and Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria-Tirona (retired) concurring.[2] For re-adjudication filed by Ismael Salcedo.
[3] For annulment of Deeds of Sale, Declaration of Ownership and Damages filed by Ebarle-Thommes against Salcedo and Deleste.
[4] For injunction with damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by Deleste and her husband against both respondents and the City Engineer of Misamis Oriental.
[5] For Interpleader filed by respondent Private Enterprise Corp. against Deleste and Ebarle-Thommes.
[6] Rollo, p. 46.
[7] Id., p. 48.
[8] Id., p. 25.
[9] Id., p. 20.
[10] Id., p. 20.
[11] Id., pp. 18-19.
[12] Id., pp. 46-48.
[13] Id., p. 46.
[14] Id., pp. 52-62.
[15] Section 9(2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; Rule 47, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Nery v. Leyson, G.R. No. 139306, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA 232.
[16] De Vera v. Agloro, G.R. No. 155673, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 203, 218; Raymundo vs. Felipe, Nos. L-30887 and L-29754, December 24, 1971, 42 SCRA 615, 630.
[17] G.R. No. 137672, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 784.
